Weekend reading: “Slipping on rungs of the income ladder” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

You’ve probably heard of concerns about “short-termism” among companies which prioritize hitting earnings targets over investing in research and development. A new paper details the phenomenon and its potential costs to U.S. productivity and economic growth.

Will the robots unleash amazing amounts of economic growth and throw us all out of our jobs? Well, it depends a lot on how increased mechanization of the economy affects labor demand.

The latest data from Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey—known as JOLTS—was released on Tuesday morning. A look at a few important relationships between JOLTS data show any structural changes in the labor market seem more likely to be on the employer side.

An investment in a college degree lasts a lifetime, yet the time to repay student loans in the United States is usually only 10 years. Other countries allow a much longer time frame and there would likely be benefits to moving to such a system here.

“In general, a worker’s starting position has become more predictive of their final position across the income spectrum.” Austin Clemens shows with two interactive graphs how income mobility during a lifetime is on the decline in the US., according to new research by a pair of 2015 Equitable Growth grantees Michael D. Carr and Emily E. Wiemers at the University of Massachusetts-Boston.

Links from around the web

Does a universal basic income make sense in today’s economy? Greg Ip argues that in an era of declining labor force participation, an untargeted policy that would likely further depress the amount of workers in the labor force doesn’t make sense. [wsj]

“If countries want to carry international surpluses indefinitely the suggestion here is they need also to reinvest those “savings” into capacity expanding investments abroad. If not, those savings will eventually end up constraining global growth by turning everything into a simple zero sum game.” Izabella Kaminska writes on global imbalances. [ft alphaville]

Why some people so concerned about inflation? Noah Smith argues that fears of slightly higher inflation—say 4 percent annually—are overwrought and that central banks would shoot for higher inflation and boost real growth. [bloomberg view]

The decline of competition in the United States “is a decline that stunts entrepreneurship, hinders workers’ mobility and slows productivity growth.” And potentially, Eduardo Porter writes, decreased corporate competition could be a reason for high levels of inequality. [nyt]

Estimates of potential economic growth in the United States have been revised downward for years. But what’s behind these declines? J.W. Mason argues that a large chunk of these downward revisions are due to the continuing effects of the Great Recession. [slackwire]

Friday figure

Figure from “A graphical update on the latest data on the U.S. jobs market” by Nick Bunker

Must-Read: Aaron Carroll: So What Did the Medicaid Expansion Actually Do?

Must-Read: Aaron Carroll: So What Did the Medicaid Expansion Actually Do?: “In 2014, only 26 states and the District of Columbia chose to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) Medicaid expansions for low-income adults…

…Laura Wherry and Sarah Miller…. By the second half of 2014, adults in the expansion states had seen their health insurance coverage increase 7.4%; Medicaid coverage increased 10.5%. This isn’t surprising, as increased coverage was the main intent of the Affordable Care Act. Coverage was found to have ‘improved’ as well (7.1%)…. In Medicaid expansion states, there were increased in physician visits (6.6%), hospital stays (2.4%), rates of diagnoses of diabetes (5.2%) and high cholesterol (5.7%). Of course, this is an observational study…. Insurance coverage is just the first step in improving access. What this study adds are some data showing that expanding Medicaid through the ACA resulted in increased coverage, improved coverage, more physician visits, and more disease diagnosed…

Must-Read: Izabella Kaminska: Why the World Needs Investment

Must-Read: Nick Bunker sends us to:

Izabella Kaminska: Why the World Needs Investment: “The liquidity trap, when monetary policy becomes ineffective at very low or zero interest rates…

…may be old news but the global dimension of the problem is a new and worrying phenomenon…. So engrained is the notion saving is always thrifty and good that it’s become extremely hard to articulate why this state of affairs is so disastrous for the global economy.On Monday, however, Citi’s rates team does an excellent job of summing up the problem…. In their opinion liquidity traps–symptomatic of the secular stagnation phenomenon more broadly–are exported abroad by way of four different channels:

  1. Capital markets transmit secular stagnation and can transmit recessions in a world with low interest rates.
  2. Policies that trigger current account surpluses are beggar-thy-neighbor.
  3. Reserve currencies bear a disproportionate share of the global liquidity trap, because of a shortage of safe assets. This works by leaving real rates too low in the face of a negative shock (e.g. Brexit) to give confidence in the ability to stimulate demand.
  4. Large fiscal expansions can eliminate secular stagnation (= bearish bonds).

In that regard, it’s worth paying attention to the growing euroglut phenomenon. As the analysts note, the Euro area in 2015 contributed to the glut phenomenon with a large surplus of 3.2% of GDP, adding to the more traditional surpluses from Japan (3.3%) and China (3%). This, in short, isn’t funny anymore. If countries want to carry international surpluses indefinitely the suggestion here is they need also to reinvest those ‘savings’ into capacity expanding investments abroad. If not, those savings will eventually end up constraining global growth by turning everything into a simple zero sum game. We’ve not seen it spelled out that simply before. But it’s an elegant and logical explanation.

Screen Shot 2016 07 11 at 11 20 28 png 762×436 pixels

Cf.: Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2015): Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB: “The consequences of extremely low equilibrium real interest rates in a world with integrated but heterogenous capital markets and nominal rigidities…

…(i) Economies experiencing liquidity traps pull others into a similar situation by running current account surpluses; (ii) Reserve currencies have a tendency to bear a disproportionate share of the global liquidity trap|a phenomenon we dub the ‘reserve currency paradox’; (iii) While more price and wage flexibility exacerbates the risk of a deflationary global liquidity trap, it is the more rigid economies that bear the brunt of the recession; (iv) Beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate devaluations provide stimulus to the undertaking country at the expense of other countries (zero-sum); and (v) Safe public debt issuances, helicopter drops of money, and increases in government spending in any country are expansionary for all countries (positive-sum). We use these results to shed light on the evolution of global imbalances, interest rates, and exchange rates since the beginning of the global financial crisis.

New analysis shows it is more difficult for workers to move up the income ladder

Against a rising chorus of concern about increasing income inequality, some economists are pushing back, suggesting that it is not income inequality we should be concerned with but rather income mobility. Income mobility describes the ability of individuals to move up and down the income ladder over some period of time. As long as mobility is healthy, they argue, society can remain egalitarian in the face of inequality, because the poor can move up and the rich down.

Intuitively, some observers assume that higher income inequality should be correlated with decreased income mobility as the rich build a bigger lead on the rest of society. But there is little consensus about whether and how income mobility has changed. What little research does exist is inconsistent with regards to findings, methods, and data sources. Equitable Growth grantees Michael D. Carr and Emily E. Wiemers at the University of Massachusetts-Boston used a new dataset to revisit the measurement of earnings mobility, the part of income that comes from work. Their results suggest that lifetime earnings mobility has declined in recent years.

The authors construct a snapshot of earnings mobility in two time periods: 1981 to 1996 as well as 1993 to 2008. In each one, workers are observed at the beginning and end of the time period to capture mobility over a 15-year span. Workers are divided into ten income deciles (each representing 10 percent of workers, ordered from lowest to highest paid) and categorized at the beginning and end of the 15-year span. Use the interactive below to explore their results in each of these two time periods.

 

To see how mobility changed over these two time periods, Carr and Wiemers look at how the probability of moving up or down rungs on the earnings ladder has changed between the two periods. As the interactive below shows, they find that most workers are less likely to move up the income ladder now (1993-2008), and a bit more likely to fall down the income ladder than they were in the past (1981-1996). The exception is earners at the very top of the income distribution. By definition, these workers at the top rung cannot rise up any farther, but in recent years, members of the top group are less likely to slip down than they used to be.

Use the dropdown menu to look at different slices of the population. A particularly notable finding from the paper is that the largest declines in upward mobility are among workers with college degrees who start in the middle of the earnings distribution. It has become increasingly difficult for these college-educated, middle-class workers to ascend into high income jobs. In general, a worker’s starting position has become more predictive of their final position across the income spectrum.

 

Carr and Wiemers use a new data source that they contend has some advantages over data used in previous research. They use the Survey of Income and Program Participation, or SIPP, to obtain demographics on a large number of workers over a long period of time. The Census Bureau merged this survey with administrative records from the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration and has made the product available to researchers. This gives Carr and Wiemers accurate information on earnings and benefits for each worker. This approach yields a large, nationally representative sample with demographic information on each individual in the data set. Better still, the researchers are able to follow individuals for a long period of time.

Economics is undergoing a kind of data revolution as administrative datasets become more common. Studies like this one may shed new light on areas of research that were previously marked by inconsistent findings. It may be some time before we can say with certainty what is happening to economic mobility in America, but this research makes an important new contribution to the existing literature.

Must-Reads: July 14, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Larry Summers: When the best umps blow a call

Must-Read: I think Larry Summers gets this wrong. Under Rivlin, Reischauer, Orszag, and Elmendorf the CBO was a national treasure. Otherwise… Not so much. Hit and miss.

Remember June O’Neill talking about how many people would lose their jobs from health care reform, and never once telling the reporters she briefed that in her models people hadn’t “lost” their jobs, they quit jobs they did not want to have and were made happier thereby?

And now we have an assumed-but-hidden 2%/year real rate of return on government infrastructure investment driving an analysis:

Larry Summers: When the best umps blow a call: “The Congressional Budget Office is an American national treasure…

…Without the impartial objectivity it brings to the budget process, our country would make much worse policy. Baseball without an umpire would be a very different game, and similarly the making of budget policy without CBO would be a very different and inferior activity. However, even the best umps occasionally blow a call, and I am afraid that is what CBO has done in its recent infrastructure report…

How other nations handle student debt and what the United States could learn from them

Graduates pose for photographs during commencement at Yale University in New Haven, Conn.

Looking just at its face value, paying back a home mortgage in the United States can seem like an impossible task. Most mortgages are 30-year loans, with payments spread over decades. This makes sense, though, because a home is a durable long-term investment. A college degree is also a long-term investment for an individual, but, in contrast, the typical student loan repayment period is 10 years. Such a short payback period amid dramatically rising student loan debt in the United States means higher loan burdens for borrowers. Giving borrowers more time to repay loans would help not only individual borrowers but also boost overall demand in the U.S. economy.

In a column for the New York Times, University of Michigan economist Susan Dynarksi describes the experience of several high-income countries with student loan repayments. Compared to other countries, the typical repayment period in the United States is very short. According to Dynarski, periods in other countries range from 20 years in Germany to up to 30 years in the United Kingdom. In Sweden, where students borrow amounts close to U.S. students, the repayments are spread over 25 years. (Tuition is free in Sweden, but students still need to borrow to cover living expenses.) So individual payments are much lower.

Given the extent of the student debt burden in the United States, stretching out payments over time could reduce the crush of today’s burden and potentially stem the rise in defaults as well.

Dynarski also highlights the Australian system, which makes student loans that are less debt-like and more flexible. In Australia, repayment for loans is done through automatic withholding like the tax system. This means not only that payments are automatic but also that the government knows exactly how much a borrower is earning. This is important because the student loan system doesn’t require repayment if earnings are under a set amount, about $40,000.

The result is a much more flexible system in Australia than in the United States. If college-educated workers with student debt are not seeing the returns from their investment, then they don’t have to pay it back until their earn more than that threshold. A shift to such a system would probably reduce defaults quite a bit in the United States as defaults are concentrated among borrowers with low balances and low earnings.

There’s also a potential macroeconomic upside to such a proposal. In Australia, when a recession hits and many workers are thrown out of a job, those newly unemployed workers don’t have to worry about making their loan payments. Their balance sheets are temporarily less burdened and so they have more cash in their pocket to continue spending in the economy. Less default and less of a downturn in consumer spending results in a somewhat stronger recovery for the overall economy, enabling more workers to return to work sooner and resume repayments on their student loans. Such a temporary reprieve would seem like a win for a large chunk of the U.S. population.

Must-Read: Mark Yzaguirre: Texas Has Prospered In Spite of Social Conservatism, Not Because of It

Must-Read: Mark Yzaguirre: Texas Has Prospered In Spite of Social Conservatism, Not Because of It: “My normal response when I hear people… criticizing Texas is… to try and find a way to defend or at least explain it…

…Governor Greg Abbott… Twitter… ‘NY led way in taxes, regulations, union abuses, high living costs & how New Yorkers are fleeing to TX’. This is a nonresponsive and utterly unsatisfactory answer from Governor Abbott. The New York ad talks about human rights, not regulatory policy and taxes. I would agree that those items are of great importance when it comes to fostering a business-friendly environment and I probably have views closer to Governor Abbott’s on such points than many of my fellow Democrats. They aren’t the only issues that matter, however. Culture, legal protections for individuals and quality of life are also big drivers for development and it’s no accident that the parts of Texas where most of the wealth is generated and prosperity is centered are its more socially progressive cities….

Business leaders in Texas, even those who might otherwise lean Republican, seem to understand that revanchist social conservatism doesn’t work well if you want to encourage educated and tolerant people to move to and stay in your city and state…. One wonders if Texas’s reputation as a bastion of a certain sort of intolerant social conservatism hurts it economically in the long run and it’s hard to find evidence that it has ever been helpful…. The Texas of the future is not the Texas that supports anti-LGBT policies and other retrograde ideas that are indefensible on general principle and do nothing to make anyone’s life better. In this one case, it was appropriate for New York to mess with Texas.

Must-Read: Noel D. Johnsony and Mark Koyamaz: States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints

Must-Read: Noel D. Johnsony and Mark Koyamaz: States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints: “In this survey we review the contributions of economic history to the study of state capacity…

…Economic history makes an important contribution to understanding how state capacity developed by ‘decompressing’ the historical coevolution of fiscal capacity, legal capacity, and rule of law. We emphasize the heterogeneity in the experiences of the countries which have eventually achieved rule of law states. We present two lessons drawn from historical research. The first is that institutions which respect the rule of law are unlikely to be robust unless a state has first adopted intermediate fiscal and political institutions which create incentives for,first elites, and eventually the rest of the population, to support them. Second, we emphasize the difficulties associated with disentangling the role of public-order and private-order institutions in generating support for growth-enhancing institutions. We argue that, in fact, both have played vital roles in the creation of institutions which support the rule of law in modern states.