Principles that Should Govern American Fiscal Policy

Employment Level 25 to 54 years FRED St Louis Fed

Well, that was a very interesting election night. Our failure in 2000 to introduce into the running code (as opposed to the specification document) of our constitution that electors switch votes so that the national popular vote winner wins the electoral college cost us dear in 2000, and may cost us even more today…

You may ask: How is one to judge what to do in such times? The answer is clear: As one has ever judged. Good and evil have not changed since yesteryear, nor are they one thing among Elves and another among Men. It is a human’s part to discern them, as much in the Golden Wood as in his own house. What would have been good policy yesterday would still be good policy today. What would have been bad policy yesterday would still be bad policy today. So we play our position.

I therefore set forth seven principles that should govern good technocratic fiscal policies that promise to enhance America’s societal well-being :

  • Preserve Our Credit
  • Our National Debt a National Blessing
  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low
  • International Agencies Agree
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment
  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich

  • Preserve Our Credit: President-elect Donald Trump has been told by many that our national debt is too high and dangerous. He has responded as one would expect a real estate developer would respond. He has proposed taking steps to shake the confidence of our creditors, and then to buy back our debt, at a heavy discount, thus removing the danger. This is a substantial misreading of the situation. Market confidence in the credit worthiness of the United States of America is an extremely valuable asset, from which we derive much benefit, and which it would be folly to throw away.

  • Our National Debt a National Blessing: In fact, at the moment, with interest rates where they are now and are expected to be for the foreseeable future, our national debt is not a burden but a blessing. It is not a drain on the Treasury but a source of wealth for the Treasury. If we do our accounts using a reasonable benchmark–setting our goal to be keeping our available physical space constant–we find that, at the levels of interest rates we see now and expect to see for the foreseeable future, a lower national that would not allow us to lower but would require us to raise taxes in order to maintain the given level of spending. The United States right now is not in the position of a cash-strapped borrower forced to pay interest. The United States right now is, rather, in the position of something like the medieval Medici bank, which people pay to safeguard their money.

  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low: The fact is that our national debt, right now, is not a burden but a profit center. That implies that, whatever you think of the long-term multi-generational fiscal outlook, right now our national debt is not too high but too low. That is the case unless one confidently anticipates a rapid and substantial increase in interest rates in the relatively near future. This was, in fact, one of the major lesson of the big article that Larry Summers and I wrote for the Brookings Institution back in 2012.

  • International Agencies Agree: Note that, after four years of argument, the IMF and other international agences agree with Larry and my technocratic judgment that right now our national debt is too low, and thus that good economic policy requires higher deficits right now, not budget balance.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (1), there are still substantial benefits to an economic policy stance, right now and for the foreseeable future as long as the global configuration of savings supply and investment demand is not transformed, with a larger deficit and tighter money and hence higher interest rates. Higher interest rates would restore the health of the banking sector. Higher interest rates might discourage the blowing of potentially dangerous bubbles. The drawback of raising interest rates–the reason that the Federal Reserve has not done so–is that it lowers employment. But if that reduction in employment is offset by an increase in the deficit that boosts employment, hit becomes a no-drawbacks policy.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (2), there are massive benefits to an economic policy stance of running larger deficits–the benefit of raising employment and making people richer, and making those people richer who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008.

  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich: If America does decide to run larger deficits, there are large benefits from choosing to do so by increasing government purchases than by cutting taxes, especially for the rich. Increasing government purchases puts to work and improves the lot of the people who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008. And cutting taxes–especially for the rich–has much smaller effects on the balance between savings and the capital inflow on the one hand and investment and government borrowing on the other. Since the effectiveness of the policy in putting people to work and in creating space for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to a healthy level without harming employment depends on this investment-savings balance, there is much more bang for a buck of government purchases than from a buck of tax cuts.

An update on the U.S. labor market from the September JOLTS report

Every month, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released data on flows in the U.S. labor market. These data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey tell us about how many workers are hired, quit their jobs, or are laid off from their jobs. It also tells us how many jobs employers are trying to hire.

Below are a few graphs pulling out key trends from the JOLTS data released yesterday morning. With the current recovery rolling into its seventh year, policymakers should continue to watch these data as the Federal Reserve considers a possible rate increase in December and as U.S. legislators and the Obama Administration wrestle over a budget deal in the coming lame duck session of Congress.

The Beveridge Curve shows the relationship between the number of job openings that employers are posting and the unemployment rate. During the recovery from the Great Recession, the curve seems to have shifted outward since the end of the downturn in mid-2009. The reason for this shift could be due to employers increasing the skills they require of workers or a lack of recruiting intensity from employers.

Breaking the curve out by length of unemployment shows that the shift outward is concentrated among workers who have been unemployed for 27 weeks or longer. A lower rate of hiring among long-term unemployed workers may be responsible for the overall outward shift.

Workers are more likely to quit their job when the labor market is stronger. If there are fewer unemployed workers to hire from, then workers who already have a job are likely to be poached and quit their current job. But different measures of labor market slack show a different relationship with quitting.

The rate of quitting seems in line with the previous relationship with the unemployment rate. Yet workers seem more likely to quit for a given prime-age employment-to-population ratio than in the past.

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: My Voter’s Guide to Economic Policy

Must-Read: A very nice framework document for the economic policy dialogue:

Mark Thoma: My Voter’s Guide to Economic Policy: “Now we can finally come together as a nation and begin to make progress on important economic, social, and political issues (I can dream, can’t I?)…

…The Capitalist System: Let’s begin with an overview of how the two parties view the capitalist system. Both Democrats and Republicans believe the market system is the best way to satisfy our economic needs. Where they differ is the degree to which government should use social insurance to protect individuals and their families when the economy goes into a recession, when technological change destroys jobs, when jobs are moved to other countries, and so on. Democrats believe these risks should by widely shared…. That is, they believe in a system known as “social democracy.” Republicans have a different view. Social insurance, in their view (not mine from the evidence I’ve seen), creates dependency on government programs and blunts the incentive to work…. 

Market Failure: As just noted, both parties believe that when markets work they are the best way to meet our economic needs. But markets can fail for many reasons such as a high degree of monopoly power, differences in information about a product between the buyer and seller (e.g. patients who are unable to evaluate medical procedures, or a car owner knowing more about the quality of the car than the buyer), and the presence of externalities (e.g. firms that pollute the water or air without incurring the costs of doing so) – the full list is fairly long. And there are some goods, economist call them public goods, which the private sector will not produce at all (national defense is the classic example). Democrats believe the government ought to intervene when there are market failures…. Republicans became leery of government intervention during market failures…. 

Response to Recessions: Consistent with their views that government should intervene when the economy experiences problems, Democrats favor the use of monetary policy to combat mild recessions. In severe recessions, when monetary policy alone is not enough, they also favor the use of fiscal policy, particularly government spending…. Most Republicans agree that monetary policy should be used to smooth fluctuations in output and employment, but they would constrain the Fed’s behavior more than Democrats…. As for fiscal policy, they do not favor the use of government spending in severe recessions, even on things such as infrastructure. They do, however, favor another type of fiscal policy, tax cuts for businesses and the wealthy…. Some Republicans go even further and argue that the government should not intervene at all when the economy goes into a recession….

Inequality: Some degree of inequality is needed to create the correct incentives in a market system, but the two parties differ on whether excessive inequality reduces economic growth, the degree to which the income of those at the top is earned and hence deserved, and the need for government to address the inequality problem. Republicans argue that… people deserve what they get. Any attempt by government to redistribute income would blunt the incentive of those at the top to pursue innovative, entrepreneurial activity and reduce our rate of economic growth. Democrats… believe much of the income of those at the top is… due… unfair bargaining between workers and firms that redirects income upward, market failures, political power that has undermined unions and protected wealthy interests, cronyism on corporate boards, and so on….

Perhaps the difference between the two parties on economic policy can be summarized by the Republican’s faith in markets and their belief that when government tries to help it tends to make things worse rather than better versus the belief among Democrats that capitalist economies need government to keep them on track, to fix market imperfections, to promote equity and equal opportunity, and to ensure that the costs associated with economic shocks are broadly shared through social insurance. My support for Democrats comes, in part, from the belief that they have the stronger hand by far when it comes to economic policy, but whatever your views happen to be, please vote!

Must-Read: Nancy Cartwright and Angus Deaton: The Limitations of Randomised Controlled Trials

Must-Read: Smart thoughts from Nancy Cartwright and Angus Deaton:

Nancy Cartwright and Angus Deaton: The Limitations of Randomised Controlled Trials: “A well-conducted RCT can yield a credible estimate of an ATE in one specific population, namely the ‘study population’…

…Sometimes this is enough…. Yet the study population is often not the population that we are interested in…. More generally, demonstrating that a treatment works in one situation is exceedingly weak evidence that it will work in the same way elsewhere; this is the ‘transportation’ problem: what does it take to allow us to use the results in new contexts, whether policy contexts or in the development of theory? It can only be addressed by using previous knowledge and understanding, i.e. by interpreting the RCT within some structure, the structure that, somewhat paradoxically, the RCT gets its credibility from refusing to use. If we want to go from an RCT to policy, we need to build a bridge from the RCT to the policy. No matter how rigorous or careful the RCT, if the bridge is built by a hand-waving simile that the policy context is somehow similar to the experimental context, the rigor in the trial does nothing to support a policy; in any chain of evidence, it is the weakest link that determines the overall strength of the claim, not the strongest….

We have a better chance of transporting results if we recognise the issue when designing the experiment–which itself requires the commitment to some kind of structure–and try to investigate the effects of the factors that are likely to vary elsewhere. Without a structure, without an understanding of why the effects work, we not only cannot transport, but we cannot begin to do welfare economics; just because an intervention works, and because the investigator thinks the intervention makes people better off, is no guarantee that it actually does so. Without knowing why things happen and why people do things, we run the risk of worthless casual (‘fairy story’) causal theorising, and we have given up on one of the central tasks of economics.

Trump’s Tax Noplan

Why I reacted badly to journalists who asked me to analyze Trump’s economic plans. The first, last, and only correct thing to say was that there never was any coherent plan. To say anything else was to try to normalize the unnormalizable. Everyone who wrote as if there was a plan should be deeply ashamed of themselves.

Here Alan Cole gets it… less wrong than most. He is still trying to normalize the unnormalizable. But he is honest about how difficult it was for him to attempt the task:

Alan Cole: _On Twitter: “This is my 407th (and, I expect, final) day covering Donald Trump’s tax proposals for @taxfoundation…

…Here’s what we’ve learned.

Donald Trump’s initial effort at tax reform this cycle came in September 2015. My analysis showed it reducing revenues by a huge amount. We put it at a $12 trillion tax cut. At first, the campaign disputed this number. I remember this day well. https://t.co/RuxyeYLiwZ:

Alan Cole on Twitter 1 This is my 407th and I expect final day covering Donald Trump s tax proposals for taxfoundation Here s what we ve learned

This came back when John McKinnon was the WSJ’s tax reporter. (Since then, he has moved to other issues and @RichardRubinDC does tax.) John was going back and forth between us and Hope Hicks, essentially transcribing an argument between me and her that lasted all day.

The initial plan was a gigantic tax cut for both the rich and the middle class, but not all narratives in September 2015 got that right. For example, Trump claimed (wrongly) that his September 2015 tax plan would cost him a fortune https://t.co/ZvpXZlQ0pB.

Note what is going on here: Alan Cole is claiming to know more about Donald Trump’s tax plan than Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump’s tax plan is presumably what Donald Trump plans to do, if Donald Trump plans to do something other than his tax plan–if Donald Trump knows that his tax plan is not what he plans to do–attempts to analyze it have already collapsed into incoherence.

It wouldn’t.

But what is “it” here? Is it Donald Trump’s tax plan, which Alan Cole know better than Donald Trump? Or is it what Donald Trump plans to do on taxes? And how, metaphysically, can what Donald Trump plans to do on taxes be different from his tax plan? If Donald Trump plans to change the tax law in ways that cost him a fortune, it what sense can his tax plan offer him a tax cut?

Simultaneously, many liberals attacked him for cutting taxes on the rich and doing nothing for the middle class, which I thought unfair.

I wrote some analysis trying to set the narrative right. The loser from the 2015 Trump plan was the US Treasury https://t.co/s2KbFgPtVw.

Needless to say, “right” here has no meaning…

Eventually the deficit number became the main story (and rightly so.) @JebBush attacked the plan in the October debate. Unfortunately in the fiscal policy part of the debate, Bush also talked about giving “a warm kiss” to Democrats, which was weird.

By 2016, @larry_kudlow was looking at ways to reduce the revenue loss from the 2015 Trump tax plan https://t.co/Obm0wnUyrT. Whispers of a new tax plan kept on happening throughout the summer, without anything concrete happening. Trial balloons were floated. In some cases, the responses to the trial balloons actually made a difference, such as here: https://t.co/y38V6c6mH2. Tax experts like @lilybatch criticized the pairing of expensing with interest deductions. Apparently this had an impact!

In the end, the campaign made expensing/interest deductibility an either/or choice, probably because of the @RichardRubinDC article. A Detroit speech, still on Trump’s website, was the main source of info on the “new” tax plan for a while. https://t.co/X1w3MjFwPH Contained in the Detroit speech was this passage, including a key pledge to a major Republican constituency: pass-through businesses:

Alan Cole on Twitter 1 This is my 407th and I expect final day covering Donald Trump s tax proposals for taxfoundation Here s what we ve learned

That pledge was one of the biggest tax stories. It was promised, un-promised, re-promised, and then collapsed into confusion.

All of that came to a head on the day of the release of the new tax plan, on a Thursday in September 2016. https://t.co/GRoCF0W8Vi. I was told this, which seemed to be backed up by the website at the time, mentioning only “corporate” rate:

Email response from Trump Deputy Policy Director: “the 15 percent rate only applies to businesses that are taxed as corporations.”

Key small-biz advocates were unhappy with the development, as reported by me:

Trump just quietly walked back the single best aspect of his tax plan to save a buck http://taxfoundation.org/blog/details-donald-trump-tax-reform-plan-september-2016

But eventually the NFIB “reacted” to the plan with this statement, praising it for keeping the promise: https://t.co/iISZMAKmHv.

Further, the website changed! As noted by this “baffled-tone” tweetstorm from the time:Alan Cole added,

Richard Rubin @RichardRubinDC: Campaign site https://twitter.com/RichardRubinDC/status/776586854720163840 says 15 is for big and small that “want to retain the profits within the business.” Whoa there…

The next day, Friday, @BCAppelbaum charged hard at the story and released this piece: https://t.co/ZjB4EJryxp.

The idea of the piece: Trump wanted tax analysts to keep the price tag of the plan low, but small biz to think the promise was kept. This line of argument eventually was used by Clinton campaign officials like @genebsperling:A

Sperling alleges that they’re touting the 15% rate for passthroughs on the campaign trail, and then scaling it back “in quiet rooms.”

I had to delay my analysis throughout the weekend while I tried to figure out what was going on:

I do not have any new information about the Trump tax plan today. Thank you for your questions!

But what was going on was that nothing was going on. They were not even coherent enough to try to keep two sets of books–an NFIB-pleasing set and a deficit-hawk set. It was just incoherent…

Finally, we released our analysis with two scores of the Trump plan that we set as a sort of upper and lower bound on the policy. We never got clear answers on this: other Trump mysteries were much the same way. What happened to that money for vets? Who knows?

There were no clear answers because there was no policy…

It was easy to get wrapped up in annoyance over the passthrough issue, but I tried to give Trump praise for his bold corporate proposal:

Alan Cole on Twitter 1 This is my 407th and I expect final day covering Donald Trump s tax proposals for taxfoundation Here s what we ve learned

Why, in God’s name? There is no proposal–nothing coherent. Why praise him?

In the final days of the election, the main voices on the Trump tax plan shifted from Kudlow to Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross. Kudlow and Navarro have differences on trade, and sadly, I think Navarro won the struggle over that part of the agenda. Eventually Navarro’s views on trade became the dominant topic of discussion even at tax policy events.

But that does not mean that Navarro “won” anything. Trump could still say anything on any day without being bound by any prior statements or position papers.

Nick Riccardi @NickRiccardi: That the Trump tax discussion at Tax Policy Center is largely about trade is basically all you need to know.

This was a turning point for some prominent tax cutters. They’re about free movement of goods/services. Navarro’s views just don’t fit. Grover Norquist now spends his days tweeting about vaping. Art Laffer watches documentaries about whales(!) https://t.co/40yjysWKOZ. The feeling of detachment and discouragement among the traditional free-market coalition is pretty palpable. I’d expect a brawler-style tax cutting candidate to be Norquist/Laffer’s best friend, but he’s not. There’s a story worth telling there.

There’s still a constituency in the U.S. for free market policy for as long as supply curves slope upwards. (Spoiler alert: they do.) But Trump is not a good avatar for the free market coalition, and it’s pretty obvious if you see how free marketers are reacting to him. This is a realigning election, without doubt. It has left powerful constituencies adrift. But most of them will be back in some form.

So I expect the presidential economic policy debates in the future to be just as “interesting” as the one we’ve just lived through.

So that’s what I’ve learned in the last 407 days covering Donald Trump’s tax plans. I can’t say it was dull. Happy election day!

Still, I look at things like: “The Taxes and Growth model says that the rate reductions alone would lead to a 4.1% increase in real GDP”. And I cannot help but think: Alan Cole is being unprofessional here. He implies that there is a coherent Trump plan, and that when all its moving parts are nailed down and estimates are made the model will say it leads to a greater than 4.1% increase in real GDP. But there is no coherent Trump plan. There are no moving parts that need to fit together. There are no estimates. And there never will be any estimates.

Thus, in my view, Alan Cole served his audience badly: he was not a trustworthy information intermediary. What he should have done was gone to Kudlow and said: This is an incoherent clusterf—. I’m going to report that this is an incoherent clusterf— unless you pull it, and bring back something coherent we can estimate and score.

Alan Cole did not do that. His failure shadows all of my understanding and evaluation of his work.

Must-Read: Branko Milanovic: The Long Shadow of 1989

Branko Milanovic: The Long Shadow of 1989: “The [Eastern European] generation born around the early 1990s, which has now reached its maturity…

…has on average a height of about 1 cm less than the previous generation…. Plummeting incomes… parental stress, alcoholism and drug abuse…. The good news is that the happiness gap between Eastern and Western Europe has closed. East Europeans are no longer systematically unhappier (in terms of self-reported happiness) than their Western counterparts…. Both the height loss and the happiness stories illustrate well the importance to people’s lives of traumatic events like the economic collapse during the transition or the Great Recession….

I read Simon Kuper’s today’s piece in the Financial Times on the diverse fortunes of Merkel, Putin, Kaczynski and Orban who were all, in different places and positions in 1989, and whose 1989 experience very much influences their today’s beliefs and policies…. What I found interesting… are two points which were very seldom found in Western press…. The first is recognition that the 1989 revolutions were essentially… revolutions of national self-determination…. Even Yeltsin’s revolution was a peculiar nationalist revolution where the core nation decided it wanted to get out of a federation…. For the other leaders, from the Baltics to the Balkans, nationalism as the main ideology was self-evident….

The second interesting point… is the… diversity of experiences…. Sizeable minorities, who either were of mixed backgrounds or had identities associated with the country that was now divvied up, were left totally unmoored…. I know of many people, myself included, who for several decades had one national identity, and then within months had to start believing they had another one…. [We] cannot… forget not only how traumatic and bloody the process was, but also how many of the newly-created countries, from Ukraine to Bosnia, remain utterly fragile and, it seems, permanently suspended over the precipice of yet another war…

Must-Reads: November 7, 2016

  • Barry Eichengreen: Rethinking Capital Controls: “Worries persist that capital controls create a breeding ground for both corruption and distortions in resource allocation…
  • Paul Krugman (2013): Phantom Crises: “Simon Wren-Lewis is puzzled by a Ken Rogoff column that sorta-kinda defends Cameron’s austerity policies…
  • Paul Krugman (2008): The Rogoff Doctrine: “Ken Rogoff is one of the world’s best macroeconomists. But…
  • Richard Mayhew: County Level Inequities in the ACA: “Health wonks like to say that the ACA is not a single program but fifty-one programs… works well in some states (California) and poorly in others (Arizona) and muddles through in most…
  • FT: The Prevailing Case for Caution by Central Banks: “The US Federal Reserve signalled a high likelihood that interest rates will be raised when it meets next in December…
  • Cosma Shalizi: Advanced Data Analysis from an Elementary Point of View: “It Is also important to be clear that when we find the regression function is a constant…

Should Reads:

Must-Read: Cosma Shalizi: Advanced Data Analysis from an Elementary Point of View

Must-Read: Cosma Shalizi vs. the Econometricians:

Cosma Shalizi: Advanced Data Analysis from an Elementary Point of View: “It Is also important to be clear that when we find the regression function is a constant…

…μ(x) = μ0 for all x, that this does not mean that X and Y are statistically independent. If they are independent, then the regression function is a constant, but turning this around is the logical fallacy of “affirming the consequent”. As in combining the fact that all human beings are featherless bipeds, and the observation that a cooked turkey is a featherless biped, to conclude that cooked turkeys are human beings. An econometrician stops there; an econometrician who wants to be famous writes a best-selling book about how this proves that Thanksgiving is really about cannibalism.

DeLong Smackdown Watch: Simon Wren-Lewis and Ann Pettifor Take Their Whacks

Simon Wren-Lewis: Ann Pettifor on mainstream economics: “Ann has a article that talks about the underlying factor behind the Brexit vote…

…Her thesis, that it represents the discontent of those left behind by globalisation, has been put forward by others. Unlike Brad DeLong, I have few problems with seeing this as a contributing factor to Brexit, because it is backed up by evidence, but like Brad DeLong I doubt it generalises to other countries…


Simon Wren-Lewis: A divided nation: “There is no reason why we need to choose between the economic and the social types of explanation…

…Kaufmann and Johnston et al can both be right. As Max Wind-Cowie says (quoted by Rick here):

Bringing together the dissatisfied of Tunbridge Wells and the downtrodden of Merseyside is a remarkable feat, and it stems from UKIP’s empathy for those who have been left behind by the relentless march of globalisation and glib liberalism.

Both these explanations see antagonism to the idea (rather than the actuality) of migration as the way an underlying grievance got translated into a dislike of the EU. But was immigration really so crucial? A widely quoted poll by Lord Ashcroft says a wish for sovereignty was more important. The problem here, of course, is that sovereignty – and a phrase like taking back control – is an all embracing term which might well be seen as more encompassing than just a concern about immigration. It really needs a follow-up asking what aspects of sovereignty are important. If we look at what Leavers thought was important, the “ability to control our own laws” seemed to have little to do with the final vote compared to more standard concerns, including immigration.

However there are other aspects of the Ashcroft poll that I think are revealing. First, economic arguments were important for Remain voters. The economic message did get through to many voters. Second, the NHS was important to Leave voters, so the point economists also made that ending free movement would harm the NHS was either not believed or did not get through to this group. Indeed “more than two thirds (69%) of leavers, by contrast, thought the decision “might make us a bit better or worse off as a country, but there probably isn’t much in it either way””. Whether they did not know about the overwhelming consensus among economists who thought otherwise, or chose to ignore it, we cannot tell.

Third, Leave voters are far more pessimistic about the future, and also tend to believe that life today is much worse than life 30 years ago. Finally, those who thought the following were a source of ill rather than good – multiculturalism, social liberalism, feminism, globalisation, the internet, the green movement and immigration – tended by large majorities to vote Leave. Only in the case of capitalism did as many Remain and Leave voters cite it as a source of ill. These results suggest that Leave voters were those left behind in modern society in either an economic or social way (or perhaps both).

Taking all this evidence into account it seems that the Brexit vote was a protest vote against both the impact of globalisation and social liberalism. The two are connected by immigration, and of course the one certainty of the Brexit debate was that free movement prevented controls on EU migration. But that does not mean defeat was inevitable, as Chris makes clear. Kevin O’Rourke points out that the state can play an active role in compensating the losers from globalisation, and of course in recent years there has been an attempt to roll back the state. Furthermore, as Johnston et al suggest, the connection between economic decline and immigration is more manufactured than real. Tomorrow I’ll discuss both the campaign and what implications this all might have.

Must-Read: FT: The Prevailing Case for Caution by Central Banks

Must-Read: There are two big questions for the Federal Reserve:

  1. Why, if you want to tighten monetary policy, are you doing so first by raising interest rates rather than by shrinking the balance sheet?
  2. Why are you so sure that your models predicting inflation rising above 2% in 2018 are superior to market expectations which see inflation as remaining below 2% into the next decade?

The first remains a mystery to me. Nobody has yet set out for me how the Federal Reserve views the relationship among its four tools of interest on reserves, the Federal Funds rate, the size of its balance sheet, and forward guidance.

I think the answer to the second is: The Fed does not think that its forecasts are superior, but does think that if inflation gets above 2% it will be unable to nudge it down without triggering a recession. This belief that attempts to nudge inflation down will fail has turned 2% from a target to a ceiling. And the FT is not a happy camper:

FT: The Prevailing Case for Caution by Central Banks: “The US Federal Reserve signalled a high likelihood that interest rates will be raised when it meets next in December…

…The markets took the Fed at its word…. The Fed’s enthusiasm for raising interest rates at all remains something of a puzzle. Growth in the real economy, both gross domestic product and the labour market, remains strong. But given the uncertainties of recent years, and historically low labour market participation in the US, the size of the output gap and the exact location of full employment are a mystery. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the personal consumption expenditure deflator with energy and food prices stripped out, remains below the 2 per cent target, as do expectations of future inflation…. Across most advanced economies, the underlying picture is the same: inflation remains historically low and there are few signs of a sustained rise caused by excessive demand. Central banks should err on the side of keeping monetary policy loose.