Must-Reads Up to Midnight on November 30, 2015

  • Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB
  • Willem Buiter: Transferring Robot Incomes to the People: “the scope for automation is actually greater, probably, in cerebral work than in physical work…” :: The distribution of wealth; the distribution of income; the distribution of utility–and, possibly, the distribution of eudaimonia…
  • Ricardo Hausmann: The Import of Exports: “To survive and thrive, societies need to pay special attention to those activities that produce goods and services they can sell to non-residents…” :: There is a very interesting argument made here about the export sector as the key link…
  • Ben Thompson: Selling Feelings: “Now… time and money… must… be invested in getting even closer to customers and more finely attuned to exactly why they are spending their money on you…” :: So how do we build an information-age economy in which producers have incentives to learn as much as they can about consumers to successfully anticipate them without also giving them an even bigger incentive and capability to deceive them?
  • Jonathan Moreno: Explaining the “History of Technology” Series, and Equitable Growth
  • Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models: “If you came into the crisis with a broadly Hicksian view of aggregate demand you did quite well…. What hasn’t worked…is our understanding of aggregate supply…” :: A key factor Krugman omits in which standard Hicksian-inclined economists’ predictions have fallen down: the length of the short run…
  • Noah Smith: Unlearning conomics: “Right now we’re in the middle of an empirical revolution in econ, and… common theories are just not matching reality very well…” :: Noah Smith is pushing me towards thinking that Econ 1 needs to teach *a lot more than supply-and-demand plus macroeconomic externalities that can be dealt with by stabilizing monetary and maybe fiscal policy…*
  • Eric Chyn: Moved to Opportunity: The Long-Run Effect of Public Housing Demolition on Labor Market Outcomes of Children: “Displaced children are 9 percent more likely to be employed and earn 16 percent more as adults…” :: Huh. It now looks like the huge benefits that got us excited back in the “moving to opportunity” policy days may have been an underestimate…

Must-Read: Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB

Must-Read: Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB: “[What are] the consequences of extremely low equilibrium real interest rates in a world…

…with integrated but heterogenous capital markets, and nominal rigidities[?]…. (i) Economies experiencing liquidity traps pull others into a similar situation by running current account surpluses. (ii) Reserve currencies have a tendency to bear a disproportionate share of the global liquidity trap—a phenomenon we dub the ‘reserve currency paradox’. (iii) Beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate devaluations stimulate the domestic economy at the expense of other economies. (iv) While more price and wage flexibility exacerbates the risk of a deflationary global liquidity trap, it is the more rigid economies that bear the brunt of the recession. (v) (Safe) Public debt issuances and increases in government spending anywhere are expansionary everywhere, and more so when there is some degree of price or wage flexibility. We use our model to shed light on the evolution of global imbalances, interest rates, and exchange rates since the beginning of the global financial crisis.

Must-Read: Willem Buiter: Transferring Robot Incomes to the People

Actor Arnold Schwarzenegger poses for photographers at a preview of the film ‘Terminator: Genisys’. (AP Photo/Jacques Brinon)

Must-Read: The distribution of wealth; the distribution of income; the distribution of utility–and, possibly, the distribution of eudaimonia, of lives worth living if we reject the hardline Benthamite pushpin-as-good-as-poetry position. For example, Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson (2010) convincingly paint a picture in which (a) pre-industrial inequality in wealth is very large, (b) pre-industrial inequality in income is moderate, and (c) pre-industrial inequality in utility is very large indeed. I think that this is a large part of what Willem Buiter is groping towards:

Willem Buiter: Transferring Robot Incomes to the People: “I’m more an optimist on technological change than some…

…who argue that the low-hanging fruit on the Tree of Knowledge has all been plucked. That we’ve done fire, we’ve done the wheel, we’ve done horsepower, and, you know, coal, electricity, chemicals, and all we have now is the tail-end of the boring ICT revolution, robotics, artificial intelligence and biotechnology, that is just a big yawn. I think this is completely wrong….

We haven’t begun to scratch the surface yet of many of the applications of ICT, robotics, artificial intelligence, and everything that goes with it, is going to create huge social, political problems. But in terms of wealth creation, you know, it’s the ultimate thing if you do this right. If you get the distributional aspects right, and don’t turn the world into an economy where the owners of capital and a few winner-take-all entrepreneurs are with all the money and the rest starve, I think technical progress is not the issue….

It’s always true that existing jobs are wiped out in a hundred years, but it’s going to go much faster now, in twenty years time, maybe half the existing jobs in the service sector, the white collar jobs, are going to be gone. Because the scope for automation is actually greater, probably, in cerebral work than in physical work. It’s very hard to get robots to walk properly. It’s much easier to make them think really fast. So I think this is going to be the real challenge. You know, unless we blow ourselves up in religious extremism…. This is going to be the real challenge we have to face, avoid the Piketty nightmare, although he got his analysis wrong…

Is the lack of paid leave partly to blame for declining U.S. labor force participation?

Couple with their newborn son, by Andy Dean, veer.com<br />

While once seen as an obscure “women’s issue,” policymakers and celebrities alike are increasingly arguing that paid family leave in the United States is a necessity in the 21st century.

Many businesses agree, with everyone from Netflix to Spotify jumping on the bandwagon and providing some of their employees with paid leave. Yet these are partial, private-sector solutions that, while a good first step, do not necessarily address the national problem. A new working paper released by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development suggests that the United States’ failure to implement such policies on a federal level—as opposed to the other OECD countries—is generating consequences for our economy that go far beyond a single family.

While various types of paid leave have become standard practice in almost all OECD countries, the United States is the only developed nation that does not have any legal right to take paid leave to care for a new child. Some U.S. businesses do offer paid leave as a benefit, but only 12 percent of private-sector workers are employed at such places. U.S. federal law does mandate 12 weeks of unpaid leave through the Family and Medical Leave Act, but only 60 percent of workers are eligible for this benefit because of various restrictions. And, among those who are eligible, many cannot afford to go without pay for that period of time.

For individual families, this is clearly problematic. Without the kinds of income support and subsidized child care that workers in other OECD countries rely on, many American parents are forced to go back to work too soon after the birth of their child. This has consequences for parent and child alike. Parents, especially women, are  more likely to experience poor health and depression when they return to work too soon. And poor care early in life can hurt children’s health and development, which can affect their well-being far into the future. On the other hand, as the cost of childcare continues to increase, many parents—and women in particular—find that continuing to work is not necessarily the most economically beneficial choice.

But these consequences create ripple effects that go far beyond an individual child or family. The working paper points out that as other OECD countries began implementing a suite of policies designed to help working parents over the past three decades, the United States did very little. At the same time, the United States has seen its labor force participation rank screech to a halt since 2000, with the nation dropping from 7th among 24 OECD nations to 17th today. While the aging Baby Boomer population is a major driver of the declining participation rate, the paper also points to our inability to help workers balance their home and work lives as a contributing factor.

U.S. women’s ability to continue working has suffered in particular. A study by Cornell University’s Francine D. Blau and Lawrence Kahn found that work-life policies explain about 28% of America’s declining female labor force participation rate relative to other OECD countries. This trend is not likely to reverse. In fact, the OECD predicts that, if all stays as it is, substantial labor force declines will continue for the next few decades, which could come at a considerable cost to U.S. economic performance. In contrast, the OECD found that eliminating the gender gap in workforce participation by 2025 could boost U.S. GDP per capita by 0.5 percentage points.

California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey have all implemented paid leave programs. While Rhode Island and New Jersey’s programs are fairly recent, California’s paid family leave policy has been in place for more than a decade, giving researchers a sufficient timeline to evaluate the policy’s effectiveness.

Different studies all find that California’s paid family leave program has increased the percentage of women who stay in the labor market post-birth. California’s paid leave program also seems to be good for business—or at least it does not harm it. Because the program does not directly cost employers—it is funded completely by employee contribution—it does not inflict a disproportionate burden on businesses. In fact, the great majority of California businesses reported that the policy had positive or neutral effects on employee turnover, absenteeism, and morale according to a survey done by the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s Eileen Appelbaum and the CUNY Graduate Center’s Ruth Milkman. Initial evaluations of the program in New Jersey report similar findings.

As the OECD paper points out, implementing a national paid family leave program in the United States—along with other family-friendly policies such as subsidized child care and paid sick days—could go a long way in helping more women stay in the labor force. Doing so could help offset the slowdown in the nation’s labor force participation rate, and contribute to stronger U.S. economic growth.

 

Must-Read: Ricardo Hausmann: The Import of Exports

Photo of container stacks and port cranes by Andrey Kuzmin, veer.com

Must-Read: There is an interesting argument to be made here about how the speed of innovation in a sector is related to the extent of the market and thus of potential competition. And there is a very interesting argument made here about the export sector as the key link:

Ricardo Hausmann: The Import of Exports: “To pay for what they want from out-of-towners…

…they must sell them some of the things that they do know how to make…. The goods and services that a place can sell to non-residents have a disproportionate impact on its quality of life–and even its viability. A mining town becomes a ghost town when the mine closes, because the grocery store, the pharmacy, and the movie theater no longer have the capacity to buy the ‘imported’ food, medicine, and films they need. In contrast to non-tradable activities, a place’s export activities need to be pretty good to convince out-of-town customers–who have ample other options–to buy…. The higher the productivity and the quality of export activities, the higher the wages they can pay and still remain competitive….

To survive and thrive, societies need to pay special attention to those activities that produce goods and services they can sell to non-residents. Indeed, the need to act on new export opportunities and remove obstacles to success is probably the central lesson from the East Asian and Irish growth miracles.
Non-tradable activities are akin to a country’s sports leagues: different people like different teams. Those engaged in tradable activities are like the national team: we should all root for them–and organize ourselves to make sure they succeed.

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Selling Feelings

Must-Read: So how do we build an information-age economy in which producers have incentives to learn as much as they can about consumers to successfully anticipate them without also giving them an even bigger incentive and capability to deceive them?

Ben Thompson: Selling Feelings: “The model is broadly applicable…

…I wrote two weeks ago about how the future of publishing will not be about monetizing pure words but rather about using words to gain fans that can be monetized through other harder-to-discover media. Time and attention remain precious commodities…. Earning trust in one area gives you the right to make money from it in another…. Software generally should be seen as a lever to solutions that are much more meaningful to customers…. Software is infinitely copyable: better to use that quality to your advantage than to base your business model on fighting gravity….

Business is difficult–it was difficult before the Internet, and it’s difficult now–but the nature of the difficulty has changed. Distribution used to be the hardest… but now… time and money… must instead be invested in getting even closer to customers and more finely attuned to exactly why they are spending their money on you…. Create the conditions where the need might manifest itself and then meet that need, and not only will your business succeed, it will, in all likelihood, succeed to an even greater extent than the physically-limited lowest common denominator winners from the ‘good old days.’

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Unlearning Economics

Must-Read: Noah Smith is pushing me towards thinking that Econ 1 needs to teach a lot more than supply-and-demand plus macroeconomic externalities that can be dealt with by stabilizing monetary and maybe fiscal policy…

Noah Smith: Unlearning Economics: “Right now we’re in the middle of an empirical revolution in econ, and…

…unsurprisingly–a ton of standard, common theories are just not matching reality very well. For example: 1…. Minimum wages should harm employment in the short term. But the data shows that they probably don’t. 2…. A big influx of immigrants should depress the wages of native-born workers of comparable skill. But the data shows… the effect is very small.  3…. Welfare programs barely reduce observable work effort. 4…. Social norms (or morals, broadly conceived) matter to people…. The stuff… [of] Econ 101… are being smacked down by the heavy hand of new data. We’re slowly unlearning economics…. Econ 101 courses around the country probably need an overhaul…. Teachers should still teach the simple, classic theories that the new facts are beginning to kill… but mainly as a way to show how data can tell us when we’re wrong.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models

Paul Krugman talks to journalists during a news conference. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

Must-Read: A key factor Krugman omits in which standard Hicksian-inclined economists’ predictions have fallen down: the length of the short run. The length of the short run was supposed to be a small multiple of typical contract duration in the economy–perhaps six years in an economy characterized by three-year labor contracts, and perhaps three years in an economy in which workers and employers made decisions on an annual cycle. After that time, nominal prices and wages were supposed to have adjusted enough to nominal aggregates that the economy either would be at or would be well on the road to its long-run full-employment configuration. Moreover, the fact that price inertia was of limited duration combined with forward-looking financial markets and investment-profitability decisions to greatly damp short-run shortfalls of employment and production from full employment and sustainable potential.

It sounded good in theory. It has not proved true in reality since 2007:

Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models: “If you came into the crisis with a broadly Hicksian view of aggregate demand…

…you did quite well… [arguing] that as long as we were at the zero lower bound massive increases in the monetary base wouldn’t be inflationary [and would have near-zero effects on broader aggregates]… budget deficits would not drive up interest rates… large multipliers from fiscal policy…. What hasn’t worked nearly as well is our understanding of aggregate supply… the absence of deflation… [of] the “clockwise spirals”… in inflation-unemployment space as evidence for… Friedman-Phelps…. The other big problem is the dramatic drop in… potential output… correlated with the depth of cyclical slumps….

[The] policy moral[?]… Central banks focused on stable inflation may think they’re doing a good job… when they are actually failing…. Fiscal contraction in a liquidity trap seems… absolutely terrible for the long-run as well as the short-run, and quite possibly counterproductive even in purely [debt burden] terms…. I don’t think even Hicksian-inclined economists have taken all of this sufficiently into account.

Weekend Reading: Paul Krugman (1997): Capitalism’s Mysterious Triumph

Paul Krugman delivers a speech at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Sunday, June 20, 2010. (AP Photo/Heribert Proepper)

Paul Krugman (1997): Capitalism’s Mysterious Triumph: “SYNOPSIS: Communism failed because of an inability to provide a sustaining reason for existence; only under crisis could it work.

Recently my local public television station has been showing a fascinating series entitled ‘Russia’s War’ – a history, produced in Russia, of the Soviet Union’s struggle in World War II. It is not a pretty story: the producers do not hesitate to tell the full story of Stalin’s brutality, and they do not try to mask the ugliness of war with patriotic romanticism. Yet this stark honesty in a way makes the account of the Soviet Union’s wartime achievement all the more impressive.

The Soviet Union did not win through military genius: most of its trained officers had been purged in political witch-hunts, and while the war eventually threw up a new set of leaders, they were competent rather than brilliant – and their advice was often overruled by a dictator whose military judgement was usually disastrous. Russian soldiers fought with dogged heroism – but then so did the Germans. Why did the Russians prevail?

The answer is surprising, given the way the 20th century has actually turned out. The Soviet triumph in World War II was, above all, a victory of production. Despite huge losses in the first months of the war, despite mass dislocations of population and the German occupation of many of the country’s key manufacturing centers, Soviet industry managed to build tanks, artillery, and aircraft that were technologically a match for Germany’s weapons, and to do so at a rate that consistently exceeded anything their opponents thought was possible. Indeed, the decisive German defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk came about precisely because the Germans launched offensives against what they imagined to be a weaker opponent, and were taken by surprise when counterattacked by thousands of tanks whose existence they had never suspected.

What does this have to do with the world of 1997? Well, nowadays we take the triumph of capitalism as something preordained by the superiority of our economic system. After all, it now seems obvious to everyone except North Korea and Cuba that a market economy is vastly more productive than one controlled from the center – and the Cuban economy is imploding, while the North Koreans are quite literally starving to death.

Moreover, every time a Communist regime collapses, it turns out that the actual state of the economy it governed was far worse than anyone had imagined. For example, typical estimates of the GDP of East Germany before the old regime collapsed put its real GDP per capita at 70 or 80 percent of the West German level – meaning that East Germany was actually richer than some regions in the West. Yet after the fall of the Berlin Wall, visiting Westerners found something that looked like a Third World economy, with antiquated factories (and disastrous environmental problems) producing consumer goods of ludicrously low quality (like the notorious East German Trabant, an automobile that makes a Honda or Ford seem like a Mercedes). We used to think that the Soviet Union had an economy about half as large as America’s, that is, bigger than Japan’s; nowadays Russia seems to have less economic power than, say, Italy. We used to think that there was a real technological race between socialism and capitalism; nowadays the symbol of Russian technology is the hapless Mir space station. It seems obvious to many people in retrospect that the productive and technological triumphs that Communists used to claim – all those heroic photgraphs of dams and posters of muscular steelworkers – were mere propaganda; in reality, we think we have learned, socialism is a system that just can’t deliver the goods, while capitalism is a system that can.

But one lesson of ‘Russia’s War’ is that matters are not that simple. Were the supposed productive triumphs of the Soviet Union under Stalin merely a hoax? Tell that to the soldiers of Germany’s Army Group Center – the few who survived. The fact is that Stalin did transform Russia into a massive industrial power – a power tested in the most unambiguous way imaginable. And his successors did achieve real technological triumphs – not just showy triumphs like sending cosmonauts into orbit, but the creation of a highly sophisticated scientific and engineering establishment. True, Russia was never any good at producing high-quality consumer goods. But it was not always the bumbling, incompetent system we now imagine.

What this means is that the collapse of Communism and the triumph of capitalism need more of an explanation than the stories we usually hear. It is not enough to explain all the reasons why a market economy is more efficient than a centrally planned one. Those explanations are basically right – but the question is why a system that functioned well enough to compete with capitalism in the 1940s and 50s fell apart in the 1980s. What went wrong?

One possible answer is that changing technology changed the rules. When the communist leader Joseph Dzhugashvili changed his name to Stalin – ‘man of steel’ – he reflected the times in which he lived, an era in which heavy industry ruled, in which giant steel plants were the symbol of progress.

These days, of course, steel-producing regions throughout the world – not just in the old Soviet Union – are depressed; try visiting southeastern Belgium.And it’s not just steel: the age when countries or companies grew rich by making heavy products in big factories seems to have passed. One can make a case that whereas old-fashioned heavy industry was susceptible to central planning, new technologies, especially in microelectronics, favor free-wheeling competition over centralized control.

Russia could at least appear to hold its own in a technological race defined by the ability to build giant rockets; it was left completely flatfooted when the West started putting powerful computers on a chip. In fact, in the last few years even Japan’s great corporations have started to look a bit like dinosaurs, lumbering helplessly in pursuit of the little startups of Silicon Valley.

Another possible answer is that capitalism triumphed because of ‘globalization’ – a process everyone talks about but which we really don’t fully understand. For some reason – perhaps some synergistic interaction among declining tariffs, cheaper transportation, and better communications – it has become possible in the last generation for many countries to industrialize rapidly, not through massive programs of government-led investment, but simply by throwing themselves open to the world market and letting events take their course. Socialist economies could not avail themselves of this new opportunity, and so they began to fall beind instead of catching up.

But neither technological change nor globalization can explain the fact that socialist economies did not merely lag the West: they actually went into decline, and then collapse. Why couldn’t they at least hold on to what they had?

I don’t think anyone really knows the answer, but let me make a conjecture: the basic problem was not technical, but moral. Communism failed as an economic system because people stopped believing in it, not the other way around.

A market system, of course, works whether people believe in it or not. You may dislike capitalism, even feel that as a system it will eventually fail, yet do your job well because your family needs the money you earn. Capitalism can run, even flourish, in a society of selfish cynics. But a non-market economy cannot. The personal incentives for workers to do their jobs well, for managers to make good decisions, are simply too weak.

In the later years of the Soviet Union, workers knew that they would be paid regardless of how hard they tried; managers knew that promotions would depend more on political connections than on performance; and nobody was offered rewards large enough to justify taking unpopular positions or any sort of serious risk. (There can’t have been more than a few dozen people in the Soviet Union – all of them politicians – who had the kind of lavish life style enjoyed by tens of thousands of successful entrepreneurs and executives in the United States). So why did the system ever work? Because people believed in it. I don’t mean that people went singing to their jobs, praising the motherland. I do mean that they did not take as much advantage of the system as they might have (and did, in the system’s later years). And I also mean that because people in authority believed in the system, they were willing to impose brutal punishments on those who did try to take advantage. (Stalin used to shoot unsuccessful generals).

We see this kind of thing all the time, in microcosm. The market does not require people to believe in it; but the centrally planned economies that live inside a market economy, known as corporations, do. Everybody knows that financial incentives alone are not enough to make a company succeed; it must also build morale, a sense of mission, which makes people work at least somewhat for the good of the company rather than think only of what is good for them. Luckily, under capitalism an individual company can fail without taking the whole society down with it – or it can be reformed without a bloody revolution.

Why did people stop believing in socialism? Part of the answer is simply the passage of time: you can’t expect revolutionary fervor to last for 70 years. But perhaps also the unexpected resurgence of capitalism played a role. By the 1980s Russia’s elite was all too aware that the country, instead of overtaking the capitalist nations, was slipping behind – that Russia was failing to take advantage of new technology, that if anyone was challenging the West it was the rising nations of Asia. Communism lost any claim to the mandate of history well before it actually fell apart, and perhaps that is why it fell apart.

In the end, then, capitalism triumphed because it is a system that is robust to cynicism, that assumes that each man is out for himself. For much of the past century and a half men have dreamed of something better, of an economy that drew on man’s better nature. But dreams, it turns out, can’t keep a system going over the long term; selfishness can.

A Powerful Intellectual Stumbling Block: The Belief that the Market Can Only Be Failed

Over at Project Syndicate: The Trouble with Interest Rates: Of all the strange and novel economic doctrines propounded since 2007, Stanford’s John Taylor has a good claim to propounding the strangest: In his view, the low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies of North Atlantic and Japanese central banks are like:

imposing an interest-rate ceiling on the longer-term market… much like the effect of a price ceiling in a [housing] rental market…. [This] decline in credit availability, reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase unemployment, a classic unintended consequence…”

When you think about it, this analogy makes no sense at all.

When a government agency imposes a rent-control ceiling, it:

  • makes it illegal for renters to pay or landlords to collect more than the ceiling rent;
  • thus leaves a number of potential landlords willing but unable to rent apartments and a number of potential renters willing but unable to offer to pay more than the rent-control ceiling.

When a central bank reduces long-term interest rates via current and expected future open-market operations, it:

  • does not keep any potential lenders who wish to lend at higher than the current interest rate from offering to do so;
  • does not keep any potential borrowers who wish from taking up such an offer;
  • it is just that no borrowers wish to do so.

The reason we dislike rent-control ceilings–that it stops transactions both buyers and sellers wish to undertake from taking place–is simply absent.

So why would anyone claim that low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies are like rent control?

I think that the real path of reasoning is this:

  1. John Taylor, and the others claiming that central banks are committing unnatural acts by controlling the interest rate, feel a deep sense of wrongness about the current level of interest rates.
  2. John Taylor and his allies believe that whenever a price like the interest rate is “wrong”, it must be because the government has done it–that the free market cannot fail, but can only be failed.
  3. Thus the task is to solve the intellectual puzzle by figuring out what the government has done to make the current level of the interest rate so wrong.
  4. Therefore any argument that government policy is in fact appropriate can only be a red herring.
  5. And the analogy to rent control is a possible solution to the intellectual puzzle.

If I am correct here, then the rest of us will never convince John Taylor and company.

Arguments that central banks are doing the best they can in a horrible situation require entertaining the possibility that markets are not perfect and can fail. And that they will never do. We have seen this in action: Five years ago John Taylor and company were certain that Ben Bernanke’s interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies risked “currency debasement and inflation”. The failure of those predictions has not led John Taylor or any other of the Republican worthy signatories of their “Open Letter to Ben Bernanke” to rethink and consider that perhaps Bernanke knows something about monetary economics. Instead, they seek another theory–the price-control theory–for why the government is doing it wrong.

Thus all we can do is repeat, over and over again, what both logic and evidence tell us:

  • That with the current configuration of fiscal policy, North Atlantic monetary policy is not too loose but if anything too restrictive.
  • That as far as the real interest rate is concerned, the “‘natural rate’… that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations”, as Milton Freidman would have put it, is lower than the one current monetary policy gives us.
  • That our economies’ inertial expectations and contracting structures have combined with monetary policy to give us nominal interest and inflation rates that are distorted, yes–but an interest rate that is too high and an inflation rate that is too low relative to what the economy wants and needs, and what a free-market flexible-price economy in a proper equilibrium would deliver.

Why does the North Atlantic economy right now want and need such a low real interest rate for its proper equilibrium? And for how long will it want and need this anomalous and disturbing interest-rate configuration? These are deep and unsettled questions involving, as Olivier Blanchard puts it, “dark corners” where economists’ writings have so far shed much too little light.

Hold on tight to this: There is a wrongness, but the wrongness is not in what central banks have done, but rather in the situation that has been handed to them for them to deal with.