Things to Read on the Evening of October 16, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads: (MOVE UP TO BELOW “PLUS” AND BEFORE “AND OVER HERE”)

 

  1. Steve Goldstein: Markets Pricing in Kocherlakota-Like Interest Rates: “Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota may be the biggest dove on the Federal Reserve, but his interest-rate projections would make him just an ordinary trader on Wall Street. The current Fed funds futures contract is pricing in interest rates of 2% at the end of the third quarter of 2017. The lowest “dot” on the Fed’s dot plot of interest rates is for rates of 2% at the end of 2017. And the next lowest dot is at 2.63%. It’s not known for certain that the 2% dot for 2017 comes from Kocherlakota, but his speeches are consistent with such a view. For example, unlike his colleagues, he doesn’t think any rate hike would be appropriate next year. He doesn’t expect inflation as measured by the PCE price index to get back to 2% until 2018. And he doesn’t want any reduction in accommodation unless the outlook is for inflation to be at 2% in two years time…”

  2. Martin Wolf, Larry Summers, Mohamed El-Erian, Brad DeLong: The Institute of International Finance, Inc. | Events

  3. John Williams: More QE Might Be Appropriate If U.S. Economy Faltered: “If we really get a sustained, disinflationary forecast… I think moving back to additional asset purchases in a situation like that should be something we should seriously consider…. The concern is the next steps that [the ECB] may need. That worries me a little bit. Will their policy response be as timely and aggressive as needed?… The markets are pricing in a lot of other things that might happen and a lot of those are negative. The cross currents are really the story.”

  4. Austin Frakt: Notes on Cutler’s The Quality Cure: “I thought one of the best aspects of the book was the expression of optimism and realism throughout—evidence-based and without overbearing cheer leading. Too many health policy books take a grumpy ‘it’s all terrible’ tone. Too many also suggest solutions that are politically unrealistic. Cutler’s is decidedly different. He’s neither grumpy nor naive about what’s possible. I also liked that the book didn’t belabor any points. At 171 pages (of main text), given what it covers, it is laudably efficient. Few books are.”

  5. Carmen M. Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch: A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief: “We take a first pass at quantifying the magnitudes of debt relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1979-2010, focusing on credit events in emerging markets, and 1920-1939, documenting the official debt hangover in advanced economies that was created by World War I and its aftermath. We examine the economic performance of debtor countries during and after these overhang episodes, by tracing the evolution of real per capita GDP (levels and growth rates); sovereign credit ratings; debt servicing burdens relative to GDP, fiscal revenues, and exports; as well as the level of government debt (external and total). Across 45 crisis episodes for which data is available we find that debt relief averaged 21 percent of GDP for advanced economies (1932-1939) and 16 percent of GDP for emerging markets (1979-2010), respectively. The economic landscape after a final debt reduction is characterized by higher income levels and growth, lower debt servicing burdens and lower government debt. Also ratings recover markedly, albeit only in the modern period.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Scott Lemieux: Abortion Green Lanternism: “Atrios is making sense: ‘What was especially maddening about Saletan-esque arguments over the years, aside from their clear wrongness, was that he seemed to truly believe that if only pro-choice people would admit it was all so icky and horrible then anti-abortion people would just surrender and go home. It was the position that only a High Priest Of Punditry could take, that the discourse was more important than the policy.’ There were a lot of pathologies in the general pundit discourse about abortion in the preceding decade (which, thankfully, seem to be a little less common now.)  But one of the strangest is the idea that there was some rhetorical strategy that could end the underlying conflict. And it’s particularly odd in the context of abortion, where public opinion has been remarkably stable since the issue became politically salient in the mid-60s, all the clever rhetorical strategies of both sides aside.   Framing and messaging are overrated in general, and abortion is a particularly strong case in point even though it’s an issue where people seem to be particularly obsessed with it.”

At the Oregon Economic Forum: Introducing Doug Elliott: “Making Wall Street Work for Main Street: Thursday Focus for October 16, 2014

I am very happy to be here this morning to introduce the Oregon Economic Forum’s Keynote Speaker, Doug Elliott of the Brookings Institution, and to set the stage for his talk.

To do that, let me ask all of you to cast yourselves back to 2006, to the end of Alan Greenspan’s long tenure as Chair of the Federal Reserve, and to the days of what was then called the “Great Moderation”. During Greenspan’s term starting in 1987 the unemployment rate had never gone above 7.8% and it had gotten as low as 3.8%. The attainment of low unemployment under Greenspan did not signal any forthcoming inflationary spiral: The peak 12-mo PCE price index core inflation rate during Greenspan’s tenure was 4.7%. The peak inflation rate that followed that 3.8% unemployment rate was 2.4%. Inflation had not been above 2.5% since December 1993.

This superb macroeconomic performance had not been the result of “good luck” understood as an absence of macroeconomic disturbances and shocks. We had seen the 25% fall in the stock market in one day in October 1987, the S&L financial crisis of the early 2000s, the Mexican peso crisis on our southern border in 1995, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, followed the next year by the bankruptcy of Russia and then by the collapse of the world’s then-largest hedge fund LTCM in the same year. 2001 had seen the collapse of the dot-com bubble, and the terror-attack on New York and the Pentagon on 9/11. Plus there had been large longer-term surges: the high-tech boom of the 1990s, the enormous Chinese export surplus surge of the late 1990s and 2000s, the Argentinian crash of 2002, the era of the global savings glut of the 2000s, the American construction and house-price boom, and the extraordinary rise in financial sophistication as the growth of derivative securities allowed risk to be finely sliced and diced and sold off to those who wished to hold that particular risk or make that particular bet. All of these held the prospect of producing significant macroeconomic disturbances to the underlying real economy of America. None of them did. Recessions were short. And small. And infrequent.

The conclusion that the economics profession–at least the macroeconomic mainstream of it–drew from this–call it 1984-2007–“Great Moderation” generation was that monetary policy had finally figured out how to do its proper job. A Federal Reserve that had painfully reestablished market trust in it as the guardian of price stability had set solid anchors foe inflationary expectations: no more creeping or trotting inflationary spirals. A Federal Reserve that no longer had to worry about making its bones with respect to its credibility as a price-stability guardian was thus free to throw its weight around and not fine tune but at least grossly adjust the economy to try to keep employment at high even if not full levels and growth and investment strong.

In such an environment allowing experimentation in the financial sector appeared to be wise. The large persistent gaps in average rates of return across asset classes appeared to economists to suggest an outsized price of risk. Financial innovation and experimentation that promised to generate forms of risk more investors would be more willing to bear more cheaply seemed to promise an improvement in economic efficiency. The risks of allowing and in fact encouraging cowboy finance appeared to be small: the princes of Wall Street had every incentive in their own portfolios and options to manage risk correctly, and in the experience of the Federal Reserve since the mid-1980s strongly indicated that whatever shocks were generated by financial disturbances the Federal Reserve could build firewalls to keep them from materially and significantly damaging the real economy of demand, employment, production, and incomes. And the peripheral financial crises–Argentinian, Russian, East Asian, Mexican? Not, the consensus of North Atlantic economists was, likely or perhaps even possible in the deep and sophisticated financial markets of the North Atlantic.

Thus when Raghu Rajan, then Chicago Business School professor and now head of the Reserve Bank of India, stood up at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Wyoming conference in 2005 and said not just that there were large risks of financial crisis but that we had no grasp of what the risks were, the response was a general hooting. My friend and patron Larry Summers told him that the “slightly Luddite premise of [his] paper” was “largely misguided”. The very sharp Armenio Fraga said that “risk is going where it belongs… we may be better off than before… [and] less of an impact of all these financial accidents on the real economy”. The only defender he had was Alan Blinder, who wanted to: “defend Raghu a little bit against the unremitting attack he is getting here for not being a sufficiently good Chicago economist…”

And so when we went into 2008 we–certainly I–thought that the situation was serious but not desperate, that the likely outcome would be a small recession like 2001, and that certainly by 2011 we would be back to normal if we took the situation sufficiently seriously–which I was highly confident that we would.

Big mistake.

It turned out that the Federal Reserve did not have a power to build firewalls to protect the real economy of demand, employment, production, and incomes from the consequences of financial distress–and, in its origins, not all that much financial distress either. We built at most one million houses above trend during the housing bubble, and–without the snowballing and feedback vicious circles–there were only a couple of hundred thousand dollars of mortgage debt on each that was not going to be repaid and had to be allocated as losses. Triple that for losses on existing homeowners who became overextended, and we still have only $600 billion of losses due to bad investments. Yet those $600 billion of fundamental losses which should have been there barely noticeable in the world economy of $80 trillion of financial assets triggered a more than $20 trillion collapse in financial values, and landed us here.

Now Doug Elliott is here to tell us why, exactly, I and so many others were so mistaken in our estimates of the situation back in 2007, and what is to be done next.

Is the era of high Chinese economic growth coming to an end?

The ups and downs in the stock market yesterday were triggered in part by concerns about the fortunes of global economic growth. The collection of economies that use the euro as their currency, the Eurozone, looks like its sliding toward a triple-dip recession. Newly released data from the United States indicating perhaps weaker economic growth ahead also fueled concerns. And yes, stock analysts and economists also are trying to discern the often opaque short-term data flowing out of China are contributing to market jitters.

But these short-term trends, while concerning, take on an altogether different complexion if a new working paper on China’s future economic growth is correct.

The National Bureauchina-dragon-275 of Economic Research earlier this week released a new paper by Lant Pritchett and Larry Summers, both of Harvard University. In short, the authors argue that China’s economy is very susceptible to a quick and sudden decrease in its growth rate. China has been growing so quickly for so long that forecasts would have us believe that the economic future of the world lies in Asia. Pritchett and Summers call this belief “Asiaphoria.” They argue that previous periods of Asiaphoria—during the rapid growth of Japan in the 1980s and then Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand in the 1990s—failed to live up to expectations.

The authors point out that the best way to evaluate the growth prospects of an economy isn’t to look at its past but rather at economies in similar situations. Pritchett and Summers act on this insight by focusing on a key finding from economic growth research: reversion to the mean. In other words, high-flying growth will eventually fall back to the overall average. Just like a middling basketball shooter can go on a hot streak for a while before his shooting percentage falls back to earth over the long run, Chinese growth is likely to decrease, and sharply.

Pritchett and Summers argue that China is more likely to have an even more swift decline in economic growth than other similar countries in the past. The reason: China’s corrupt and authoritarian political system. This system means there is very little rule of law in China. And the authors even go so far as to say that there are “plausible scenarios which may disrupt the current political settlement” (translation: political instability) that could sharply reduce growth rates.

There are other reasons to be concerned about Chinese growth, though on a longer time frame. A recent article in The Economist flagged concerning research about the growth in Chinese productivity. The rate of growth in total factor productivity, or how efficiently an economy uses labor and capital, seems to be declining. One potential reason for the decline is the financial sector, dominated by state-owned banks, which isn’t delivering funds to highly productive firms. Total factor growth is the basis for long-run economic growth, so this trend is worrying for China’s economic future.

Of course, these fears may all be overblown. Pritchett and Summers are clear that the growth decline they identify in recent research on dynamics of economic growth isn’t destiny. The decline in Chinese total factor productivity growth isn’t a well-established fact yet. And predictions, especially those about the future, are notoriously difficult. But the possibility of a sudden and sharp decrease in Chinese growth or an even slowing economic malaise is high enough that we all need to think about how the economy might handle such an event.

What Would Be Convincing Evidence That 2%/Year Is too Low for the Inflation Target?: Hoisted from the Archives/Wednesday Focus

God! We were (and are) so smart!

J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers (1992): Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth:

On almost any theory of why inflation is costly, reducing inflation from 10%/year to 5%/year is likely to be much more beneficial than reducing it from 5%/year to 0%/year. So austerity encounters diminishing returns. And there are potentially important benefits of a policy of low positive inflation. It makes room for real interest rates to be negative at times, and for relative wages to adjust without the need for nominal wage declines….

These arguments gain further weight when one considers the recent context of monetary policy in the United States. A large easing of monetary policy, as measured by interest rates, moderated but did not fully counteract the forces generating the recession that began in 1990. The relaxation of monetary policy seen over the past three years in the United States would have been arithmetically impossible had inflation and nominal interest rates both been 3%-points lower in 1989. Thus a more vigorous policy of reducing inflation to 0%/year in the mid-1980s might have led to a recent recession much more severe than we have in fact seen…

If the past 24 hours… the past six months… the past six years… are not convincing evidence that a 2%/year inflation target is too low, what would be convincing evidence to that effect?

10 YEAR Bond Quote 10 Year Treasury Note Bond Price Today 10 YEAR ICAPSD MarketWatch

Plus Bonus Hoisted from the Archives:

A 2%/Year Inflation Target Is too Low: First, the live question is not whether the Federal Reserve should raise its target inflation rate above 2% per year.

The live question is whether the Federal Reserve should raise its target inflation rate to 2% per year.

On Wednesday afternoon, Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke stated that he was unwilling to undertake more stimulative policies because “it is not clear we can get substantial improvements in payrolls without some additional inflation risks.” But the PCE deflator ex-food and energy has not seen a 2% per year growth rate since late 2008: over the past four quarters it has only grown at 0.9%. At a 3.5% real GDP growth rate, unemployment is still likely to be at 8.4% at the end of 2011 and 8.0% at the end of 2012–neither of them levels of unemployment that would put any upward pressure at all on wage inflation. It thus looks like 1% is the new 2%: on current Federal Reserve policy, we are looking forward to a likely 1% core inflation rate for at least another year, and more likely three. A Federal Reserve that was now targeting a 2% per year inflation rate would be aggressively upping the ante on its stimulative policies right now. That is not what the Federal Reserve is doing. Would that we had a 2% per year inflation target.

But if we were targeting a 2% inflation rate–which we are not–should we be targeting a higher rate? I believe that the answer is yes.

To explain why, let me take a detour back to the early nineteenth century and to the first generations of economists–people like John Stuart Mill who were the very first to study in the industrial business cycle in the context of the 1825 crash of the British canal boom and the subsequent recession. John Stuart Mill noted the cause of slack capacity, excess inventories, and high unemployment: in the aftermath of the crash, households and businesses wished to materially increase their holdings of safe and liquid financial assets. The flip side of their plans to do so–their excess demand for safe and liquid financial assets–was a shortage of demand for currently-produced goods and services. And the consequence was high unemployment, excess capacity, and recession,.

Once the root problem is pointed out, the cure is easy. The market is short of safe and liquid financial assets? A lack of confidence and trust means that private sector entities cannot themselves create safe and liquid financial assets for businesses and households to hold? Then the government ought to stabilize the economy by supplying the financial assets the market wants and that the private sector cannot create. A properly-neutral monetary policy thus requires that the government buy bonds to inject safe and liquid financial assets–what we call “money”–into the economy.

All this is Monetarism 101. Or perhaps it is just Monetarism 1. We reach Advanced Macroeconomics when the short-term nominal interest rate hits zero. When it does, the government cannot inject extra safe and liquid money into the economy through standard open-market operations: a three-month Treasury bond and cash are both zero-yield government liabilities, and buying one for the other has no effect on the economy-wide stock of safety and liquidity. When the short-term nominal interest rate hits zero, the government has done all it can through conventional monetary policy to fix the cause of the recession. The economy is then in a “liquidity trap.”

Now this is not to say that the government is powerless. It can buy risky and long-term loans for cash, it can guarantee private-sector liabilities. But doing so takes risk onto the government’s books that does not properly belong there. Fiscal policy, too, has possibilities but also dangers.

My great uncle Phil from Marblehead Massachusetts used to talk about a question on a sailing safety examination he once took: “What should you do if you are caught on a lee shore in a hurricane?” The correct answer was: “You never get caught on a lee shore in a hurricane!” The answer to the question of what you should do when conventional monetary policy is tapped out and you are at the zero interest rate nominal bound is that you should never get in such a situation in the first place.

How can you minimize the chances that an economy gets caught at the zero nominal bound where short-term Treasury bonds and cash are perfect substitutes and conventional open-market operations have no effects? The obvious answer is to have a little bit of inflation in the system: not enough to derange the price mechanism, but enough to elevate nominal interest rates in normal times, so that monetary policy has plenty of elbow room to take the steps it needs to take to create macroeconomic stability when recession threatens. We want “creeping inflation.”

How much creeping inflation do we want? We used to think that about 2% per year was enough. But in the past generation major economies have twice gotten themselves stranded on the rocks of the zero nominal bound while pursuing 2% per year inflation targets. First Japan in the 1990s, and now the United States today, have found themselves on the lee shore in the hurricane.

That strongly suggests to me that a 2% per year inflation target is too low. Two macroeconomic disasters in two decades is too many.


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Understanding economic inequality and growth at the top of the income ladder

Thanks in large part to the ground-breaking work of Paris School of Economics professor Thomas Piketty, and his co-authors, including University of California-Berkley economics professor Emmanuel Saez, we know that we are living in an era of widening inequality. The share of post-tax-and-transfer income going to the top 1 percent of earners increased from nearly 8 percent in 1979 to about 17 percent in 2007. Over the course of the current economic recovery, the top 1 percent has received 95 percent of all pre-tax income gains—seeing a 31 percent increase in their incomes—while the bottom 99 percent saw a meager 0.4 percent increase.

Economists hypothesize several reasons for this sharp increase in income inequality, among them rising pay for chief executives and other senior executives, increasing returns to superstar workers, the rise of the financial industry, and the decline in top-income tax rates.But this debate is far from over. And the issue is not just income inequality. Economic inequality is on the rise across a variety of dimensions, including wealth. According to research by Saez and Gabriel Zucman, assistant professor of economics at the London School of Economics, the share of wealth owned by the top 0.01 percent has increased 4-fold over in the past 35 years.

Graphical-top

Piketty’s data makes the case that the steady accumulation of wealth at the top of the income spectrum is one of the most important ways that income inequality affects our economy. While there may be a theoretical argument for why higher incomes provide greater incentives for individual effort or inventing the next “big thing,” it may also be that, beyond a certain point, income and wealth inequality dampens incentives as the wealthy increasingly seek to preserve their wealth rather than risk it in potentially productive endeavors while the non-wealthy are locked out due to “opportunity hoarding” by those at the top.

One fundamental issue that Piketty’s book, “Capital in the 21st Century,” compels us to consider is the interaction between the flow of income and the stock of wealth. Does today’s flow of income to the very top of the economic ladder calcify into tomorrow’s wealth inequality? After all, the very high incomes that some people earn will allow them to build larger and larger stocks of capital over time.

Do we need to address rising income or wealth inequality in order to save our capitalist economy? How can we do so without hurting the vibrancy of today’s economy? The three essays in this section of our conference report—by UC-Berkeley economist Emmanuel Saez, Michael Ettlinger, founding director of the University of New Hampshire Carsey School of Public Policy, and Northwestern University sociology PhD candidate Fiona Chin—discuss the state of top incomes, the consequences of their rise, and possible policies to promote more widely shared economic growth. —Heather Boushey

Download the full 2014 conference booklet, with full citations included for all of the essays, including those addressing the top of the income ladder on this page

The Explosion of U.S. Income and Wealth Inequality

by Emmanuel Saez

In the United States today, the share of total pre-tax income accruing to the top 1 percent has more than doubled over the past five decades. The wealthy among us (families with incomes above $400,000) pulled in 22 percent of pre-tax income in 2012, the last year for which complete data are available, compared to less than 10 percent in the 1970s. What’s more, by 2012 the top 1 percent income earners had regained almost all the ground lost during the Great Recession of 2007-2009. In contrast, the remaining 99 percent experienced stagnated real income growth—after factoring in inflation—after the Great Recession.

Another less documented but equally alarming trend has been the surge in wealth inequality in the United States since the 1970s. In a new working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Gabriel Zucman at the London School of Economics and I examined information on capital income from individual tax return data to construct measures of U.S. wealth concentration since 1913. We find that the share of total household wealth accrued by the top 1 percent of families— those with wealth of more than $4 million in 2012—increased to almost 42 percent in 2012 from less than 25 percent in the late 1970s. Almost all of this increase is due to gains among the top 0 .1 percent of families with wealth of more than $20 million in 2012. The wealth of these families surged to 22 percent of total household wealth in the United States in 2012 from around 7.5 percent in the late 1970s.

The flip side of such rising wealth concentration is the stagnation in middle-class wealth. Although average wealth per family grew by about 60 percent between 1986 and 2012, the average wealth of families in the bottom 90 percent essentially stagnated. In particu­lar, the Great Recession reduced their average family wealth to $85,000 in 2009 from $130,000 in 2006. By 2012, average family wealth for the bottom 90 percent was still only $83,000. In contrast, wealth among the top 1 percent increased substantially over the same period, regaining most of the wealth lost during the Great Recession.

For both wealth and income, then, there is a very uneven recovery from the losses of the Great Recession, with almost no gains for the bottom 90 percent, and all the gains concentrated among the top 10 percent, and especially the top 1 percent. How can we explain such large increases in income and wealth concentration in the United States and what should be done about it?

Contrary to the widely held view, we cannot blame everything on globalization and new technologies. While large increases in income concentration occurred in other English-speaking countries such as the United Kingdom or Canada, other developed-nation members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, such as those in continental Europe or Japan, experienced far smaller increases in income concentration. At the same time, income tax rates on upper income earners have declined significantly since the 1970s in many OECD countries, particularly in English-speaking ones. Case in point: Top marginal income tax rates in the United States and the United Kingdom were above 70 percent in the 1970s before President Ronald Reagan’s administration and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government drastically cut them by 40 percentage points within a decade.

New research I published this year with Paris School of Economics profes­sor Thomas Piketty and Stefanie Stantcheva at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology shows that, across 18 OECD countries with sufficient data, there is indeed a strong correlation between reductions in top tax rates and increases in the top 1 percent’s share of pre-tax income from the 1960s to the present. Our research shows that the United States experienced a 35-percentage point reduc­tion in its top income tax rate and a ten-percentage point increase in the share of pre-tax income earned by the top 1 percent. In contrast, France and Germany saw very little change in their top tax rates and the share of pre-tax income accrued by the top 1 percent over the same period.

The evolution of top tax rates is a good predictor of changes in pre-tax income concentration. There are three scenarios to explain the strong response of top pre-tax incomes to top tax rates. They have very different policy implications and can be tested in the data.

First, higher top tax rates may discourage work effort and business creation among the most talented—the so-called supply-side effect of higher taxes. In this scenario, lower top tax rates would lead to more economic activity by the rich and hence more economic growth. Yet the overwhelming evidence shows that there is no correlation between cuts in top tax rates and average annual real (inflation-adjusted) GDP-per-capita growth since the 1960s. Countries that made large cuts in top tax rates, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have not grown significantly faster than countries that did not, such as Germany and Denmark.

Second, higher top tax rates could increase tax avoidance. In that scenario, increas­ing top rates in a tax system riddled with loopholes and tax avoidance opportuni­ties is not productive. A better policy would be first to close loopholes in order to eliminate most opportunities for tax avoidance and only then increase top tax rates. Conservative commentators argue that the surge in pre-tax incomes discussed above could be indicative of tax avoidance in the 1970s, when top earners were presumably hiding a large fraction of their income amid high taxes.

If this tax avoidance scenario were true, then charitable giving among top earners should have decreased once top tax rates were cut. After all, charitable giving is tax deductible and thus is more advantageous precisely when top tax rates are high. In fact, charitable giving among the rich surged pretty much in the same proportion as their reported incomes over the past several decades. If the rich are able to give so much more today than in the 1970s, it must be the case that they are truly richer.

Third, while standard economic models assume that pay reflects productivity, there are strong reasons to be skeptical, especially at the top of the income ladder where the actual economic contribution of managers working in complex organizations is particularly difficult to measure. In this scenario, top earners might be able partly to set their own pay by bargaining harder or influencing executive compensation com­mittees. Naturally, the incentives for such “rent-seeking” are much stronger when top tax rates are low.

In this scenario, cuts in top tax rates can still increase the share of total household income going to the top 1 percent at the expense of the remaining 99 percent. In other words, tax cuts for the wealthiest stimulate rent-seeking at the top but not overall economic growth—the key difference from the supply-side scenario that justified tax cuts for high income earners in the first place.

Up until the 1970s, policymakers and public opinion probably considered—rightly or wrongly—that at the very top of the income ladder pay increases reflected mostly greed or other socially wasteful activities rather than productive work. This is why poli­cymakers were able to set marginal tax rates as high as 80 percent in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Reagan-Thatcher supply side revolutions succeeded in making such top tax rate levels unthinkable, yet after decades of increasing income concentration alongside mediocre economic growth since the 1970s followed by the Great Recession, a rethinking of that supply side narrative is now underway.

Zucman and I show in our new working paper that the surge in wealth concentra­tion and the erosion of middle class wealth can be explained by two factors. First, differences in the ability to save by the middle class and the wealthy means that more income inequality will translate into more inequality in savings. Upper earners will nat­urally save relatively more and accumulate more wealth as income inequality widens.

Second, the saving rate among the middle class has plummeted since the 1980s, in large part due to a surge in debt, in particular mortgage debt and student loans. With such low savings rates, middle class wealth formation is bound to stall. In contrast, the savings rate of the rich has remained substantial.

If such trends of growing income inequality and growing disparity in savings rates between the middle class and rich persist, then U.S. wealth inequality will continue to increase. The rich will be able to leave large estates to their heirs and the United States could find itself becoming a patrimonial society where inheritors dominate the top of the income and wealth distribution as famously pointed out by Piketty in his new book “Capital in the 21st Century.”

What should be done about the rise of income and wealth concentration in the United States? More progressive taxation would help on several fronts. Increasing the tax rate as incomes rise helps curb excessive and wasteful compensation of top income earners. Progressive taxation of capital income also reduces the rate of return on wealth, making it more difficult for large family fortunes to perpetuate themselves over generations. Progressive estate taxation is the most natural tool to prevent self-made wealth from becoming inherited wealth. At the same time, complementary policies are needed to encourage middle class wealth forma­tion. Recent work in behavioral economics by Richard Thaler at the University of Chicago and Cass Sunstein at Harvard University shows that it is possible to encourage savings and wealth formation through well-designed programs that nudge people into savings. –Emmanuel Saez is a professor of economics  and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California-Berkeley

Addressing Economic Inequality Requires a Broad Set of Policies and Cooperation

by Michael Ettlinger

There are any number of policies suggested by policymakers, academics and commentators for addressing economic inequality. A representative sample would include tax redistribution, improving education, raising the minimum wage, direct government job creation, employer hiring incentives, subsidized child care, better retirement security, a stronger social safety net, direct middle- and low-income subsidies, ending the socialization of environmental degra­dation, aggressive financial market regulation, stronger trade unions, more invest­ment in public goods (paid for by the better off), socially responsible trade policy, immigration reform, corporate governance changes, and campaign finance reform.

That’s certainly a formidable list, but interestingly most analysts and advocates who care about economic inequality focus on just one or two of these—typically offer­ing a concise, but ultimately unsatisfying recipe. Given the rapidly rising levels of inequality, when one reads the typical, short, policy agenda, it’s hard not to have a feeling of ennui—a sense that the solution offered falls well short of what’s needed to solve the problem or is completely impractical.

It is, for example, hard to believe that better educational opportunities is the com­plete answer. Improving education has huge virtue in terms of economic advance­ment at the individual level, creating opportunity, personal fulfillment, and overall economic growth. But, aside from anything else, at the rate we’re going, we’ll have again doubled our level of inequality by the time substantial numbers of people are likely to benefit from improved education. And it’s not like we’ve licked how exactly to improve education or that it’s clear that improved education solves the problem.

After all, if the result of boosting educational attainment is simply more competi­tion for a slowly increasing number of jobs that require further education, then the effect might primarily be that different people are on the winning and losing ends of inequality, not a lessening of inequality itself—at least from a global perspective. And the historical record is not encouraging. So, we should improve education, but we shouldn’t count on it as the silver bullet for addressing inequality.

There are other policies, of course, that are blunter instruments and clearly could fundamentally change the distribution of income and wealth. Taxes are the most clear cut example. If we take a sizable portion of the income of the wealthy and, one-way-or-another, distribute it to everyone else, inequality would, unequivocally, be reduced (call this the Sherwood Forest approach). But redistribution on that scale is unlikely and, at truly the scale that would be needed to reduce the levels inequal­ity to what it was even a few years ago, would probably be damaging to the overall economy. While there is ample evidence that the moderately higher levels of income tax on the well off are not the economic disaster sometimes claimed, addressing extreme economic inequality exclusively through the income tax could get us to the point at which higher taxes do cause harm. As with education, raising income taxes on the wealthy is not, alone, the answer.

“Wealth” or “capital” taxes on the assets of the better off, another favored approach, face a number of practical limitations. One problem in the United States is that a federal wealth tax would almost certainly require an amendment to the constitution. But even aside from that “technicality,” there is a limit to what one could reasonably expect to accomplish with a wealth tax.

One of the virtues of an income tax is that it taxes money going between two parties who both are typically required to inform the tax authorities of the transaction—so to outright cheat on taxes requires the complicity of at least two people. It happens, but the requirement of trust limits it. Wealth, in contrast, can be held without active engagement of another party.

Another virtue of an income tax is that if the transaction is honest then the dollar amount involved is usually clear-cut. That is less true for a tax on wealth. Assets held in publicly traded corporations or real estate in areas where there are frequent land deals are relatively easy. But the valuation of closely held corporations, let alone art and obscure intellectual property rights, can be extremely difficult—and one can count on more wealth ending up in those forms if a substantial wealth tax were put in place. A very small wealth tax would not necessarily spark this sort of tax avoid­ance. A substantial one would.

I can make similar arguments for almost the entire list I started with. Even if one believes that the minimum wage is too low, most everyone would agree that it can be too high. Even if one believes that our trade regimes are a factor in increasing inequality and that reforms are needed, overly restrictive policies would be coun­terproductive. Even if you believe that the outsized incomes from Wall Street are a consequence of power and influence—not genuine contributions to our overall prosperity—the national economy would surely be hurt if we tried to address eco­nomic inequality purely through restraints on the financial sector.

If you didn’t have ennui when you started reading this you probably do now. But the point isn’t that it’s impossible to address income inequality. The point is that it’s going to take a range of approaches. And, arguably, a range of approaches is easier to accomplish than trying to put all of one’s eggs in a single basket. If the whole solution doesn’t depend on a confiscatory tax on the wealthy, or vastly increasing educational attainment, or world-wide consensus on a socially responsible, equi­table, trade agreement—but instead on incremental change in range of areas—that is a much less daunting task.

There are agreements to be had in many of these areas. None of those individual policies will be at the scale needed to address inequality in a meaningful way, but together they can add up to make a difference.

There are reasons to do this. Extreme inequality leaves many people having harder lives than is necessary while, at the other end of the spectrum, personal wealth can reach a point where its growth does little to improve the lives of its beneficiaries—with the overall result being a net reduction in the aggregate quality of life. And there are real dangers to our society of such severe stratification. It’s an issue that is going to require a broad range of effort and cooperation around the world to address. But it’s achievable if we don’t try to accomplish it with just one or two highly contested policies. — Michael Ettlinger is the founding director of the Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of new Hampshire

What the Wealthy Know and Believe About Economic Inequality

by Fiona Chin

The wealthiest one percent among us in the United States are pulling away from everyone else, a trend documented by numerous economists and highlighted often by the media. Despite all this attention on inequality, there is a dearth of empirical research on what the wealthy know and believe to be true about this trend.

Recent research on social stratification and mobility in our country examines the beliefs of ordinary Americans about the growing wealth and income gaps, but few academics are talking directly to the wealthiest Americans about their own per­ceptions. It is notoriously difficult to interview wealthy subjects. It is hard to find them, given their scarcity in the population. Once you identify possible subjects, it is hard to gain their cooperation, particularly when discussing topics they find uncomfortable, such as income and wealth inequality.

How the very affluent view economic inequality is important because what they know and think influences how they interact with our political leaders responsible for translating these views into public policies. If policymakers respond disproportionately to the affluent and the majority of the wealthy do not favor government programs to ameliorate inequality then it is especially important for scholars and policy experts to learn what ideas and preferences the wealthy embrace. In contrast, if the majority of the very affluent favor steps to rectify the wealth and income gaps, then policymakers can consider enacting programs that are favored more by the general public.

I study wealthy Americans to find out what they believe about income and wealth inequality.1 My data come from two sources. The first is the Survey of Economically Successful Americans and the Common Good, or SESA, which was pioneered by Northwestern University political science professor Benjamin Page and Vanderbilt University political science professor Larry Bartels and funded by the Russell Sage Foundation.2 NORC at the University of Chicago conducted the survey in 2011. Respondents had an average of $14 million in household wealth (median of $7.5 million), making the sample representative of the wealthiest one-to-two percent of Chicago-area residents.

Most national surveys with representative samples capture very few respondents from the top of the wealth distribution. While it targets the Chicago metropolitan area, SESA is among the very few data sets on the wealthy and includes questions on a variety of topics, from economic mobility to taxes, retirement, philanthropic and charitable volunteering and giving, and other areas. As a survey, however, SESA was limited in the depth to which respondents could answer any particular question.

Upon reviewing the original survey sheets with interviewer notations in the margins, I found that the wealthy were eager to express more nuance than closed-ended survey responses provided. To complement the survey data with more detail, I am compiling a second source of information by conducting in-depth interviews with economically successful Americans from across the country. These interviews focus much more specifically on subjects’ beliefs about eco­nomic inequality and mobility, politics, and public policy.

As of August 2014, I have conducted 89 interviews ranging from 45 minutes to three hours in length. I spoke with top income earners and top wealth hold­ers, who I recruited based on the chain-referral method. Although my sample is not statistically representative, this methodology has allowed me to collect data on the beliefs of wealthy Americans from different geographic regions and backgrounds. Interview respondents had an average of $8.2 million in household wealth (median of $4.7 million). The interview sample was not as wealthy as the SESA sample overall, but more than half of my interviewees were within the top one percent of the income or wealth distributions. Interview subjects were from 18 different metropolitan areas across 15 states and the District of Columbia and worked in a variety of occupations and industries.

Despite the methodological differences, the interview questions that duplicated SESA questions yielded very similar patterns of answers. My research is on-going, but I have some preliminary results to share, with the important caveat that I am continuing to analyze my data and hope to conduct approximately ten more interviews.

The wealthy are aware of economic inequality and recognize that it has grown in recent decades. In the SESA data and my own in-depth interviews, the vast majority of respondents knew that income inequality is larger today than it was 20 years ago. They also tended to express a desire for a lower level of income inequality. Approximately two-thirds of respondents believed that income differences in our society are too large.

The wealthy also recognize that the distribution of wealth across society is very skewed. In fact, they tend to overestimate the proportion of wealth held by the top one percent. Based on the SESA data and my preliminary interviews, the median perception of the respondents so far was that the top one percent hold approxi­mately half of all U.S. wealth. (According to New York University economist Edward Wolff, the wealthiest one percent held a 35 percent share of the country’s household net worth, as of 2007.3) In my interviews, I also probe subjects about how large a share the wealthiest one percent “ought” to hold. Only about two-fifths of interview respondents believed that the wealthiest one percent ought to hold less.

In short, both survey and interview respondents tended to agree that income inequality is too high. But my interview data show that the wealthy did not neces­sarily believe that there should be less wealth inequality.

As much as the wealthy appear to be aware of growing economic inequality, they did not necessarily favor any kind of public intervention to remedy or ameliorate the trend. In fact, the wealthiest SESA respondents favored cutting back federal government programs such as Social Security, job programs, health care, and food stamps. Only 17 percent of SESA respondents thought that the government should “redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.”

Among my interviewees, very few were in favor of raising taxes to redress eco­nomic disparities, although a minority supported public intervention in the form of job training and other programs aimed at increasing economic opportunity. In general, many interview subjects were very pessimistic about the future of inequality trends and did not foresee any slow down in the growing bifurcation between the wealthy and the rest of society.

As a group, then, the wealthy are well informed about current events and public affairs, according to my preliminary interviews and the SESA data. They pay atten­tion to the news and are very politically active, so understanding and considering their preferences are important. My preliminary findings indicate two emerging patterns: The wealthy know that economic inequality is rising, but they do not agree that anything should or can be done to reverse the trend. My analysis is at an early stage, and much more research must be done in this arena in order to inform a productive dialogue between scholars and policymakers. –Fiona Chin is Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Northwestern University and a graduate research assistant at the Institute for Policy Research

 

If not r > g, what’s behind rising wealth inequality?

The Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago yesterday released a survey of a panel of highly regarded economists asking about rising wealth inequality. Specifically, IGM asked if the difference between the after-tax rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the overall economy was the “most powerful force pushing towards greater wealth inequality in the United States since the 1970s.”

The vast majority of the economists disagreed with the statement. As would economist Thomas Piketty, the originator of the now famous r > g inequality. He explicitly states that rising inequality in the United States is about rising labor income at the very top of the income distribution. As Emmanuel Saez, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley and a frequent Piketty collaborator, points out r > g is a prediction about the future.

But if wealth inequality has risen in the United States over the past four decades, what has been behind the rise? A new paper by Saez and the London School of Economics’ Gabriel Zucman provides an answer: the calcification of income inequality into wealth inequality.

“Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data,” their new working paper, is firstly an impressive documentation of the significant changes in wealth distribution in the United States.

Saez and Zucman create a data series using tax records to measure wealth inequality going back to 1913. The trend is similar to the one for income inequality in the United States: a high level of inequality at the beginning of 20th century that declined substantially during the mid-century only to climb starting in the late 1970s and reaching high levels again in recent years.

Rising wealth inequality since the late 1970s has been a case of the top of the distribution pulling away from everyone else. Specifically, the rise of the 0.1 percent is the dominant story. In 1979, the top tenth of the top 1 percent held 7 percent of the wealth in the United States. By 2012, the share held increased threefold to 22 percent. (An earlier version of this data was highlighted at Equitable Growth’s annual conference in September.) In fact, almost half of the total increase in wealth from 1986 to 2012 went to the top 0.1 percent of wealth holders. The increase is dramatic and brings wealth inequality to a level around that prevailing in 1929.

101514-new-saez-data

What caused this increasing concentration of wealth? In short, an increase in income inequality coupled with rising savings inequality. As income flowed upward to those at the top, rich individuals increased the rate at which they saved income. Saez and Zucman refer to this phenomenon as the “snowballing effect.” And Piketty does consider the calcification of top incomes into wealth inequality in “Capital in the 21st Century.”

This effect certainly isn’t the well-known r > g phenomenon. But Saez and Zucman’s research shows that there’s more than one way for wealth inequality to arise.

Morning Must-Read: Steve Goldstein: Markets Pricing in Kocherlakota-Like Interest Rates

Steve Goldstein: Markets Pricing in Kocherlakota-Like Interest Rates: “Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota…

…may be the biggest dove on the Federal Reserve, but his interest-rate projections would make him just an ordinary trader on Wall Street. The current Fed funds futures contract is pricing in interest rates of 2% at the end of the third quarter of 2017. The lowest “dot” on the Fed’s dot plot of interest rates is for rates of 2% at the end of 2017. And the next lowest dot is at 2.63%. It’s not known for certain that the 2% dot for 2017 comes from Kocherlakota, but his speeches are consistent with such a view. For example, unlike his colleagues, he doesn’t think any rate hike would be appropriate next year. He doesn’t expect inflation as measured by the PCE price index to get back to 2% until 2018. And he doesn’t want any reduction in accommodation unless the outlook is for inflation to be at 2% in two years time…

Department of “Huh?!”: Yet Another Thomas Piketty Edition

Let’s quote Thomas Piketty:

Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century: “Let me return now to the causes of rising inequality…

…in the United States. The increase was largely the result of an unprecedented increase in wage inequality and in particular the emergence of extremely high remunerations at the summit of the wage hierarchy, particularly among top managers of large firms…

Justin Wolfers: Fellow Economists Express Skepticism About Thomas Piketty: “Has he convinced his fellow economists?…

…They’re intrigued, but not convinced. Perhaps Mr. Piketty has isolated the forces that will drive wealth inequality in the future, but for now, they’re not convinced the forces he focuses on are central to understanding the recent rise in wealth inequality. At least that’s my reading of the latest survey run by the University of Chicago’s Initiative on Global Markets. I’ve written before about their Economic Experts panel, which is intended to be broadly representative of opinion among elite academic economists…. The expert economists were asked whether

the most powerful force pushing toward greater wealth inequality in the U.S. since the 1970s is the gap between the after-tax return on capital and the economic growth rate.

To translate, does the T-shirt slogan “r>g” explain why wealth has become more unequally distributed?… 18 percent… uncertain. The clear majority either disagreed (59 percent) or strongly disagreed (21 percent)….

But what was the point of this? We saw from the Piketty quote up at the top that Piketty does not think that “r>g” has been driving the rise in American inequality. Why is it an interesting question to ask?

Justin, in my view, buries the lead, for he does indeed point out later on in his article:

If surveyed, it is likely that he would have joined the majority view in disagreeing with the claim the survey asked about. In Mr. Piketty’s telling, rising incomes among the super-rich are responsible for the recent rise in wealth inequality…

But doesn’t that make the IGM Forum poll not any sort of sober assessment of economists’ views of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century but, rather, something else?

Shouldn’t the IGM Forum at the Booth Business School of the University of Chicago have found somebody who had actually read Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century to decide on what questions to ask?

I am sure that it was always such–that intellectual standards in the academy were always not that high, and that a great many of the people making arguments always were people who hadn’t done their homework. But I do seem to be reminded of it more and more these days, especially since the beginning of the financial crisis back in 2007…

Afternoon Must-Read: John Williams: More QE Might Be Appropriate If U.S. Economy Faltered

John Williams: More QE Might Be Appropriate If U.S. Economy Faltered: “If we really get a sustained, disinflationary forecast…

…I think moving back to additional asset purchases in a situation like that should be something we should seriously consider…. The concern is the next steps that [the ECB] may need. That worries me a little bit. Will their policy response be as timely and aggressive as needed?… The markets are pricing in a lot of other things that might happen and a lot of those are negative. The cross currents are really the story.