Principles that Should Govern American Fiscal Policy

Employment Level 25 to 54 years FRED St Louis Fed

Well, that was a very interesting election night. Our failure in 2000 to introduce into the running code (as opposed to the specification document) of our constitution that electors switch votes so that the national popular vote winner wins the electoral college cost us dear in 2000, and may cost us even more today…

You may ask: How is one to judge what to do in such times? The answer is clear: As one has ever judged. Good and evil have not changed since yesteryear, nor are they one thing among Elves and another among Men. It is a human’s part to discern them, as much in the Golden Wood as in his own house. What would have been good policy yesterday would still be good policy today. What would have been bad policy yesterday would still be bad policy today. So we play our position.

I therefore set forth seven principles that should govern good technocratic fiscal policies that promise to enhance America’s societal well-being :

  • Preserve Our Credit
  • Our National Debt a National Blessing
  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low
  • International Agencies Agree
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment
  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich

  • Preserve Our Credit: President-elect Donald Trump has been told by many that our national debt is too high and dangerous. He has responded as one would expect a real estate developer would respond. He has proposed taking steps to shake the confidence of our creditors, and then to buy back our debt, at a heavy discount, thus removing the danger. This is a substantial misreading of the situation. Market confidence in the credit worthiness of the United States of America is an extremely valuable asset, from which we derive much benefit, and which it would be folly to throw away.

  • Our National Debt a National Blessing: In fact, at the moment, with interest rates where they are now and are expected to be for the foreseeable future, our national debt is not a burden but a blessing. It is not a drain on the Treasury but a source of wealth for the Treasury. If we do our accounts using a reasonable benchmark–setting our goal to be keeping our available physical space constant–we find that, at the levels of interest rates we see now and expect to see for the foreseeable future, a lower national that would not allow us to lower but would require us to raise taxes in order to maintain the given level of spending. The United States right now is not in the position of a cash-strapped borrower forced to pay interest. The United States right now is, rather, in the position of something like the medieval Medici bank, which people pay to safeguard their money.

  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low: The fact is that our national debt, right now, is not a burden but a profit center. That implies that, whatever you think of the long-term multi-generational fiscal outlook, right now our national debt is not too high but too low. That is the case unless one confidently anticipates a rapid and substantial increase in interest rates in the relatively near future. This was, in fact, one of the major lesson of the big article that Larry Summers and I wrote for the Brookings Institution back in 2012.

  • International Agencies Agree: Note that, after four years of argument, the IMF and other international agences agree with Larry and my technocratic judgment that right now our national debt is too low, and thus that good economic policy requires higher deficits right now, not budget balance.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (1), there are still substantial benefits to an economic policy stance, right now and for the foreseeable future as long as the global configuration of savings supply and investment demand is not transformed, with a larger deficit and tighter money and hence higher interest rates. Higher interest rates would restore the health of the banking sector. Higher interest rates might discourage the blowing of potentially dangerous bubbles. The drawback of raising interest rates–the reason that the Federal Reserve has not done so–is that it lowers employment. But if that reduction in employment is offset by an increase in the deficit that boosts employment, hit becomes a no-drawbacks policy.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (2), there are massive benefits to an economic policy stance of running larger deficits–the benefit of raising employment and making people richer, and making those people richer who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008.

  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich: If America does decide to run larger deficits, there are large benefits from choosing to do so by increasing government purchases than by cutting taxes, especially for the rich. Increasing government purchases puts to work and improves the lot of the people who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008. And cutting taxes–especially for the rich–has much smaller effects on the balance between savings and the capital inflow on the one hand and investment and government borrowing on the other. Since the effectiveness of the policy in putting people to work and in creating space for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to a healthy level without harming employment depends on this investment-savings balance, there is much more bang for a buck of government purchases than from a buck of tax cuts.

No. There Is Not One Chance in Seven the 2018Q4 Fed Funds Rate Will Be 4.75% or Higher

WTF?! A 15% chance that the Fed Funds Rate will be 4.75% or higher in 27 months? Only a 15% chance that the Fed Funds rate will be effectively zero in 27 months?

Janet Yellen: Figure 1:

Yellen figure1 20160826 png 735×610 pixels

I confess I do not understand how such a graph could be estimated and drawn.

Business cycle asymmetry is a thing. It is an important thing.

The note under the graph says:

Confidence interval equals the median of the end-of-year funds rate paths projected by individual FOMC members (interpolated quarterly), plus or minus the average root mean square prediction error for 0 to 9 quarters ahead made by private and government forecasters over the past 20 years, subject to an effective lower bound of 12.5 basis points.

Eyeballing, I get a 9-quarter-ahead standard error of the forecast of a symmetric 2.2%-points. Look at the data over the past 20 years:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

There are no episodes in which private and government forecasters underestimated the 9-quarter-ahead funds rate by 2.2%-points. Even in March 2004 observers were expecting more than 2%-points of tightening over the next 9 quarters. By contrast, there have been two episodes in which private and government forecasters’ 9-quarter-ahead funds rate forecasts were more than 4%-points high:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

If the Federal Reserve is truly failing to take account of business cycle asymmetry here–taking some of the risk that the economy will greatly weaken rapidly and using it to raise its estimated probability of a sudden upside breakout on inflation–then I will be flummoxed. But if that is not what they are doing, why draw this graph?

Indeed, if we look back over the past 40 years, we see only two episodes of an unanticipated tightening of more than 2.2%-points: the late 1970s Volcker disinflation itself, and Greenspan’s late 1980s tightening overshoot. I see no way of ascribing any probability greater than 1 in 20 to a late-2018 fed funds rate of 4.75% or more.

What More Has to Happen Before the Fed Concludes That This Looks Like Yet Another Failed Interest-Rate Liftoff?

Real Gross Domestic Product FRED St Louis Fed

If you had told the Federal Reserve at the start of last December that 2015Q4, 2016Q1, and 2016Q2 were going to come in at 0.9%, 0.8%, and 1.2%, respectively, a rational Fed would not only have not raised interest rates in December, they would have announced that they would not even think of raising interest rates until well into 2017, and they would have started looking for more things they could do that would safely boost demand.

So why is the FOMC now not cutting interest rates back to zero? I mean, what more has to happen before the balance of probabilities says that this is likely to be yet another failed liftoff of interest rates?

The Bond Market and Expectations: A Parthian Shot

Parthian shot Google Search

In my The Need for Expansionary Fiscal Policy I quote Greg Ip:

policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

If bond markets were pricing in a a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks, the yield curve would be very steeply sloped indeed. Just saying.

Must-Read: Steve Goldstein: Fed’s Lael Brainard Calls for ‘Waiting’ as Labor Market Has Slowed

Https www federalreserve gov monetarypolicy files fomcprojtabl20151216 pdf

Must-Read: If people on the FOMC had known late last November that the first half of 2016 would be as bad as it is shaping up to be–a GDP growth rate that looks to be 1.7%/year rather than 2.4%/year, and a PCE-chain inflation rate of not 1.6%/year but 0.8%/year–how many of them would have pulled the trigger and gone for an interest rate increase last December?

I confess I do not know why Lael Brainard is saying “there is uncertainty that future data will resolve in the near-term and so we should wait” rather than “if we knew then what we know now we wouldn’t have raised rates in December, and so we should cut”:

Steve Goldstein: Fed’s Lael Brainard Calls for ‘Waiting’ as Labor Market Has Slowed: “Brainard, who’s the first Fed official to speak since the Labor Department…

…reported just 38,000 jobs were added in May, said the central bank should wait for more data on how the economy is performing in the second quarter, as well as a key vote by Britain on whether to leave the European Union. ‘Recognizing the data we have on hand for the second quarter is quite mixed and still limited, and there is important near-term uncertainty, there would appear to be an advantage to waiting until developments provide greater confidence,’ Brainard said at the Council on Foreign Relations. She said she wanted to have a greater confidence in domestic activity, and specifically mentioned the uncertainty around the Brexit vote, as reasons to pause at the next Federal Open Market Committee meeting, which is due to end June 15…

Must-read: Jon Faust: “Still Crazy After All These Years”

Must-Read: Jon Faust: Still Crazy After All These Years: “For the past several years, the Congressional Budget Office has been offering frightening forecasts…

…about government debt growing out of control unless strong action is taken. While these forecasts have played a prominent role in policy debates, the CFE’s Jonathan Wright and Bob Barbera have for several years been arguing that those forecasts are, well, crazy. Or as the headline on Bob’s 2014 FT piece put it: ‘Forecasts of U.S. Fiscal Armageddon are Wrong.’ The key… is that the CBOs economic growth and interest rate projections jointly make no sense…. Under the CBO’s projected tepid growth projection, interest rates were highly unlikely to rise to the assumed levels….

We were glad to read in Greg Ip’s recent column that Doug Elmendorf, the CBO director responsible for those forecasts until recently, now agrees. Elmendorf and Louise Scheiner of the Hutchins Institute make the argument that:

the fact that U.S. government borrowing rates are at historical lows and likely to stay low for some time, implies spending cuts and tax increases should be delayed and smaller in size than widely believed.

It was Elmendorf’s CBO that helped stoke those widely-believed views now labelled as misguided. And as noted above, the CBO is still stoking. For the sake of coherent public policy, we hope that the CBO will listen to Elmendorf and Scheiner.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Bonds on the Run”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Bonds on the Run: “Something scary is going on in financial markets…

…Bond prices in particular are indicating near-panic…. Bond markets are a bit less flighty than stocks, and also more closely tied to the economic outlook. (A weak economy has mixed effects on stocks–low profits but also low interest rates–while it has an unambiguous effect on bonds.)… Plunging rates tell us is that markets are expecting very weak economies and possibly deflation for years to come, if not full-blown crisis…. A very bad place into which to elect a member of a party that has spent the past 7 years inveighing against both fiscal and monetary stimulus, and has learned nothing from the utter failure of its predictions to come true.

Email chatter:

JGB ten years at 0. Wow. Just wow. What a widowmaker…. Excepting buying assets at the dawn of QE, every EXPLICIT trade that hinged on relying on industrial core Central Bank inflation credibility has been a widowmaker…

It is starting to look, I must say, that [the U.S. Fed’s] triggering the taper tantrum and then doubling down on the proposition that triggering the taper tantrum was not an error is going to be judged very harshly when people look back at this decade or so from now…

I’m adding [U.S.] Q4 at a bit over 1%…. Q1 gets to 2%, but some of that is the mild winter. I do have growth staying in the 2 to 2 1/2% range after that, but I have to admit that assumes that exports crawl back to some growth, the consumer stays steadfast, there’s some inventory rebuilding, and S&L spending holds up–much of that is a wing and a prayer…

I have been much more wrong about, and much more worried by, their failure to deliver in the last 12-18 months when their intent was to raise inflation. Nowhere so more than Japan, where they did everything largely as prescribed…

it is over-ambitious to assume that projections about exchange rate expectations dominate over other factors. There is long demonstrated home bias, reinforced by Reinhart-esque longstanding structures and practices of financial repression. In the data, it is bizarre but evident over decades that Japanese private capital flows are opposite of most places: when the economy slows (speeds up), net capital flows are in (out), so the exchange rate moves the ‘wrong’ way…

Richard Koo has been saying that stout talk from the Fed about boosting rates (Jim Bullard is one thing, but say it ain’t so, Stan) is helping to spook the market. I’m getting inclined to agree…

“Whatever it takes” worked for Draghi as a signal of long-term commitment and a regime shift from Trichet. From Kuroda, my take is it was viewed as an act of desperation. Accordingly, Japanese investors took more about this as bad news on the Japanese economy and about BOJ capabilities than they did as evidence of stimulus…

The tendency of my dear friends to never admit error or wish to retrace steps bug[s] me…. Independence is to be used, and stop being so frigging afraid of Paul Ryan! QE4, anybody?…

The broader and more significant issue of why what the BOJ has done has not been enough to sustainably raise inflation, and it hasn’t worked in EU and US either…

Must-read: Łukasz Rachel and Thomas D. Smith: “Towards a Global Narrative on Long-Term Real Interest Rates”

Graph 30 Year Treasury Inflation Indexed Security Constant Maturity FRED St Louis Fed

Must-Read: Łukasz Rachel and Thomas D. Smith: Towards a Global Narrative on Long-Term Real Interest Rates: “Many candidate explanations for the low level of real interest rates have been put forward…

…Less progress has been made on bringing together the different hypotheses into a unifying framework, on quantifying their relative importance and on predicting the future path for real interest rates. This column attempts to fill that gap, and suggests that persistent shifts to global desired savings and investment are behind the bulk of the fall in real interest rates. Those trends are unlikely to unwind anytime soon, so that the global equilibrium rate is likely to remain low, perhaps settling at or below 1% in the medium to long-run.

Must-Read Pre-Liftoff Lollapalooza: Lukasz Rachel and Thomas D Smith: Secular Drivers of the Global Real Interest Rate

Must-Read Pre-Liftoff Lollapalooza: As Larry Summers says, this fits neither Ben Bernanke’s ascription of low real interest rates to a transitory global savings glut caused by the political-insurance preferences of non-return maximizing market actors, nor Ken Rogoff’s belief that it is overwhelmingly the result of overleverage and the need for the unwinding phase of a debt supercycle. The cures proposed are then (i) higher target inflation rates, (ii) higher public debt levels, (iii) more mobilization of risk-bearing capacity in private-sector financial markets, (iv) redistribution, and (v) an international lender of last resort that emerging markets trust.

Lukasz Rachel and Thomas D Smith: Secular Drivers of the Global Real Interest Rate: “Long-term real interest rates across the world have fallen by about 450 basis points over the past 30 years…

…We think we can account for around 400 basis points of the 450 basis points fall… slowing global growth [is] one force… but shifts in saving and investment preferences appear more important… demographic forces, higher inequality and to a lesser extent the glut of precautionary saving by emerging markets. Meanwhile, desired levels of investment have fallen as a result of the falling relative price of capital, lower public investment, and… an increase in the spread between risk-free and actual interest rates. Moreover, most of these forces look set to persist and some may even build further. This suggests that the global neutral rate may remain low and perhaps settle at (or slightly below) 1% in the medium to long run. If true, this will have widespread implications for policymakers — not least in how to manage the business cycle if monetary policy is frequently constrained by the zero lower bound.

Must-Read: Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford: The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy

Must-Read: The reality-based piece of the macroeconomic world is right now divided between those who think (1) that Bernanke shot himself in the foot and robbed himself of all traction by refusing to embrace monetary régime change and a higher inflation target, and thus neutered his own quantitative-easing policy; and (2) that at least under current conditions markets need to be shown the money in the form of higher spending right now before they will give any credit to factors that make suggest they should raise their expectation of future inflation. What pieces of information could we seek out that would help us decide whether (1) or (2) is correct?

Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford (2003): The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy: “Our dynamic analysis also allows us to further clarify the several ways…

…in which the central bank’s management of private sector expectations can be expected to mitigate the effects of the zero bound. Krugman emphasizes the fact that increased expectations of inflation can lower the real interest rate implied by a zero nominal interest rate. This might suggest, however, that the central bank can affect the economy only insofar as it affects expectations regarding a variable that it cannot influence except quite indirectly; it might also suggest that the only expectations that should matter are those regarding inflation over the relatively short horizon corresponding to the term of the nominal interest rate that has fallen to zero. Such interpretations easily lead to skepticism about the practical effectiveness of the expectations channel, especially if inflation is regarded as being relatively “sticky” in the short run.

Our model is instead one in which expectations affect aggregate demand through several channels…. Inflation expectations, even… [more than] a year into the future… [are] highly relevant… the expected future path of nominal interest rates matters, and not just their current level… any failure of… credib[ility] will not be due to skepticism about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its commitment…