Must-read: Branko Milanovic: “There is a trade-off between citizenship and migration”

Must-Read: A surprisingly-large (to me) number of people have been trashing the very sharp Branko Milanovic for what seems to any normal economist to be an obvious point: At one pole is (1) restricting immigration far below the economically-rational level for any economic welfare analysis because the political system rejects providing full national-community citizenship rights and powers to every migrant. At the other pole is (2) completely decoupling political voice from geographic location and affective ties to the local community. The best policy has to be somewhere in the middle. Yet many more so-called “leftists” than really ought to or than I expected to see say that (1) is obviously correct, and that Branko is guilty of ThoughtCrime for thinking about where in the middle the proper balance might lie…

Branko Milanovic: There is a trade-off between citizenship and migration: “The rich world believes it has reached the limits of acceptable migration….

…We know that migration does more to reduce global poverty and inequality than any other factor. Calculations done by Alan Winters of the University of Sussex show that even a small increase in migration would be far more beneficial to the world’s poor than any other policy…. So is there a way to make greater migration acceptable to the native populations of the rich countries?… Most of a person’s lifetime income is determined by where he or she lives…. Citizens of rich countries receive a citizenship premium, while citizens of poor countries suffer a citizenship penalty. Migration is the attempt by the global poor to enjoy that premium, or at least a part of it, for themselves….

We [need to find a way to] redefine “citizenship” in such a way that migrants are not allowed to lay claim to the entire premium falling to citizens straight away, if at all… [to] assuage the concerns of the native population, while still ensuring the migrants are better off than they would be had they stayed in their own countries…. Migrants could be allowed to work for a limited number of years, or to work only for a given employer, or else be obliged to return to their country of origin… pay higher taxes since they are the largest net beneficiaries of migration…. This would require significant adjustments to traditional ways of thinking about migration and citizenship….

It is not clear that the old conception of nation-state citizenship as a binary category that in principle confers all the benefits of citizenship to anyone who happens to be physically present within a country’s borders is adequate in a globalised world. In effect, there is a trade-off between such a view of citizenship and the flow of migration…. If graduated categories of citizenship were created… we would be able to reconcile the objective of reducing world poverty with reducing migration to acceptable levels. If we do not do something, we will be stuck in a position in which everyone who makes it to the rich world is given full rights of citizenship, but we do everything in our power to make sure that nobody gets here.

Must-read: Arindrajit Dube and Ben Zipperer: “Puerto Rico’s predicaments: Is its minimum wage the culprit?”

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube and Ben Zipperer: Puerto Rico’s predicaments: Is its minimum wage the culprit?: “The federal minimum wage–which has applied to Puerto Rico since 1983…

is much more binding there than it is on the mainland…. In 2014, for example, the federal minimum wage stood at 77 percent of the median hourly wage in Puerto Rico, compared to 42 percent in the United States…. Clearly, the Puerto Rico’s minimum wage exceeds the cautious rule-of-thumb of 50 percent of median wage of full-time workers suggested by one of us in previous work. But… the major problem with a minimum wage-centric explanation is timing. There has been no change in the relative minimum wage between Puerto Rico and the mainland over the past 32 years. And since the federal standard has not kept up with wage growth on the island, the bite of the minimum wage in Puerto Rico has eroded over this period….

In their 1992 paper, ‘When the Minimum Wage Really Bites: The Effect of the U.S. Level Minimum on Puerto Rico,’ economists Alida Castillo-Freeman… and Richard Freeman… found evidence of moderate-sized job losses by comparing unemployment trends over time, and by comparing wages and employment across industries on the island. Yet… Alan Krueger found that some of the findings by Castillo-Freeman and Freeman proved fragile… driven by the over-representation of many narrow manufacturing industries in their sample….

Professors Freeman and Krueger are in complete agreement today that it is unlikely either to be a major factor behind the current economic crisis, or an important part of the solution. Indeed, the long-run decline in the bite of the minimum wage presents a serious challenge for those arguing otherwise, since the timing of the crisis is inconsistent with minimum wage having played a real role in it…

Must-read: Ben Spielberg: “How to Prepare for the Next Recession”

Must-Read: Ben Spielberg: How to Prepare for the Next Recession: “Because interest rates are already so low…

…the Fed’s principal ammunition–the ability to further lower rates–is unlikely to have much traction when the next downturn rolls around. If we want to mitigate hardship and help the economy get back on its feet when that happens, the prudent move would be to strengthen the ‘automatic stabilizers’ in the federal budget–programs like unemployment insurance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP (food stamps) and Medicaid–that, without the need for congressional action, expand when the economy is weak and contract when the economy is on its way to recovery…. As they currently stand, these programs aren’t enough…. One of the biggest challenges during a recession is at the state level–many states have balanced-budget requirements, which mean that as tax revenues drop, spending has to as well, making the recession more painful…. Policy makers from both major political parties recognize the risks of inaction; Congress passed stimulus packages under the administrations of both George W. Bush and President Obama. In addition to increasing SNAP benefits, providing states with fiscal relief and enacting a Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program that served over one million people, the Obama stimulus funded about 260,000 subsidized jobs in 2009 and 2010. But it would be risky to depend on the same wisdom to come through in the next crisis…

Weekend reading: Matt Bruenig: What Is Wealth?

Matt Bruenig: What Is Wealth?: “In ‘Capital,’ Piketty tracks as far back as he can the history of wealth inequality…

…which is also described as the history of inequality in the ownership of capital. In order to embark upon such a project, one must provide a definition of wealth and capital, which turns out to be a contentious undertaking.

For Piketty, wealth and capital are ultimately socially constructed categories. When he refers to wealth, he is not talking about land or machines or buildings necessarily. He is talking about anything that can be traded as an asset that generates a financial return in a society at a given moment in time. In periods when people could be bought and sold like capital, those people counted as wealth. Right now, monopoly rights over ideas (patents) and media (copyright) count as wealth as well.

So he is not tracking the history of wealth and capital in a physical sense. He is tracking the history of the distribution of asset values. The decision to track wealth this way is clearly the correct one for his project, but it already appears to be driving some confusion in the crush of reviews and reactions.

Wealth Is Socially And Politically Constructed

The source of this confusion is that, within economic discourse especially, we often conceptualize wealth as this almost objective thing: there is a building here and it has a certain market value and that is the amount of wealth it represents. But the ‘market value’ of a given asset is totally dependent upon the way our laws construct our economic institutions.

Consider an apartment building for instance. The market value of that apartment building is supposed to be the net present value of the flow of future rents the building will generate. But the future flow of rents depends upon the laws surrounding the leasing of apartments. In a legal universe with rent control, the market value of the apartment building is lower than a legal universe without rent control. Moving from a non-rent-control universe to a rent-control universe would not change the building at all, but it would destroy a lot of ‘wealth’ (defined here as asset values) because it would reduce the net present value of the flow of future rents the building will generate. Moving in the opposite direction would create a lot of ‘wealth.’

Obviously, changing rent laws does not literally create or destroy wealth in the physical sense of the word. The building is still the building. All it does is change legal relationships such that the market value of the building has gone down, making total wealth in the national accounts decline. Market values, and therefore wealth, do not track objective valuations of things in the abstract; rather, they track the valuation of legally constructed rights and powers with regards to things.

Germany

It is precisely this legally constructed nature of wealth that JW Mason hit on in an excellent post on Piketty at his blog. In the post, he walks through the puzzle that economic powerhouse Germany has the least wealth in Europe. He points out that they don’t actually have the least wealth in some physicalist sense of the word. It’s just that their legal institutions grant less rights and powers to people with regard to a variety of wealth assets. And that causes wealth to show up much lower in the national accounts.

For instance, Germany’s corporate governance structure limits the power of shareholders over firms, delegating a significant chunk of power to workers in the firms instead. This means that the asset value of corporate stock is lower, which means ‘wealth’ in the country is lower. But that wealth valuation does not reflect the physical reality of machines and buildings and tools and so on that firms actually hold. It just reflects, as all market values do, the way German law has constructed economic power and control over firms.

Robert Hale

The pioneer of this legal constructivist account of market valuation was legal realist Robert Hale. Instead of just remarking on how rent control of corporate governance reform can cause asset values to rise or fall, Hale goes all the way to the bone with his analysis. Laws do not just affect valuation of assets. Laws are the very core of asset values.

The net present value of the future flow of income from an asset is entirely structured by legal regimes. A country that has no property law, for instance, would have asset values of $0 even if it was identical to the US in terms of the buildings and machines and so on that was contained within it. If that same country invented some real weak property laws, then asset values would pop into existence because future flows of income would suddenly become a thing you can account for in the present and therefore capitalize into an asset price. I could go further with this, but the point should be clear enough here: since laws create and enforce powers and rights with respect to things and their future use, they are also the primary determinant of ‘wealth.’

Failure to appreciate the legally constructed nature of asset values and therefore ‘wealth’ causes economists and courts alike extreme confusion. They often analyze wealth and economic interactions as if they are these scientific, pre-political things, and in so doing totally miss the institutional forces that are actually determining things like asset prices.

Hale provides an amusing example of this confusion in the form of court cases where judges are trying to figure out what rates to set for public utility prices. The way these courts often handled this question was to determine the market value of the assets of the utility, multiply those assets by a particular rate of return, and then set the utility prices accordingly. This seems reasonable enough except that the ‘market value of the assets of the utility’ is entirely determined by what the utility prices are. Since the utility’s assets are valued by the net present value of the future flow of income, and the future flow of income is established by the price the judge selects, the judge is actually determining the value of the utility’s assets when they establish the prices even though the judge thinks they are reflecting the value of the utility’s assets.

Conclusion

The public utility cases are an especially egregious example of this sort of confusion about what wealth is, and one that seemed to have unhealthily obsessed Hale. But it’s emblematic of the broader trend here. Our discourse in this world, even in learned policy circles, still talks about our economy as if it is this quintessentially pre-political, natural thing. Politics in this discussion is described as something that invades, intervenes, and distorts the natural, independent workings of this separate thing called the economy.

Accordingly, deep confusion abounds as people try to scope in hard on what capital or wealth really is as if they are physicists studying a natural phenomena. Wealth assets are always and anywhere political and social constructs. Things exist, but ‘wealth’ is a fiction, the contours of which are fully derivative of how we create our systems of control and power over the material things of the world. This is not some kind of abstract philosophical point either. Just look at asset value data (as in Germany) and you see it, empirically.

Whose are the ruling macroeconomic ideas?

It is now six years since Olivier Blanchard called for “outlining the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework”. Yet what is that framework? Where is it? Who outlines it? And what processes will give it political traction?

Looking back to 2010:

Olivier Blanchard et al. (2010): Rethinking Macro Policy: “The global crisis forced economic policymakers…

…to react in ways not anticipated by the pre-crisis consensus…. Here the IMF’s chief economist and colleagues (i) review the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, (ii) identify the elements which turned out to be wrong, and (iii) take a tentative first pass at outlining the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework…

You can argue that the elements of such a framework are there. But they are disassembled, lying on the ground, disconnected. And as far as political traction, they are next to nowhere.

I am ending my invited lectures these days with this:

It is traditional to close lectures like this with Keynes’s “madmen in authority” quote:

Is the fulfilment of these ideas a visionary hope? Have they insufficient roots in the motives which govern the evolution of political society? Are the interests which they will thwart stronger and more obvious than those which they will serve?

I do not attempt an answer in this place…. But if the ideas are correct… it would be a mistake, I predict, to dispute their potency over a period of time…. The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas….

There are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

Yet when I look around, I see lots of ideas with a potency that is extremely great but with influence that is nowheresville.

The ruling ideas are not those of “academic scribblers”. They are, rather, much simpler. At the moment I count five:

  1. The bankers have us by the plums…: Thus it is important to cosset, coddle, and enrich our bankers, because only if they are confident will the engine of financial intermediation that is the only thing that can create a booming full-employment economy run smoothly.

  2. Debt is bad (except when it is used to fund tax cuts for “job creators”)…: Hence it is important to cut Social Security and make sure that not an extra drop is spent on public infrastructure.

  3. Today’s extremely low interest rates must be unnatural…: Hence they need to be reversed and monetary policy “normalized” as quickly as normalization can be accomplished without renewed recession.

  4. Only pain can drive reform…: Hence boosting employment and restoring fast growth would be bad as it would impeded the essential process of actually undertaking the badly-needed “structural reforms”.

  5. We couldn’t have done any better…: The most urgent economic problems of the North Atlantic aren’t the standard ones of too-little “money” (of various kinds) chasing a normal amount of goods, but are complicated and irresolvable.

If the ruling ideas were those of Bagehot, Kindleberger, Keynes, Friedman–even a Hayek–we could do something, although in the last case it would take a lot of intellectual ingenuity to make a silk purse out of that particular sow’s ear. But the ruling ideas are barely ideas–they are, rather slogans. The bipartisan technocratic policy center of politicians who listen to arguments about what policies might actually work is gone–or at least paralyzed. And too many key levers of power are held by a right–in Germany, in Britain, and in the U.S.–that appears profoundly uninterested in argument abut policy effectiveness, if not uninterested in policy effectiveness itself.

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard: “Rethinking Macro Policy”

Must-Read: It is now six years since Olivier Blanchard called for “outlining the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework”. Yet what is that framework? Where is it? Who outlines it? And what processes will give it political traction?

Olivier Blanchard et al. (2010): Rethinking Macro Policy: “The global crisis forced economic policymakers…

…to react in ways not anticipated by the pre-crisis consensus…. Here the IMF’s chief economist and colleagues (i) review the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, (ii) identify the elements which turned out to be wrong, and (iii) take a tentative first pass at outlining the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework.

Must-read: Jim Tankersley: “The world has too many workers. Here’s one way to fix it”

Must-Read:I really do not like the “too many workers” framing: I vastly prefer either:

  • Too little public investment
  • Too little government purchases
  • Too little government debt
  • Too little risk-bearing capacity
  • Too little in the way of safe assets for savers to hold

But the argument seems 100% right to me:

Jim Tankersley: The world has too many workers. Here’s one way to fix it: “overcomplicating America’s economic challenges today…

…Maybe the problem is simple: too many workers. That is the argument made in a new paper released by the centrist Democratic think tank Third Way, which theorizes that the world economy is suffering from an oversupply of labor and too little demand for the goods and services those workers produce…. Daniel Alpert… [makes] Third Way’s latest effort to shape the liberal policy conversation in the 2016 presidential primaries. It does so in decidedly un-centrist fashion — by embracing a larger infrastructure spending program than Bernie Sanders does….

Alpert laments the ‘suddenness and extent of the integration of over 3 billion people into a global capitalist market, that really only hitherto consisted of about 800 million in the advanced economies.’ He argues that worker influx has triggered a wave of low-wage job creation in America. He notes that nearly half of the jobs created in the current recovery have come in traditionally low-wage sectors…. Intervening, he says, requires a ‘bold change in policy focus’ for the United States. Which is to say, a $1.2 trillion infrastructure spending program, at a time when Congress remains dead set against big new spending plans. Alpert estimates it would create 5.5 million jobs….

It might seem an unusual position for a centrist think-tank, outflanking the most liberal presidential candidate on the left. But Third Way officials argue it’s an economic imperative. ‘Whether it’s through some sort of spending deal, where you’re getting more money into infrastructure, or repatriation or some other means, you have to get this done’ in Congress, said Jim Kessler, the group’s senior vice president for policy. ‘That glut of worldwide labor is not going to go away, magically.’

Must-read: Ben Thompson: “Obsoletive: Revolutionary Products in Tech Don’t Disrupt–They Obsolete”

Must-Read: Ben Thompson (2013): Obsoletive: Revolutionary Products in Tech Don’t Disrupt–They Obsolete: “[Christiansenian] disruption is low-end…

…a disruptive product is worse than the incumbent technology on the vectors that the incumbent’s customers care about. But, it’s cheaper, and better on other vectors that different customers care about. And, eventually, as the new technology improves, it takes the incumbent’s market.

This is not what happened in cell phones. In 2006, the Nokia 1600 was the top-selling phone… the BlackBerry Pearl the best-selling smartphone. Both were only a year away from their doom, but that doom was not a cheaper, less-capable product, but in fact the exact opposite: a far more powerful, and fantastically more expensive product called the iPhone…. The problem for Nokia and BlackBerry was that their specialties–calling, messaging, and email–were simply apps: one function on a general-purpose computer. A dedicated device that only did calls, or messages, or email, was simply obsolete. An even cursory examination of tech history makes it clear that ‘obsoletion’–where a cheaper, single-purpose product is replaced by a more expensive, general purpose product–is just as common as ‘disruption’–even more so, in fact…. The Mac (and PC), iPod, and iPhone weren’t so much disruptive as they were obsoletive. They absorbed a wide range of specialized tools for a price far greater than any one of those tools cost on their own….

Christensen’s theory of disruption remains an incredibly elegant and insightful framework for understanding why some companies–like Microsoft, to name the best example–decline. But it’s dramatically over-applied in technology. Most new products are simply better… while the most revolutionary products… are obsoletive. They are more expensive, more capable, and change the way we live…

Must-reads: April 30, 2016


Should-reads:

Must-read: Ben Thompson: “Antitrust and Aggregation”

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Antitrust and Aggregation: “With zero distribution costs and zero transaction costs…

…consumers are attracted to an aggregator through the delivery of a superior experience, which attracts modular suppliers, which improves the experience and thus attracts more consumers, and thus more suppliers in the aforementioned virtuous cycle. It is a phenomenon seen across industries including search (Google and web pages), feeds (Facebook and content), shopping (Amazon and retail goods), video (Netflix/YouTube and content creators), transportation (Uber/Didi and drivers), and lodging (Airbnb and rooms, Booking/Expedia and hotels)…. All things being equal the equilibrium state in a market covered by Aggregation Theory is monopoly: one aggregator that has captured all of the consumers and all of the suppliers.

This monopoly, though, is a lot different than the monopolies of yesteryear…. Consumers are self-selecting onto the Aggregator’s platform because it’s a better experience. This has completely neutered U.S. antitrust law, which is based on whether or not there has been clear harm to the consumer… it’s why the FTC has declined to sue Google for questionable search practices….

Once competitors die the aggregators become monopsonies — i.e. the only buyer for modularized suppliers. And this, by extension, turns the virtuous cycle on its head: instead of more consumers leading to more suppliers, a dominant hold over suppliers means that consumers can never leave, rendering a superior user experience less important than a monopoly that looks an awful lot like the ones our antitrust laws were designed to eliminate….

There was one remedy from the European Commission settlement with Microsoft that actually worked out quite well: Windows was required to document interoperability protocols for work group servers, which while designed for the benefit of established competitors like Sun, was actually more important for the open-source Samba project. Samba made it possible for non-Windows PCs and servers to be fully compatible with Windows-based networks, making it viable to use a Mac or Linux machine in corporate environments, or (more importantly) in corporate data centers, one of the first areas where the Windows monopoly started to come apart. Of course Windows remained dominant on the desktop thanks to its application lock-in…. Both of these approaches — interoperability and API disclosure — could be solutions when it comes to defusing the market power of aggregators…