Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Selling Feelings

Must-Read: So how do we build an information-age economy in which producers have incentives to learn as much as they can about consumers to successfully anticipate them without also giving them an even bigger incentive and capability to deceive them?

Ben Thompson: Selling Feelings: “The model is broadly applicable…

…I wrote two weeks ago about how the future of publishing will not be about monetizing pure words but rather about using words to gain fans that can be monetized through other harder-to-discover media. Time and attention remain precious commodities…. Earning trust in one area gives you the right to make money from it in another…. Software generally should be seen as a lever to solutions that are much more meaningful to customers…. Software is infinitely copyable: better to use that quality to your advantage than to base your business model on fighting gravity….

Business is difficult–it was difficult before the Internet, and it’s difficult now–but the nature of the difficulty has changed. Distribution used to be the hardest… but now… time and money… must instead be invested in getting even closer to customers and more finely attuned to exactly why they are spending their money on you…. Create the conditions where the need might manifest itself and then meet that need, and not only will your business succeed, it will, in all likelihood, succeed to an even greater extent than the physically-limited lowest common denominator winners from the ‘good old days.’

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Unlearning Economics

Must-Read: Noah Smith is pushing me towards thinking that Econ 1 needs to teach a lot more than supply-and-demand plus macroeconomic externalities that can be dealt with by stabilizing monetary and maybe fiscal policy…

Noah Smith: Unlearning Economics: “Right now we’re in the middle of an empirical revolution in econ, and…

…unsurprisingly–a ton of standard, common theories are just not matching reality very well. For example: 1…. Minimum wages should harm employment in the short term. But the data shows that they probably don’t. 2…. A big influx of immigrants should depress the wages of native-born workers of comparable skill. But the data shows… the effect is very small.  3…. Welfare programs barely reduce observable work effort. 4…. Social norms (or morals, broadly conceived) matter to people…. The stuff… [of] Econ 101… are being smacked down by the heavy hand of new data. We’re slowly unlearning economics…. Econ 101 courses around the country probably need an overhaul…. Teachers should still teach the simple, classic theories that the new facts are beginning to kill… but mainly as a way to show how data can tell us when we’re wrong.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models

Paul Krugman talks to journalists during a news conference. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

Must-Read: A key factor Krugman omits in which standard Hicksian-inclined economists’ predictions have fallen down: the length of the short run. The length of the short run was supposed to be a small multiple of typical contract duration in the economy–perhaps six years in an economy characterized by three-year labor contracts, and perhaps three years in an economy in which workers and employers made decisions on an annual cycle. After that time, nominal prices and wages were supposed to have adjusted enough to nominal aggregates that the economy either would be at or would be well on the road to its long-run full-employment configuration. Moreover, the fact that price inertia was of limited duration combined with forward-looking financial markets and investment-profitability decisions to greatly damp short-run shortfalls of employment and production from full employment and sustainable potential.

It sounded good in theory. It has not proved true in reality since 2007:

Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models: “If you came into the crisis with a broadly Hicksian view of aggregate demand…

…you did quite well… [arguing] that as long as we were at the zero lower bound massive increases in the monetary base wouldn’t be inflationary [and would have near-zero effects on broader aggregates]… budget deficits would not drive up interest rates… large multipliers from fiscal policy…. What hasn’t worked nearly as well is our understanding of aggregate supply… the absence of deflation… [of] the “clockwise spirals”… in inflation-unemployment space as evidence for… Friedman-Phelps…. The other big problem is the dramatic drop in… potential output… correlated with the depth of cyclical slumps….

[The] policy moral[?]… Central banks focused on stable inflation may think they’re doing a good job… when they are actually failing…. Fiscal contraction in a liquidity trap seems… absolutely terrible for the long-run as well as the short-run, and quite possibly counterproductive even in purely [debt burden] terms…. I don’t think even Hicksian-inclined economists have taken all of this sufficiently into account.

Weekend Reading: Paul Krugman (1997): Capitalism’s Mysterious Triumph

Paul Krugman delivers a speech at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Sunday, June 20, 2010. (AP Photo/Heribert Proepper)

Paul Krugman (1997): Capitalism’s Mysterious Triumph: “SYNOPSIS: Communism failed because of an inability to provide a sustaining reason for existence; only under crisis could it work.

Recently my local public television station has been showing a fascinating series entitled ‘Russia’s War’ – a history, produced in Russia, of the Soviet Union’s struggle in World War II. It is not a pretty story: the producers do not hesitate to tell the full story of Stalin’s brutality, and they do not try to mask the ugliness of war with patriotic romanticism. Yet this stark honesty in a way makes the account of the Soviet Union’s wartime achievement all the more impressive.

The Soviet Union did not win through military genius: most of its trained officers had been purged in political witch-hunts, and while the war eventually threw up a new set of leaders, they were competent rather than brilliant – and their advice was often overruled by a dictator whose military judgement was usually disastrous. Russian soldiers fought with dogged heroism – but then so did the Germans. Why did the Russians prevail?

The answer is surprising, given the way the 20th century has actually turned out. The Soviet triumph in World War II was, above all, a victory of production. Despite huge losses in the first months of the war, despite mass dislocations of population and the German occupation of many of the country’s key manufacturing centers, Soviet industry managed to build tanks, artillery, and aircraft that were technologically a match for Germany’s weapons, and to do so at a rate that consistently exceeded anything their opponents thought was possible. Indeed, the decisive German defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk came about precisely because the Germans launched offensives against what they imagined to be a weaker opponent, and were taken by surprise when counterattacked by thousands of tanks whose existence they had never suspected.

What does this have to do with the world of 1997? Well, nowadays we take the triumph of capitalism as something preordained by the superiority of our economic system. After all, it now seems obvious to everyone except North Korea and Cuba that a market economy is vastly more productive than one controlled from the center – and the Cuban economy is imploding, while the North Koreans are quite literally starving to death.

Moreover, every time a Communist regime collapses, it turns out that the actual state of the economy it governed was far worse than anyone had imagined. For example, typical estimates of the GDP of East Germany before the old regime collapsed put its real GDP per capita at 70 or 80 percent of the West German level – meaning that East Germany was actually richer than some regions in the West. Yet after the fall of the Berlin Wall, visiting Westerners found something that looked like a Third World economy, with antiquated factories (and disastrous environmental problems) producing consumer goods of ludicrously low quality (like the notorious East German Trabant, an automobile that makes a Honda or Ford seem like a Mercedes). We used to think that the Soviet Union had an economy about half as large as America’s, that is, bigger than Japan’s; nowadays Russia seems to have less economic power than, say, Italy. We used to think that there was a real technological race between socialism and capitalism; nowadays the symbol of Russian technology is the hapless Mir space station. It seems obvious to many people in retrospect that the productive and technological triumphs that Communists used to claim – all those heroic photgraphs of dams and posters of muscular steelworkers – were mere propaganda; in reality, we think we have learned, socialism is a system that just can’t deliver the goods, while capitalism is a system that can.

But one lesson of ‘Russia’s War’ is that matters are not that simple. Were the supposed productive triumphs of the Soviet Union under Stalin merely a hoax? Tell that to the soldiers of Germany’s Army Group Center – the few who survived. The fact is that Stalin did transform Russia into a massive industrial power – a power tested in the most unambiguous way imaginable. And his successors did achieve real technological triumphs – not just showy triumphs like sending cosmonauts into orbit, but the creation of a highly sophisticated scientific and engineering establishment. True, Russia was never any good at producing high-quality consumer goods. But it was not always the bumbling, incompetent system we now imagine.

What this means is that the collapse of Communism and the triumph of capitalism need more of an explanation than the stories we usually hear. It is not enough to explain all the reasons why a market economy is more efficient than a centrally planned one. Those explanations are basically right – but the question is why a system that functioned well enough to compete with capitalism in the 1940s and 50s fell apart in the 1980s. What went wrong?

One possible answer is that changing technology changed the rules. When the communist leader Joseph Dzhugashvili changed his name to Stalin – ‘man of steel’ – he reflected the times in which he lived, an era in which heavy industry ruled, in which giant steel plants were the symbol of progress.

These days, of course, steel-producing regions throughout the world – not just in the old Soviet Union – are depressed; try visiting southeastern Belgium.And it’s not just steel: the age when countries or companies grew rich by making heavy products in big factories seems to have passed. One can make a case that whereas old-fashioned heavy industry was susceptible to central planning, new technologies, especially in microelectronics, favor free-wheeling competition over centralized control.

Russia could at least appear to hold its own in a technological race defined by the ability to build giant rockets; it was left completely flatfooted when the West started putting powerful computers on a chip. In fact, in the last few years even Japan’s great corporations have started to look a bit like dinosaurs, lumbering helplessly in pursuit of the little startups of Silicon Valley.

Another possible answer is that capitalism triumphed because of ‘globalization’ – a process everyone talks about but which we really don’t fully understand. For some reason – perhaps some synergistic interaction among declining tariffs, cheaper transportation, and better communications – it has become possible in the last generation for many countries to industrialize rapidly, not through massive programs of government-led investment, but simply by throwing themselves open to the world market and letting events take their course. Socialist economies could not avail themselves of this new opportunity, and so they began to fall beind instead of catching up.

But neither technological change nor globalization can explain the fact that socialist economies did not merely lag the West: they actually went into decline, and then collapse. Why couldn’t they at least hold on to what they had?

I don’t think anyone really knows the answer, but let me make a conjecture: the basic problem was not technical, but moral. Communism failed as an economic system because people stopped believing in it, not the other way around.

A market system, of course, works whether people believe in it or not. You may dislike capitalism, even feel that as a system it will eventually fail, yet do your job well because your family needs the money you earn. Capitalism can run, even flourish, in a society of selfish cynics. But a non-market economy cannot. The personal incentives for workers to do their jobs well, for managers to make good decisions, are simply too weak.

In the later years of the Soviet Union, workers knew that they would be paid regardless of how hard they tried; managers knew that promotions would depend more on political connections than on performance; and nobody was offered rewards large enough to justify taking unpopular positions or any sort of serious risk. (There can’t have been more than a few dozen people in the Soviet Union – all of them politicians – who had the kind of lavish life style enjoyed by tens of thousands of successful entrepreneurs and executives in the United States). So why did the system ever work? Because people believed in it. I don’t mean that people went singing to their jobs, praising the motherland. I do mean that they did not take as much advantage of the system as they might have (and did, in the system’s later years). And I also mean that because people in authority believed in the system, they were willing to impose brutal punishments on those who did try to take advantage. (Stalin used to shoot unsuccessful generals).

We see this kind of thing all the time, in microcosm. The market does not require people to believe in it; but the centrally planned economies that live inside a market economy, known as corporations, do. Everybody knows that financial incentives alone are not enough to make a company succeed; it must also build morale, a sense of mission, which makes people work at least somewhat for the good of the company rather than think only of what is good for them. Luckily, under capitalism an individual company can fail without taking the whole society down with it – or it can be reformed without a bloody revolution.

Why did people stop believing in socialism? Part of the answer is simply the passage of time: you can’t expect revolutionary fervor to last for 70 years. But perhaps also the unexpected resurgence of capitalism played a role. By the 1980s Russia’s elite was all too aware that the country, instead of overtaking the capitalist nations, was slipping behind – that Russia was failing to take advantage of new technology, that if anyone was challenging the West it was the rising nations of Asia. Communism lost any claim to the mandate of history well before it actually fell apart, and perhaps that is why it fell apart.

In the end, then, capitalism triumphed because it is a system that is robust to cynicism, that assumes that each man is out for himself. For much of the past century and a half men have dreamed of something better, of an economy that drew on man’s better nature. But dreams, it turns out, can’t keep a system going over the long term; selfishness can.

A Powerful Intellectual Stumbling Block: The Belief that the Market Can Only Be Failed

Over at Project Syndicate: The Trouble with Interest Rates: Of all the strange and novel economic doctrines propounded since 2007, Stanford’s John Taylor has a good claim to propounding the strangest: In his view, the low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies of North Atlantic and Japanese central banks are like:

imposing an interest-rate ceiling on the longer-term market… much like the effect of a price ceiling in a [housing] rental market…. [This] decline in credit availability, reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase unemployment, a classic unintended consequence…”

When you think about it, this analogy makes no sense at all.

When a government agency imposes a rent-control ceiling, it:

  • makes it illegal for renters to pay or landlords to collect more than the ceiling rent;
  • thus leaves a number of potential landlords willing but unable to rent apartments and a number of potential renters willing but unable to offer to pay more than the rent-control ceiling.

When a central bank reduces long-term interest rates via current and expected future open-market operations, it:

  • does not keep any potential lenders who wish to lend at higher than the current interest rate from offering to do so;
  • does not keep any potential borrowers who wish from taking up such an offer;
  • it is just that no borrowers wish to do so.

The reason we dislike rent-control ceilings–that it stops transactions both buyers and sellers wish to undertake from taking place–is simply absent.

So why would anyone claim that low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies are like rent control?

I think that the real path of reasoning is this:

  1. John Taylor, and the others claiming that central banks are committing unnatural acts by controlling the interest rate, feel a deep sense of wrongness about the current level of interest rates.
  2. John Taylor and his allies believe that whenever a price like the interest rate is “wrong”, it must be because the government has done it–that the free market cannot fail, but can only be failed.
  3. Thus the task is to solve the intellectual puzzle by figuring out what the government has done to make the current level of the interest rate so wrong.
  4. Therefore any argument that government policy is in fact appropriate can only be a red herring.
  5. And the analogy to rent control is a possible solution to the intellectual puzzle.

If I am correct here, then the rest of us will never convince John Taylor and company.

Arguments that central banks are doing the best they can in a horrible situation require entertaining the possibility that markets are not perfect and can fail. And that they will never do. We have seen this in action: Five years ago John Taylor and company were certain that Ben Bernanke’s interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies risked “currency debasement and inflation”. The failure of those predictions has not led John Taylor or any other of the Republican worthy signatories of their “Open Letter to Ben Bernanke” to rethink and consider that perhaps Bernanke knows something about monetary economics. Instead, they seek another theory–the price-control theory–for why the government is doing it wrong.

Thus all we can do is repeat, over and over again, what both logic and evidence tell us:

  • That with the current configuration of fiscal policy, North Atlantic monetary policy is not too loose but if anything too restrictive.
  • That as far as the real interest rate is concerned, the “‘natural rate’… that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations”, as Milton Freidman would have put it, is lower than the one current monetary policy gives us.
  • That our economies’ inertial expectations and contracting structures have combined with monetary policy to give us nominal interest and inflation rates that are distorted, yes–but an interest rate that is too high and an inflation rate that is too low relative to what the economy wants and needs, and what a free-market flexible-price economy in a proper equilibrium would deliver.

Why does the North Atlantic economy right now want and need such a low real interest rate for its proper equilibrium? And for how long will it want and need this anomalous and disturbing interest-rate configuration? These are deep and unsettled questions involving, as Olivier Blanchard puts it, “dark corners” where economists’ writings have so far shed much too little light.

Hold on tight to this: There is a wrongness, but the wrongness is not in what central banks have done, but rather in the situation that has been handed to them for them to deal with.

Review of Ben Friedman’s “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth”: Hoisted from the Archives from Ten Years Ago/The Honest Broker

“The Effects of Good Government,” painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti

Hoisted from the Archives from Ten Years Ago: Ben Friedman’s, “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth”: Ten years ago, my review of Ben Friedman’s very nice The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth was up at Harvard Magazine:

Growth is Good: An economist’s take on the moral consequences of material progress

Economists have always been very good at detailing the material consequences of modern economic growth. It makes us taller: we are perhaps seven inches taller than our preindustrial ancestors. It makes us healthier: babies today have life expectancies in the seventies, not the twenties (and more than half that improvement is not directly related to better medical technology, narrowly defined). It provides us with leisure: eight-hour workdays (rather than ‘Man’s work is from sun to sun, and woman’s work is never done.’) It provides us with enough clothing that we are not cold, enough shelter that we are not wet, and enough food that we are not hungry. It provides us with amusements and diversions, so that there is more to do in the evenings than huddle around the village campfire and listen yet again to that blind poet from the other side of the Aegean tell the only long story he knows—the one about Achilles and Agamemnon. As time passes, what were luxuries become, first, conveniences, and then necessities; what were utopian dreams become first luxuries and then conveniences; and what was unimagined even in wild fantasy becomes first utopian dreams and then luxuries.

Economists have been less good at detailing the moral consequences of economic growth. There are occasional apothegms: John Maynard Keynes observed that it is better for a man to tyrannize over his bank balance than his fellows (a rich society has an upper class that focuses on its wealth as power-over-nature, rather than on its power as power-over-people). Adam Smith wrote about how wealth made it attractive for the British aristocracy to abandon their feudal armies and private wars and move to London to take up positions in society and at court. Voltaire (who not even I can claim was an economist) observed that people who in other circumstances would try to kill each other for worshipping the wrong god (or the right god in the wrong way) were perfectly polite and civil when they met each other as potential trading partners on the floor of the London Exchange. Albert Hirschman (who is an economist) wrote a brilliant little book, The Passions and the Interests, about the eighteenth-century idea that commercial society made humans ‘sweet’: polite, courteous, and civilized, viewing one another as potential partners in mutually beneficial market exchanges, rather than as clan members to be helped, clan enemies to be killed, or strangers to be robbed. But focus on the moral consequences of economic growth has—from the economists’ side, at least—been rare.

Benjamin M. Friedman ’66, Jf ’71, Ph.D. ’71, Maier professor of political economy, now fills in this gap: he makes a powerful argument that—politically and sociologically—modern society is a bicycle, with economic growth being the forward momentum that keeps the wheels spinning. As long as the wheels of a bicycle are spinning rapidly, it is a very stable vehicle indeed. But, he argues, when the wheels stop—even as the result of economic stagnation, rather than a downturn or a depression—political democracy, individual liberty, and social tolerance are then greatly at risk even in countries where the absolute level of material prosperity remains high….
Consider just one of his examples—a calculation he picks up from his colleague Alberto Alesina, Ropes professor of political economy, and others: in an average country in the late twentieth century, real per capita income is falling by 1.4 percent in the year in which a military coup occurs; it is rising by 1.4 percent in the year in which there is a legitimate constitutional transfer of political power; and it is rising by 2.7 percent in the year in which no major transfer of political power takes place. If you want all kinds of non-economic good things, Friedman says—like openness of opportunity, tolerance, economic and social mobility, fairness, and democracy—rapid economic growth makes it much, much easier to get them; and economic stagnation makes getting and maintaining them nearly impossible.

The book is a delight to read, probing relatively deeply into individual topics and yet managing to hurry along from discussions of political order in Africa to economic growth and the environment, to growth and equality, to the Enlightenment thinkers of eighteenth-century Europe, to the twentieth-century histories of the major European countries, to a host of other subjects. Yet each topic’s relationship to the central thesis of the book is clear: the subchapters show the virtuous circles (by which economic growth and sociopolitical progress and liberty reinforce each other) and the vicious circles (by which stagnation breeds violence and dictatorship) in action. Where growth is rapid, the movement toward democracy is easier and societies become freer and more tolerant. And societies that are free and more tolerant (albeit not necessarily democratic) find it easier to attain rapid economic growth.

Friedman is not afraid to charge head-on at the major twentieth-century counterexample to his thesis: the Great Depression in the United States. Elsewhere in the world, that catastrophe offers no challenge to his point of view. Rising unemployment and declining incomes in Japan in the 1930s certainly played a role in the assassinations and silent coups by which that country went from a functioning constitutional monarchy with representative institutions in 1930 to a fascist military dictatorship in 1940—a dictatorship that, tied down in a quagmire of a land war in Asia as a result of its attack on China, thought it was a good idea to attack, and thus add to its enemies, the two superpowers of Britain and the United States. In western Europe the calculus is equally simple: no Great Depression, no Hitler. The saddest book on my shelf is a 1928 volume called Republican Germany: An Economic and Political Survey, the thesis of which is that after a decade of post-World War I political turmoil, Germany had finally become a stable, legitimate, democratic republic. And only the fact that the Great Depression came and offered Hitler his opportunity made it wrong.

In the United States, however, things were different—and not favorable to Friedman’s broad thesis. The 1930s were an extraordinarily painful economic shock to this country, but also a decade during which our nation strengthened its commitment to the liberal values that are its best nature. Admittedly, things might have gone otherwise: consider Huey Long in Louisiana, Father Coughlin over the airwaves, California’s treatment of Depression-era migrants from other states that we read about today only in The Grapes of Wrath, and the white-hot hatred for Roosevelt as a class traitor that puts today’s shrill, unbalanced critics of Bush and Clinton in the shade. (Up until his dying day six months ago, my 98-year-old grandfather would still say the country was lucky to have survived FDR.) All these examples show us signs of an America that could have gone the other way in the 1930s. Yet, as Friedman writes, ‘America during the Great Depression strengthened its commitment to these positive values [of openness, tolerance, and democracy], and, moreover, did so in ways that proved lasting.’ The New Deal was a:

chaos of experimentation…to mobilize the effective energy of government to spread economic opportunity as widely as possible—to include those whom birth and the tide of events had left out of the distribution of America’s economic dividends. Rather than seeking scapegoats to exclude…the route America took in the 1930s was deliberately pluralist and inclusive, seeking input and participation from a more diverse collection of constituencies than ever before. And the intent of all this political activism was not just restored economic prosperity but more equal economic opportunity.

The line I use in my American economic-history lectures starts by suggesting that before the Great Depression, America’s rural, small town, and urban (and overwhelmingly Protestant) middle classes—farmers, druggists, merchants, and so forth—did not really believe that they had interests in common with the non-white rural and the not-quite-white (and Jewish and Catholic) urban-immigrant working classes. The Great Depression impoverished enough people who thought they had it made to convince enough of the middle class that they had enough interests in common with the working class to make it worthwhile to push for equality of opportunity for everyone—or at least for some people who weren’t white, northern-European Protestants. This is my best guess, but it is only a guess. Friedman does not really know why the Great Depression did not make America a less democratic, less tolerant, less free country. But he does not apologize: he concludes his chapter by quoting the noted Harvard economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron—‘Historical hypotheses are not… universal…. They cannot be falsified by a single exception.’

Friedman has not written his version of economic history and moral philosophy just for the sake of antiquarians like me who like to read about the strange and faraway places that are our own past. He takes historical patterns and draws from them immediate and powerful lessons for the present.

Consider China. There are those today in Washington, D.C., who look forward to a future in which China is America’s enemy: they believe it will in some way increase our ‘national greatness’ to wage a new Cold War in Asia—albeit against an enemy weaker than Stalin’s Soviet Union was. There are those in Vice President Cheney’s office who think that trade with China is a bad idea: it creates a pro-China lobby that will stop any attempts by the United States to slow down China’s growth and acquisition of technology. Better, they think, to try to keep China as poor and barefoot as possible for as long as possible.

From Friedman’s perspective—and from mine—this is simply insane. In all likelihood, China a century from now will be a full-fledged post-industrial superpower whatever the policies of the United States. Do you want to maximize the likelihood that that superpower will have a representative government presiding over an open, free society? Then work to maximize economic growth, says Friedman. (And I would add: Does it really improve the national security of the United States for schoolchildren in China to be taught that the United States sought to keep them as poor as possible for as long as possible?)

In fact, the China policy of the Clinton administration was to do whatever we could to speed China’s growth in the expectation that rapid economic growth will introduce the political cuckoo’s egg of democracy into the nest. A rapidly growing, prosperous middle class will be interested in liberty and opportunity, and will be a much more powerful force for democratization and personal freedom in China than a battalion of lecturing neoconservative think-tanks or a host of remotely guided cruise missiles.

Consider the developing world more broadly. Friedman is—as I am—a card-carrying neoliberal. We economists do not understand very much about how knowledge of modern technologies and effective organizations and institutions diffuses from region to region around the globe. We do know that it diffuses appallingly slowly: there are still three billion people throughout the world whose lives are largely preindustrial (even if theyare far above the Malthusian poverty in which most of our preindustrial ancestors lived). We suspect that maximizing contact—economic, social, and cultural—is a powerful way to transfer ideas and practices. Hence the neoliberal imperative: do whatever you can to maximize economic growth in the developing world, and hope that rapid growth generates in its train the strong local pressures for social, environmental, cultural, and political advance that are needed if non-economic forms of progress are to be stable and durable.

There is a criticism of the neoliberal view that holds that higher material incomes cannot be the cure to poverty, for poverty is also a lack of voice in society, a lack of security in one’s position, and a lack of respect. With all this Friedman agrees. But he adds that faster material progress is the best way to generate pressures to produce voice, security, and respect.

Hence the neoliberal imperative: lower barriers to trade and contact; lower barriers of all kinds; lower barriers in the expectation that faster economic growth will itself generate countervailing pressures that will undo and cure the bad social and distributional side-effects of faster growth. Friedman’s reading of the moral consequences of economic growth provides a powerful piece of support to this neoliberal imperative. (Support so powerful, in fact, that Joseph E. Stiglitz, our Nobel Prize-winning non-neoliberal friend, has an attack on The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth in the November-December 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs.)

Consider the United States today. For a generation now, the benefits of economic growth have been concentrated in those slots in American society that are at or near the top. To the extent that any of America’s working class is richer today in inflation-adjusted terms than the nation’s workers were in the early 1970s, it is because today’s households have fewer children and a greater proportion of their members out earning money. America’s middle class today does live better than the middle class lived in 1970 (and a bunch of the children of the 1970s working class are in today’s middle class). But today the gap between America’s middle class and its upper class yawns extremely wide, at levels not seen since before the stock market crash of 1929.

Friedman is very worried that unequally distributed prosperity is not really prosperity at all. During the past generation we have seen the U.S. government place its thumb on the scales on the side of making the distribution of income and wealth in America more unequal. Some of this has been for reasons of economic efficiency: withdrawing the regulatory umbrellas that allowed some unions to turn blue-collar jobs into occupations with middle-class salaries, or reducing tax rates while eliminating loopholes. Some has been for reasons of moral purity: the replacement of the idea that being a single mother raising children was an important social task that deserved support with the idea that single mothers ought to work. Some is simply a naked wealth grab by the politically powerful.

What will the moral consequences of unequally distributed prosperity be? Friedman fears, and perhaps for good reason, that they will resemble the consequences of economic stagnation. People who feel that they are living no better, or not much better, than their parents will search for enemies: Hollywood writers, foreigners, people of ‘loose’ morals, and Harvard graduates. And America will become a less free and less democratic society. The argument follows the lines of the argument in Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? Those for whom the American market economy is not delivering increasing prosperity do not reach for the right answer: policies to strengthen the safety net, provide security through social insurance, and improve opportunity through better education. Instead, they reach for the wrong answers: closing down society and denouncing enemies—anti-Hollywoodism as the social democracy of fools, one might say.

I find myself more optimistic. This is not to say that I disagree with the political program for America today that can be drawn out of Friedman’s book: the pro-growth, pro-opportunity, pro-social-insurance policies of today’s national Democratic Party are mother’s milk to me. But I do not think we look forward to the generation of stagnation in the working and the middle classes that Friedman fears. Yes, the past generation has been a distributional disaster for America. Yes, at some point in the future the ‘outsourcing’ of jobs made possible by modern telecommunications and computer technologies will produce enormous structural change in the American economy. But the population of the United States is growing slowly. The desirability of the United States as a place in which to locate economic activity is growing rapidly: the underlying engine of technological progress is spinning faster than it has in at least a generation. I see rising working- and middle-class incomes in America during the next generation generating what is in Friedman’s terms a virtuous, not a vicious, circle.

Must-Read: Eric Chyn: Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public Housing Demolition on Labor Market Outcomes of Children

Implosion of the former Lexington Terrace housing projects near downtown Baltimore, Saturday, July 27, 1996. (AP Photo/Gary Sussman)

Must-Read: Huh. It now looks like the huge benefits that got us excited back in the “moving to opportunity” policy days may have been an underestimate:

Eric Chyn: Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public Housing Demolition on Labor Market Outcomes of Children: “This paper provides new evidence on the effects of moving out of disadvantaged neighborhoods…

…on the long-run economic outcomes of children…. Public housing demolitions in Chicago… forced households to relocate to private market housing using vouchers…. Compar[ing] adult outcomes of children displaced by demolition to their peers who lived in nearby public housing that was not demolished[,] displaced children are 9 percent more likely to be employed and earn 16 percent more as adults…

Must-Reads Up to Mid-Morning on November 27, 2015

  • Must-Read: Adam Posen: Some Big Changes in Macroeconomic Thinking from Lawrence Summers
  • Refet S. Gürkaynak and Troy Davig: Central Bankers as Policymakers of Last Resort: “Central banks… have been shouldering ever-increasing policy burdens beyond their core mandate…. The end result is that tools available to the central bank may be used excessively but ineffectively…” :: I would say central bankers should be (a) more modest, but also (b) commit not to price stability but to making Say’s Law true in practice…
  • Charles Arthur: Artificial Intelligence: “‘Homo sapiens will be split into a handful of gods and the rest of us’…” :: Just what is it that makes some personal service jobs–personal-care attendant, housekeeper–low-status and Low-pay, while keeping others–investment manager who fails to beat the indexes–high status and high pay?
  • Jeffry Frieden: ‘The Money Makers,’ by Eric Rauchway: “For the next 10 years, even as war clouds gathered and then as war raged, American and British policy makers, led by John Maynard Keynes and the United States Treasury official Harry Dexter White, planned a new international monetary order…” :: Few people today realize the extent to which the New Deal was not ideological or theoretical but rather their opposites: pragmatic. And where the New Deal was ideological or theoretical, it tended to be the least successful–witness Thurman Arnold and utilities, or Roosevelt’s austerian turn in 1937-1938.
  • William Poole: Don’t Blame the Fed for Low Rates: “Long-term rates reflect weak job creation and credit demand, both a result of President Obama’s poor economic stewardship…” :: The factors he points to… would… produce both (a) a fall in interest rates and (b) a fall in the equity values of established companies. We have the first. We do not have the second…

Must-Read: Adam Posen: Some Big Changes in Macroeconomic Thinking from Lawrence Summers

Must-Read: Adam Posen: Some Big Changes in Macroeconomic Thinking from Lawrence Summers: “In the United States, since 1965, there has been a tripling of the non-employment rate…

…for men… 24 and 54… similar trends… elsewhere…. It is a real puzzle to observe simultaneously multi-year trends of rising non-employment of low-skilled workers and declining measured productivity growth. Either we need a new understanding, or one of these observed patterns is ill-founded or misleading…. Unless we can somehow transform that sustained lower demand for workers into the widespread leisure of the sort imagined by Keynes and some science fiction writers, with the income redistribution to support it, I would think this is very bad news for social stability and technological progress….

Unmeasured quality improvement… [the] fraction of the economy… [susceptible] has been rising, so the amount of mismeasurement (and therefore productivity understatement) would be rising…. [Thus] inflation is lower than even its currently low level–and that has the consequence that real interest rates are higher, so monetary policy at present is tighter… [and] farther away from its mandated inflation target…

Recessions in the OECD… in most cases the level of GDP is lower five to ten years afterward than any prerecession forecast or trend…. “The classic model of cyclical fluctuations… around the given trend is not the right model…. The preoccupation of macroeconomics should be on lower frequency fluctuations that have consequences over long periods of time….

Discussing… Abenomics’ results… I asked whether a message we should take from the Japanese experience is to avoid bad states of the economy at almost any cost…. [And] the very language we use to speak of business cycles, of trend growth rates, of recoveries of to those perhaps non-stationary trends, and so on–which reflects the underlying mental framework of most macroeconomists–would have to be rethought.

Must-Read: Refet S. Gürkaynak and Troy Davig: Central Bankers as Policymakers of Last Resort

Must-Read: So should central bankers be given more tools–conduct monetary/fiscal policy via “social credit” assignment of seigniorage to individuals and monopolize financial regulation? Or should central bankers focus on price stability and only price stability? I would say central bankers should be (a) more modest, but also (b) commit not to price stability but to making Say’s Law true in practice…

Refet S. Gürkaynak and Troy Davig: Central Bankers as Policymakers of Last Resort: “Central banks around the world have been shouldering ever-increasing policy burdens beyond their core mandate…

…of stabilising prices… without an accompanying expansion of their policy tools. They have become policymakers of last resort, residual claimants of macroeconomic policy. As central banks take on the duty of addressing policy concerns other than inflation–and consequently take the blame for not completely solving those problems–other policymakers get a free hand in pursuing alternative goals, which may not be aligned with social welfare. The end result is that tools available to the central bank may be used excessively but ineffectively….

As Orphanides (2013) highlights, the increase in central banks’ implicit mandates is widely visible. In the developed economies, this is most clearly manifested in central banks’ attempts to compensate for fiscal tightening after the Great Recession. More recently, attention has turned to using interest rate policy to promote financial stability. In developing and emerging market economies, central banks carry out policies to affect a long list of macroeconomic outcomes, including capital flows, exchange rates, bank loan growth rates, housing prices and the like, as well as keeping an eye on inflation. An implicit expectation that central banks will take on these objectives, along with their willingness to do so, runs the risk of producing inferior outcomes compared to when central banks mind their core business of fostering price stability…