Must-Read: Ryan Avent: Making Monetary Policy Great Again

Must-Read: Ryan Avent over at Democracy, making the argument for a monetary policy regime change http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/45/making-monetary-policy-great-again/:

Historically, when monetary “regime change” has occurred—when the public has been jolted out of a bad equilibrium into a good one—it is as a result of a political shift. It was Roosevelt that delivered regime change—by suspending gold convertibility—not the Federal Reserve. It was Richard Nixon who ended America’s role in the international gold standard set up after the second world war. In Britain, it was the government of Margaret Thatcher that engineered a disinflationary recession, and a political commitment to Paul Volcker by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan that facilitated the end of high inflation in America. In Japan, where nominal GDP is at last rising in sustained fashion, it was the election of Shinzo Abe, who essentially ran on a platform of monetary regime change (and nationalism), that made the difference.

Must- and Should-Reads July 13


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Jacob Levy: The Sovereign Myth

Jacob Levy: The Sovereign Myth: “The sense of control that is often attributed to voters in the olden days was really a sense of satisfaction with outcomes… https://niskanencenter.org/blog/sovereign-myth/

…Long years of economic growth in the West, broadly shared in, and in excess of the expectations of people who had lived through wars and economic collapse, propelled this satisfaction. In retrospect, though, it’s easy to flatter ourselves that, if things went well, it’s because we made such good decisions. Things look rather different when expectations are suddenly, sharply disappointed, as in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath…. The simple versions of the “economic anxiety” explanations for who supports such political movements have been widely debunked. But I think it is part of what makes fertile ground for such holist and fear-based political movements. The loss of the feeling of control can, moreover, go past economic questions; the demagogue can promise a restoration of control to the real people on social and cultural matters, too.

But in all these domains, the promise of control will be disappointed.

To the demagogue, the disappointment is a feature, not a bug. A perpetually frustrated and perpetually fearful populace is one that will continue to lend support to demagoguery. The policies adopted by an Erdogan or a Duterte are not meant to solve problems, but to keep the fear of them alive. Those of us hoping to see decent liberal democratic constitutionalism in the future have to proceed differently. Yes, there has to be hope for a better future; but hope is not the same as autarkic, nationalist, or democratic sovereign control…. We need to think of politics itself as a result of human action but not human design and decision, which even those who understand spontaneous and emergent orders in economics and society have been reluctant to do. It’s difficult to come to terms with. But however we are to manage the difficult psychological task of navigating currents that we didn’t decide into being, the first step will be understanding and admitting that we didn’t decide them.

I discuss some of these issues in greater depth in two recent academic pieces: Contra politanism, Against solidarity: Democracy without fraternity

Should-Read: Salvatore Morelli: Is growing inequality hurting our economies?

Should-Read: Salvatore Morelli: Is growing inequality hurting our economies?: “The recent 2007–2008 collapse of the global financial system naturally acted as a catalyst for growing concerns around the increasing dispersion of economic resources within most advanced economies… https://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/is-growing-inequality-hurting-our-economies/

…Subsequently, the landmark book by Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, underlined very clearly the risk of the rising importance of inherited intergenerational advantages in transforming our societies into patrimonial capitalistic economies dominated by wealthy dynasties…. The reverse direction of inquiry—how macroeconomic performance may be affected by the extent of inequality—rests instead outside the scope of Piketty’s analysis and modeling…. In fact, the investigation of the (fairly complex) relationship between inequality and economic growth has been featured prominently in the empirical literature on inequality, with disparate findings and hypotheses pointing in different directions….

Economic theory provides different anchors as to why the so-called equity-efficiency trade-off may fall apart…. If most of the dispersion of economic outcomes of individuals results from inequality of opportunities… opportunities are not necessarily given to the most talented but to individuals with predetermined circumstances, and economic growth may in turn be weakened…. High levels of income and wealth inequality… may be detrimental to the level of economic activity as only those who inherit sufficiently high wealth may be able to pay the fixed cost of entrepreneurial activity or education…. Investments in productive capital and risky activities themselves can also be discouraged by highly unequal distribution of resources as a result of increasing rent-seeking behavior and other expropriation actions…. Does wealth inequality really promote rent-seeking behavior?… Bonica and Rosenthal documented the U.S. campaign contributions of the Forbes 400 wealthiest individuals between 1982 and 2012. Their figures imply an average individual donation of $10,000 for each $1 million increase in wealth—presumably a relatively easy achievement for a billionaire…

Should-Read: Martin Sandbu: Globalisation goes on without those who want to get off

Should-Read: Martin Sandbu: Globalisation goes on without those who want to get off: “The EU, Japan and Canada keep the economic openness show on the road… https://www.ft.com/content/97582468-5fc7-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1

…The significance of this imminent accomplishment is only matched by the degree to which it is ignored by the public…. The EU, flanked by Japan and Canada, has taken on the leadership mantle of economic globalisation. Even more importantly, if implemented, the two deals show that Europe is capable of leading successfully…. For countries such as the US and the UK, which behave as if they have been victimised by globalisation, the new European trade deals show the wrong-headedness of their self-pity…. The US and the UK can hurt themselves by throwing up barriers to trade between themselves and their trading partners. But that is all they will achieve; there will not be a reorientation of “better” or “fairer” trade that will somehow improve on the status quo ante. (Of course there are plenty of domestic policies that these countries can improve, but there is no need to deglobalise to make those changes.) Meanwhile the countries that have stuck to their senses will simply move ahead shaping the global economy…

Should-Read: Koichi Hamada: The Rebirth of the TPP

Should-Read: Koichi Hamada: The Rebirth of the TPP: “Jagdish Bhagwati said… ‘the TPP was a bit like allowing people to play golf in a club, but only if they also attended a particular church’… https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tpp-revival-japan-us-by-koichi-hamada-2017-06

…The deal’s signatories were in it for the golf–that is, the expanded trade and investment flows. But they couldn’t avoid the obligation to accept rules that would benefit the US…. The US… had a strong national interest in both the golf and the church. Now it will get neither. And when the new TPP, excluding the US, begins to flourish, US businesses will be wishing Trump had not canceled their tee time…

Should-Read: Stefan Klasen et al.: Inequality – worldwide trends and current debates

Should-Read: Stefan Klasen et al.: Inequality – worldwide trends and current debates: “Income inequality has been rising in many developing countries since the 1980s…” https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/142156/1/86139593X.pdf

…At the same time, global income inequality has been roughly stable (or even falling slightly) and there is great heterogeneity in within-country inequality trends across countries and regions. Non-income inequality tends to have fallen, both within and between countries. There is no empirical evidence that rising inequality is an inevitable consequence of economic growth; similarly, the evidence of the impact of changes in inequality on growth is also inconclusive, although higher levels of inequality appear to be harmful for subsequent development. At the same time, reducing inequality is seen as important to promote greater fairness as well as to speed up poverty reduction. To study trends in inequality, we use a framework where income inequality is related to inequality in assets (land, labor, human capital, and physical capital), return to these assets, inequality in private transfers, and redistribution by the state. Trends in inequality are tied to these different drivers which differ greatly by country and over time. This framework also generates opportunities for policy intervention to tackle inequality.

This will, however, depend greatly on the country. As a result, it is useful to start a policy framework with an inequality diagnostics to identify the most important drivers of levels and changes in inequality in a particular country; this is also an activity where bilateral development partners can play an important supporting role. When it comes to particular policy issues, some of the issues that have been discussed for a long time remain highly relevant, including land reform (where land is still an important asset), pro-poor educational policies, rural infrastructure, and a focus on improving agricultural productivity of poor farmers. At the same time, increasing the redistributive role of the state through a higher tax take (to be achieved via broadening the tax base, increasing tax compliance, increase resource taxes), and increasing pro- poor social transfers. On the international dimension, there is now a greater emphasis on assisting developing countries with fighting tax evasion and tax avoidance of firms and individuals. As a single bilateral donor, it is not easy to have a significant impact on inequality and an explicit aid program on inequality reduction might also be politically contentious.

In principle, the potential is there for significantly affecting inequality via technical cooperation assisting states (and potentially non-state actors) in implementing an inequality-reducing agenda. Budget support and other systemic approaches can of course also support an overall agenda of reducing inequality, as can investment projects if they focus on the policy-areas for inequality reduction outlined here…

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Should-Read: Douglas L. Campbell: In the Idiocy of Kevin Warsh: More Evidence for the ‘Self-Induced Paralysis’ Thesis

Should-Read: Doug Campbell: Douglas L. Campbell: In the Idiocy of Kevin Warsh: More Evidence for the ‘Self-Induced Paralysis’ Thesis: “I believe it is clear that the main reason the economy has been growing slowly since the financial crisis is overly tight monetary policy… http://douglaslcampbell.blogspot.ru/2017/07/in-idiocy-of-kevin-warsh-more-evidence.html

…In particular, look at… 2009, when the Fed adopted no new stimulus despite headline deflation and mass job losses, on net (in terms of rates or asset purchases, forward guidance was done), or in 2010, when the Fed raised the discount rate. What on Earth could they have been thinking?… Part of the answer might be that Ben Bernanke, ever a consensus builder, would have liked to do more, but was also constrained by other members of the FOMC. Sam Bell provides some evidence for this in a can’t miss article on Kevin Warsh, who now appears to be a front-runner for the Fed Chair job, who was still worried about inflation pressures even after Lehman Brothers failed in 2008…. Warsh is a lawyer by training… appointed to the Fed at age 35 with a light resume after his father-in-law, Ronald Lauder… likely influenced his selection with donations. Even as the economy was tanking in 2008 and 2009, Bell writes that “Warsh adopted a skeptical and increasingly oppositional posture. He doubted the Fed could do much good without creating much bigger problems.”

Much bigger problems? What could be a bigger problem than letting the economy burn in a financial crisis?

“In March 2009 he told his Fed colleagues that he was “quite uncomfortable with the idea of purchasing long-term Treasuries in size” because ‘if the Fed is perceived to be monetizing debt and serving as a buyer of last resort in the name of lowering risk-free rates, we could end up with higher rates and less credibility as a central bank.'” The Fed should hold off on more stimulus in the worst recession in 75 years because it might actually end up with higher rates and lose credibility? Why wouldn’t the Fed lose credibility if it was perceived as not fighting the recession? Warsh continued to warn about the dangers of both monetary and fiscal stimulus in 2010. Warsh was also far and away not the only crazy one at the Fed at that time. In 2011… Daniel Tarullo… told me he believed that Jean-Claude Trichet’s interest rate hikes in 2010–which are widely seen to have been premature and to have helped ignite the European Debt Crisis–were justified. These comments suggested to me that Tarullo was somewhere to the right of Genghis Khan on monetary policy. Then, there were also worthies like Richard Fisher, Often Wrong but Seldom Boring, who “warned throughout most of 2008 that inflation was the primary danger to the economy”.

And that, my friends, is how the Tea Party was born….

The FOMC is that it’s a job most people seem to not want to do for very long. It’s a revolving door. Most people will do it for 4-5 years, and then quit for greener pastures, as it is not a job that pays that much, particularly by the pornographic standards of finance and banking…. In part because it is a revolving door the Obama administration never took its appointments seriously. They left in place an FOMC made up mostly of Republicans, including staunch white male MBA-holding Republicans raised in the south in the 1960s. Obama’s economic advisors apparently did not see this as potentially problematic.

And, then we had Bernanke, who apparently still holds the view that economic growth in the US economy is still more-or-less OK. In 2011, I also had a conversation with Ben Bernanke…. He was actually surprised when I asked him why he wasn’t doing more, given that core inflation at the time was running around 1.4%. His response is that higher inflation wasn’t costless. But I didn’t see how inflation of 2% vs. 1.4% would be as costly as millions of people out of work. It seems, few people at the Fed were trying to influence him in the direction of doing more. What all of this evidence does is make the thesis of “Self-Induced Paralysis”, that the major problem with the US economy is overly tight monetary policy, more plausible…

Are economic boom-and-bust cycles stronger when capital is more available?

A worker stands in the early morning sunlight on a home construction project in Newtown, Pennsylvania, June 2012.

Sometimes when policymakers try to compensate for a deficiency in an economy, they can go overboard and create a problem with excess. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. economy appeared to be suffering from a lack of credit. Policymakers worked to solve that problem and increased the flow of credit. Credit growth did improve as a number of states deregulated their lending institutions, but at what cost? The short-term gains of an increase in credit supply led to a boom, but the medium-term effects aren’t entirely clear. Was the boom due to increased business investment that created a foundation for a stronger economy? Or did it lead instead to a boost in demand that was not sustainable in the long run?

In a new paper released yesterday as an Equitable Growth working paper, economists Atif Mian of Princeton University, Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago, and Emil Verner, also of Princeton, show the potential downsides for an economy when credit growth jumps upward.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States went through a period of banking deregulation, letting banks from different states compete in each others’ markets. The result was increased access to capital as financial institutions decided to lend more. Importantly—at least for the empirical approach of this paper—the states didn’t deregulate all at once. The difference in timing allows Mian, Sufi, and Verner to tease out the impact of banking deregulation on states’ economies.

What they find is that the shock of increasing the supply of credit led to a more pronounced business cycle: a bigger boom during the 1982–1989 expansion and a stronger decline during the 1989–1992 recessionary period. How this happened was due primarily to where the credit flowed once the supply was increased. Let’s simplify their findings a bit here and assume there’s two main ways the credit could flow. The first is increased lending to businesses, which leads to more investment and higher productivity growth. The second is lending that took the form of loans to households, which strengthened local demand.

Mian, Sufi, and Verner’s results are more consistent with the second case. The increase in credit during this period is almost entirely channeled toward household loans in the form of real estate lending. States that deregulated early saw a much larger increase in household debt as well as bigger increases in home prices. At the same time, those states also had larger increases in employment in “non-tradable” sectors—think retail or construction—as well as stronger wage growth in those industries compared with tradable industries such as manufacturing. There was also stronger price growth in the non-tradable sectors.

All these factors made the recessions that followed the economic booms in that period more severe. The increased demand led to higher wages in the less productive non-tradable sector and higher prices in the non-tradable sector. The higher wages required more layoffs when the downturns hit, while higher prices in non-tradable industries meant that those states’ local economies were less competitive.

This pattern is familiar to anyone who’s paid attention to the state of the European economy in the 21st century. The introduction of the euro in 1999 increased credit flows to countries such as Greece and Spain, acting in a similar way to the increase in credit from deregulation in the United States in that earlier period. The result, at least in Spain, was a large boost to household debt and the construction industry, followed by a housing bust, recession, and a grindingly slow economic recovery.

It’s hard to tell at this point the long-term effects of credit-supply shocks, at least in the wake of banking deregulation in the United States four decades ago, because the estimates from Mian, Sufi, and Verner for the long-term effects aren’t precise enough to come to firm conclusions. Further research is needed. But this research should keep us alert to the very real possibility that increasing the supply of credit in an economy might not be everywhere and always a positive force.

Explaining the “What is equitable growth?” essay series

What is “equitable growth” and how do we measure it? This new recurring series asks economists, other researchers, and practitioners to explore these questions. Equitable growth means an economy that raises living standards for all families. We have seen decades of economic growth in the U.S.—commonly measured by GDP. Yet that success has not meant significant income growth for most American families. Clearly GDP doesn’t provide the full picture. How do we know we’re on the right track? There is little consensus around what specific of indicators are required to quantify whether the economy is growing on behalf of all Americans. Is it a matter of looking at different already existing measures? Should new data using existing concepts of income and well-being be created? Do our concepts of what’s important to measure need updating as well? A better understanding of equitable growth—and how to measure it—can improve our understanding, inform decisions and lead to better outcomes for all.

The “What is equitable growth” series of essays

Why current definitions of family income are misleading, and why this matters for measures of inequality
By Nancy Folbre, director of the program on gender and care work at the Political Economy Research Center at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Improving the measurement and understanding of economic inequality in the United States
By Robert Solow, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.