There is increasing evidence of monopsony power in labor markets, with implications of lower wages and higher inequality. One popular policy recommendation is to constrain such monopsony power through more organized unions of workers, such as in local bargaining councils—collections of trade unions and employers representing specific industry-regions that consultatively bargain over and set minimum wages and working conditions for those industry-regions. This project will study the effect of such “sectoral bargaining” using South African data. Using matched employer-employee tax data from the South African Revenue Service, Bassier will match these agreements to firms as demarcated by industry and location. There are currently 39 legally recognized bargaining councils in South Africa, each covering a specific industry-region. Bargaining councils are estimated to cover 40 percent of workers in the formal sector in South Africa, concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport industries in addition to covering the public sector. This research could give insight into how sectoral bargaining could improve worker power and mitigate the effects of monopsonistic labor markets.

Johnson and Levine seek to understand how enforcement of government safety regulations affects workers’ wages and how the effect differs across groups of workers based on income, race, and ethnicity in the United States. While prior work focused on whether inspections lower subsequent workplace injuries and affect overall establishment payroll, scholars don’t know much, if anything, about the impact of inspections on individual workers’ wages. If regulatory enforcement lowers wages at the same time it improves health and safety, then the overall effects on worker well-being may be mixed. The two researchers will utilize the randomness of inspections by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. This setting offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of inspections as if examining a randomized controlled trial. Johnson and Levine plan to compare the trajectories of establishments (and workers at those establishments) randomly selected for inspection to those eligible but not selected for inspection. Inspection data will be linked to the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data series. In addition to yielding new evidence about the impact of safety and health regulatory enforcement on workers’ wages, this work also has the potential to contribute to the current literature on monopsony power in labor markets by investigating whether the effect of inspections on wages varies by local labor market concentration.

Surveillance is increasing in almost all areas of U.S. society. In formerly incarcerated Black men’s lives, surveillance represents a pervasive threat that operates through both techniques and technologies. Research shows that fear of surveillance leads formerly incarcerated Black men to avoid vital economic institutions. Prior research also finds that a criminal record diminishes Black men’s employment prospects. This research will extend the literature by examining how a criminal record operates as a credential that enables work but limits upward mobility by pulling ex-offenders into community-based, low-quality crime prevention jobs and also constrains work through surveillance practices that reinforce the stigma of the criminal record. This qualitative work will utilize archival, interview, and ethnographic methods and focus on Black men in the Englewood neighborhood of Chicago. This research seeks to demonstrate the often-invisible ways that surveillance mechanisms reproduce racial inequalities, advancing our theoretical understanding of how surveillance mediates access to socioeconomic resources, and providing insight into substantive interventions.

A growing body of evidence suggests that monopsony power is an important feature of the low-wage labor market. One reason why employers have some degree of wage-setting power is that jobs are differentiated, meaning workers differently value certain “amenities.” Existing research shows the valuation of nonwage characteristics such as control over schedules. Yet more evidence is needed to understand how nonwage amenities contribute to workplace power. This research will use a Facebook survey of workers at Walmart Inc. to shed new light on the degree of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market and the role of amenities in monopsony. The survey presents Walmart workers with hypothetical job offers, with random wage draws, to estimate the quit elasticity. This can be translated into the firm-specific labor supply curve, a measure of the degree of monopsony. Dube will then ask how amenities other than wages at the job affect quits, specifically using a regression framework to scale those factors into a money-metric valuation of different amenities. He will then zoom into "dignity at work" as a specific type of amenity and will test whether minimum wages may affect amenity provision by firms.

This project seeks to determine the overall impact of Walmart supercenters on local employment and earnings, and more generally on the competitive structure of affected local labor markets. The research design exploits the fact that Walmart Inc. attempted to place a supercenter in 39 counties but was prevented from doing so as the result of local efforts. These counties are compared to those where a supercenter was opened. Data on employment and earnings is gathered from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, and county-by-year labor force data from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics, both from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Preliminary results show that the entry of Walmart supercenters caused significant reductions in aggregate local employment and earnings, with retail employment increasing immediately upon entry before largely reverting to pre-entry levels. This research will help us understand how large employers can exercise monopsony power locally in the market for less-skilled labor and what the consequences are for workers.

Fine, Galvin, Round, and Shepherd seek to understand the relationship between region, race, state enforcement capacities, and minimum wage violations in the United States, and what the mechanisms are by which weaker state enforcement capacities might produce a higher incidence of minimum wage violations. This exploratory, theory-building project involves three major empirical components. First, the four researchers will improve upon, merge, and expand separate datasets they previously compiled on subnational labor standards enforcement capacity to create a novel and flexible database of all the enforcement capacities of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Data and coding rules will be made fully transparent to enable future researchers to use whichever combination of codes best suits their particular research questions. Second, the researchers will use CPS-MORG data to estimate the minimum wage violation rate in every state and region of the United States. Third, they will use exploratory, in-depth comparative case studies to identify and theorize a repertoire of mechanisms linking the legacy of slavery and the post-slavery racialized economy in the South to weak state enforcement capacity and minimum wage violations in order to understand the role of federalism in creating and maintaining Black-White racial disparities.