The Bond Market and Expectations: A Parthian Shot

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In my The Need for Expansionary Fiscal Policy I quote Greg Ip:

policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

If bond markets were pricing in a a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks, the yield curve would be very steeply sloped indeed. Just saying.

The Need for Expansionary Fiscal Policy

Sisyphus Greek mythology Britannica com

I understand that we are Sisyphus here. And I accept that:

Je laisse Sisyphe au bas de la montagne! On retrouve toujours son fardeau. Mais Sisyphe enseigne la fidélité supérieure qui nie les dieux et soulève les rochers. Lui aussi juge que tout est bien. Cet univers désormais sans maître ne lui paraît ni stérile ni futile. Chacun des grains de cette pierre, chaque éclat minéral de cette montagne pleine de nuit, à lui seul, forme un monde. La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffit à remplir un coeur d’homme. Il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux.

But would people who ought to know better please stop adding weights to the stone that we are trying to roll uphill?

Thus I find myself quite annoyed by the sharp and usually-reliable Greg Ip this morning…

Let me back up: Here’s the story so far:

(1) They say that North Atlantic governments cannot afford to spend more to boost their economies via expansionary fiscal policy right now. We point out that current interest rates on Treasury debt are so low low private company would pass up the ability to borrow to stimulate and invest.

(2) They then say that maybe interest-rate will jump up a lot, soon, and thus make borrow to spend to stimulate and invest a bad deal. We point out that financial markets certainly do not expect any such thing. And we points out that, if you are truly worried about longer-run debt sustainability, the standard calculations tell us that debt- and amortization-to-GDP ratios will be lower with aggressive borrow and spend to stimulate and invest policies then with austerity.

(3) They then say that financial markets are irrational and wrong–it interest-rate will go up, will go up soon, and will go up far. We point out that fearful financial markets have been better forecasters then their hopes of imminent normalization every year for the past decade.

(4) They then say: let’s ignore those interest rates and pretend they are not telling us anything about the benefits and costs right now of fiscal expansion. We reply: you are economists–economists are supposed to take prices seriously, not throw the information in them away.

(5) They then say: nevertheless, running up the nominal debt through expansionary fiscal policy is somehow risky. We say: do helicopter money, which does not run up the debt.

(6) They then say: but even a half booming economy will take the pressure off of governments and bureaucrats to undertake urgent and important structural reforms. We ask: what evidence can you point to to support any claim that useful structural reform is easier and I low-pressure that in a high-pressure economy?

And we are met with silence.

And then they go back to parroting their talking point (1) again.

Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation: “What if Larry Summers is right…

…[and there is] a chronic deficiency of investment relative to savings that has trapped the world in a state of low economic growth largely resistant to monetary policy[?] Events… have strengthened Mr. Summers’s case…. Formerly skeptical economists are less so: Both the International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve have implicitly warmed to Mr. Summers’s thesis. With yields taking another leg down after Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, the evidence of secular stagnation, Mr. Summers says, is stronger than ever. If he’s right, the world needs a contingency plan. The most direct response is more expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. lower taxes or higher spending), which would bolster demand and push interest rates up.

But policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

Why are policy makers rightfully wary? All Ip says is:

Paolo Mauro of the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that countries have often overestimated their long-term potential growth, resulting in too-high deficits and debts…

Um. No. The arithmetic tells us that at current interest rates fiscal expansion right now will not raise but lower the debt- and amortization-to-GDP ratios. Unless Mauro wants to take that on–which he does not–his piece is irrelevant for that reason alone. Moreover, Mauro seems to think that we have been overestimating long-term potential growth and correcting estimating long-term interest rates. That is wrong. We have been overestimating both long-term interest rates and long-term potential growth. If you overestimate both by the same amount, the biases induced in your estimates of the right current debt-to-GDP ratio are offsetting. The right level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is primarily a function of r-(n+g), the difference between the real interest rate r on Treasury debt and the real growth rate g of productivity plus the real growth rate n of the labor force. A reduction in r accompanied by an equal or smaller reduction in (n+g) is not a first-order reason to reduce government spending or the deficit right now. And that is what we have.

Here Larry Summers is right. Greg Ip is wrong. Larry has by now written a huge amount about his. Yet Ip counterposes his body of work to one working paper by Paulo Mauro that is, as best as I can see, irrelevant to secular stagnation arguments and concerns.

Why is it irrelevant? Mauro does correctly point out that lower future growth is a reason to slow the future growth of real government spending. But what Mauro does not point out is that such a fall in projected future growth is a reason to cut the level of spending now–or to avoid increases in the level of spending that would otherwise be good policy now–only if the slower expected growth is unaccompanied by an equal reduction in Treasury interest rates. Our reduction in expected future economic growth appears to have accompanied by a larger reduction in Treasury interest rates.

This opinions-of-shape-of-earth-differ-both-sides-have-a-point framing is… beneath what Greg ought to be writing. If he thinks Larry is wrong–or even that the anti-Larry case is arguable–he needs to find and quote real arguments that have real relevance here, and more than one of them, not a single piece from the Peterson Institute that is off-point.

Must-Read: Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation

Must-Read: Um. No. Larry Summers is right. The sharp and usually-reliable Greg Ip is wrong. This opinions-of-shape-of-earth-differ-both-sides-have-a-point framing is simply wrong.

The right level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is primarily a function of r-(n+g), the difference between the real interest rate r on Treasury debt and the real growth rate g of productivity plus the real growth rate n of the labor force. A reduction in r accompanied by an equal or smaller reduction in (n+g) is not a first-order reason to reduce government spending or the deficit now–or to postpone or cancel plans to increase the deficit right now that would otherwise be good policy

Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation: “If Larry Summers is right…

…the most direct response is more expansionary fiscal policy…. But policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

Why are policy makers rightfully wary? All Ip says is:

Paolo Mauro of the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that countries have often overestimated their long-term potential growth, resulting in too-high deficits and debts…

And chasing the link:

Paulo Mauro: Fiscal Policy in the Era of Stagnation: “Policymakers often mistake a long-lasting growth slowdown for a temporary slowdown…

…and systematically fail to increase the primary fiscal surplus sufficiently when the long-run economic growth rate declines. Economic history provides several examples of debt crises or near-crises caused by unexpected, long-lasting slowdowns in economic growth that were not recognized in time…. Ignoring a permanent slowdown in the rate of economic growth can lead to policy mistakes. For example, a country projecting a stable government debt ratio of 100 percent of GDP over the next decade or two would experience an increase in that ratio to 140 percent in 10 years if growth turns out to be 1 percentage point lower than assumed. As deficits rise, the ratio would balloon to more than 200 percent after 20 years…

Source: P. Mauro, R. Romeu, A. Binder, and A. Zaman, 2013, A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy (link is external), IMF Working Paper 13/5, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

The implication Ip takes from this is simply wrong. Slower future growth is a reason to slow the future growth of real government spending. It is a reason to cut the level of spending now–or to avoid increases in the level of spending that would otherwise be good policy–only if the slower expected growth is unaccompanied by an equal reduction in Treasury interest rates. But that is not the case: our reduction in expected future economic growth is accompanied by a larger reduction in Treasury interest rates.

Must-Read: David Warsh: The Downside of Outrageous

Must-Read: The always interesting and usually thoughtful David Warsh gets this one, I think, very right:

David Warsh: The Downside of Outrageous: “If there is one man beside Trump himself whose spirit will haunt the hall… Cleveland… it is Robert L. Bartley…

…as editor of the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal,  Bartley spearheaded the creation of the say-anything, stop-at-nothing rules that ultimately led to Trump’s success in gaining the Republican Party’s nomination…. After taking over the editorial page in 1972, he became the most influential administrator of the rules of American public debate in the last third of the twentieth century… began the populist revolt that has since found its apotheosis in Trump…. As a small-government libertarian, I never subscribed to the Journal edit page’s supply-side orthodoxy…. Reagan won the presidency in 1980, and Bartley won a Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing. The editorial page had become immensely powerful, and has remained so.  Bartley told an interviewer in 1981, about the time Wanniski was fired for train-station-electioneering for a supply-side insurgent candidate, ‘Jude had a tremendous influence over the tone and direction of the page. He taught me the power of the outrageous.’…

I can pinpoint the day the page lost me altogether. It was March 18, 1993, with a famous editorial, whose title, ‘No Guardrails,’ has since become a WSJ battle cry. A physician who performed abortions in Florida had been ambushed and killed by a protester in Florida. The editorialist, Daniel Henninger, wrote…. “The date when the U.S… began to tip off the emotional tracks… is August 1968…. The real blame here… falls on the intellectuals–university professors, politicians and journalistic commentators… [who] defended each succeeding act of defiance–against the war, against university presidents, against corporate practices, against behavior codes, against dress codes, against virtually all agents of established authority.” There was something downright creepy about that editorial…. From the short-lived administration of Gerald Ford to the zero-based budgeting and deregulation under Jimmy Carter, from disinflation under Paul Volcker to tax simplification and Social Security stabilization under Ronald Reagan, the signal events of those years constituted a retreat from the excesses of the Sixties….

By 2001, Bartley was ill. He stepped down…. The editorial page soon began a relentless campaign for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Bartley died in December 2003, a week after receiving the Presidential Medal of Freedom…. Is it fair to blame the chaos surrounding this year’s Republican nomination on Bob Bartley?… I think so. No one in my lifetime systematically removed more of those guardrails, the norms governing good-faith political and economic discourse, than he. Trump is the downside of forty years of WSJ ed page comment too often just like his: outrageous, sulfurous, and, all too often, half-baked.  Bartley is dead; long live Bartley…. James and Lachlan [Murdoch] have their work cut out for them. Sometime in the next few years they must replace [Bartley’s protege Paul] Gigot, 61, with an editor capable of restoring credible focus…

Ireland’s spectacular economic growth reveals a stark truth about corporate tax avoidance

Photo of the Atlantic coast in Ireland

If you were tuning in to the world economy for the first time, last Tuesday’s release from Ireland’s Central Statistics Office would probably convince you that the Irish economy is booming. According to the Irish agency’s annual national income statistics, the domestic economy in 2015 grew a staggering 26.3 percent in real terms (after accounting for inflation). These are numbers you don’t even see in developing countries. They are unheard of in an advanced economy. And far from experiencing healthy, robust growth, most advanced economies are struggling to generate even low single-digit economic growth. So these numbers should raise an eyebrow.

Ireland’s gross domestic product growth rate isn’t a lie, but it highlights a peculiar thing about the country—its status as a tax haven. GDP measures the total value of everything produced within the country. But in Ireland’s case, a lot of very big companies, many in the high technology and pharmaceutical industries, like to say all of their intellectual property rights exist in Ireland for tax purposes. When companies in these industries design a new product they can avoid paying U.S. corporate tax by transferring their intellectual property—such as patents and brands—to an Ireland-based subsidiary. Strategies to avoid taxation can get quite complex, including such “tax-efficiency” maneuvers as the “Double Irish” and the “Dutch Sandwich.”

Whatever the maneuver, profits from the sales of those items in the United States and around the world accrue to these firms’ Irish-based subsidiaries, resulting in a significantly reduced tax burden on those profits. This artificially inflates the size of the Irish economy and creates some wild gyrations in the country’s reported growth rate.

One way to show the severity of this issue in countries such as Ireland and other offshore tax havens is to divide their gross domestic product by an alternative measure of an economy’s size—gross national income, a measure of all the things produced by nationals of a country. An Irish person’s wages when working in the United States, for example, registers as Irish national income (while simultaneously registering in U.S. GDP figures). Gross national income also excludes foreign-owned earnings, including that intellectual property owned by U. S. companies that are located in tax havens.

The ratio of these measures in normal, non-tax haven countries usually hovers around one. The earnings of foreign-owned capital and labor and domestic-owned capital and labor deployed in foreign countries usually nets out. In tax-haven countries, however, this ratio can be extremely lopsided. In Ireland, the ratio as of 2015 was 0.85. In Luxembourg, the difference is even starker, coming in at 0.69. And these ratios have been trending downward as the level of tax avoidance in the world economy explodes. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

Now, there are other reasons why gross national income and gross domestic product can differ. The workforce of Luxembourg consists of many foreign residents and workers from nearby countries. But nonetheless, Luxembourg is widely known as a tax haven and some portion of this differential can be attributed to its role as one.

In his 2015 book “The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens,” author Gabriel Zucman of the University of California-Berkeley estimates just how much money is being shifted around the world for purposes such as sheltering money from the tax authorities. He calculates that 55 percent of the $650 billion of foreign profits earned by U.S. companies in 2013 were booked in just six low-tax countries: The Netherlands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland. For U.S. companies, this comes out to about 18 percent of all U.S. corporate profits “earned” in tax havens, and results in lost tax revenue of about $130 billion a year. Kim Clausing of Reed College calculated similarly—about $100 billion a year in lost tax revenue.

Putting an end to international tax-avoidance is now a major focus of organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which now boasts its “Base erosion and profit shifting” program. But more work needs to be done so that U.S. companies are not able to skirt their obligations. International coordination alongside smart business tax reform here in the United States could help put an end to corporate tax avoidance.

Must-Read: Jon Faust: Why Has Transparency Been so Damn Confusing?

Must-Read: I believe that the extremely sharp Jon Faust is completely correct when he says that over the past three years Fed policy has been driven by: (1) as long as employment gains persist, gradually reducing accomodation; and (2) as long as inflation remains below target, pause in the removal of accommodation if it looks as though employment gains might falter. The problem is that there has been an awful lot of information hitting the Fed over the past three years about the economy. For one thing, we have learned that the unemployment rates typically thought of as reflecting full employment now come with prime-age employment-to-population ratios of not 81% or 80% but 78%:

Employment Population Ratio 25 54 years FRED St Louis Fed

And we have learned that financial markets are not looking forward to any maturity of Treasury bonds yielding more than inflation for, well, forever:

30 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Both of those pieces of information should have led to a reevaluation of the policy rule. They have not. Both of those pieces of information are not consistent with the economy evolving as the Fed expected it three years ago.

So the great question is: What–if anything–will trigger the Fed’s reevaluation of its policy rule? And what will it change its policy rule to if that reevaluation is triggered? That–rather than people getting distracted by shiny pronouncements from individual FOMC participants–is why transparency has been so damn confusing:

Jon Faust: Why Has Transparency Been so Damn Confusing?: “[Fed] consensus has behaved consistently as if driven by two principles…

…[1] So long as steady job market gains persist, continue a gradual, pre-announced removal of accommodation. [2] So long as inflation remains below target, take a tactical pause if credible evidence arises that the job gains might soon falter…. Over the last three years, we’ve gotten normalization at a preannounced pace as in to the first principle, punctuated only by brief (so far) tactical pauses as under the second…. My story directly contradicts the popular narrative of a skittish, market-obsessed Fed flip-flopping at every opportunity. This is where the well-disguised part comes in….

The 19 policymakers on the FOMC have, since the crisis held widely divergent views…. Under the leadership of the Chair, these views somehow blend in a reasonably coherent compromise policy… fully embraced by no one…. The chosen policy often appears to be an orphan, at best, and can become a whipping boy. But the consensus policy is generally much simpler to understand than those 19 component views…. There is a strong pull toward that ‘skittish, market-obsessed Fed’ narrative…. The FOMC statement and press conference… are the principal places where the communication is unambiguously directed at explaining the consensus…. Communications other than these systematically obscure and confuse much more than they clarify…

Must-Read: Antonio Fatás and Lawrence H. Summers: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations

Must-Read: Antonio Fatás and Lawrence H. Summers: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations: “The global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of GDP in all advanced economies…

..At the same time, and in response to rising government debt levels, many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates. We empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regarding fiscal policy multipliers. Our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy. The large size of the effects points in the direction of self-defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by DeLong and Summers (2012). Attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to GDP ratio through their long-term negative impact on output.

Must-Read: Christopher L. Foote, Lara Loewenstein, and Paul S. Willen: Cross-Sectional Patterns of Mortgage Debt during the Housing Boom: Evidence and Implications

Must-Read: Christopher L. Foote, Lara Loewenstein, and Paul S. Willen: Cross-Sectional Patterns of Mortgage Debt during the Housing Boom: Evidence and Implications: “[The] reallocation of mortgage debt to low-income or marginally qualified borrowers…

…[in] the early 2000s housing boom… never occurred…. The distribution of mortgage debt with respect to income changed little…. There is no evidence that increases in homeownership during the boom were concentrated among low-income or marginal borrowers. Previous cross-sectional research stressing the importance of low-income borrowers and communities during the mortgage boom was based on the inflow of new mortgage originations alone. As a result, it could not detect offsetting outflows in mortgage terminations that left the allocation of debt with respect to income stable over time.

Must-Read: Judd Cramer and Alan B. Krueger: Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber

Must-Read: Judd Cramer and Alan B. Krueger: Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber: “This paper… compar[es] the capacity utilization rate of UberX drivers…

…with that of traditional taxi drivers in five cities…. UberX drivers spend a significantly higher fraction of their time, and drive a substantially higher share of miles, with a passenger in their car than do taxi drivers…. 1) Uber’s more efficient driver-passenger matching technology; 2) the larger scale of Uber than taxi companies; 3) inefficient taxi regulations; and 4) Uber’s flexible labor supply model and surge pricing more closely match supply with demand throughout the day.