School segregation undermines U.S. economic mobility and dynamism

School segregation—far from being a topic relegated to debates about school busing in the past or something that is only relevant in the South—is an issue very much present and alive today. Just in the past week, a decision about whether the state would take over some of the schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, raised concerns that the home of the Little Rock Nine would be resegregated, and a story came out about the racist reactions to a plan to desegregate schools in Howard County, Maryland.

Adding to the chorus of voices calling for renewed attention to the issue of school segregation is a new report, “U.S. school segregation in the 21st century: Causes, consequences, and solutions,” by former Equitable Growth Research Assistant Will McGrew. He draws upon the latest social science research into the persistence and resurgence of school segregation, examining trends in racial and socioeconomic school segregation since 1954 and the key legal and economic drivers of these trends in school segregation through to the present day. McGrew then breaks down the empirical effects of school segregation on economic inequality, mobility, and growth, concluding with a set of policy recommendations.

Throughout, he uses the research to make the case that school segregation is not an inevitable outcome of individual preferences or choices, but rather is highly responsive to legal and policy decisions. The consequences of school segregation on economic mobility are of particular concern because they lock in and perpetuate inequalities in economic outcomes between white Americans and Americans of color, particularly black and Latinx Americans.

Furthermore, by limiting children’s ability to reach their full potential, school segregation obstructs the future dynamism of the U.S. economy. As the U.S Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education—the 1954 ruling that school segregation is unconstitutional—clearly stated, separate is inherently unequal. And by trapping low-income and black and Latinx students in poorly resourced schools, segregation obstructs their human capital development and limits their exposure to examples and options for their future, thereby hurting their individual economic outcomes, as well as future U.S. economic dynamism and growth.

In his report, McGrew highlights the research of economists Stephen B. Billings of the University of Colorado, David J. Deming at the Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy, and Jonah Rockoff at Columbia University to present the consequences of renewed school segregation. They found that when busing, and therefore desegregation, ended in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, school district in the early 2000s, test scores and high school graduation rates fell for both white and black students in the newly segregated, high-poverty schools. Conversely, McGrew cites research by University of California, Berkeley economist Rucker Johnson, who found that among black students, the average effects of 5 years of exposure in desegregated schools led to about a 15 percent increase in wages and a 11 percentage point decline in the annual incidence of poverty in adulthood.

Other research by Harvard University doctoral student and Equitable Growth grantee Alex Bell, Harvard economist and former Equitable Growth Steering Committee Member Raj Chetty, and their co-authors examines who becomes an inventor. They found that exposure to innovation during childhood is a key determinant of who grows up to become an inventor. McGrew, in his report, weaves these findings together with research by Michigan State University economist and Equitable Growth Research Advisory Board member Lisa Cook, who details the obstacles that women and black and Latinx people face in becoming inventors, including the discrimination they encounter. The consequences of these obstacles are too many individuals being held back from reaching their full potential because of segregation, and the U.S. economy missing “lost Einsteins” and “lost Katherine Johnsons,” whose innovations could boost output and dynamism in the economy as a whole.

School segregation is not an inevitable outcome of individual choices or preferences. In fact, the “preferences” that lead high-income, white families to choose to buy homes in “good” school districts are, in fact, themselves shaped by policy decisions that continue to tie primary and secondary school financing to local property taxes. Policymakers who use the excuse of “personal preferences” ignore the evidence that desegregation efforts did work and had positive impacts on students’ outcomes both as students and as workers. Allowing what little progress was made during the brief period of court-ordered school desegregation to erode and reverse risks not only the individual opportunities of millions of kids to reach their full potential but also the strength of the broader U.S. economy.

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Weekend reading: Inequality and taxes edition

This is a post we publish each Friday with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is relevant and interesting articles we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Amid the ongoing and growing debate about ways to reduce inequality, a new working paper shows that a wealth tax, rather than capital income taxes, would better boost efficiency, productivity, and investments in the economy. Summarizing the working paper, Somin Park explains the authors’ findings that switching to a wealth tax rewards productive investments and broadens the tax base, improving the allocation of capital and increasing output, compared to a system of capital income taxation. In effect, a wealth tax would increase economic growth while reducing consumption inequality.

As inequality concentrates more and more economic power at the very top of the income and wealth ladders, the political preferences of the economic elite are ever more relevant. A new working paper studying the partisan leanings of top CEOs shows that a majority of these executives vote for and support Republicans, Somin Park writes in a post covering the new research. The authors of the paper studied Federal Election Commission records for more than 3,800 individuals who served as chief executive officers of companies in the S&P Composite 1500 index between 2000 and 2017, and found that 57 percent were Republican, while only 19 percent were Democrats and the remainder were neutral. As Park notes, these findings are significant because the preferences of CEOs are a window into corporate political spending, which, since the Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, is unlimited and is not necessarily disclosed to investors. CEOs also express their views and provide advice on policy to lawmakers, occupying an influential position in the policymaking process.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics this week released the August data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, or JOLTS. Raksha Kopparam and Austin Clemens produced four graphs using the data, which demonstrate that job openings declined slightly in August, as did the quits rate and the rate of hires per opening.

And finally, check out Brad DeLong’s latest worthy reads for his takes on must-see content from Equitable Growth and around the web.

Links from around the web

In 2018, for the first time in the history of the United States, the richest of the rich Americans paid a lower effective tax rate than the working class, writes Christopher Ingraham in a Washington Post article covering a new study by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman of the University of California, Berkeley. More specifically, the study finds that the richest 400 families in the United States paid an average effective tax rate of 23 percent, while the bottom 50 percent of American households paid an average rate of 24.2 percent. Saez and Zucman attribute the shocking results of their study to decades of top income-tax rate cuts, slashed capital gains and estate tax rates, and an inadequate IRS enforcement budget, as well as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which lowered the top income tax bracket and slashed the corporate tax rate.

In light of this, maybe we should take Annie Lowrey of The Atlantic’s suggestion—to “cancel billionaires”—more seriously. It isn’t just that the increase in inequality has left too many with too little, she writes, while noting that this is certainly a troubling trend. But inequality is also changing the very nature of our society, our economy, and our country. Lowrey describes exactly how inequality constricts mobility, damages human capital, stifles innovation, drags down growth, and endangers our political system. She concludes that a wealth tax could be a way to both pay for programs for the poor and “[reduce] the incentive for the rich to soak up all that money in the first place … pushing the steps of the income ladder closer together to make them easier to climb.”

As the rich become richer and the middle class stagnates, families face many more hurdles than they used to in their quest to achieve the American Dream. With rising costs of housing, healthcare and childcare, and education, and increasingly demanding jobs that pay less for the same or more work, “middle-class families are working longer, managing new kinds of stress, and shouldering greater financial risks than previous generations did,” write Tara Siegel Bernard and Karl Russell in The New York Times. They go on to examine in detail four families from different corners of the United States, as well as their monthly budgets, to illustrate the challenges these households—and millions more like them across the country—face as they work to enter or stay in the middle class.

And considering the increased cost of childcare in recent years, should we start paying stay-at-home parents for their hard work? The idea has bipartisan support, writes Claire Cain Miller in The New York Times Upshot blog, with social conservatives endorsing its support of traditional families and progressives rallying behind the recognition of the economic value of unpaid domestic labor. While both sides certainly also take issue with the idea for different reasons, and there are various takes on how to go about doing it, people can agree on one thing: Children need care, and families usually take some kind of financial hit to provide it, whether it’s leaving a job to provide it yourself or paying someone else to do so.

Friday Figure

Figure is from Equitable Growth’s “The political influence and preferences of the U.S. economic elite,” by Somin Park.

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Brad DeLong: Worthy reads on equitable growth, October 5–11, 2019

Worthy reads from Equitable Growth:

  1. This is very, very, very much worth watching: “Research on Tap: Unbound,” in which “Equitable Growth celebrated the release of Heather Boushey’s book, Unbound: How Inequality Constricts Our Economy and What We Can Do About It. She was joined by Sandra Black, Atif Mian, and Angela Hanks for a conversation moderated by Binyamin Appelbaum.”
  2. And this upcoming event will be well worth attending, “Vision 2020: Evidence for a Stronger Economy”: “Vision 2020 will bring together leading voices from the policymaking, academic, and advocacy communities to highlight the most pressing economic issues facing Americans today. This daylong conference will explore recent transformative shifts in economic thinking that demonstrate how inequality obstructs, subverts, and distorts broadly shared economic growth and what we can do to fix it.”
  3. I would have thought wealth taxation would be the default conventional neoliberal public finance position. You want to broaden the base and lower the rates. And what base is broader than wealth? Administrative, behavioral-response, and information-revelation considerations can move you away from a wealth tax to narrower bases. But it has always seemed to me that a wealth tax is where you start. That does not seem to be how the public finance intellectual community is reacting. We, however, are providing pushback. Read Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov, Burhan Kuruscu, Sergio Ocampo, and Daphne Chen, “Use It or Lose It: Efficiency Gains from Wealth Taxation,” in which they write: “How does wealth taxation differ from capital income taxation? When the return on investment is equal across individuals, a well-known result is that the two tax systems are equivalent. Motivated by recent empirical evidence documenting persistent heterogeneity in rates of return across individuals, we revisit this question. With such heterogeneity, the two tax systems have opposite implications for both efficiency and inequality. Under capital income taxation, entrepreneurs who are more productive, and therefore generate more income, pay higher taxes. Under wealth taxation, entrepreneurs who have similar wealth levels pay similar taxes regardless of their productivity, which expands the tax base, shifts the tax burden toward unproductive entrepreneurs, and raises the savings rate of productive ones. This reallocation increases aggregate productivity and output.”
  4. My Job as the Economist Here Is to Do the Numbers,” in which I write: “People believe that they have rights to a good life. People believe they have rights to stable communities that support them and that don’t disrupt and overturn their lives … Look at my neighbors … horrified at the idea that they might want to tear down a single-family house and build an apartment building for students. People think that they have the right to the income that corresponds to the profession or the occupation that they have worked hard to become part of … People believe that … their job shouldn’t suddenly vanish because some financier 3,000 miles away decided it doesn’t make a cost-benefit test. Yet the only rights the market respects are property rights, and the only property rights that are worth anything are those that help you make things for which rich people have a serious and unsatiated jones. The fact that the U.S. economy over the past 40 years has not been delivering substantially rising living standards for everybody means that the market’s failure to deliver these other forms of nonproperty rights becomes the source of—call it economic anxiety—a big potential problem.”

 

Worthy reads not from Equitable Growth:

  1. Why invite people onto TV just so that they can tell lies? Read Zachary Basu, “Trump trade adviser Peter Navarro: Tariffs aren’t hurting anyone in the U.S.,” in which Basu writes: “White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said on CNN’s ‘State of the Union’ Sunday that tariffs on Chinese goods are not hurting consumers in the United States, despite reports to the contrary from researchers at Harvard, the University of Chicago, the International Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve of Boston and more.”
  2. This is absolutely fascinating. The rich in the American South were much poorer a generation after the Civil War than they had been before: Sharecropping and Jim Crow were less effective at extracting wealth from African Americans. But Phil Ager and company find no signs that those fractions of the elite who were direct slaveholders lost more than those members of the elite who were indirect slaveholders. I am going to have to think very hard about this. Read Philipp Ager, Leah Platt Boustan, and Katherine Eriksson, “The Intergenerational Effects of a Large Wealth Shock: White Southerners After the Civil War,” in which they write: “The nullification of slave-based wealth after the U.S. Civil War (1861–65) was one of the largest episodes of wealth compression in history. We document that white southern households with more slave assets lost substantially more wealth by 1870 relative to households with otherwise similar pre-War wealth levels. Yet, the sons of these slaveholders recovered in income and wealth proxies by 1880, in part by shifting into white collar positions and marrying into higher status families. Their pattern of recovery is most consistent with the importance of social networks in facilitating employment opportunities and access to credit.”
  3. The best thing I have yet seen on how industrial organization, concentration, and monopsony drive the conclusion that increases in the minimum wage do not reduce employment in the United States today—or, rather, for which groups of workers minimum wage increases lower and for which raise employment. Read José Azar, Emiliano Huet-Vaughn, Ioana Marinescu, Bledi Taska, and Till von Wachter, “Minimum Wage Employment Effects and Labor Market Concentration,” in which they write: “Why is the employment effect of the minimum wage frequently found to be close to zero? Theory tells us that when wages are below marginal productivity, as with monopsony, employers are able to increase wages without laying off workers, but systematic evidence directly supporting this explanation is lacking. In this paper, we provide empirical support for the monopsony explanation by studying a key low-wage retail sector and using data on labor market concentration that covers the entirety of the United States with fine spatial variation at the occupation-level. We find that more concentrated labor markets—where wages are more likely to be below marginal productivity—experience significantly more positive employment effects from the minimum wage. While increases in the minimum wage are found to significantly decrease employment of workers in low concentration markets, minimum wage-induced employment changes become less negative as labor concentration increases, and are even estimated to be positive in the most highly concentrated markets. Our findings provide direct empirical evidence supporting the monopsony model as an explanation for the near-zero minimum wage employment effect documented in prior work. They suggest the aggregate minimum wage employment effects estimated thus far in the literature may mask heterogeneity across different levels of labor market concentration.”
  4. It is now very, very clear that whatever Facebook says about how it strives to keep your data private, it is lying. Organizations are what they do: Facebook is an organization that makes money out of offering people data they can then use to try to hack your brain. Read Kate Conger, Gabriel J.X. Dance, and Mike Isaac, “Facebook’s Suspension of ‘Tens of Thousands’ of Apps Reveals Wider Privacy Issues,” in which they write: “Facebook said on Friday that it had suspended tens of thousands of apps for improperly sucking up users’ personal information and other transgressions, a tacit admission that the scale of its data privacy issues was far larger than it had previously acknowledged. The social network said in a blog post that an investigation it began in March 2018—following revelations that Cambridge Analytica, a British consultancy, had retrieved and used people’s Facebook information without their permission—had resulted in the suspension of ‘tens of thousands’ of apps that were associated with about 400 developers. That was far bigger than the last number that Facebook had disclosed of 400 app suspensions in August 2018 … Facebook … suspended 69,000 apps. Of those, the majority were terminated because the developers did not cooperate with Facebook’s investigation; 10,000 were flagged for potentially misappropriating personal data from Facebook users. The disclosures about app suspensions renew questions about whether people’s personal information on Facebook is secure, even after the company has been under fire for more than a year for its privacy practices.”
  5. My colleague Christy Romer is giving the Keynes lecture at the University of Cambridge on October 17, on “The Narrative Approach to Establishing Causation in Macroeconomics.”
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Why a wealth tax in the United States might increase efficiency

The well-documented rise in wealth inequality in the United States since the 1980s has sparked debate on wealth taxes as a tool to raise revenue and reduce wealth disparities. Contributing to this debate, a new working paper finds that wealth taxes are preferable to capital income taxes because a wealth tax shifts the tax burden from productive to unproductive entrepreneurs and reallocates capital to the more productive ones. The optimal wealth tax in the model the authors study increases aggregate productivity and reduces consumption inequality relative to the status quo, thus delivering large and broad-based welfare gains.

A wealth tax is a tax on a household’s wealth, or the value of its assets less its debts, whereas a capital income tax is based on the income generated by wealth. Federal, state, and local governments in the United States tax wealth through property taxes; income taxes on interest, dividends, and capital gains; and corporate taxes, but they do not use wealth taxes.

In their paper, economists Fatih Guvenen and Sergio Ocampo Diaz of the University of Minnesota, Gueorgui Kambourov and Burhan Kuruscu of the University of Toronto, and Daphne Chen of Econ One compare wealth taxes and capital income taxes and find that the optimal wealth tax yields gains for rich and poor families alike.

The five co-authors find that wealth taxes increase aggregative productivity and output through two main channels. The first is what the authors term the “use-it-or-lose-it” channel. Under a wealth tax, individuals who own the same amount of wealth pay equal taxes, regardless of how much income their wealth generates. You use your wealth productively or you lose it. This shifts the tax burden toward unproductive entrepreneurs. Second, a wealth tax reduces the after-tax returns of high-return entrepreneurs less than low-return ones, which raises the savings rate of productive entrepreneurs.

The paper highlights how differences in the rates of return on capital—return heterogeneity, in economic parlance—have important implications on how policymakers should think about taxing capital. Wealth taxation and capital income taxation are equivalent when the rate of return to wealth is equal across individuals. Indeed, much of the existing literature on capital taxes assumes that everyone earns the same return on their wealth. Yet there is a growing body of research that documents significant differences in rates of return across individuals, even after adjusting for risk, both in the United States and overseas. Further, economic models that account for return heterogeneity more effectively generate the extreme concentration of wealth, or the so-called thick Pareto tail, that many models of inequality have failed to do.

Incorporating such heterogeneity shows capital income taxes and wealth taxes have quite different implications for efficiency. Adapting an example from the paper, consider two individuals, Alan and Betty, who each have $1,000 in wealth. Alan keeps his wealth as cash tucked away under his mattress, while Betty actively invests her wealth in productive investments. Many models assume that Alan and Betty get the same returns on their wealth. The authors, however, point out that if Alan earns a return of zero percent and Betty earns a return of 20 percent, a capital income tax falls entirely on Betty because she has a positive capital income of $200. Alan has a capital income of $0 and thus no capital income tax liability.

Under a wealth tax, Alan and Betty—or any pair of individuals owning the same amount of wealth—pay equal taxes, regardless of how much income their wealth generates. Switching to a wealth tax rewards productive investments and broadens the tax base from just Betty’s capital income to both individuals’ wealth. This leads to a better allocation of capital and higher output than under capital income taxation.

The authors find that the optimal wealth tax rate in their model economy is about 3 percent. The revenues from wealth taxes allow the government to reduce the tax on labor income—from 22.5 percent to 14.5 percent. Adding an exemption level to the optimal wealth tax changes the results only marginally: The optimal level below which one would be exempt from the wealth tax is fairly low—about a quarter of average labor income. And the tax rates on both wealth and labor income rise only slightly. In contrast, the optimal capital income tax rate is negative and large, about 35 percent, meaning that the tax system subsidizes capital income.

In the authors’ model, an optimal wealth-tax economy delivers greater and more broad-based economic well-being than the optimal capital income-tax economy due to a large rise in the level of consumption driven by lower labor income taxes and a decline in consumption inequality. The distribution of consumption is more equal under a wealth tax because the rise in consumption is proportionally larger for lower-income people since wage income accounts for a higher share of their total disposable resources. In contrast, a capital income tax requires higher taxes on labor income—since it acts as a subsidy to capital income—thereby resulting in only a small rise in after-tax wages.

In sum, the authors conclude that a wealth tax is preferable to a capital income tax because it has the potential to boost growth while also reducing consumption inequality.

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JOLTS Day Graphs: August 2019 Report Edition

Every month the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases data on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. Today, the BLS released the latest data for August 2019. This report doesn’t get as much attention as the monthly Employment Situation Report, but it contains useful information about the state of the U.S. labor market. Below are a few key graphs using data from the report.

1.

The quits rate dropped slightly to 2.3% but still suggests that workers are confident.

2.

Hires per opening has ticked up a bit lately, but drops to 0.82 in this report

3.

Unemployed workers per job opening has been fluctuating slightly around 0.8 for months

4.

Job openings declined slightly, to their lowest point since March of 2018.

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The political influence and preferences of the U.S. economic elite

With economic resources increasingly concentrated the top of the wealth and income ladders in the United States, the political power to influence and make policy increasingly resides with a tiny minority of people who are accruing the most from U.S. economic growth. A recent paper adds to our understanding of the political preferences of those at the top and how they might influence policy, by presenting empirical evidence on the partisan leanings of U.S. public-company chief executive officers. The results show that CEOs disproportionately display pro-Republican preferences.

The authors—Alma Cohen of Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University, Moshe Hazan of Tel Aviv University, Roberto Tallarita of Harvard Law School, and David Weiss of Tel Aviv University—use Federal Election Commission records to look at the political contributions of more than 3,800 individuals who served as CEOs of companies included in the S&P Composite 1500 index during the 18-year period of 2000 to 2017.

The authors find that more that 57 percent of CEOs are Republicans, 19 percent are Democrats, and the rest are neutral. CEOs are classified as Republicans if they contribute at least two-thirds of their donations to Republican candidates, as Democrats if they contribute at least two-thirds of their donations to Democratic candidates, and neutral if they split their financial support among the two major parties. The median CEO directs 75 percent of their total contributions to Republicans. The pattern is consistent over time: Republican CEOs substantially outnumber Democratic CEOs in each year of the 18-year period that is studied. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

Why is it important to understand the political preferences of CEOs? The heads of S&P Composite 1500 companies are an extremely small group, accounting for less than 0.001 percent of U.S. voters. They do, however, wield a very high degree of influence over policymaking and politics in the United States through corporate political spending and policy activism.

First, CEO preferences are a window into corporate political spending, which is highly influential especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which allowed corporations to make unlimited independent political expenditures. Public companies are generally not required to disclose their political spending to their investors, and although direct contributions must be reported to a federal or state agency, information is scattered among hundreds of filings. Corporations can also make donations through intermediaries.

Public companies make up less than 0.1 percent of the total number of U.S. firms but account for more than 30 percent of private-sector employment and more than 50 percent of pretax profits. The four co-authors note that directing even a tiny fraction of corporate profits to politics has the potential to make a huge impact. In 2017, S&P 1500 companies had aggregate profits of $1.2 trillion. Using just 0.1 percent of these profits for political spending would direct $1.2 billion into the political process. For comparison, the two major presidential candidates in the 2015–2016 cycle raised a combined total of $1.2 billion.

Second, CEOs express views and provide advice on policy—both individually and through their most prominent association, the Business Roundtable. About 200 CEOs of leading companies are part of the Business Roundtable, which was created to formulate and advocate policy views and does so successfully. In the runup to the passage of the 2017 tax law, for example, the organization persuaded lawmakers to repeal the corporate alternative minimum tax, a measure designed to ensure that each corporation paid at least some minimum amount of tax. CEOs also express opinions on issues unrelated to their companies’ core business, such as LGBTQ rights, race relations, and climate change.

CEOs also occupy a privileged position as advisers to policymakers at the highest levels. President Donald Trump created an advisory committee, appointing 16 CEOs of large public companies to advise him on business regulation and economic policy, and another advisory council to advise him on manufacturing growth. President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Council on Jobs and Competitiveness included prominent CEOs tasked with providing “nonpartisan” advice.

Turning back to the research findings of the paper, Republican leanings among CEOs hold even when their preferences are disaggregated by industry sector, region, and gender. Dividing the companies into 12 industry sectors, the authors find that each sector shows a pro-Republican imbalance, with considerable variation across industries. The energy sector is composed of almost 90 percent Republicans and 5 percent Democrats. Manufacturing and chemicals also lean heavily Republican, while business equipment and telecoms have the lowest Republican-Democrat ratio, at 1.6.

By region, pro-Republican preferences are strongest for CEOs of companies headquartered in the Midwest and the South. These preferences are the least strong for CEOs of companies in the Northeast and West. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

The gender of chief executives also is significantly associated with partisan preferences. There is a clear pro-Republican tilt characterizing the male CEOs but not the female CEOs, who make up only 2.8 percent of the group. Male Republican CEOs are more than three times as numerous as male Democratic CEOs, while female Republican CEOs outnumber female Democratic CEOs by a ratio of just 1.1. The pro-Republican tilt among male CEOs is strong and consistent throughout the entire period, whereas it is much more variable for female CEOs, with Democrats outnumbering Republicans in some years. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

This research on the political preferences of U.S. CEOs adds another layer to our understanding of how economic inequality subverts our democracy and the public institutions and the policymaking process we need to support the U.S. economy—laid out by Equitable Growth President and CEO Heather Boushey in her new book, Unbound: How Inequality Constricts Our Economy and What We Can Do About It.

A booming political science literature documents how those at the top of the wealth and income distribution are more able than the rest to get their interests heard in the political process and set the political agenda. Policies supported by the rich are two-and-a-half times more likely to pass than those not supported by the rich. And political campaign contributions largely nudge out candidates to the left and even in the center. Further, corporate money is pervasive throughout the U.S. political system, seen through the many lobbyists working on Capitol Hill and even through charitable donations made by corporations.

U.S. CEOs and the few others at the top use their political influence to eliminate regulations and reduce taxes—thereby eroding the ability of public institutions to do essential functions and make critical public investments that benefit the overall economy. By subverting our economy in various ways, economic inequality undermines confidence that institutions of governance can deliver for the majority. Inequality in wealth and power is thwarting the government from taking on collective endeavors that provide the foundation for strong, stable, broad-based growth, while promoting the interests of the economic elite over others.

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Weekend reading: “Competition and employment” edition

This is a post we publish each Friday with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is relevant and interesting articles we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

The landscape of competition and consumer protection has changed and the Federal Trade Commission is trying to keep up with the times, writes Jonathan Sallet. In hearings conducted between September 2018 and June 2019, the FTC heard from experts and analysts on how things have changed and what the FTC can do to adapt the full spectrum of its competition work. Sallet compiles the suggestions from the hearings under five broad categories: growing market concentration, evolving business models, protecting competition as well as consumers, utilizing modern economic tools and analysis, and taking advantage of the full range of enforcement tools at the FTC’s disposal. Integrating the knowledge from these hearings into its day-to-day work will be essential for the FTC to continue its antitrust law enforcement in the modern economy.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics issued its monthly report on the U.S. labor market for September, showing that despite employment for prime-age worker rising to near pre-Great Recession levels, these gains are mainly in healthcare and education, while manufacturing and construction employment rates have plateaued and retail employment decreased. Likewise, the data show that there is no evidence that the current tight labor market is exerting upward pressure on wages as nominal wage growth remains below healthy levels. Raksha Kopparam and Kate Bahn put together five graphs highlighting these important trends in the monthly announcement.

Head over to Brad DeLong’s latest worthy reads for his takes on must-see content from Equitable Growth and around the web.

Links from around the web

The U.S. Census Bureau recently announced that inequality has grown to its highest point in more than 50 years, meaning that the gap between the richest and poorest Americans is at its widest point in decades. The numbers indicate that “America has not become a poor country but an unfair country,” writes Sarah Jones for New York Magazine. “The poor aren’t necessarily making less money, but as the wealthy get wealthier, people on the bottom end of the income scale are running in place,” she continues, arguing that we may have finally reached the tipping point on inequality in the United States.

As California lawmakers toy with the idea of implementing a public banking system, it wouldn’t hurt to take a look at North Dakota, where the nation’s only state-owned bank has been up and running for more than a century. Obvious differences (in size, economy, and population, to name a few) between the two states aside, “many of the characteristics of the modern economic landscape are eerily similar to that of a century ago when [the Bank of North Dakota] first passed: increasing income inequality and predatory practices on the part of financial institutions,” writes Will Peischel for Vox.

It would seem that wealth taxes are all the rage, as Democratic presidential candidates Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT) each recently announced their proposals for increasing taxation on the rich. Former Vice President Joe Biden is reportedly also weighing his options in this area. But, argues Ashlea Ebeling in Forbes, the wealthy may want to prepare for a change in the estate tax rather than a new wealth tax. The estate tax can be applied to a larger group of people and is already in place, albeit in a highly scaled-back position thanks to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which more than doubled the estate tax exemption to those estates valued at $11.4 million and higher. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive and could be implemented together, or alongside any of the multitude of other options available for taxing wealth.

Home health aides are increasingly sought-after to provide care for elderly and retiring Americans—and they have one of the most difficult jobs in the labor market—but these workers rarely receive the pay or protections they deserve. A new bill introduced by House and Senate Democrats aims to change that, however, by creating sustainable career paths for caregivers, including apprenticeships, on-the-job training, professional development, or mentoring, reports Alexia Fernández Campbell for Vox. These supports will be essential given that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates a 41 percent increase in the number of available home caregiver positions—1.2 million more than the current 2.9 million—by 2026.

Friday Figure

Figure is from Equitable Growth’s “Equitable Growth’s Jobs Day Graphs: September 2019 Report Edition,” by Raksha Kopparam and Kate Bahn.

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Brad DeLong: Worthy reads on equitable growth, September 28–October 4, 2019

Worthy reads from Equitable Growth:

  1. Listen to Kate Bahn’s podcast, “Real talk with feminist visionaries, Season 3, No. 23, Kate Bahn.” This isn’t your Econ 101 take on the economy!
  2. Read Equitable Growth grantee Ellora Derenoncourt’s new paper with co-author Claire Montialoux, “Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality,” in which they present a key finding: “20 percent of the decline in the racial earnings gap during Civil Rights era stemmed from one single reform of the minimum wage.”
  3. Read Jonathan Sallet, “Competitive Edge: Five Building Blocks for Antitrust Success: The Forthcoming FTC Competition Report,” in which he writes: “Here are five building blocks for successful antitrust enforcement that the Federal Trade Commission should embrace in order to, as its Chairman Joseph Simons said (quoting his predecessor Bob Pitofsky), ‘restore the tradition of linking law enforcement with a continuing review of economic conditions to ensure that the laws make sense in light of contemporary competitive conditions’ … Pay attention to growing market concentration … Business models are evolving [and] today, multisided business models intersect with other economic trends that include network effects, the aggregation of data, and vertical integration … Antitrust enforcement protects competition, not just consumers … Modern economic analysis is up to the challenge … Congress gave the FTC broader enforcement tools than just the Sherman and Clayton Acts.”
  4. Re-read Carmen Ye, “Why we need better re-employment policies for formerly incarcerated African American men,” because she makes these important points: “African American men … 33 percent of the 1.56 million Americans held in state or federal prisons … When these men are released from prison, what will their employment prospects look like? … Black applicants with no criminal record receive a callback or job offer at the same rate as white applicants with a felony conviction. Yet black applicants without a criminal record were three times as likely to get a callback as those with a record.”

 

Worthy reads not from Equitable Growth:

  1. Once again, we have a piece by an impressively credentialed academic Republican economist that seems to me to have no contact with reality. There is no economist I know of, save for Robert Barro, who has ever said or implied that the “neutral” real interest rate today is the same 2.4 percent that the average real interest rate was from 1986–2008. To the contrary, there has been a very long and active discussion—led over the past two decades by current New York Fed President John Williams—about how far the “neutral” rate has fallen and how persistent that fall will be. And one conclusion of that debate has been that the current real federal funds rate of “only 0.7 percent” does indeed look “high” by some important metrics. So, why would anyone write as though this literature does not exist? Read Robert J. Barro, “Is Politics Getting to the Fed?,” in which he writes: “From the early 1980s until the start of the financial crisis in September 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve seemed to have a coherent process for adjusting its main short-term interest rate, the federal funds rate. Its policy had three key components: the nominal interest rate would rise by more than the rate of inflation; it would increase in response to a strengthening of the real economy; and it would tend toward a long-term normal value. Accordingly, one could infer the normal rate from the average federal funds rate over time. Between January 1986 and August 2008, it was 4.9 percent, and the average inflation rate was 2.5 percent … The Fed’s prolonged low-interest-rate policy, which was supplemented by quantitative easing [or QE], seems misguided, considering that the economy had long since recovered, at least in terms of the unemployment rate. The nominal federal funds rate was not placed on an upward trajectory until the end of 2016 … It is hard to view today’s nominal federal funds rate of 2.4 percent as high. With an inflation rate of 1.7 percent, the real federal funds rate is only 0.7 percent. And yet the Fed’s “high”-interest-rate policy was fiercely attacked by Wall Street … That view is not crazy if you are focused solely on boosting the stock market. On average, interest-rate cuts do tend to stimulate the stock market by making real returns on bonds less competitive. But that does not mean it is good economic policy always to be cutting rates.”
  2. A very nice look back at a big story from a decade ago that simply did not happen. Read Ben Casselman, “The White-Collar Job Apocalypse That Didn’t Happen,” in which he writes: “‘Where in retrospect I missed the boat is in thinking that the gigantic gap in labor costs between here and India would push it to India rather than to South Dakota,’ Mr. Blinder said in a recent interview … Adam Ozimek revisited Mr. Blinder’s analysis to see what had happened over the past decade. Some job categories that Mr. Blinder identified as vulnerable, like data-entry workers, have seen a decline in United States employment. But the ranks of others, like actuaries, have continued to grow … Overall, of the 26 occupations that Mr. Blinder identified as ‘highly offshorable’ and for which Mr. Ozimek had data, 15 have added jobs over the past decade and 11 have cut them. Altogether, those occupations have eliminated fewer than 200,000 jobs over 10 years, hardly the millions that many feared … In the jobs that Mr. Blinder identified as easily offshored, a growing share of workers were now working from home. Mr. Ozimek said he suspected that many more were working in satellite offices or for outside contractors, rather than at a company’s main location. In other words, technology like cloud computing and videoconferencing has enabled these jobs to be done remotely, just not quite as remotely as Mr. Blinder and many others assumed … Call centers [and] telemarketing jobs have declined sharply in the United States since 2007, as much of the work was sent overseas. But the number of customer service representatives has continued to grow … Telemarketers are essentially selling products and often working from a script. Customer service and other call-center work like tech support often require a more nuanced understanding of the customer experience.”
  3. There are remarkably good odds that the next global recession will be triggered by the miscalculations of politicians who have no business holding any office whatsoever. I have but one quibble with Nouriel Roubini’s argument here. The situation in Argentina is dire for Argentina and the southern cone, but it is not the kind of thing that can provoke a global recession. President Donald Trump and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, by contrast, might. Read Nouriel Roubini, “Four Collision Courses for the Global Economy,” in which he writes: “Between U.S. President Donald Trump’s zero-sum disputes with China and Iran, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s brinkmanship with Parliament and the European Union, and Argentina’s likely return to Peronist populism, the fate of the global economy is balancing on a knife edge. Any of these scenarios could lead to a crisis with rapid spillover effects … In each case, failure to compromise would lead to a collision, most likely followed by a global recession and financial crisis … The problem is that while compromise requires both parties to de-escalate, the tactical logic of chicken rewards crazy behavior. If I can make it look like I have removed my steering wheel, the other side will have no choice but to swerve. But if both sides throw out their steering wheels, a collision becomes unavoidable.”
  4. No matter what our domestic economic problems, it is still essential to remind ourselves that for humanity as a whole, the years since 1980 have seen the greatest improvement in economic well-being, globally, of any 40-year period in human history. We have been truly blessed. Read Noah Smith, “Globalization Has Cut Inequality Between Rich and Poor Countries,” in which he writes: “Up through the 1980s, the blessings of the Industrial Revolution seemed largely confined to a handful of countries in Western Europe, East Asia, the [United States], Australia, and Canada. But in the past three decades, there has been a sea change, and developing countries have made great strides in catching up. Although inequality has risen within some nations, at the global level it’s going down: Much of this catch-up is happening in countries that are still largely poor, such as India or Indonesia. To an economist—or someone who cares about alleviating the suffering of the world’s poorest people—this still represents a miracle. But a skeptic of globalization might wonder whether it can really be called a success if broad middle-class living standards still remain the exclusive privilege of a handful of nations, many of them former colonial powers.”
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Equitable Growth’s Jobs Day Graphs: September 2019 Report Edition

On October 4th, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released new data on the U.S. labor market during the month of September. Below are five graphs compiled by Equitable Growth staff highlighting important trends in the data.

1.

The employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers continued its upward trend to 80.1% in September, after a significant increase in the prior months.

2.

The growth in average hourly earnings year-over-year slowed further to 2.9%, with no evidence that the tight labor market is exerting upward pressure on wages.

3.

Employment in health care and education continues to drive job growth, as manufacturing and construction plateaued and retail declined in September.

4.

While there has been growth in the share of unemployed workers who have voluntarily left their jobs to look for new opportunities, there is also a lower share of workers out of the labor force who are re-entering to look for jobs.

5.

An increasing proportion of unemployed workers have been out of a job for 5-14 weeks and for longer than 15 weeks, increasing from 29.1% to 30.8% and 34.4% to 36.9%, respectively, in September.

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Competitive Edge: Five building blocks for antitrust success: the forthcoming FTC competition report

Antitrust and competition issues are receiving renewed interest, and for good reason. So far, the discussion has occurred at a high level of generality. To address important specific antitrust enforcement and competition issues, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth has launched this blog, which we call “Competitive Edge.” This series features leading experts in antitrust enforcement on a broad range of topics: potential areas for antitrust enforcement, concerns about existing doctrine, practical realities enforcers face, proposals for reform, and broader policies to promote competition. Jonathan Sallet has authored this month’s contribution.

The octopus image, above, updates an iconic editorial cartoon first published in 1904 in the magazine Puck to portray the Standard Oil monopoly. Please note the harpoon. Our goal for Competitive Edge is to promote the development of sharp and effective tools to increase competition in the United States economy.


Jonathan Sallet

Between September 2018 and June 2019, the Federal Trade Commission conducted a series of public hearings to study the landscape of competition and consumer protection. The next step—and the crucial one—is for the FTC to integrate the lessons learned from those proceedings into its day-to-day work.

Here are five building blocks for successful antitrust enforcement that the FTC should embrace in order to, as its Chairman Joseph Simons said (quoting his predecessor Bob Pitofsky), “restore the tradition of linking law enforcement with a continuing review of economic conditions to ensure that the laws make sense in light of contemporary competitive conditions.”1

Antitrust enforcers should pay attention to growing market concentration

On the first day of the hearings, Jonathan Baker, a law professor at American University’s Washington School of Law and author of the new, indispensable book The Antitrust Paradigm, laid out nine reasons to conclude that “market power is substantial and has been growing.”2 Baker emphasized that the growth of oligopolies in markets that include airlines, brewing, and hospitals are all outcomes that he said cannot be explained simply by growth in scale economies.3

Economists Joshua Wright at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia School of Law and Steven Berry at Yale University took different views. Wright said that his review of the evidence of market concentration led to the conclusion that “we do not know much that is relevant to formation of antitrust policy” and emphasized that he would not equate market concentration with the presence or absence of competition.4 Berry cautioned against overreliance on market concentration as the explanation of the increase in corporate profits.5

But Berry also emphasized that in light of the evidence of higher markups, “[w]e cannot just wave our hands and say it is all fine.”6 Rather, he said that “sophisticated context-sensitive antitrust policy is clearly important.”

What to do in the face of these competing viewpoints? In her testimony that same day, economist Fiona Scott Morton at the Yale University School of Management emphasized that uncertainty does not justify antitrust inaction. Rather, she said that the evidence of growing market power suggests that underenforcement is today a greater risk than overenforcement.7

Underenforcement can lead, of course, to familiar kinds of competitive harm, such as higher prices and reduced innovation. But there is more. The United States is in its fifth decade of increasing income inequality—on September 26, 2019, the U.S. Census Bureau released figures showing that income inequality had reached its highest level in more than 50 years of measurement. Baker and Steven Salop at Georgetown Law opined that “[m]arket power contributes to growing inequality.”

Scott Morton’s point is fundamental. Antitrust is law enforcement, and law enforcement rests on case-specific evidence. But larger trends should surely impact the prioritization of antitrust resources and the questions that antitrust enforcers ask. Indeed, if the right investigations are not opened and the right questions are not asked, then we may never know whether a problem ever existed.

Vertical merger transactions are a good example. As Salop explained at the hearings, vertical mergers may look benign in a world of unconcentrated upstream and downstream markets, where customers at both levels face a plethora of competitive alternatives, but such transactions require much greater scrutiny when a new vertical relationship is created in a world of oligopolies. 8 That’s because the existence of oligopolies make it more likely that an input supplier can harm some of its customers in order to aid its downstream affiliate and harm consumers as a result. Salop argued that anticompetitive presumptions should apply to vertical mergers in some circumstances.

Daniel O’Brien, former deputy director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics and now executive vice president at the consultancy firm Compass Lexecon, didn’t see it the same way. He told the commission that he did not contend there could never be input foreclosure, but contended that mergers of companies offering complementary products would normally be procompetitive.9 An example of complementary products would be razors and razor blades—if you use one, you’re more likely to use the other. O’Brien also said that procompetitive presumptions should apply to some vertical mergers.

In my view, the discussion of vertical mergers illuminates why antitrust enforcement should recognize the changing nature of markets and, in particular, the manner in which the existence of oligopolies increases the need to consider theories of harm when considering vertical arrangements. Understanding broad changes in the U.S. economy helps antitrust agencies formulate theories of harm, focus their economic analysis, and consider, early on in an investigation, what facts will likely be most important. The forthcoming FTC competition report should consider how best to recognize the implications of these broad economic trends.

Business models are evolving, which can change the terms of competition

Two-sided business models aren’t new. Think of the coffee house in London in the early 1700s that, profiting from the aggregation of ship owners and the insurance brokers, morphed into Lloyd’s of London. But today, multisided business models intersect with other economic trends that include network effects, the aggregation of data, and vertical integration. That’s a reason why merger enforcement should look more closely at the acquisition of potential or nascent competitors.

If Microsoft Corp. in the early 1990s had tried to buy the then-independent web browser company Netscape in order to protect its monopoly in personal computer operating systems, would enforcers have then understood the competitive implications of blunting the ability of new browser rivals to attack the market for PC operating systems? Such potential or nascent competition is particularly important in winner-take-all markets that often (and without any necessary trace of anticompetitive conduct) tip toward single-firm dominance—an outcome that emphasizes competition for the market, not just competition for greater share within a market. When dominance becomes embedded, markets are much less likely to self-correct.

Also, antitrust enforcement should fight any extension of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Ohio vs American Express Co. (wrongly decided in my view) to multisided business models generally. Any expansion of American Express would leave consumers and competitors vulnerable to a range of anticompetitive actions that are justified by a company sharing its increased profits with one out-of-market group of users at the expense of others.

The American Express decision paired this error with another one—the suggestion that direct evidence of harm to competition isn’t enough in an vertical case without the separate presentation of a properly defined antitrust market. The forthcoming FTC competition report could usefully untangle these knots by explaining how to identify the narrow slice of multisided markets actually at issue in American Express, and then offering thoughts on how to identify competitive harm in vertical cases generally.

Antitrust enforcement protects competition, not just consumers who buy things

Multiple speakers explained that antitrust protects the competitive process, not just direct purchasers or final consumers. Carl Shapiro, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, proposed in the hearings that a business practice be judged to be anticompetitive if it harms trading parties on the other side of the market as a result of disrupting the competitive process.10 For Shapiro, this approach would give structure to antitrust law and economics in a world in which the dangers of horizontal agreements, exclusionary conduct, and anticompetitive horizontal and vertical mergers have all grown.11

Think about the potential impact on workers from the market power of employers. University of Pennsylvania economist Ioana Marinescu proposed in her work, including with UPenn Law School professor Herbert Hovenkamp, that when merging employers in the same place hire workers with the same kinds of qualifications to do the same kind of job, traditional antitrust principles appropriately ask whether the workers would be harmed by a labor monopsony.

The extent to which labor monopsonies are generally the cause of lower wages for workers was hotly debated. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Nancy Rose, for example, questioned whether market concentration is generally the cause of low wages. At the same time, she recommended the study by Elena Prager at Northwestern University and Matt Schmitt at the University of California, Los Angles of hospital merger effects on labor as the type of study that can shed light on this question. And enforcement activity has recognized circumstances, concerning nurses and Silicon Valley workers for example, in which antitrust injury has been inflicted upon employees.

That recognition is the basis, for example, for the joint 2016 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission policy treating as illegal “no poach” agreements among companies not to hire each other’s workers. Similarly, in United States v. Anthem, Inc., the Department of Justice challenged a healthcare merger asserting, in part, that the increased buyer power of the new firm would “enhance Anthem’s leverage,” which would likely reduce the rates that hospitals and physicians would be able to earn.

So, there appears to be a broad consensus that merging employers could hold market power over labor and that where that would occur, the transaction should be examined using well-established antitrust principles.

Indeed, monopsony, as a concept generally, deserves more attention. Monopsony is monopoly turned upside down—with market power being directed by a buyer at a seller to force input prices artificially lower than they would be in a competitive market. As the Supreme Court said a long time ago, antitrust enforcement is not just about protecting consumers from rising prices but also about guarding more broadly against anticompetitive disruption of competitive pricing (and nonpricing terms).12 That understanding reaches monopsonies, too.

Another example of antitrust enforcement ensuring competition arises when harm is to a business, not directly to a consumer. For example, the FTC successfully blocked the proposed Staples-Office Depot merger that would have harmed business customers. The FTC should not narrow its search for competitive harm to consumers only.

Modern economic analysis is up to the challenge

Of course, knowing more is always better than knowing less. But law enforcement agencies need to make the best judgements they can because justice delayed is justice denied. So, it’s important to recognize that modern economics offers analysis fit for these times. As Scott Morton said at the FTC hearings, “I think we have the tools. I do not think we need to spend ten years developing the tools.”13

Indeed, in 2018, Scott Morton wrote, along with Jonathan Baker and me in the Yale Law Journal, that in the aftermath of the Chicago School critique of antitrust enforcement, the economics profession has developed “many tools that identify and measure anticompetitive conduct.” Economics can now explain why it does not make sense to presume that markets will self-correct from monopoly or collusion, exclusionary vertical conduct cannot be anticompetitive because there is only a single monopoly profit, or most mergers in concentrated markets are efficient and therefore procompetitive. The FTC hearings featured important perspectives on the best way that antitrust agencies can apply today’s economic learnings in a manner that ensures that antitrust fully recognizes today’s competitive conditions.

Congress gave the FTC broader enforcement tools than just the Sherman and Clayton Acts

An important aspect of Federal Trade Commission authority is the scope of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which establishes the agency’s power to halt “unfair methods of competition.” I suggested at one hearing that Section 5 should be re-examined and applied to reach anticompetitive harms beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. This might include unilateral conduct that, as Steven Salop has written, “leads to achievement, maintenance, or enhancement of market power that likely harms consumers on balance.”

In its administrative complaint filed against Intel Corp., for example, the FTC alleged that Intel’s conduct constituted a “stand-alone” violation of Section 5 (that is, without reference to the Sherman Act). UPenn’s Hovenkamp has suggested that the FTC consider the use of Section 5 to attack monopoly in its incipiency, reach collusion-like activity (including through the use of certain most-favored nation clauses), and halt anticompetitive behavior outside a firm’s primary market, where these is no actionable threat of achieving market power in that other market.

So, for example, the FTC commissioners could consider whether input foreclosure is harmful to competition when conducted by an integrated firm with market power in a concentrated market for the production of a critical input where its upstream affiliate (the supplier of that input) is a substantial supplier of that input to downstream rivals.

After all, the FTC was given its authority in 1914 under the Federal Trade Commission Act precisely because Congress decided that the Sherman Act didn’t go far enough. Similarly, although the FTC’s Section 5 prohibition of “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” has traditionally been applied to consumer protection issues that are separate from competition questions, the agency should be alert to circumstances in which anticompetitive conduct is also unfair and deceptive. Imagine false statements by a seller to consumers that effectively prevent rivals from competing effectively to the detriment of those consumers.

Conclusion

These five lessons should inform the full spectrum of the FTC’s competition work, from framing the issues to be examined in a merger or conduct investigation to creation of remedies, the use of rulemaking authority, and competition advocacy. These five lessons also should apply to litigation, the ultimate test for antitrust enforcement. And they should also help generalist judges understand what antitrust law and economics have already established.

As the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s Director of Markets and Competition Policy Michael Kades explains, government antitrust enforcement is hampered when courts require antitrust enforcers to spend their time and resources proving water makes things wet rather than bringing cases on behalf of consumers.

This is the moment when the FTC can again demonstrate the intellectual curiosity that was the basis for its creation—as an expert agency that rigorously analyzes markets and competition. The FTC’s competition hearings provide both a map for antitrust enforcement and a benchmark against which to measure future administrative and judicial decisions. Publication of a strong, pro-enforcement report and the integration of its learnings into the day-to-day work of the FTC will be an important and necessary step in the right direction.

Jonathan Sallet is a senior fellow at the Benton Institute for Broadband & Society. I am appreciative to Jonathan Baker, Michael Kades, Steven Salop, Carl Shapiro, and Fiona Scott Morton for their review of this essay in draft form.