- A Springfield Education :
- Is Globalization Really Fueling Populism? :
- Black Lives Matter, Economic History Edition :
Should-reads:
- What Brexit surveys really tell us: “We can learn surprisingly little…” :
- Central Banking’s Final Frontier? :
Should-reads:
Must-Read: A Springfield Education: “The Political Life of Abraham Lincoln: A Self-Made Man, 1809-1849 by Sidney Blumenthal
Simon & Schuster, 576 pp….
…This is a splendid book, and on a Lincolnian theme—the political Lincoln—that was in sagging need of a facelift…. Lincoln so closely resembled the Manchester School of Richard Cobden and John Bright that people spoke of Cobden as the British Lincoln, and Lincoln kept on his office mantelpiece a lithograph of Bright. Lincoln had had entirely too much of governmental intervening, over and over again, to protect the interests of slaveholders to find much charm in a government-directed economy….
Blumenthal’s work of building the context for Lincoln’s political activism in the presidential elections of 1836 through 1848 is a miracle of detail and his six chapters on Lincoln as a congressman in antebellum Washington are worth the price of the book alone. Blumenthal continually reminds us of what happened next door, as in this single ominous sentence: ‘Eight days after [Charles] Sumner was bludgeoned nearly to death, Lincoln stood on the stage at Bloomington to found the Illinois Republican Party.’ Never have we had such an exquisite warp of the ins and outs of political life in the 1830s and ’40s laid across the weft of Lincoln’s individual trajectory.
Rarely has a Lincoln biographer come to his task with such elegance of style…. Here is a great book, on a theme that too many people disdain to regard as great. That they are wrong about the theme, and wrong about Lincoln, is the burden of Blumenthal’s labor, and no one can come away from reading A Self-Made Man without understanding that, or without eagerly anticipating the ensuing volumes.
Must-Read: Is Globalization Really Fueling Populism?: “Amid relative economic stability, rising real wages, and low unemployment rates [in northern Europe]…
:…grievances about the economic impacts of economic globalization are simply not that powerful. Instead, right-wing populist parties like the FPÖ, Finland’s True Finns, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland are embracing identity politics, playing on popular fears and frustrations – from ‘dangerous’ immigration to the ‘loss of sovereignty’ to the European Union – to fuel nationalist sentiment.
In the southern European countries, however, the enduring impact of the euro crisis makes populist economic arguments far more powerful. That is why it is left-wing populist parties that are winning the most support there, with promises of, say, tax credits for low-paid workers. The most extreme case is Greece’s leftist Syriza party, which rode to victory in last year’s elections on pledges to end austerity. (Once in power, of course, Syriza had to change its tune and bring its plans in line with reality.)
Calling the rise of populism in Europe a revolt by the losers of globalization is not just simplistic; it is misleading. If we are to stem the rise of potentially dangerous political forces in Europe, we need to understand what is really driving it – even if the explanation is more complex than we would like.
Must-Read: Black Lives Matter, Economic History Edition: “‘I use the individual-level records from my own family…
:…in rural Mississippi to estimate the agricultural productivity of African Americans in manual cotton picking nearly a century after Emancipation, 1952-1965.
That is from Trevon Logan’s Presidential address to the National Economics Association.
Partly he calculates the productivity of his sharecropping ancestors relative to slave holding estates a century before (a persistent question in American economic history). But mainly he makes an argument for doing more qualitative interviews, which seems like an obvious point, except that systematic qualitative work is the exception in economic history (as it is in development economics):
That richer, fuller picture reveals that the work behind the estimates came to define the way that the Logan children viewed racial relations, human capital, savings, investment, and nearly every aspect of their lives. We learn not only about the picking process itself, but that chopping cotton may have been the most physically taxing aspect of the work. Similarly, the sale of cotton seed during the picking season was an important source of revenue for the family, and yet this economic relationship with the landowner was outside of the formal sharecropping contract. We also learn that it is impossible to divorce the work from its social environment{ an era in which Jim Crow, segregation, and other elements of overt racial oppression were a fact of life. Although none of the children has picked cotton in more than forty years, this experience continues to govern their daily lives and the way they interact with the world around them. Rather than being an item of the past, the work recorded in the cotton picking books continues to be a salient factor in their current economic decision-making.
Over the past 40 years, women in the United States have played an increasingly important role in family economic well-being. Women have increased their levels of educational attainment and their participation in the labor force and have seen increases in pay. This transformation in how women spend their days means that most families must figure out how to make do without a full-time, stay-at-home caregiver.
While conflicts between the demands of work and caregiving are now commonplace, families too often are left on their own to cope, without the support of sufficient social infrastructure—such as affordable child care and elder care, paid time off for medical and family leave, and the flexible work hours—and macroeconomic policies that would reduce unemployment, increase wages, and encourage full employment. These findings are detailed in Heather Boushey’s recently released book, “Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict,” which explores how women’s increased hours of work over the past four decades helped American families maintain economic security.
In this issue brief, we unpack women’s role in helping stabilize family incomes for a specific subset of the U.S. population: young families, or families where at least one person is above the age of 16 and everyone is under the age of 35. Using data from the Current Population Survey, we chronicle how family incomes changed between 1979 and 2013 for young low-income, middle-class, and professional families. Specifically, we decompose the differences in male earnings, female earnings from greater pay, female earnings from more hours worked, and other sources of income over this time period.
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We find that even though women in young families have increased their hours of work as much as women in the working-age families in our issue brief “Women have made the difference for family economics security,” these young families have seen less income growth.
Here are our key findings:
Despite recent improvements in the U.S. labor market, young workers continue to face tough conditions. This past March, for example, the unemployment rate for all people over the age of 16 was 5.0 percent, but was 8.4 percent for young workers (ages 20 to 24). The challenges, however, go beyond relatively high unemployment and underemployment (compared to older workers) and include slow wage growth, limited opportunities to move up the job ladder, and, for those that have not been able to find a firm foothold in the job market, the long-term scarring of their earnings potential.
Higher unemployment among younger workers is due to a number of factors, not all of which are bad. We expect that young workers will change jobs more often—ideally, transitioning between jobs to find better offers—as they build their careers and grow their earnings. To the extent that young workers’ higher unemployment is due to spending more time seeking jobs or moving to a different city, this is not necessarily bad.
But there also are not-so-good reasons for higher unemployment. Young workers are often first-time job seekers with limited work experience, which makes them more likely to be passed over in hiring decisions. Even once they are hired, they are typically the most junior employees and thus most susceptible to being laid off or let go when their firms run into trouble.
The Great Recession of 2007–2009 created a host of challenges for young workers: Those who entered the labor market at that time, couldn’t find their footing, and then were often overlooked in favor of “fresh” workers in later years. Research by economists Giuseppe Moscarini at Yale University and Fabien Postel-Vinay at University College London finds that during the Great Recession, many workers became trapped in low-wage jobs, which they describe as the job ladder “shutting down.” On top of this, for many young workers who earned a college degree, the added burden of increasing student debt loads delayed steps in the traditional economic lifecycle, among them homeownership, car ownership, and even marriage.
Economic struggles are compounded for the nearly half of young families with children. In 2013, almost half (43.7 percent) of young families had a child under age 18 present in the home. The higher up a young family is on the income ladder, the less likely they are to have a child at home. Among young professional families, only 22.6 percent have a child at home, compared to 37.7 percent among middle-class families and 57.6 percent among low-income families.
Young families struggle with how to address work-life conflict within the context of this tough labor market. As Heather Boushey documents in her book, “Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict,” families over the past four decades have relied on the added hours and earnings of women to boost income. Women’s increased participation in the labor force has been an effective coping mechanism amid the shifting fortunes for male workers in the U.S. economy over this period, directly contributing to family economic security. But this can be a tough strategy without policies to help address the day-in, day-out conflicts between work and family life. This can be even harder for young workers who are least likely to have built up reserves of sick or vacation time or may be more vulnerable to layoffs.
This issue brief extends the analysis in “Finding Time” and explores what this looks like specifically for young families up and down the income ladder. Using data from the Current Population Survey, we calculate how family income has changed between 1979 and 2013 for low-income, middle-class, and professional families who are “young”—where at least one person is above the age of 16 and everyone in the household is 35 years old or younger. (See Box.) We decompose these changes over time into differences in male earnings, female earnings from more pay, female earnings from more hours worked, and other sources of income, which include Social Security and pensions, which are minimal given the age of workers in these families.
Between 1979 and 2013, young families saw comparatively small gains—and in the case of low-income families, large losses—in family income. When we break down the changes in household income, we find that over those 34 years, for low-income young families, the only positive contribution to income was the added earnings women received by working more hours. For young middle-class and professional families, female earnings (from both more pay and hours) have been crucial in mitigating steep drops or even smaller increases, respectively.
Defining income groups and young familiesThe analysis in this issue brief follows the same methodology presented in “Finding Time.” For ease of composition, we use the term “family” throughout the brief, even though the analysis is done at the household level. In this issue brief, we refer to what we call “young” families and compare their experiences to “working-age” families. A working-age family (the subject of an earlier issue brief) is one where at least one person in the household is between the ages of 16 and 64. Young families are a subset of these working-age families: Young families are those that have at least one person over the age of 16 and where everyone is under 35 years of age. We split households in our sample into three income groups:
Table 1 breaks down the share of young families (a subset of these working-age families) across the three income groups in 2013. Young families are more likely than working-age families to be low-income. Table 1![]() |
Before focusing on the changes in family income, let’s first set some broad context for the changes in family economics between 1979 and 2013.
Between 1979 and 2013, young low-income families lost income, middle-class ones experienced small gains, and professionals saw their income soar. These trends follow those more generally for working-age families. The key difference between young and working-age families, however, is that young families’ income levels are lower than those of working-age families more generally. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1
Young families have seen the same rising inequality that has affected families overall. In 1979, low-income young families had an average annual household income of $24,845 in 2015 dollars. Between 1979 and 2013, these families saw their income drop by 22.9 percent, down to $19,154. This is a significant decrease; between 1979 and 2013, low-income working-age families’ income fell only by 2.0 percent on average. Over the same time period, young middle-class families’ income stalled. In 1979, young middle-class families had an average household income of $63,648, which had grown only slightly—by 3.4 percent—to $65,783 in 2013. Young professional families, however, saw their income rise 36.6 percent, going from $104,031 in 1979 to $142,075 in 2013.
Inter-group disparities in family income are not only an indication of widening inequality but also may indicate that “filtering down” is underway. Recently, because there have not been enough jobs to employ all the young workers who need a job, those with a college degree (some of which are categorized as professionals in our analysis) have been scooping up a disproportionate share of the jobs available—even those jobs that do not require a college degree. This crowds out young workers without a college degree (most of whom fall into either our middle-class or low-income groups), making it much harder for less-educated workers to find suitable employment. Instead, they must either accept an even lower-paying job or exit the labor market completely. This might shed some light on why young low-income families have seen larger losses in income.
Between 1979 and 2013, across all three income groups, women in young families increased their working hours. In 1979, on average, women from young low-income households worked 662 hours annually (about 13 hours per week), and by 2013, their hours had grown by 23.0 percent to 814 (or 16 hours per week). Over this same time period, women from young middle-class families, on average, grew their annual hours by 19.8 percent, from 1,109 in 1979 to 1,328 in 2013 (or from 21 hours per week to 26 hours per week). Similarly, women in young professional families saw a 27.4 percent rise in their hours of work. (See Figure 2.)
Figure 2
The shift in hours is virtually identical across young and working-age women in professional families, but the trends differ by age within low-income and middle-class families. In middle-class families, women in working-age families put in more hours than those in young families. This could be due to more women in young middle-class families being in school rather than working. Yet within low-income families, women in young families are slightly more likely to have a paying job than are women in working-age families, and this was true in both 1979 and 2013.
Figures 1 and 2 show that between 1979 and 2013, hours of work for women in young families increased across all income groups, yet family income has not increased commensurately across all three groups. To understand what’s going on, we decompose the changes in young families’ average household income between 1979 and 2013 into male earnings, female earnings, and income from other non-employment-related sources, which include Social Security and pensions. Specifically, we divide female earnings into the portion due to women earning more per hour and the portion due to women working more per year. To calculate female earnings stemming directly from the additional hours worked, we take the difference between 2013 female earnings and the hypothetical earnings of women if they earned 2013 hourly wages but worked the same hours as women did in 1979. (For more on how we did this calculation, please see our Methodology.)
We find that within young families across the income spectrum, women’s contributions, particularly from more working hours, have been the most important factor in boosting family incomes. Yet incomes have not risen in tandem, as both men’s earnings in low-income and middle-class families pulled down family income. Without women’s added hours and higher earnings, family income would have fallen, all else being equal. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 3
Between 1979 and 2013, young low-income families saw their income fall sharply. Most of this decline is due to the drop in men’s earnings—a loss of $6,305—although women’s earnings per hour also fell, reducing income by $365. Within young low-income families, the only positive contribution to household income was the added work hours of women, which boosted average annual income by $1,410.
Over this same period, in young middle-class families, average annual household income grew by more than $2,000, even though male earnings dragged family income down by $5,210. The only reason middle-class families saw any income gains was because of increases in women’s earnings, both in terms of higher pay per hour and more hours of work. Women’s earnings from more work hours accounted for the largest component of the gain, adding $3,729 to average annual income. The second-largest component was women’s earnings from higher pay, which added $2,210. Income from other (non-employment) sources also helped boost the incomes of young middle-class families.
Young professional families experienced significant growth in average income. Combined, women’s higher earnings from higher pay and additional hours of work boosted family income by $22,790, close to 60 percent of the total change. In stark contrast to men in young low-income or middle-class families, men in young professional families saw their earnings rise—adding $14,886 to family income. Young professional families had a relatively negligible positive change in other sources of income.
Young families have not fared as well as working-age families more generally. When we look at the changes to family income between 1979 and 2013 for young and working-age families side by side, the challenges facing young families is put in sharp relief. Specifically, we compare the percent change in women’s hours and wages—both of which are components used in calculating women’s earnings due to more hours worked—and men’s earnings for young and working-age low-income, middle-class, and professional families. (See Figure 4.)
Figure 4
Across income groups, women from young and working-age families have seen similar rates of increase in their working hours, a fact that we saw earlier in Figure 2. But despite these similarities, the wages of women from young families did not grow nearly as much as the wages of women from working-age families. In fact, in low-income young families, women’s wages fell by 5.6 percent, compared to 8.1 percent growth in women’s wages for low-income working-age families. For the middle-class and professional income groups, young families saw much smaller gains—roughly half—in women’s wages than working-age families.
What is also striking is that across the board, men had worse earnings outcomes in young families in comparison to working-age families. At the bottom of the income ladder, men from young families saw their earnings fall by 43.8 percent, while the earnings of men from working-age families only fell by 20.4 percent. Middle-class men’s earnings for young and working-age families dropped by relatively similar percentages (11.7 percent and 9.0 percent, respectively). At the top, men from young professional families saw a 21.5 percent increase in their earnings compared to a 27.9 percent increase in men’s earnings in working-age professional families.
Across income groups, women’s increased work hours and—for all but low-income families—rising pay have helped young families secure their income. When we compare their changes in family income between 1979 and 2013, young families are much worse off than working-age families, seeing greater losses and smaller gains in women’s wages and men’s earnings across the board.
So while women’s earnings from both more pay and hours have made a tangible positive difference for young families, it is simply not enough to strengthen their economic security. That’s why policies that would reduce unemployment, increase wages, and encourage full employment for young workers are essential. And when the labor market is weak, ensuring that safety net programs adequately support young workers and their families is an important way to give them an equitable chance to improve their futures.
Further, with women’s added hours of work being so important to family economic well-being, the reality is that young families and working-age families alike need access to policies to help them address work-life conflicts. Nearly half of young families have a small child at home and are balancing the needs of parenting young children with holding down a job. They need access to the same basket of policies other workers need, including paid sick days, paid family and medical leave, and access to safe, affordable, and enriching child care. Many young people are also trying to navigate a work schedule with earning an educational degree, and policies such as those that promote predictable schedules can help them invest in their future while holding down a job to make ends meet.
Heather Boushey is the Executive Director and Chief Economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, and the author of the book “Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict” from Harvard University Press. Kavya Vaghul is a Research Analyst at Equitable Growth.
The authors would like to thank John Schmitt, Ben Zipperer, Dave Evans, Ed Paisley, David Hudson, and Bridget Ansel. All errors are, of course, ours alone.
The methodology used for this issue brief is identical to that detailed in the Appendix to Heather Boushey’s “Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict.” wanted to find out from you whether I also need to include these cutoffs. Thanks!s adequately support young workers and their fa
In this issue brief, we use the Center for Economic and Policy Research extracts of the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement for survey years 1980 and 2014 (calendar years 1979 and 2013). The CPS provides data on income, earnings from employment, hours, and educational attainment. All dollar values are reported in 2015 dollars, adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index Research Series available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because the Consumer Price Index Research Series only includes indices through 2014, we used the rate of increase between 2014 and 2015 in the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to scale up the Research Series’ 2014 index value to a reasonable 2015 index estimate. We then used this 2015 index value to adjust all results presented.
For ease of composition, throughout this brief we use the term “family,” even though the analysis is done at the household level. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2014, two-thirds of households were made up of families, defined as at least one person related to the head of household by birth, marriage, or adoption.
We divide our sample into three income groups—low-income, middle-class, and professional households—using the definitions outlined in “Finding Time” and detailed in the box presented in the analysis above. For calendar year 2013, the last year for which we have data at the time of this analysis, we categorized the income groups as follows:
Note that all cut-offs above are displayed in 2015 dollars, using the inflation-adjustment method presented earlier.
In our analysis, we limit the universe to people with non-missing, positive income of any type. This means that even if a person does not have earnings from some form of employment but does receive income from Social Security, pensions, or any other source recorded by the CPS, they are included in our analysis. Additionally, we limited our sample to young families—or households where at least one person is older than 16 and everyone is under the age of 35.
These data are decomposed into income changes between 1979 and 2013 for low-income, middle-class, and professional families. The actual household income decomposition uses a simple shift-share analysis to find the differences in earnings between 1979 and 2013 and calculate the extra earnings due to increased hours worked by women.
To do this, we first calculate the male, female, and other earnings by the three income categories. To calculate the sex-specific earnings per household, we sum the income from wages and income from self-employment for men and women, respectively. The amount for other earnings is derived by subtracting the male and female earnings from total household earnings. We average the household, male, female, and other earnings by each income group for 1979 and 2013 and take the differences between the two years to show the raw changes in earnings by each income group.
To find the change in hours, for each year, by household, we sum the total hours worked by men and women. We average these per-household male and female hours, by year, for each of the three income groups.
Finally, we calculate the counterfactual earnings of women. We use the 2013 earnings per hour for women and multiply it by the 1979 hours worked by women. Finally, we subtract these counterfactual earnings from the female earnings in 2013, arriving at the female earnings due to additional hours.
One important point to note is that because of the nature of this shift-share analysis, the averages don’t exactly tally up to the raw data. Therefore, when presenting average income, we use the sum of the decomposed parts of income. While economists typically show median income, for ease of composition and the constraints of the decomposition analysis, we show the averages so that the data are consistent across figures. Another important note is that we make no adjustments for changes over time in topcoding of income, which likely has the effect of exaggerating the increase in professional families’ income relative to the other two income groups.
Should-reads:
The decline of the labor share of income in the United States—a topic well covered in this space—seems to have paused. As Neil Irwin points out at The Upshot, the data over the past year or so show a rising share of national income going to compensation of labor. At the same time, corporate profits as a share of income are on the decline. Irwin notes that corporate profits accounted for 14.2 percent of income in the middle of 2014 but were closer to 12 percent by the end of last year.
And yesterday morning, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released data on productivity growth in the first quarter of 2016. The average cost of labor to make another unit of output, known as a unit labor cost, rose by more than 4 percent. Most of that gain was due to rising wages, but also because labor productivity declined by a percentage point.
So what are we to make of a rising labor share when productivity growth is close to zero?
Labor productivity growth has been quite terrible as of late. It declined at an annualized rate of 1.1 percent in the first three months of 2016, while its descent was steeper in the last quarter of 2015 at a 1.8 percent annual rate. This is in keeping with the longer trends of weak labor productivity growth in recent years and the declining total factor productivity growth.
The source of weak productivity growth is one of the most important economic questions right now, but it doesn’t seem like we’re going to definitively answer it soon. Jared Bernstein runs through some interesting possibilities, including a malfunctioning financial system, a slack macroeconomy, and dysfunctional government. But mechanically, the recent struggles of labor productivity may have to do with the industries where workers are being hired.
Since the start of the fourth quarter of 2015, the largest gains in employment have been in low-productivity industries such as leisure and hospitality, construction, and education and health services. More workers are producing things, but these workers are increasingly in industries where their labor isn’t producing that much more. A recent post by economist Dietz Vollrath shows that this trend has been going on since 2000, as workers have moved into industries that don’t just have low productivity but declining productivity growth as well. These are accounting exercises that can’t tell us the reason for these movements, but they’re instructive. Maybe we want to pay attention to the flow of workers and the dynamism of businesses.
In an era of low or even negligible productivity growth, policymakers may face some choices about what they’d like to achieve. At FT Alphaville, Toby Nangle lays out an “impossible trinity” of high corporate profits, steady inflation of 2 percent, and nominal wage growth of 4 percent. And while increasing productivity in the past hasn’t necessarily led to broadly shared wage growth, it’s definitely necessary. Hopefully, the recent trend is just an anomaly and we’ll soon see more sustained productivity growth. Fingers crossed.
So if inflation-adjusted wage growth exceeds productivity growth, then labor will get relatively more of output. But unless productivity growth jumps up, the absolute gains labor will see will be modest. A world where gains happen on both fronts definitely sounds more preferable.
Must-Read: Four Common-Sense Ideas for Economic Growth: “Since the summer of 2009, the US economy has grown at about 2 percent…
:…The 10-year interest rate at the end of trading today [February 18, 2016] was just a bit below 1.8 percent…. We are having trouble achieving… a 2 percent inflation…. This is the judgment of a market that thinks that the Fed is not going to do anything like what it says it’s going to do…. The real interest rate is at least a kind of measure of the certainty equivalent of the productivity of capital. If the market is saying that’s below 1 percent, that has to be of concern as well. [And] the Fed has been substantially too optimistic in its one-year-ahead forecast every year for the last six….
What should be done?… First, there is an overwhelming case in the United States for expanded public infrastructure investment…. Yt the rate of infrastructure investment is lower now than it’s been anytime since 1947. If you take depreciation out, federal infrastructure investment is negative…. Second, we should increase support for private investment in infrastructure…. With respect to private investment, tax reform is critical…. Third, we should grow our effective labor force…. What we do to educate our workforce matters. What we do to incentivize our workforce—through the design of our social safety net, and through disability insurance—matters. What we do to change our immigration policies—particularly our immigration policies on highly skilled workers—matters….
Fourth, our financial system requires continuing attention… the 1987 crash, the 1990 real-estate bubble, the S&L crash, the Mexican financial crisis, the Asian financial crisis, the internet bubble, Enron, and then the Great Recession of 2008. On average, a crisis every three years for the last 30 years. That surely has taken a toll on growth. At the same time, because pendulums swing, at a time of substantial unemployment, a large number of middle-class Americans are not able to get mortgages today with reasonable down payments. It appears, though the matter is in some dispute, that there are significant impediments in the flow of capital to small businesses as well. Financial reform, labor-force support, stimulus to private investment, increases in public investment—this stuff is not rocket science. Most of it operates on both the demand side and the supply side….
If all you care about is that we’ve got an excessive federal debt, the most important determinant of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2030 is how rapidly the economy grows between now and then. If what you care about is American national security, the most important determinant of how much we are respected and how much influence we have in the world is how well our economy performs. If what you care about is inequality and poverty, the most important determinant of the employment prospects of the poor is how rapidly the economy is growing…
Must-Read: The Elite’s Comforting Myth: We Had to Screw Rich Country Workers to Help the World’s Poor: “Roger Cohen gave us yet another example of touching hand-wringing from elite types…
:…about the plight of the working class in rich countries…. Cohen acknowledges that there is a real basis for their rejection of the mainstream: they have seen decades of stagnating wages. However Cohen tells us the plus side of this story, we have seen huge improvements in living standards among the poor in the developing world. In Cohen’s story, the economic difficulties of these relatively privileged workers is justified by the enormous gains they allowed those who are truly poor. The only problem is that these workers are now looking to these extreme candidates. Cohen effectively calls for a more generous welfare state to head off this turn to extremism, saying that we may have to restrain ‘liberty’ (he means the market) in order to protect it. This is a touching and self-serving story. The idea is that elite types like Cohen were winners in the global economy. That’s just the way it. Cohen is smart and hard working, that’s why he and his friends did well. Their doing well also went along with the globalization process that produced enormous gains for the world’s poor. But now he recognizes the problems of the working class in rich countries, so he says he and his rich friends need to toss them some crumbs so they don’t become fascists.
We all should be glad that folks like Cohen support a stronger welfare state, but let’s consider his story… imagine that mainstream economics wasn’t a make it up as you go along discipline. The standard story in economics is that capital is supposed to flow from rich countries to poor countries…. Rich countries lend poor countries the capital they need to develop… [run] large trade surpluses with the developing world. In effect, the rich countries would be providing the capital that poor countries need to build up their capital stock and infrastructure, while still ensuring that their populations are fed, housed, and clothed. We actually were seeing a pattern of development largely along these lines in the early 1990s….
This pattern was reversed in 1997 with the U.S.-I.M.F.’s bailout from the East Asian financial crisis…. The countries directly affected began to run huge trade surpluses in order to accumulate massive amounts of reserves. Other developing countries also decided to go the same route in order to avoid ever being in the same situation as the countries of East Asia. From that point forward developing countries like China and Vietnam ran enormous trade surpluses. This implied huge trade deficits and unemployment for manufacturing workers in the United States and to a lesser extent Europe…. Cohen is giving us this impressive display of hand-wringing…. It’s very touching, but in the standard economics, it was hardly necessary. The standard economics would have allowed the pattern of growth of the early and mid-1990s to continue…. The fact that the textbook course of development was reversed, with massive capital flows going from poor countries to rich countries, was due to a massive failure of the international financial system…. The fact that manufacturing workers paid this price, and not doctors, lawyers, and other highly paid professionals, was by design….
It’s touching that folks like Roger Cohen feel bad for the losers from the process of globalization. But the story is that they didn’t just happen to lose, his friends designed the game that way.
Last week we published an interactive graph showing trends in U.S. labor force participation since 1975, using data from the Current Population Survey. While that graph lets you select which time period you want to look at, we thought it might be informative to be able to pick which age group you want to look at. That’s what the interactive below allows you to do.
Select an age bracket and see trends in the share of U.S. workers who are:
• Employed part-time or full-time
• Officially unemployed
• Disabled
• In-home caregivers
• Students in school
• Retired
The data assembled span three versions of the Current Population Survey, with new surveys being instituted in 1989 and 1994. All three surveys feature a labor force participation item that is generated based on responses to a series of yes/no questions on the survey. This variable is called ESR, LFSR, and PEMLR, respectively, on the three versions of the survey. A second variable—called major activity, or MAJACT, on the first two surveys and PENLFACT on the post-1994 survey—was used to distinguish between certain categories of non-labor force respondents. Finally, a question on total hours worked was used to distinguish full-time workers from part-time workers.
The results are fairly consistent across surveys for certain age groups but there are important discrepancies. Most notably, the pre-1989 survey did not allow respondents to specifically identify themselves as retired. Instead, the “other” category included retirees. The wording and question order of the 1989-1993 survey appears to bias respondents in favor of choosing “carer” over “retired,” so another break in the retired series is evident in 1994. Minor changes in the survey may also have contributed to the uptick in respondents identifying as “disabled” in the most recent version of the survey.
This project’s github includes the Python code that was used to analyze the raw monthly CPS data, including our survey-weighting procedure and all coding decisions made.