U.S. over-education and underemployment over the course of a lifetime

A woman looks at job postings at the New York State Department of Labor, July 2009.

As newly minted college graduates start to enter the labor force in the coming weeks and months, the specter of underemployment hangs over some graduation ceremonies. Concern about having to take a job that doesn’t require a college degree is down from when the labor market earlier this decade was much weaker, but it’s still there. This sort of job mismatch is usually thought of as a concern for young workers. Yet as much as we think of underemployment as a problem for young workers, some new research shows that it may be more prevalent for older workers.

In a new working paper released today by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, Georgetown University doctoral candidate Ammar Farooq looks at “over-education” over the course of a lifetime. Using data on the educational requirements of occupations and employment data during the 2000s, Farooq can see what shares of college-educated workers at different ages are in jobs that don’t require a degree. The result is a U-shaped relationship as workers age—a relationship that shows college graduates are more likely to start off in jobs for which they are overqualified, then work themselves into positions more in line with their educational attainment as they approach middle age, only to reverse course as they grow older. (see Figure 1)

Figure 1

What accounts for this U-shaped curve? Looking at data on the transition between over-education and being in a properly matched job, Farooq finds that as college-educated workers age, they are increasingly likely to move into a job that doesn’t require a degree and are less likely to move into a job that does require one.

Interestingly, Farooq also finds that almost half of the moves into underemployment—defined as having a job for which one is overqualified—don’t happen after workers with college degrees become unemployed. Instead, about half the moves happen when these workers are already employed but shifting into positions that require less than a college education, peaking at around 60 percent of all moves during ages 40 to 45. This means that transitions aren’t all about unemployment forcing workers into jobs for which they may be overqualified. And while working part time increases the probability of being overemployed, after controlling for this and other characteristics, the trend is still U-shaped over time.

Furthermore, when workers are moving into jobs that don’t require a degree, they aren’t moving into jobs that require lots of experience. Those job moves also result in wage declines for the worker.

Whatever the cause of this particular U.S. labor market trend, these trends indicate that the “cruel game of musical chairs” in the job market isn’t exclusively a problem for the young. College-educated workers later in life are likely to move into jobs they are seemingly overqualified for. It seems like chairs are being pulled out from under more workers than previously thought.

Should-Read: Michael Clemens: What the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban Refugees Can Teach Us about the Economics of Immigration: An Explainer and a Revelation

Should-Read: Yes. The invariable rule is that results George Borjas reports on immigration should be handled with tongs and asbestos mitts. Why do you ask? https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-mariel-boatlift-cuban-refugees-can-teach-us-about-economics-immigration

Michael Clemens: What the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban Refugees Can Teach Us about the Economics of Immigration: An Explainer and a Revelation: “The Borjas study had a critical flaw that makes the finding spurious…

…That flaw is explained in a new research paper that I co-authored with Jennifer Hunt, who is the James G. Cullen Professor of economics at Rutgers University. In this blogpost, I explain the flaw and why it reinforces earlier findings that the Mariel Boatlift influx of Cuban immigrants did not reduce wages of Miami workers…. The study focuses on a small group within that larger sample, a group where the sample shifted to include a lot more black male workers with relatively low wages—simultaneously with the Boatlift. This has the effect of sharply reducing the average wage of people in the sample, but this had nothing to do with the Cuban influx…

Must-Read: Nicholas Bagley: Taking the Nuclear Option Off the Table

Must-Read: I am now hopelessly confused.

I get that it Trump drops the appeal—and if states have not intervened—that the executive is thereafter enjoined from paying the cost-sharing payments.

But I did not think that the executive was required to pay the cost-sharing payments. It was simply not required not to pay the payments. If the Justice Department decides that the House is right as a matter of law, what stops Trump from accepting that legal advice and stopping the cost-sharing payments?

I would have thought that the states would not only have to intervene, but to obtain an injunction requiring Trump to continue to pay the cost-sharing payments until final adjudication is attained.

So I am hopelessly confused here…

Nicholas Bagley: Taking the Nuclear Option Off the Table: “Last Thursday, fifteen states and the District of Columbia moved to intervene in House v. Price… http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/taking-the-nuclear-option-off-the-table/

…This is a bigger deal than it may seem, and could offer some comfort to insurers that are in desperate need of it. Apologies for the long post, but the law here is complex and uncertain…. The district court sided with the House and entered an injunction prohibiting the payments. The court, however, puts its injunction on hold to allow for an appeal. The Trump administration has now inherited the lawsuit…. If Trump drops the appeal, which he has threatened to do, the injunction would spring into effect and the cost-sharing payments would cease immediately, destabilizing insurance markets across the country. It’s the nuclear option.

If the states are allowed to intervene, however, they could pursue the appeal even if Trump decides to drop it. With the appeal in place, the injunction couldn’t take effect until the case is heard and decided…

Should-Read: Stan Collender: This Week’s Rollout Of Trump 2018 Budget Could Be His Biggest Failure Yet

Should-Read: Stan Collender: This Week’s Rollout Of Trump 2018 Budget Could Be His Biggest Failure Yet: “There was no Trump speech to… Congress last week at which his budget was featured… https://www.forbes.com/sites/stancollender/2017/05/21/due-tuesday-2018-budget-could-be-trumps-biggest-failure-yet/

…The president won’t even be in the country (or even in a U.S. time zone) when his budget is released…. [No] budget-related press conference… [or] victory lap… The White House will be stepping on the budget story big time… Neither OMB Director Mulvaney nor any other Trump economic official is scheduled to be on… talk shows…. Mulvaney’s first testimony… virtually certain to get much less attention… [than] the Congressional Budget Office[‘s]… estimates of the impact of the House-passed American Health Care Act…. The Republican leadership let it be known that the House might have to vote on the bill a second time because, as reported, it might not satisfy all of the Senate’s Byrd rule requirements….

Given how poorly the rollout of the Trump 2018 budget is being planned, it could easily disappear from view and be ignored before the end of the week. At best it will be a missed opportunity for the Trump White House. At worst, it will be one of the Trump administration’s worst policy and governing failures…

Must- and Should-Reads: May 22, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Must-Read: Noah Smith: The NIMBY Challenge

Must-Read I disagree with Noah Smith: reading Phil Price convinced me that Phil Price is an idiot, that for many, many people NIMBYism is not a “flawed but serious package of ideas” but rather “simple ignorance”—or, perhaps, rather, very hard work to remain ignorant, in a way that is supportive of the “selfishness of incumbent homeowners trying to feather their own nests… [and] white people trying to exclude poor minorities from their communities while still appearing liberal…”

What was Andrew Gelman thinking in giving him his microphone?

Noah Smith: The NIMBY Challenge: “NIMBY theorists like [Phil] Price… should do the following thought experiment… http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-nimby-challenge.html

…Imagine destroying a bunch of luxury apartments in SF. Just find the most expensive apartment buildings you can and demolish them.  What would happen to rents in SF if you did this? Would rents fall? Would rich people decide that SF hates them, and head for Seattle or the East Bay or Austin? Maybe. But maybe they would stay in SF, and go bid high prices for apartments currently occupied by the beleaguered working class. The landlords of those apartments, smelling profit, would find a way around anti-eviction laws, kick out the working-class people, and rent to the recently displaced rich. Those newly-displaced working-class people, having nowhere to live in SF, would move out of the city themselves, incurring all the costs and disruptions and stress of doing so. 

If you think that demolishing luxury apartments would have this latter result, then you should also think that building more luxury apartments would do the opposite. Price should think long and hard about what would happen if SF started demolishing luxury apartments….

I think Price’s posts have the following lessons for YIMBYs:

  1. Econ 101 supply-and-demand theory is helpful… but don’t rely on it exclusively… use a mix of data, simple theory, thought experiments, and references to more complex theories.
  2. Always remind people that the price of an apartment… doesn’t come built into its walls and floors.
  3. Remind NIMBYs to think about the effect of new housing on whole regions, states, and the country itself, instead of just on one city or one neighborhood. If NIMBYs say they only care about one city or neighborhood, ask them why.
  4. Ask NIMBYs what they think would be the result of destroying rich people’s current residences.
  5. Acknowledge that induced demand is a real thing, and think seriously about how new housing supply within a city changes the location decisions of people not currently living in that city.
  6. NIMBYs care about the character of a city, so it’s good to be able to paint a positive, enticing picture of what a city would look and feel like with more development….

The YIMBY viewpoint has the weight of evidence and theory on its side. But the NIMBY challenge is not one of simple ignorance. Nor is it purely driven by the selfishness of incumbent homeowners trying to feather their own nests, or by white people trying to exclude poor minorities from their communities while still appearing liberal (two allegations I often hear). NIMBYism is a flawed but serious package of ideas, deserving of serious argument.

Should-Read: Larry Summers: 5 Suggestions for Avoiding Another Banking Collapse

Should-Read: Larry Summers: 5 Suggestions for Avoiding Another Banking Collapse: “First, it is essential to take a dynamic view of capital…

…Second, a crucial challenge… is assuring prompt responses to deteriorating conditions that do not set off vicious cycles. Markets were sending clear signals of major problems in the financial sector well in advance of the events of the fall of 2008 but the regulatory community did not even limit bank dividend payouts, even after the experience at Bear Stearns, which had been deemed “very well capitalized” even as it was failing. Current experiences in Europe where some institutions have a price-to-book ratio of barely 0.35 and have not yet been forced to raise capital are not encouraging about lessons learned….

Third, regulators need to be attentive to franchise value…. Regulatory costs are an especially large issue for smaller banks…. Fourth, bankers may be more right in their concerns about increased costs of capital and its effect on lending than economists usually suggest…. Fifth, it is high time we move beyond a sterile debate between more and less regulation. No one who is reasonable can doubt that inadequate regulation contributed to what happened in 2008 or suppose that market discipline is sufficient…. At the same time, not all regulatory expansions are desirable…

Will the Trump administration double-count its magic asterisk?

Press reports indicate that President Donald Trump’s budget, scheduled for release tomorrow, will assert that administration policies can deliver a balanced budget in 10 years by combining sharp cuts to anti-poverty and safety net programs with growth from unspecified or minimally detailed tax and regulatory reforms. According to these reports, the forthcoming budget assumes that the rate of economic growth will reach 3 percent by 2021. In contrast, the Congressional Budget Office projects a growth rate of 1.9 percent for the same year.

Assuming large growth effects from policies that have yet to be specified in detail certainly qualifies as fantasy budgeting or, in Washington terms, a magic asterisk. But what’s even more striking about the anticipated budget plan is the expected assertion that revenue-neutral tax reform will contribute to deficit reduction. Administration officials and congressional Republicans have been explicit that they plan to credit the revenue feedback from any growth delivered by tax reform against the cost of tax reform. Yet counting the revenue feedback from growth in assessing whether a tax reform proposal increases or decreases revenues means that there is no additional revenue to reduce the deficit below the level that would be realized under current law.

In short, the Trump administration seems prepared to double-count the gains from its magic asterisk.

A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the assumed growth rates could add $2 trillion to revenues relative to the CBO’s current-law baseline. Thus, a budget that purports to achieve balance predicated on this growth could be short by well more than $1 trillion—even if the growth projections were realized—by failing to recognize that the revenues from tax-reform-induced growth are going to be used to offset the cost of that reform. (The exact overstatement of revenues would depend on how much growth is attributed to tax reform and how much growth is attributed to other policies in justifying the economic assumptions.)

This estimate of the overstatement of revenues would be conservative even if large growth effects were realized, as it ignores both the implausibility of the administration’s growth forecasts and the large revenue losses that would result from the tax reform plans that the Trump campaign and the administration have put forth previously. The Tax Policy Center, for example, estimated that then-candidate Trump’s plan would cost $6 trillion while delivering less than $200 billion in revenue feedback from growth in the first decade of its implementation—before ultimately harming growth in the long run by running up the debt and thus reducing investment. These estimates suggest that the administration’s budget documents could be understating deficits by well more than $6 trillion relative to the actual impact of its policies.

Even by the standards of the federal budget, which operates at a scale that is sometimes difficult to comprehend, these numbers are large. If only $1 trillion is attributable to double-counting the gains from tax reform, that’s still more than the savings that the American Heath Care Act realizes by taking health insurance away from 14 million Americans through Medicaid cuts. Moreover, the CBO’s most recent deficit projections under current law total $9 trillion for the next 10 years. Assuming the administration will achieve balance by the 10th year but not before, the Tax Policy Center’s estimates of the Trump tax plan suggest that the president and his economic policy team could be claiming to reach balance while actually making the 10-year deficit outlook worse—even with harsh cuts to anti-poverty programs and policies that sharply reduce the number of Americans with health insurance.

How will it be apparent that the administration is not merely assuming implausible growth from its policies but actually double-counting those same growth projections? Traditionally, the president’s budget is presented on a set of post-policy economic assumptions. That is, the economic assumptions underlying the budget assume the enactment of the president’s policies. Judged against this set of economic assumptions, a revenue-neutral tax plan with implausible growth effects, such as those previously promised by the administration, should appear as a large tax cut, measured in the low trillions of dollars. Since the administration is pointing to tax reform as a justification for the rosy economic assumptions, this is the most likely approach—and the most likely criteria by which the budget should be judged.

While the traditional approach to budgeting includes the impact of proposed policies in setting the economic assumptions, there is an alternative approach that would be more consistent with the administration’s rhetoric on tax reform. In fact, the Obama administration used this approach when it counted deficit reduction resulting from economic growth generated by certain elements of immigration reform as a policy impact in its budgets. Under this alternative approach, the economic effects of a policy change are ignored when setting the economic assumptions. But by ignoring the growth impacts when setting the economic assumptions, those growth impacts can be included in the budget estimate for the proposal without double-counting the gains.

Thus, while the CBO concluded in 2013 that immigration reform would add 3.3 percent to gross domestic product 10 years after enactment, the economic assumptions underlying the last budget submitted by the Obama administration incorporated growth of only 0.7 percent attributable to immigration reform in its economic assumptions. The difference between 0.7 percent and 3.3 percent reflected the growth that had been included in estimating the budgetary impact of the proposed immigration reform. Critically, if the Trump administration takes this second course in estimating the impact of tax reform on the budget, then budget documents would appropriately show no impact of tax reform on revenues—but the administration would then need to justify its economic assumptions without reference to tax reform.

The analysis above takes administration officials’ previous public statements as informative about the direction of policy. Another option would be to recognize the budget as a statement of administration policy that supersedes those previous statements. Under this view, including the growth impacts of tax reform in setting the economic assumptions for the budget while showing no revenue impact of tax reform would amount to a statement that the administration now believes tax reform should be revenue-neutral based on conventional scoring—excluding impacts on growth—and any gains from growth should thus be used to reduce the deficit.

Recognizing the long-term fiscal challenges the country faces, this approach would be a wise policy choice on the part of the new administration. And in combination with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s previous statements ruling out a tax cut for the upper class—the so-called Mnuchin rule—this addendum would provide a solid foundation for real tax reform. Yet it is unlikely that this is the course the administration intends to pursue.

So when the administration presents the budget tomorrow, watch not only for rosy economic assumptions to improve the deficit outlook but also for double-counting of the benefits of those economic assumptions. If the administration does in fact double-count the benefits, then recognize and understand the implied policy content of that choice. And if the administration tries to justify its harsh cuts to anti-poverty and safety net programs on the basis of clear-eyed fiscal accounting, then remember that these same officials are anything but clear-eyed when it comes to accounting for their plans for tax reform.

Must-Read: Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti: Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation

Must-Read: Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti: Housing Constraints and
Spatial Misallocation
: “We quantify the amount of spatial misallocation of labor across US cities and its aggregate costs… http://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/growth.pdf

…Misallocation arises because high productivity cities like New York and the San Francisco Bay Area have adopted stringent restrictions to new housing supply, effectively limiting the number of workers who have access to such high productivity. Using a spatial equilibrium model and data from 220 metropolitan areas we find that these constraints lowered aggregate US growth by more than 50% from 1964 to 2009…

Should-Read: Fabio Ghironi: On Twitter: to @MESandbu

Should-Read: Fabio Ghironi: On Twitter: to @MESandbu: “Some readings and thoughts on Macron’s plans and macro policy in the euro area… https://twitter.com/FabioGhironi/status/865695595566030848

…@MESandbu on possible costs from quest for euro-level substitutes for natl policy: https://amp.ft.com/content/a94cad66-3569-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e Here’s what @MESandbu thinks Macron should focus on: https://amp.ft.com/content/203e4e1a-357f-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e FT View: This could be good time to pursue badly needed reform of the banking system: https://www.ft.com/content/c6c824c8-3637-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3.

I agree w much in these articles, but I also think that Macron’s push for more fiscal policy coordination/fiscal union is very important. Policymakers across EU should move away from notion that, if countries followed its rules, SGP would accomplish fiscal coordination. The SGP is not coordination. It is a set of constraints over and above those subject to which optimal coordination should be pursued. I wrote a few thoughts on this last July here: http://faculty.washington.edu/ghiro/GhiroStraightjacketsVsCoordination0716.pdf

Bottom line: the SGP is suboptimal; it is unenforceable, as Germany itself contributed to showing; and it should be ditched. Policymakers should also move away from the notion that fiscal policy harmonization should necessarily be pursued. Asymmetric shocks across EZ countries are bound to make differences in fiscal policies the optimal outcome under desirable coordination! Finally, policymakers (& analysts) should also move away from the notion that fiscal union should always & only mean a transfer union….

My hope is conversation wd help understanding that true fiscal coordination/union involves more than transfer union. In that sense, I think talking about EZ finance minister can help bc it naturally leads to the question of the role of this minister, which I hope wd lead to discussion of coordination beyond transfers. And even if that’s not accomplished, I think clarity wd be valuable…