Must-Read: Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited

Must-Read: Naughty, naughty!

Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited: “[We] do not find convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers for EU countries…

…during the sovereign debt crisis (2012-2013) or during the tepid recovery thereafter…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 but not for 2011-2012…. For 2012-2013 we find a larger estimate than Blanchard and Leigh, but due to the higher standard error the estimated coefficient is no longer significant at the 5% level…. In the two periods we added, our estimated coefficients are close to zero…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a statistically significant negative coefficient in the panel forecast for 2009-2013. This result holds for the prolonged period 2009-2015. However, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient when we perform the panel analysis for the period 2011-2015.

Nowhere in their piece do Mohlmann and Suyker report their estimated coefficient and its standard error for the entire period 2009-2015.

Repeat: nowhere in their piece do they report estimates for their entire sample.

Trying to back out estimates from the information they do give, if they had reported it they would have reported a number like -0.60 with a standard error near 0.23. Compare that to the Blanchard-Leigh estimates for 2009-2013 of a number of -0.67 with a standard error of 0.16.

See that a good and true lead is not “[There is no] convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers… during… 2012-13 or thereafter…”

See that a good and true lead would be: “There is no statistical power at all over 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 to test whether excess fiscal multipliers in those years are different than the strong excess fiscal multipliers found by Blanchard and Leigh…”

Seizing the high ground of the null hypothesis for one’s favored position, and then running tests with no power, is undignified…

Blanchard leigh Google Search

Must-Reads Up to the Wee Hours of December 2, 2015

  • Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed: “The Fed will repeatedly change the rule… [or] stick to the rule longer than it should…” :: It does boggle my mind that John Taylor and Paul Ryan would take the 2004-today experience as suggesting that the Federal Reserve should be even loosely bound by any sort of policy “rule”
  • Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Pre-Industrial Inequality: “Compare… inequality to the maximum feasible inequality that… might have been ‘extracted’ by those in power…’ :: And the ‘winner’ for all time–in terms of success at extracting as much wealth from the workers as possible given resources, population, and technology–is Mughal India in 1750!

At What Time Scale, If Any, Does the Long Run Come?

Paul Krugman: Is The Economy Self-Correcting?: “Brad DeLong… has this wrong…

…The proposition of a long-run tendency toward full employment isn’t a primitive axiom in IS-LM. It’s derived… under certain assumptions… [with] good reason to believe that even under ‘normal’ conditions it’s… very weak…. And under liquidity-trap conditions it’s not a process we expect to see operate at all….

Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers… find… a half-life for output gaps of around 6 years. [In] the long run… we might not all be dead, but most of us will be hitting mandatory retirement…. [And] at the zero lower bound the process doesn’t work… [but] bring[s] on a debt-deflation spiral. Yes, a sufficiently large price fall could bring about expectations of future inflation–but that’s not the droid we’re looking for mechanism we’re talking about here…. Slumps usually don’t last all that long… [because] central banks… push back…. The economy isn’t self-correcting… [but] relies on Uncle Alan, or Uncle Ben, or Aunt Janet to get back to full employment. Which brings us back to the liquidity trap, in which the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…

But, I say, Uncle Ben did try to come to the rescue!:

Graph St Louis Adjusted Monetary Base FRED St Louis Fed
  • A doubling of the monetary base…
  • Followed by the 20% increase in the monetary base that was QE I…
  • Followed by the 30% increase in the monetary base that was QE II…
  • Followed by the 50% increase in the monetary base that was QE III…

These are big increases. If you think that only 1/10 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 36% rise in the long-run money stock and thus the long-run price level. If you think that only 1/25 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 15% increase in the long-run price level.

It is true that some of us thought that Uncle Ben should go double again after QE III–that he should push the monetary base up from $4 trillion to $8 trillion to see what happens. But Ben’s decision to call a halt to base-expansion was not clearly wrong, given the limited benefits and the unknown unknowns associated with such derangement of the structure of asset duration, after a 360% increase in the monetary base.

Paul will say that this is what his “in the liquidity trap… the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…” means. And Paul Krugman is (surprise! surprise!) right. To lose that much traction, however? To have the default assumption be that none of quantitative easing is going to stick for the long run, whenever the long run comes?

The failure of the full-employment long run to come “soon” once extraordinary quantitative easing was on the policy menu may not have surprised Paul. It certainly has surprised me…

Hoisted from the Archives from Five Years Ago: Department of “HUH?!?!?!?!?!?!

Every once in a while I think that our austerian intellectual adversaries could not have been as clueless in the aftermath of 2008 as I remember them being. But then I go back through my archives, and find things like this:


Department of “HUH?!?!?!?!?!?!”: Does David Andolfatto really think that the speed with which unemployed workers found jobs sped up as the recession hit?

Apparently so:

Is the Deficient Demand Hypothesis Consistent with the Facts on Labor Market Turnover

In a typical quarter, roughly 2,000,000 workers per month exited unemployment into employment. When the recession hits… look at what happens to the UE flow. While it does not rise as sharply as the EU flow, it rises nevertheless… and continues to remain high even as the EU flow declines. Is this surge in job finding rates among the unemployed consistent with the deficient demand hypothesis?

Wow. Just wow.

The pace of new hires falls by 30% as the recession hits. Firms just don’t see the demand to justify hiring at the normal pace.

But when firms hire, they hire from employed and the not-in-the-labor-force as well as the unemployed. With more than twice as many unemployed, a greater share of new hires now come from the currently-unemployed than used to, and so a greater number of people make the unemployment-to-employment transition.

But that is not any “surge in job finding rates among the unemployed.”

Your average unemployed person has a harder time and a lower chance of finding a job when the recession hits. Andolfatto has forgotten–or never bothered to learn–that a “job-finding rate” has a denominator as well as a numerator. There is no surge in the job finding rates among the unemployed–rather, the reverse.

This really is not rocket science, people…

The Importance of Unemployment Insurance for American Families and the Economy Brookings Institution

China’s market crash means Chinese supergrowth could have only 5 more years to run

Mapping China s Growth Infographics on What Will China s Growth Look Like in 2020 Business Insider

Now that 90 days have passed, from the Huffington Post from Last August: China’s Market Crash Means Chinese Supergrowth Could Have Only 5 More Years to Run

Ever since I became an adult in 1980, I have been a stopped clock with respect to the Chinese economy. I have said–always–that Chinese supergrowth has at most ten more years to run, and more probably five or less. There will then, I have said, come a crash–in asset values and expectations if not in production and employment. After the crash, China will revert to the standard pattern of an emerging market economy without successful institutions that duplicate or somehow mimic those of the North Atlantic: its productivity rate will be little more than the 2%/year of emerging markets as a whole, catch-up and convergence to the North Atlantic growth-path norm will be slow if at all, and political risks that cause war, revolution, or merely economic stagnation rather than unexpected but very welcome booms will become the most likely sources of surprises.

I was wrong for least twenty-five years straight–the jury is still out on the period since 2005. And that makes me very hesitant, now that a crash–even if, perhaps, not the crash I was predicting–is at hand, to count China and its supergrowth miracle out.

Economic Destabilization Financial Meltdown and the Rigging of the Shanghai Stock Market Global Research Centre for Research on Globalization

A great deal of China super-growth always seemed to me to be just catch-up to the norm one would expect, given East Asian societal-organizational capabilities. China had been far depressed below that norm by the misgovernment of the Qing, the civil wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese conquest, and the manifold disasters of rule by paranoid Parkinson’s Disease-sufferer Mao Zedong. Take convergence to that East Asian societal-capability norm, the wisdom of first Deng Xiaoping, then Jiang Zemin in applying the standard Hamiltonian gaining-manufacturing-technological-capability-through-light-manufacturing-exports development strategy (albeit on a world-historical scale), and a modicum of good luck, and China seemed understandable. There thus seemed to me to be no secret Chinese institutional or developmental sauce.

Given that, I focused on how China lacked the good-and-honest-government, the societal trust, and the societal openness factors that appear to have made for full convergence to the U.S. frontier in countries from Japan and Singapore to Ireland and France. One of the few historical patterns to repeat itself with regularity over the past three centuries has been that, wherever governments are unable to make the allocation of property and contract rights stick, industrialization never reaches North Atlantic levels of productivity.

Fast economic convergence is a myth in Europe and in emerging economies

Sometimes the benefits of entrepreneurship are skimmed off by roving thieves. Sometimes economic growth stalls. Sometimes profits are skimmed by local notables, who abuse what ought to be the state’s powers for their own ends. China–in spite of all its societal and cultural advantages–had failed to make its allocation of property rights stick in any meaningful sense through the rule of law. Businesses could flourish only when they found party protectors, and powerful networks of durable groups of party protectors at that.

Another headwind for China in the future is that, as the very sharp young whippersnapper Noah Smith1 points out, the Hamiltonian manufactures-export strategy is played out, not just for poorer countries wishing to emulate China but for China in the future. Historically, the Hamiltonian strategy of moving farmers to factories and setting them to work using imported manufacturing technology is the only reliably-successful development strategy, because manufacturing technology is the only one that can be reliably imported–you buy the machines to make the products, you buy the blueprints for the products to be made, and with a few engineering coaches hired from abroad you are in business. But that requires that people outside your country buy your low-priced manufactures. And the world has reached a point at which demand for manufactured goods is no longer highly elastic. Already James Fallows2 reports on Chinese entrepreneurs lamenting how the real profits flow to the owners of scarce natural resources or the owners of brands and of design and engineering resources, leaving those who actually make the manufactured goods with only crumbs.

Greece or Chile thus seemed to me to be China’s most-likely future, and it always seemed to me it would take quite a while to get there.

Yet, so far, contrary to my expectations for more than a generation, China has hitherto kept growing and growing rapidly even without anything a North Atlantic economic historian would see as the rule of law. It has had its own system of what we might call industrial neofeudalism. Instead of property and contract rights the king’s judges will enforce, Chinese entrepreneurs have protection via their fealty to connection-groups within the party that others do not wish to cross. It is, in a strange way, almost like the libertarian fantasy in which you hire your own personal police department in a competitive market come to life. Such a system should not work: Party connection-groups should find themselves unable to referee their disputes. The evanescence of their positions should lead them into the same shortsighted rent-extraction logic that we have seen played out over and over again in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. And yet, somehow, in China, eppur si muove.

Now I do believe that after this stock market crash China is likely to have another five to ten years of very healthy growth. The party can redistribute income from the rich to the middle and the poor, and from the coasts to the interior. Mammoth demand from an enriched urban middle class and peasantry can provide business for all of China’s factories that otherwise would be selling into an export market with lower-than-expected demand elasticity. The interior can be brought up to the manufacturing productivity standards of the coast.

But that, I think, is the last trick the Chinese government can play to keep anything like Chinese supergrowth going. And after it is played, China will–unfortunately–more likely than not become another corrupt middle-income country in the middle-income relative development trap.

I have been wrong about the duration of China’s growth miracle for all of my adult life. But I am confirmed in my forecast when I read the thoughts of very sharp China perma-bull Stephen Roach3:

There are many moving parts in China’s daunting transition…. While progress on economic rebalancing is encouraging, China has put far more on its plate: simultaneous plans to modernize the financial system, reform the currency, and address excesses in equity, debt, and property markets… [plus] an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, a more muscular foreign policy, and a nationalistic revival couched in terms of the “China Dream.”… The economic-reform strategy [could be] stymied by the lack of political will in a one-party state…. History is littered with more failures than successes in pushing beyond the per capita income threshold that China has attained. The last thing China needs is to try to balance too much on the head of a pin. Its leaders need to simplify and clarify an agenda…

Therefore I once again say: China’s supergrowth has five more years to run. And, after it ebbs, China’s success at grasping the future depends not on economic growth but on political reform–the establishment of the rule of law and an open society rather than the rule of the CCP and a closed party elite–and only after successful political transition might economic growth and convergence resume.

For kids’ future, money does matter

(AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki)

Money may not be able to buy happiness, but a new working paper suggests that it can have significant effects on children’s mental health and personality traits—particularly for our country’s most vulnerable kids.

The study—by Randall Akee of UCLA, Emilia Simeonova of Johns Hopkins University, and Jane Costello and William Copeland of Duke University—looks at a group of child and adolescent members of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians using data from the Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth. Four years into the study, a casino opened on the reservation, and the Eastern Cherokee tribal government distributed a share of the profits—about $4,000—to each adult member of the tribe annually. These families, who averaged an annual income of $22,145 before the casino opening, saw a whopping 20 percent boost in their earnings.

This income increase provided researchers with an unusual glimpse into the ways in which money can directly affect children’s outcomes—especially those already suffering from behavioral problems and poor mental health.

Researchers have established that developing certain personality traits and cognitive skills at a young age go a long way in affecting one’s future health and well-being. And poor children are much more likely to suffer from mental and physical health problems that can limit their ability to learn and navigate the world as they grow older. But many of these past studies focus on early-childhood interventions, in large part due to the fact that cognitive skills—such as memory, reasoning, perception, and intuition—are only malleable at a very early age. This begs the question: What kinds of policies might help older disadvantaged children and teenagers?

Akee and his team point out that the kinds of mental health and personality traits that are associated with positive life outcomes—such as better physical health, educational attainment, and lifetime earnings—are still flexible at this time in a child’s life. And, while other studies have looked at how participation in education or social programs affects such traits, research has yet to establish a direct connection between extra unearned cash (unrelated to a parent’s job) and a child’s behavioral health.

The authors compared adolescents who resided in households that received the extra income by age 16 to those who received it later, or not at all. And the effects were dramatic: The extra income significantly lowered behavioral and emotional disorder among the studied children and adolescents. There were also large improvements in two personality traits that social scientists have linked to long-term positive life outcomes: Conscientiousness was boosted by 42.8 percent of a standard deviation, and agreeableness by 30.6 percent.

It is not completely clear how the money brought about these changes in such a profound way, although Akee and his co-authors have some ideas. Their work found a marked change in the parents’ mental health, as well as their relationship with the child and spouse. All of these changes have strong effects on children’s well-being. Households living outside the reservation were also more likely to move to higher-income areas. Research has established that one’s neighborhood has a direct effect on childhood outcomes. The authors found that, among the small subpopulation that did move, part of the improved mental well-being was due to the better neighborhood.

This study by Akee and his team is especially important considering that one in five children in the United States now live below the federal poverty line—defined as $23,550 for a family of four in 2013. While the United States does provide government assistance to children through programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, these programs are tied to the work effort of the parents and can be difficult to access, sometimes imposing undue hardship on the working poor. There are some international conditional cash transfer policies and small U.S.-based experiments we can look to, which tie the benefit to health check-ups, school attendance, or other similar factors. The point, however, is that any policies that are in place are ones that center on the parent—not the child.

The study is not without its limits. For one, it looks at a single population, both culturally and geographically. And, while other studies have looked at interventions that are similar in size, they are not similar in duration—the casino benefit is a permanent change for this population. Akee and his team, however, undoubtedly give a boost to the argument that if we want to really improve children’s futures, money does matter.

Must-Read: Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed

Must-Read: It does boggle my mind that John Taylor and Paul Ryan would take the 2004-today experience as suggesting that the Federal Reserve should be even loosely bound by any sort of policy “rule”:

Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed: “That suggests two possible outcomes…

…One, the Fed will repeatedly change the rule or deviate from it, which defeats the supposed purpose of the rule, which is for the Fed be predictable and constant. Or the Fed, to avoid invasive audits by Congress, might stick to the rule longer than it should until the economic consequences are intolerable. Stanley Fischer… once said of exchange-rate rules: ‘The only sure rule is that whatever exchange-rate system a country has, it will wish at some times that it had another one.’ Similarly, history suggests that if the Fed is forced to adopt a rule for monetary policy, it will eventually have to abandon it. The only question is how costly that process is likely to be.

An introduction to the geography of student debt

Today, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, with Generation Progress and Higher Ed, Not Debt, released its interactive, Mapping Student Debt, which compares the geographic distribution of average household student loan balances and average loan delinquency to median income across the United States and within metropolitan areas. The stark patterns of student debt across zip codes enable us to begin to analyze the role that debt plays in people’s lives and the larger economy.

Delinquency and income

One element of the student debt story that has already been explored is that borrowers with the lowest student loan balances are the most likely to default because they are also the ones likely face the worst prospects in the labor market. Our analysis using the data displayed in the interactive map is consistent with these findings.

The geography of student debt is very different than the geography of delinquency. Take the Washington, D.C. metro region. In zip codes with high average loan balances (western and central Washington, D.C.), delinquency rates are lower. Within the District of Columbia, median income is highest in these parts of the city. Similar results–low delinquency rates in high-debt areas–can be seen for Chicago, as well. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

For the country as a whole, there’s an inverse relationship between zip code income and delinquency rates. As the median income in a zip code increases, the delinquency rate decreases, corroborating findings that low-income borrowers are the most likely to default on their loan repayments. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

What explains this relationship? There appear to be two possible, and mutually consistent, theories. First, although graduate students take out the largest student loans, they are able to carry large debt burdens thanks to their higher salaries post-graduation. One study of student loans by institution type reports a three-year cohort default rate for graduate-only institutions of 2 percent to 3 percent.* Second, the rise in the number of students borrowing relatively small amounts for for-profit colleges has augmented the cumulative debt load, but because these borrowers face poor labor market outcomes and lower earnings upon graduation (if they do in fact graduate), their delinquency rates are much higher. This is further complicated by the fact that these for-profit college attendees generally come from lower-income families who may not be able to help with loan repayments.

The inverse relationship between delinquency and income is not surprising, especially when considering that problems of credit access have disproportionately affected poor and minority populations in the past. In the 1930s, for example, the government-sanctioned Home Owner’s Loan Corporation labeled maps of American cities by each neighborhood’s worthiness for mortgage lending. Neighborhoods outlined in red were considered the least worthy, purposefully coinciding with their black and poor white populations. Banks and insurance agencies also adopted these discriminatory “redlining” practices, further cutting off communities from the essential capital that is needed to develop neighborhoods and invest in sustainable infrastructure. Though redlining was outlawed in the 1960s, its pernicious effects still persist, as seen in Figure 2 as well as in maps of the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2006.

It might seem counterintuitive that lack of access to credit results in delinquency—seemingly a problem of “too much debt.” But in fact, lack of access to credit and delinquency are two sides of the same coin. Nearly everyone needs access to credit markets to meet basic economic needs, and if they can’t get loans through competitive, transparent financial networks, poor people are more likely to be subjected to exploitative credit arrangements in the form of very high rates and other onerous terms and penalties, including on student loans. That disadvantage interacts with and is magnified by their lack of labor market opportunities. The result is exactly what we see across time and space: high delinquency rates for those with the least access to credit markets.

Student loan balances and debt burdens

When we look at average loan balance and median income, we find a stark positive relationship, at least below a certain income threshold. As median income increases in a zip code, so does the average loan balance, until income reaches approximately $140,000. After that, the relationship becomes flat. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

Figure 4 shows the relationship between the “burden” of student loan payments and zip code median income. Using the “average monthly payments on student loans” variable, we calculate that student debt absorbs around 7 percent of gross income in zip codes where median income is $20,000, declining to 2 percent in the highest-income zip code

Figure 4

These graphs show us that the burden of student debt isn’t just shouldered by the young. As borrowers age, servicing their student debt hinders their ability to accumulate wealth. In fact, the Pew Research Center found that college-educated householders with student debt have one-seventh the wealth of people without debt, in part because the wealthiest students don’t need to go into debt to pay for college. Student debt repayment may also delay expenditures that are associated with the traditional economic lifecycle, such as owning a home or a car or even getting married. Altogether, this new expense associated with attaining a middle-class income contributes to the erosion of middle-class wealth across generations.

As cumulative student debt continues to grow and we learn more about its role in the nation’s many economic problems, it is clear that a reconsideration of the policies that treat student debt as “good debt” because it finances valuable human capital is in order, especially in light of the problems that even young college graduates have in the labor market.

Methodology

This geographic analysis uses two primary datasets: credit reporting data on student debt from Experian and income data from the American Community Survey.

The Experian data includes eight key student debt variables (see Figure 5) aggregated from household-level microdata to the zip code level. The underlying household data are a snapshot of the entire U.S. population at a single point in time—in this case, the autumn of 2015.

Figure 5

There are a number of caveats regarding the Experian data file that have guided our methodology for constructing variables and analyzing results:

• The universe of households contains only those with “any type of credit” and which, therefore, have a credit report. Relative to the population as a whole, this likely excludes the poorest households without any official credit access whatsoever.

• It is unclear how Experian constructs “households” since credit reports pertain to an individual’s credit history.

• If the same student loan has more than one signatory, then the loan may be assigned to multiple households and hence to multiple zip codes or even counted more than once within the same household.

• Experian claims that the universe of their geographically-aggregated data is all households with credit, but the levels of the data on loan balance and delinquency are more consistent with the idea that the universe is only households that have student loans. In other words, Experian claims their data include households that have credit but no outstanding student loans, but if that is the case the reported levels for both average loan balance and average delinquency are much higher than other sources would suggest. Average loan balance and average delinquency rates, however, are comparable to reliable outside estimates if interpreted as loan balance and delinquency among only those households with student debt.

For these reasons, we do not report any student loan data in dollar amounts. Instead, we have used two of the Experian variables to construct analogs to relative average household loan balance and relative delinquency.

To create the average household loan balance variable in the interactive map, we calculate an “average of the average” zip code-level student loan balance for the entire country, then code zip codes by percentage above or below that average-of-averages. For delinquency, we calculate a “delinquency rate” for each zip code by dividing the average number of 90-or-more-days-delinquent loans per household by the average number of outstanding loans per household. Then, after winsorizing the top one percent of observations to the 99th percentile value, we project the “delinquency rate” onto a scale that ranges from 0 to 10.

For user-friendliness, we assign each of these student debt scale variables a qualitative category. If average loan balance on the map is “somewhat high,” for example, then it means that a zip code’s average loan balance is between 25 and 35 percent higher than the national average of $24,271. Similarly, if the delinquency reads “very low,” it corresponds to a scale level between 0.067 and 0.091. Figure 6 summarizes the relationship between each of the scale variables’ levels and their qualitative description.

Figure 6

Next, we merge zip code-level median income data from the 2013 American Community Survey with our imputed scaled student debt variables in order to construct choropleth maps.

The actual map uses three different techniques to display the variables on a choropleth scale. For the average loan balance, we artificially set ten cutpoints to enhance the geographic variation in metropolitan areas; to do this, we maximized the breadth of the color categories for values higher than the average-of-averages loan balance. For delinquency, we created ten quantiles (or equal counts) to account for the right-skewed data. Finally, for median income, we used ten jenks (or natural breaks in the data) to assign the color scale. Higher numbers and darker shading correspond to higher household average student loan balances, higher shares of outstanding loans that are 90 or more days delinquent in the previous 24 months, and higher median incomes. We think that the geographic variation in the Experian data (and as seen in the maps) is believable, but not the levels reported by Experian.

Download the “Mapping Student Debt” presentation from the December 1, 2015 release (pdf)

*Correction, December 8, 2015: A previous version of this column cited a Department of Education projected graduate student default rate of 7 percent, but the Department has removed that projection from its website and we now think the 2 percent to 3 percent realized default rate is a better estimate.

Must-Read: Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Pre-Industrial Inequality

Must-Read: And the ‘winner’ for all time–in terms of success at extracting as much wealth from the workers as possible given resources, population, and technology–is Mughal India in 1750!

Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Pre-Industrial Inequality: “Is inequality largely the result of the Industrial Revolution?…

…Or were pre-industrial incomes as unequal as they are today? This article infers inequality across individuals within each of the 28 pre-industrial societies, for which data were available, using what are known as social tables. It applies two new concepts: the inequality possibility frontier and the inequality extraction ratio. They compare the observed income inequality to the maximum feasible inequality that, at a given level of income, might have been ‘extracted’ by those in power. The results give new insights into the connection between inequality and economic development in the very long run.

Ye Olde Inæqualitee Shoppe Pseudoerasmus Https pseudoerasmus files wordpress com 2014 09 blwpg263 pdf

Today’s Economic History: Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised

Today’s Economic History: Roth is very good on “money” defined as a unit of account.

But there are, of course, other perfectly-fine definitions of “money”: “means of payment”, “medium of exchange”, “that which you need to hold to take advantage of or avoid suffering from market disequilibrium”, “even store of value”.

To say that the definition attached to how you use the word “money” is the only correct definition and that everyone with a different definition is doing it wrong–well, that’s just doing it wrong yourself…

Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised: “The earliest uses of money in recorded civilization were not coins…

…or anything like them. They were tallies of credits and debits (gives and takes), assets and liabilities (rights and responsibilities, ownership and obligations), quantified in numbers. Accounting. (In technical terms: sign-value notation.)

Tally sticks go back twenty-five or thirty thousand years. More sophisticated systems emerged six to seven thousand years ago (Sumerian clay tablets and their strings-of-beads predecessors). The first coins weren’t minted until circa 700 BCE — thousands or tens of thousands of years after the invention of ‘money.’

These tally systems give us our first clue to the nature of this elusive ‘social construct’ called money: it’s an accounting construct. The earliest human recording systems we know of — proto-writing — were all used for accounting.* So the need for social accounting may even explain the invention of writing.

This ‘accounting’ invention is a human manifestation of, and mechanism for, reciprocity instincts whose origins long predate humanity. It’s an invented technique to do the counting that is at least somewhat, at least implicitly, necessary to reciprocal, tit-for-tat social relationships. It’s even been suggested that the arduous work of social accounting — keeping track of all those social relationships with all those people — may have been the primary impetus for the rapid evolutionary expansion of the human brain. ‘Money’ allowed humans to outsource some of that arduous mental recording onto tally sheets.

None of this is to suggest that explicit accounting is necessary for social relationships. That would be silly. Small tribal cultures are mostly dominated by ‘gift economies’ based on unquantified exchanges. And even in modern societies, much or most of the ‘value’ we exchange — among family, friends, and even business associates — is not accounted for explicitly or numerically. But money, by any useful definition, is so accounted for. Money simply doesn’t exist without accounting.

Coins and other pieces of physical currency are, in an important sense, an extra step removed from money itself. They’re conveniently exchangeable physical tokens of accounting relationships, allowing people to shift the tallies of rights and responsibilities without editing tally sheets. But the tally sheets, even if they are only implicit, are where the money resides.

This is of course contrary to everyday usage. A dollar bill is ‘money,’ right? But that is often true of technical terms of art. This confusion of physical tokens and other currency-like things (viz, economists’ monetary aggregates, and Wray’s ‘money things’) with money itself make it difficult or impossible to discuss money coherently.

What may surprise you: all of this historical and anthropological information and understanding is esoteric, rare knowledge among economists. It’s pretty much absent from Econ 101 teaching, and beyond. Economists’ discomfort with the discipline’s status as a true ‘social science,’ employing the methodologies and epistemological constructs of social science — their ‘physics envy’ — ironically leaves them bereft of a definition for what is arguably the most fundamental construct in their discipline. Likewise for other crucial and constantly-employed economic terms: assets, capital, savings, wealth, and others.

Now to be fair: a definition of money will never be simple and straightforward. Physicists’ definition of ‘energy’ certainly isn’t. But physicists don’t completely talk past each other when they use the word and its associated concepts. Economists do when they talk about money. Constantly.

Physicists’ definition of energy is useful because it’s part of a mutually coherent complex of other carefully defined terms and understandings — things like ‘work,’ ‘force,’ ‘inertia,’ and ‘momentum.’ Money, as a (necessarily ‘social’) accounting construct, requires a similar complex of carefully defined, associated accounting terms — all of which themselves are about social-accounting relationships.

At this point you’re probably drumming your fingers impatiently: ‘So give: what is money?’ Here, a bloodless and technical term-of-art definition:

The value of assets, as designated in a unit of account.

Which raises the obvious questions: What do you mean by ‘assets’ and ‘unit of account’? Those are the kind of associated definitions that are necessary to any useful definition of money. Hint: assets are pure accounting, balance-sheet entities, numeric representations of the value of goods (or of claims on goods, or claims on claims on…).