Must-Read: Josh Bivens: Larry Summers, the Congressional Progressive Caucus Budget, and the Abandonment of Fiscal Policy

Must-Read: Josh Bivens: Larry Summers, the Congressional Progressive Caucus Budget, and the Abandonment of Fiscal Policy: “Federal budget season came and went this year without any budget proposal hitting the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives…

…This was an odd (and ironic) bit of incompetence by the GOP leadership, who couldn’t even wrangle a majority to support their own budget proposal. But it was especially damaging to U.S. economic policy debates because it limited attention paid to the budget of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC)…. The need to resuscitate fiscal policy was usefully underscored in a widely-discussed speech by former Treasury Secretary and National Economic Council Chair Larry Summers earlier this week….

I am here to tell you that the most important determinant of our long term fiscal picture is how successful we are at accelerating the economy’s growth rate in the next three to five years, not the austerity measures that we implement…. What are the crucial elements of changing the fiscal monetary mix I would highlight?

One, the only one I have a slide on, is a substantial increase in public investment. It is insane that [net] federal and infrastructure [investment] is now negative at a moment when interest rates have never been lower and ten-year real interest rates are essentially zero and precious little good is happening at the state and local level either….

Second, strong support for social insurance. When Keynes came to the United States in 1942, he pointed out that an important virtue of Social Security was that it could absorb the excess savings that would potentially hold back U. S. economic growth after the Second World War. Those considerations were not relevant in the succeeding 60 years but they potentially are relevant in our current period of secular stagnation….

The Summers speech has been widely commented-upon, and rightly so—it contains a lot of wisdom. People should know, however, that the ideas in his remarks are embodied in real-world legislation proposed earlier this year, and which sadly disappeared without much attention, all because the Republican-led House could not even organize themselves to have the annual debate on budget proposals.

Must-Read: Artir: No Great Technological Stagnation

Must-Read: Artir: No Great Technological Stagnation: “Some people many economists say we are living through a Great Stagnation…

…I take an engineering perspective and look directly at technology itself. For some reason, no one has done what I will do in this post. Surely productivity is important, but since technology is supposed to be a substantial component of TFP, someone should have looked into precisely that. Shame upon the World’s Blogosphere! My point here is that, by the measures we have, there is no stagnation. I leave it to someone else to solve the puzzle of why TFP growth is low while technological growth is constant. Let’s begin with some charts. Here (Nagy et al. 2011), you have long run trends for several Information Technologies and different curve fittings for them. In the paper they explain which one is the best one. Hint: not the exponential!…

Must-Read: Jeremiah Dittmar and Ralf R Meisenzahl: The Protestant Reformation, Economic Institutions, and Development

Must-Read: Jeremiah Dittmar and Ralf R Meisenzahl: The Protestant Reformation, Economic Institutions, and Development: “Origins of growth: How state institutions forged during the Protestant Reformation drove development…

…Throughout history, most states have functioned as kleptocracies and not as providers of public goods. This column analyses the diffusion of legal institutions that established Europe’s first large-scale experiments in mass public education. These institutions originated in Germany during the Protestant Reformation due to popular political mobilisation, but only in around half of Protestant cities. Cities that formalised these institutions grew faster over the next 200 years, both by attracting and by producing more highly skilled residents.

The state can be a rent-extracting institution or a provider of public goods. What happens when the state becomes the provider of public goods?

Recent research suggests that where states have greater capacity to provide public goods, economic outcomes may be superior (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010, Acemoglu et al. 2015). The economics literature has emphasised expansions of state capacity that emerged for geostrategic and military reasons in European history ‘from above’.

In a recent paper (Dittmar and Meisenzahl 2016), we study a unique experiment that shifted legal institutions at the local level – the institutional public goods programme of the Protestant Reformation in Germany.

The institutions that we study were city-level laws that established Europe’s first large-scale experiments with mass public education and significantly expanded the social welfare bureaucracies and state capacities of cities. These legal institutions established a fundamental innovation in funding and oversight for municipal activities – the ‘common chest’, a literal box of funds used to support public services. Significantly, the adoption of these institutions reflected popular political mobilisation.

In our research, we study the local variation in institutions and answer three interrelated questions:

  1. How did these innovations shape development?
  2. Why did some but not all cities adopt these institutions?
  3. What was the political process driving these transformations in German society?

Mapping an institutional upheaval: The local adoption of these new legal institutions was highly variable. In fact, fewer than 55% of cities that adopted Protestantism established legal institutions to support the provision of public goods. We observe variation across neighbouring cities in the same territory, subject to the same territorial lord.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

The impact of institutions on long-run development: We test the hypothesis that cities with city-level Reformation laws by 1600 subsequently grew relatively quickly. Our first finding is that cities that adopted the Reformation institutions grew to be at least 25% larger in 1800 than observably similar cities. In contrast, we find no variation in growth associated with Protestant religion conditional on public goods institutions.

Historical evidence suggests that migration drove city growth in pre-industrial Europe (de Vries 1986, Bairoch 1991, Reith 2008). Existing quantitative evidence on migration is limited. We collect novel microdata on the migration and local formation upper tail human capital (Mokyr 1999, Squicciarini and Voigtlander 2015). Our data, drawn from the Deutsche Biographie, comprise thousands of the most important cultural and economic figures in German history between 1300 and 1800 – jurists, merchants, writers, artists, composers, and educators. We use the data to document the human capital response to institutional change.

Figure 2 shows how migration responded to institutional change by plotting the number of upper tail human capital migrants observed in cities that adopted public goods laws, cities that became Protestant but did not formalise public goods provision, and Catholic cities. These cities were attracting similarly small numbers of migrants before the Reformation, which is marked by the vertical line at 1518. A large shift in migration towards cities with public goods institutions appears in the 1520s, as legal reforms were passed. This gap persisted over the next 200 years and notably was driven by differences in migration from small towns to cities, not by a ‘brain drain’ from less to more desirable cities.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

We similarly find that cities with public goods institutions began producing more upper tail human capital starting after 1520. We find no differences in the local formation of upper tail human capital before the Reformation and 50-200% higher formation of upper tail human capital after the Reformation when we compare cities with laws supporting public goods provision to cities without these institutions.

Why not all cities adopted public goods institutions: The Protestant Reformation was both a religious revival movement and an anti-corruption movement with an institutional agenda. The institutional agenda was designed to expand the provision of public services.

Popular political mobilisation drove the Protestant Reformation. Local elites and city councils initially resisted the introduction of Protestantism (Cameron 1991, Dickens 1979). Civil disobedience and unrest pushed policymakers to meet citizen demands and pass laws establishing the public goods institutions of the Reformation. Differences in institutional outcomes across municipalities reflected differences in local preferences and in political mobilisation, which varied across cities even within the same territory.

How plague outbreaks shifted politics and institutions:The very features that led some communities to welcome religious innovation and to mobilise in support of institutional change may have had independent implications for economic development.

To untangle cause and effect, we study how plague outbreaks in the critical juncture of the early 1500s shifted local politics and pushed otherwise similar cities towards institutional change.

During plague outbreaks incumbent wealthy elites typically fled their home cities or died, reducing their political power (Dinges 1995). Following plague outbreaks, migration into cities increased, changing the composition and politics of the population (Isenmann 2012). During these periods, suffering was acute and civic order could break down. Before the Reformation, plagues led to religious innovations within Catholicism – such as the development of penitential rituals and marches and the construction of church altars to ‘plague saints.’

During the Reformation – with the introduction of political and religious competition – plagues suddenly operated as institutional shifters. Plagues operated as institutional shifters not only because they caused extreme suffering, but specifically because Protestants and Catholics were differentiated in the market for religion in their institutional programme and teachings regarding the plague.

We study local plague outbreaks in the early 1500s as a source of plausibly random variation in institutional change. The intuition is that plagues that hit the generation in place when the Reformation broke across German cities were random, conditional on long-run levels and trends. In the data, we find that an additional plague in the early 1500s increased the probability of adopting the new legal institutions by 10-25%.

To illustrate the research design, Figure 3 shows the timing of plague outbreaks in select cities. In Figure 3, we highlight the period 1500 to 1522, which serves as the baseline period that we use to study the implications of the plague for institutional change.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

To document the unique relationship between plagues in the early 1500s, institutions, and growth, we study plague outbreaks across the entire period from 1400 to 1600. Figure 4 plots the point estimates from rolling instrumental variable (IV) regressions that study log city population in 1800 as the outcome. We estimate these regressions shifting the time period, which we use as the plague exposure IV for institutional change year-by-year. There is no significant relationship between plagues across the 1400s and subsequent institutional change and the 2SLS estimates of the population growth impact of induced variation in institutions are insignificant. In the early 1500s, these relationships change. With the introduction of religious and political competition, we see plague exposure being activated as an institutional shifter with development consequences in the early 1500s.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

Conclusion: During the Protestant Reformation, some but not all German cities adopted new municipal legal institutions. These institutions expanded state capacity and established public schooling. The cities that adopted these institutions grew faster over the next 200 years. These cities attracted and produced more upper tail human capital individuals and embarked on more dynamic development trajectories. Cities that adopted Protestantism but did not formalise public goods institutions in law had no similar advantage.

Our results strongly suggest that human capital was not dormant, waiting to be ‘activated’ during the Industrial Revolution – it was instead a fundamental driver of growth over the early modern period. More broadly, our findings suggest that the Protestant Reformation was a canonical model of the emergence and implications of state capacity driven by political movements that challenge elites.

Authors’ note: The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.


References:

Acemoglu, D, C Garcia-Jimeno and J Robinson (2015) ‘State capacity and economic development: A network approach’, American Economic Review, 105: 2364-2409.

Bairoch, P (1991) Cities and economic development: From the dawn of history to the present, University of Chicago Press.

Besley, T and T Persson (2009) ‘The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics’, American Economic Review, 99: 1218-44.

Besley, T and T Persson (2010) ‘State capacity, conflict, and development’, Econometrica, 78: 1-34.

Cameron, E (1991) The European Reformation, History Reference Center, Clarendon Press.

De Vries, J (2006) European Urbanization, 1500-1800, Routledge.

Dickens, A (1979) ‘Intellectual and social forces in the German Reformation’, in Mommsen, W (ed), Stadtburgertum und Adel in der Reformation, Ernst Klett.

Dinges, M (1995) ‘Pest und Staat: Von der Institutionengeschichte zur Sozialen Konstruktion?‘, in Dinges, M and T Schilch (eds) Neue Wege in der Seuchengeschichte, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart.

Dittmar, J and R Meisenzahl (2016) ‘State capacity and public goods: Institutional change, human capital, and growth in early modern Germany’, Working paper, LSE Centre for Economic Performance and Federal Reserve Board.

Isenmann, E (2012) Die Deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter 1150-1550, Bohlau.

Mokyr, J (2009) The enlightened economy: An economic history of Britain, 1700-1850, New Economic History of Britain, Yale University Press.

Reith, R (2008) ‘Circulation of skilled labour in late medieval Central Europe’, in Epstein, S and M Prak (eds) Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Squicciarini, M and N Voigtlander (2015) ‘Human capital and industrialization: Evidence from the age of Enlightenment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130: 1825-83.”

Must-Read: Dietrich Vollrath: Can We Get Rich by “Doing Business” Better?

Must-Read: Dietrich Vollrath: Can We Get Rich by “Doing Business” Better?: “Below I’m going to get to the gory details of why the Doing Business (DB) indicators generally suck…

…But let me start with this note. The DB index [John] Cochrane uses is a ‘distance to the frontier’ index. Meaning you get a number that tells you how close to best practices in business conditions a country gets. If you are at the best practices in all categories, you’d get a 100. Cochrane says, and I quote, ‘If America could improve on the best seen in other countries by 10%, a 110 score would generate $400,000 income per capita…’. Stew on that for a moment. Think about how that DB frontier index is constructed.

Cochrane went there. He said it could go to 11….

[…]

It Gets Worse: In the follow up post, Cochrane appeals to a graph from my textbook with Chad Jones… the relationship of an index of ‘social infrastructure’ and TFP…. I calculated it, graphed it, and stuck it on the slide that Cochrane linked to. I simply scaled and averaged the 6 different components of the World Bank’s governance indicators, much like the DB index. It has all the issues I described above, except worse. This figure tells us very little. Which is why in the book we immediately say that you cannot infer anything causal from it, and then go on to talk about some of the better studies done looking at specific institutions and their effects on economic outcomes…

Can we get rich by Doing Business better Dietrich Vollrath

Must-read: Ben Thompson: “China Watching”

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: China Watching: “I am often asked why I don’t write more about China…

…the reason, as I’ve explained in the past, is that the country, particularly anything having to do with the government–which by extension covers all big businesses, tech included–is basically unknowable to an outsider, and the more you learn about China, the more you realize this is the case. To that end, while I feel relatively confident about what I am going to write, given the Chinese angle I am unashamed to admit that I could be 100% wrong; frustratingly, we will probably never know for sure…

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Apple in China

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Apple in China: “Apple… with its model of status-delivering hardware differentiated by software locked to its devices…

…has been uniquely successful in the world’s most populous country. [And] for many years Apple’s model freed them from the usual hoops that most Western tech companies have had to jump through to get a piece of the irresistible Chinese market. For example:

  • Microsoft spends $500 million a year in China, mostly at its Beijing R&D center (its largest outside of Redmond), and has promised to up that total after a recent antitrust investigation
  • Cisco pledged to invest $10 billion in China last year after being increasingly frozen out from Chinese purchases after the Edward Snowden revelations
    Qualcomm, after settling an antitrust case, formed a $280 million joint venture with a provincial government that included technology transfer
  • Intel has promised up to $5.5 billion to transform a chip plant that it originally said would be two generations behind to become cutting edge; a few months later the company formed a joint venture with two local firms in direct response to Chinese concern about reliance on foreign companies in the chip industry. That follows a previous $1.5 billion investment in two other chipmakers partially owned by the Chinese government
  • Dell adopted a new strategy last fall predicated on partnering in China to the tune of $125 billion over five years, forming a joint venture with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and deep partnerships with Kingsoft Corporation for work in the cloud ‘fully supporting and embracing the China ‘Internet+’ national strategy.’

The Internet+ strategy is a plan to integrate the Internet with traditional industries, but its introduction has gone hand-in-hand with an increasingly strong preference for Chinese technology from Chinese firms. Thus the partnerships, joint ventures, and investment. And yet, until now, the most successful American tech company in China has operated mostly without interference…

What can the state see? Or, the extraordinary power of the night-watchman state

Hoisted from 2010: James Scott, “Legibility,” Flavius Apion, Anoup, the Emperor Justinian, Robin of Locksley, Rebecca Daughter of Mordecai, King Richard, and Others..: Cato Unbound: James Scott: The Trouble with the View from Above.: A comment:

In 542 AD the late Roman (early Byzantine?) Emperor Justinian I wrote to his Praetorian Prefect concerning the army–trained and equipped and paid for by the Roman State to control the barbarians and to ‘increase the state.’ Justinian was, Peter Sarris reports in his Economy and Society in the Age of Justinian, upset that:

certain individuals had been daring to draw away soldiers and foederati from their duties, occupying such troops entirely with their own private business…. The emperor… prohibit[ed] such individuals from drawing to themselves or diverting troops… having them in their household… on their property or estates…. [A]ny individual who, after thirty days, continues to employ soldiers to meet his private needs and does not return them to their units will face confiscation of property… ‘and those soldiers and fioderati who remain in paramonar attendance upon them… will not only be deprived of their rank, but also undergo punishments up to and including capital punishment.’

Justinian is worried because what is going on in the country he rules is not legible to him. Soldiers–soldiers whom he has trained, equipped, and paid for–have been hired away from their frontier duties by the great landlords of the Empire and employed on their estates and in the areas they dominate as bully-boys. One such great landlord was Justinian’s own sometime Praefectus Praetorio per Orientem Flavius Apion, to whom one of Flavius’s tenants and debtors, one Anoup, wrote:

No injustice or wickedness has ever attached to the glorious household of my kind lord, but it is ever full of mercy and overflowing to supply the needs of others. On account of this I, the wretched slave of my good lord, wish to bring it to your lordship’s knowledge by this present entreaty for mercy that I serve my kind lord as my fathers and forefathers did before me and pay the taxes every year. And by the will of God… my cattle died, and I borrowed the not inconsiderable amount of 15 solidi…. Yet when I approached my kind lord and asked for pity in my straits, those belonging to my lord refused to do my lord’s bidding. For unless your pity extends to me, my lord, I cannot stay on my ktema and fulfill my services with regard to the properties of the estate. But I beseech and urge your lordship to command that mercy be shown to me because of the disaster that has overtaken me…

The late Roman Empire as Justinian wished it to be would consist of (a) slaves, (b) free Roman citizens (some of whom owned a lot of land), (c) soldiers, (d) bureaucrats, and (e) an emperor. The slaves would work for their masters. Slaves along with their citizen masters and non-slaveholding citizens would farm the empire (some of the citizens owning their land; some renting it). All would be prosperous and pay their taxes. And the emperor would use the taxes to pay the soldiers who dealt with the Persians, the Huns, the Goths, and the Vandals; to fund the building of Hagia Sophia and other works of architecture in Constantinople; and to promote the true faith and extirpate heresy. If the countryside were legible to him, that is how things would be–slaves and citizens in their places, landlords and tenants in their mutually-beneficial contractual relationships, all prosperous and all paying their taxes to support the empire.

But Justinian knows very well that the countryside is not legible to him. The contracts that Flavius Apion makes with his tenants are made under the shadow of the threat that if Flavius Apion does not like the way things are going he will send a bucellarius to beat you up. Anoup is not pointing out to Flavius Apion that their landlord-tenant relationship is a good thing and that keeping him as a tenant rather than throwing him off the land for failure to pay the rent is in both their interests. Instead, Anoup is calling himself a slave (which he is not). Anoup is calling Flavius Apion a lord (which he is not supposed to be). Anoup is appealing to a long family history of dependence of himself and his ancestors on the various Flavii Apionoi and Flavii Strategioi of past generations. Justinian thinks that things would be better served if the countryside were properly legible to him and he could enforce reality to correspond to the legal order of slaves and citizens, tenants and landlords interacting through contract, and taxpayers. Flavius Apion would prefer that the order be one of proto-feudalism: that all the Anoups know and understand that they are at his mercy, and that the emperor is far, far away. And we don’t know what Anoup thinks. We do know thait does not sound as though he experiences the lack of legibility of the countryside to the emperor and his state as a full and complete liberation. And we do know that the Emperor Justinian was gravely concerned about the transformation of his soldiers into bucellarii, into the dependent bully-boys of the landlords–both because it meant that they were not on the borders where they belonged and because it disturbed what he saw as the proper balance of power in the countryside and what he saw as the emperor’s justice.

Justinian’s big (and to him insoluble) problem was that the Flavius Apion whose bully-boys beat up his tenants when they displeased was the same Flavius Apion who headed Justinian’s own bureaucracy.

Thus when James Scott speaks of how local knowledge and local arrangements having the ability to protect the people of civil society from an overmighty, blundering state, I say ‘perhaps’ and I say ‘sometimes.’

It is certainly the case that the fact that Sherwood Forest is illegible to the Sheriff of Nottingham allows Robin of Locksley and Maid Marian to survive. But that is just a stopgap. In the final reel of Ivanhoe the fair Rebecca must be rescued from the unworthy rogue Templar Sir Brian de Bois-Guilbert (and packed offstage to marry some young banker or rabbi), the Sheriff of Nottingham and Sir Guy of Gisborne must receive their comeuppance, the proper property order of Nottinghamshire must be restored, and Wilfred must marry the fair Rowena–and all this is accomplished by making Sherwood Forest and Nottinghamshire legible to the true king, Richard I ‘Lionheart’ Plantagenet, and then through his justice and good lordship.

A state that makes civil society legible to itself cannot protect us from its own fits of ideological terror, or even clumsy thumb-fingeredness. A state to which civil society is illegible cannot help curb roving bandits or local notables. And neither type of state has proved terribly effective at constraining its own functionaries.

In some ways, the ‘night watchman’ state–the state that enables civil society to develop and function without distortions imposed by roving bandits, local notables, and its own functionaries, but that also is content to simply sit back and watch civil society–is the most powerful and unlikely state of all.

Must-read: Eduardo Porter: “As Jobs Vanish, Forgetting What Government Is For”

Must-Read: Eduardo Porter: As Jobs Vanish, Forgetting What Government Is For: “Though the decline of well-paid working class jobs is often portrayed as the inevitable consequence of globalization and technological change…

…it is in large part the result of a failure of government…. ‘Concrete Economics’ (Harvard Business Review Press) by J. Bradford DeLong and Stephen Cohen… ‘American Amnesia’ (Simon and Schuster) by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson… point out that for all our love of rugged individualism, government played a large and underappreciated role in reshaping the American economy before — and it could do so again….

High tariffs against imports imposed from the time of Alexander Hamilton, to help foster America’s industrial development… huge grants of land to build railways… [which] vastly increased productivity in agriculture… catalog retailing to centralized meatpacking… innovations that spawned entire industries…. Bolstering workers’ human capital… the Land-Grant College Act… the G.I. Bill…. Local governments across the country poured money and resources into an impressive expansion of secondary education…. Finally, the government directly created jobs — whether in the burst of infrastructure investment in the 1930s that gave us the Hoover Dam, among other huge projects, or the tenfold increase in federal spending from 1939 to 1945 as the government built up the military-industrial complex to fight Germany and Japan.

Why American politics turned against this successful model of pragmatic policy-making remains controversial…. The good news is that the United States may have the best opportunity in decades to overcome its anti-government political biases…. So what’s holding us back? The loss of a vision, once shared across much of the ideological spectrum, of what government can accomplish, when it is allowed to do its job.

Must-read: Timothy B. Lee: “Some thoughts on the end of economic growth”

Must-Read: Timothy B. Lee: Some thoughts on the end of economic growth: “Technological progress in a particular industry often has diminishing returns…. Clothing is the best example…

A larger and larger fraction of the value people get from the clothing they buy… reflects social factors rather than economic ones…. A similar point can be made about food…. Most of the value of a restaurant meal comes from factors that can’t easily be improved by technology…. So families have been spending a shrinking share of their incomes on basic necessities…. During the 20th century, there was a steady stream of new inventions — cars, televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, telephones, electric lighting, personal computers, and so forth — that soaked up peoples’ growing disposable income. Over the last 30 years, this process has continued for information technology…. But outside of the IT sector, significant new inventions have been few and far between….

A century ago, rich people could spend their money on a wide variety of technological luxury goods — electric lighting, telephones, automobiles, indoor plumbing — that substantially improved their quality of life. Today, very wealthy people have private jets, but otherwise it’s hard to think of examples of major technologies that are available to them but not to Americans with more modest incomes. Instead, wealthy people spend money on… positional goods… and labor-saving services…. We’re running out of room for technological improvements in most areas of economic life, with three big exceptions: IT, medicine… transportation… energy….

We should expect a gradual slowdown in productivity growth rates…. This could be seen as a pessimistic take, but the optimistic way to think about it is that Americans in the top half of the income distribution have arrived: we’re getting pretty close to the highest level of material comfort and security that it’s possible for a human civilization to have. Our children and grandchildren probably won’t enjoy a much higher standard of living than we do, but that’s mostly because it’s hard to imagine what a much higher standard of living would look like.

AlphaChat: Underappreciated Moments in Economic History

Underappreciated Moments in Economic History

Cardiff Garcia: Welcome to AlphaChat, the business and economics podcast of the Financial Times. I’m Cardiff Garcia….

First up on the show is Brad DeLong, an economist and economic historian at the University of California at Berkeley. He is also the coauthor of the New Book: Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy. We are going to be discussing this book in a forthcoming episode of Alphachat-Terbox, our long-form sister podcast segment. But for this I have asked Brad to choose three under appreciated moments in economic history, and to give us the lessons we should learn from those events. I do not know what Brad’s chosen. I will be learning along with you.

Brad: Thanks for common on AlphaChat.

Brad DeLong: Thank you very much.

Cardiff Garcia: So what is first on the agenda? What is the first underappreciated event in economic history that you want to share with us?

Brad DeLong: The first is the bursting of the 1825 canal bubble in Britain, centered on London finance. It is the first time we have a business cycle that is truly triggered not by the embarrassment of some dominant banking house and not by some government default–like Charles II Stuart’s Stop of the Exchequer or the financial manipulations of Felipe II Habsburg of Spain, whom his bankers called “the borrower from Hell”.

Instead, it is the first time we have a wave of enthusiasm in high-tech investment–i.e., canals–leading to lots of overinvestment due to overoptimism (and to the failure of one set of canal builders to realize how much the market for their canal’s services would be eroded by the construction of other canals). We then have the crash. And there follows the spillover of the crash to manufacturing as a whole. 1826 sees the first year in which mechanized cotton production falls, ever, by 30%.

It also had powerful consequences for both economic theory and economic policy practice.

Jean-Baptiste Say.

He was the originator of Says’ Law. He was the first person to ever say that a general glut–a short-of-demand-driven business cycle that led to mass unemployment was not something we had to worry about. Why not? Because, Say argued, nobody made something to sell unless they planned to then use the money to buy, and so while you could certainly have excess supply in some industries that would be matched by excess demand in other industries. Thus people would shift from demand-short to demand-surplus industries quickly: the market would do its job of reallocating resources and tuning the economy to maximum productivity.

1825-26 in Britain convinced Say that he had been wrong.

His subsequent writings do not dismiss general gluts–short-of-demand-driven business cycles–as impossible, but recognize them.

1825-26 was also the first time that central banks engaged in lender-of-last-resort activities in response to a tech crash. The banking house of Pole, Thornton, and Co. was one that had made among the most canal loans and was among those most likely to be highly embarrassed. E.M. Forster’s great-aunt’s nephew, the very young Henry Thornton, then 25 or so, appears to have been the only non-somnolent partner of the bank in London in December 1825 when the crisis hit. He went to the Bank of England. He lied. He said: “We are solvent but illiquid.” And the Bank of England agreed to support him.

That weekend, Sunday morning before dawn, the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England counted out banknotes (to preserve secrecy) and then wheeled them through the pre-dawn streets of London in the December gloom so that when the bank opened the following Monday morning they could show huge piles of banknotes behind the tellers to suggest that they were in fact well-capitalized.

It tells us a number of things. We see a major move in economic theory, as the patron saint of the austerity point-of-view, Jean-Baptiste Say, abandons the positions he had been pushing since 1803. It shows the origins of large-scale lender-of-last-resort activities in response to a financial crisis produced by a large-scale bursting of a high-tech or other speculative investment bubble.

And it also shows the first case of the bankers successfully manipulating the central bank–inducing it to come to their rescue and so emerge from the crisis whole and even enriched via government support, even though the were the ones whose rash, risky, and inappropriate lending had caused it.

Cardiff Garcia: A fantastic example. I often lament that when we talk about bubbles we tend to stay with modern examples. We tend to get into comparisons between the housing bubble and the dot-com bubble and we talk about the remnants of those bubbles and the damage left behind by them. A lot of the time we ignore the fact that bubbles are as old as many and credit. There are great lessons to be learned.

Brad DeLong: As soon as you have large-scale credit where the borrower no longer knows the lender–where the fact that borrowings have been good for so long that you think you do not need to check whether borrower is in fact good for it–the value of being able to borrow in the future is so high that who would risk their reputation? When everyone stops checking the quality of the debts they own, and when the debts they own circulate as money, as assets widely perceived to be safe, then you are looking for a crisis. At some point it will become clear that things you thought were safe really were not safe at all. After all, the debts of Felipe II Habsburg of Spain–Master of the New World, owner of all the gold of the Aztecs and the Incas, proprietor of the mountain of silver that was Pitosi in Peru–how could he possibly get himself embarrassed? Well, he gave away enough land grants and pensions to the nobles of Spain, and he spent so much on the Wars of the Counterreformation in their attempt to suppress the insurgency of the fundamentalist religious terrorist fanatics who were the sixteenth-century Dutch–Protestant religious fanatics then–that he managed to get himself bankrupt.

Cardiff Garcia: Wonderfully insightful. What is your second example?

Brad DeLong: My second example is something I just learned about this week. One of our Berkeley graduate student, Gillian Brunet, is studying World War II for her dissertation.

World War II in the U.S. has always been of great interest as it sees the rapid movement of an economy from a depression-economics economy with lots of slack to an inflation-economics economy with excess demand pressure.

First Franklin Roosevelt gets worried about Nazi Germany. He starts trying to assemble alliances. He fails miserably.

France and Britain draw a line in the sand, saying: “We will declare war on you if you attack Poland!” Hitler responds: “What could you do about it? Poland is on the other side of us Germans from you. Don’t make empty threats.” So Hitler attacks Poland. Behold! He finds that–contrary to all the canons of game theory–Britain and France actually meant it. This is unusual. Until 1944, when it was clear that the United Nations had the war won, France and Britain were the only countries that ever declared war on Nazi Germany. Other countries waited until the Nazi tanks had actually crossed their border–or, very rarely, until the Nazis had declared war on them–to enter the conflict. France was the only country that shared a land border with Nazi Germany that ever dared make the decision not to try to hide but rather to take the fight to the Nazis and put their country in harm’s way.

Thus after World War II in Europe starts in September 1939, Franklin Roosevelt wants to build as much military hardware as he can and send as much as he can to aid France and Britain in their fight. But it is not until the end of 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and Hitler’s declaration of war on the U.S. that total mobilization begins.

Starting in 1942, therefore, the U.S. was a war economy: dedicated to defeating Hitler and Tojo no matter what.

The question is: how did this transformation take place? How do you go from a slack economy to an inflation economy? And what happens to standard macroeconomic patterns and correlations as you do?

It turns out–and this is the thing I learned this week–that only a little bit of central planning allows you to do an enormous amount to redirect economic activity without having runaway inflation and your price level quadruple as you try to send the market very strong price signals that war material is now very highly valued. All the federal government had to do was send an executive order shutting down the civilian uses of those assembly lines capable of producing tanks and airplanes and trucks. Demanding that they be redirected to military vehicles. In the aftermath, a huge chunk of industrial capacity switched over effectively immediately to serve the needs of the Pentagon-to-be. And the funding emerged as well without extraordinary inflation, for everyone who would have bought a car in 1942 or 1943 saved the money instead and loaned it to the government by buying war bonds. Thus the same money flowed from consumers to factory workers–but through the government, and directing the workers to build tanks instead of cars.

You thus managed to switch a lot of production over very quickly without much inflation by just using the right teeny amount of central planning. Possible applications to what we may decide to do in the next decade or two with respect to global warming–if something very bad happens, and it becomes the moral equivalent of war for us rather than something to simply leave as a mess for future generations.

Cardiff Garcia: And your final example of an under appreciated event from economic history?

Brad DeLong: Let me–I know we will do this next time–talk about Steve Cohen’s and my book, Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy. That subtitle is there because Alexander Hamilton is perhaps the only American who has, personally, made a real difference. That subtitle is also there because we are trying to sail as close as possible to the Lin-Manuel Miranda “Hamilton” boom in order to sell books, without ourselves becoming an intellectual-property misappropriation test case.

Our big overall thesis is that American economic policy has been remarkably good over the past two centuries–up until something happens around 1980. After that, the U.S. as a whole begins investing in the wrong industries: Health-care administration bureaucrats, financiers making lots of money by encouraging small investors to trade and then benefiting from the price pressure, people using quirks in the capital-structure fact that pension beneficiaries have cash-flow but not control rights to expropriate pension funds and then put the remaining obligations to the underfunded PBGC, the focus on sharply raising income inequality because our extremely-valuable overclass has been so underpaid since 1929 and won’t do their managerial and entrepreneurial jobs properly unless much more highly recompensed. These are not the industries of the future in any good sense. But these are the industries that America has been investing in increasingly since 1980.

Before 1980, we invested in other things: aerospace, computers, highways and suburbs, high-tech manufacturing of whatever day–electric power, internal combustion engines, machine tools, interchangeable parts, high-pressure steam engines. We invested in producing a comparative advantage in resource-intensive technological-frontier manufacturing, even though the British Empire’s Navigation Acts had left us with a strong comparative disadvantage in such industries. And so even back before the Civil War the British Parliament is sending over Commissions of Inquiry to ask: just how is it that New England productivity in these sectors of manufacturing has gotten so damned high? How did they accomplish this leap-frogging in machine-tool and even some aspects of textile technology?

The answer is precisely that Americans were not terribly ideological back before 1980 where the economic policy rubber hit the road. People back then overwhelmingly believed that the world was a mixed and complicated place where circumstances altered cases. What you need was to look down, around, up: to ask what was most likely to work out well now on the ground, rather than what conforms to some simplistic overarching ideological view of the world which explains everything in terms of some small set of simple principles you can count without taking off your shoes. An ideology allows you to live your life confident and smug. But it is also probably wrong.

Back around 1790 or so the ideologists were the Jeffersonians. The Jeffersonians believed that small yeoman farmers were good–ahem, Monticello?–and the only guarantee of middle-class prosperity and political liberty as well. Manufacturing, banking, urbanization, commerce in excess, a government investing in what was then high-tech–those are sources of corruption and very dangerous threats to freedom. Jefferson, at the end of the eighteenth century, said: Look at London, that corrupt resource-extracting machine, it’s taking the British down the road that in ancient Rome led to the collapse of the Roman Republic and to rise of tyrants like Julius Caesar. Our only chance is to cut ourselves off and to make our politics and our economic organization as far from Britain’s as we can.

Hamilton said: Hey, wait a minute. What works? Let’s see what industries are actually producing jobs for workers that pay high wages. Let’s see what are the opportunities for economic development here. Let’s see where there is a possibility for the government to exert a helpful nudge. And when Jefferson’s successors got into office and had to deal with the realities of power–well, they followed Hamiltonian policies: because they worked.

James Madison in opposition had argued very eloquently that the First Bank of the United States had been unconstitutional.

James Madison as president enthusiastically signed the bill creating and then had his attorney general aggressively defend the rights and powers of the Second Bank of the United States.

Cardiff Garcia: One of the themes of the book is that the debates of those early years about the country’s foundational economics have reappeared again. Brad, thanks for being on AlphaChat. We are going to be discussing Brad DeLong’s book with Steve Cohen, Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, on an forthcoming episode of Alphachat-Terbox, our long-form sister podcast.

But before we let you go, Brad, can you give us a longform recommendation?

Brad DeLong: Two books I am recommending right now are Martin Wolf’s The Shifts and the Shocks and Barry Eichengreen’s Hall of Mirrors. I think that if you read these two books you know what you need to know and more than 99.9% of the world knows about the current pickle that we are in: how we might get out of it, and why should be depressed (unless you are both already rich and willing to bear substantial risks in order to grab for returns).