Things to Read on the Morning of February 24, 2015

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Nick Bunker: The Future of Retirement Savings: “Devlin-Foltz… Henriques, and… Sabelhaus focus… on… participation…. The participation rate among working-age households… was close to 80 percent between 1989 and 2007. But… has dropped to… 75 percent…. [And] younger workers’ participation rate has fallen below the level of previous generations of young workers—today’s young workers aren’t saving as much younger workers in years past… [with] the biggest decline… among workers in the bottom half…”

  2. Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz: Forecasting Trend Growth: Living with Uncertainty: “We should all be wary of anyone who claims to be able to forecast trend growth accurately and reliably. Even after the fact, it takes some time to discern the underlying trend. As a result, we need to build decision frameworks–for businesses and for policymakers–that are robust to the sorts of forecast errors we have seen in the past. Consider that approach the economist’s version of Keats’ negative capability. Second, our inability to get a precise fix on the output gap presents significant challenges for monetary policy, as this is commonly used as a prime indicator of inflationary pressures in the economy. If central bankers are unsure of the size of the output gap (or even its sign), then the likelihood of policy errors rises substantially. That reinforces the view of monetary policy setting as a problem of risk management in which policymakers must balance the hazards and costs associated with potentially large errors.”

  3. Lawrence Mishel: Even Better Than a Tax Cut: “The challenge is to ensure that a typical worker’s wages grow along with profits and productivity. There is no silver bullet, but the key is… to reverse decades of decisions that have undercut wage growth. We need to start with monetary policy…. The most important decisions… are those of the Federal Reserve Board…. Before raising rates, it is essential we achieve a robust recovery, with roughly 3.5 to 4 percent annual [nominal] wage growth…. Another short- to medium-term policy decision affecting wage growth is to avoid trade deals, such as the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, that would further erode Americans’ wages and send jobs overseas. And… bolster… labor standards and institutions… [by] raising the minimum wage… rais[ing] the salary threshold for overtime…. Protecting and expanding workers’ right to unionize… moderniz[ing] our New Deal-era labor standards to include earned sick leave and paid family leave… stronger laws and enforcement to deter and remedy wage theft…. Wage stagnation is… a result of a policy regime that has undercut the individual and collective bargaining power of most workers. Because wage stagnation was caused by policy, it can be reversed by policy, too.

  4. Nick Bunker: The Case for Inaction on Interest Rates: “Equitable Growth’s Ben Zipperer… [argued] average wage growth should be at least 3.5 percent a year…. Wen does wage growth cross above this threshold?… Not until the employment rate for workers ages 25 to 54 crosses 79 percent…. As of January 2015, this prime-age employment to population ratio was 77.2 percent. The ratio has been on the rise, but it still has a ways to go before it hits 79 percent. Growing at its current rate, that rate won’t hit 79 percent until 2017 at the earliest…. With inflation below its target, worries about stalled or slowing economic growth abroad, a strengthening dollar, and an incomplete labor market recovery, the Federal Open Markets Committee should consider the consequences of raising interest rates too soon. Perhaps the best move is to do nothing and simply wait…”

Should Be Aware of:

  • Charles Pierce: “This thing should be thrown out while the lawyers are getting out of their cabs in front of the building. Dred Scott had an actual injury done to him. Brenda Levy doesn’t even know what injury she suffered. This is the ultimate crossroads for the institution of the Supreme Court. Legacy moment, Chief Justice Roberts. The ghost of Roger Taney awaits your decision to see if he’s finally off the hook.”
  • Joe Mullin: Secrets Become History: Edward Snowden in Citizenfour Wins Documentary Oscar

  • Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig: Giuliani: Obama Doesn’t Love America–“He Doesn’t Love You”: “For Giuliani and the Republicans who have shyly signaled agreement with him, it is America–the very idea of this state–that defines their selfhood, their emotional attachments, their moral sentiments, their love. And yet America is still just a state, among others: The fact that conservative identity is so wrapped up in the numinous notion of America suggests a strange relationship to their purported philosophy of small government. After all: states are temporary, they change, they are material organizations meant to confer certain material benefits. At least, that would be a limited view of government. Whatever Giuliani’s understanding of the American state is, it can’t honestly be called limited, no matter how low he would push taxes or how many programs he would cut, so long as it dominates so much of his soul.”

  • Scott Lemieux: The IRS Issued Tax Credits to Cover Up BENGHAZI!!!!!!!: “If the facts are on your side, pound the facts into the table. If the law is on your side, pound the law into the table. If neither the facts nor the law are on your side, pound the Fox News talking points into the ground. [Brian Buetler]: ‘That Cannon is defending his case by nodding like a Fox News bobblehead to an unrelated pseudo scandal is not anomalous. In both the media and in their briefs to the Supreme Court, the law’s challengers have papered over weaknesses in their historical and legal arguments with conservative bromides familiar to talk radio consumers, Fox News viewers, and recipients of anti-Obamacare talking points. This kind of conservative argumentum ad reptilis, has a successful track record with at least one conservative justice on the Supreme Court. During oral arguments in the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act three years ago, Antonin Scalia made reference sua sponte to the ‘Cornhusker Kickback’—a short-lived special deal for Nebraska in the Senate health care bill that became a metaphor on Fox News for the ACA’s corrupted legislative process, and was thus made national. But to those of us outside the conservative information bubble, it speaks to two themes that define challenge itself: that it is built on a fabricated history, and that it poses a de facto test to the cohesiveness of conservative movement infrastructure. Can a case built on an informational foundation that’s rejected everywhere outside the movement stand on the strength of the right’s intellectual and professional networks? Is the apparent internal consistency of a story and argument that only conservatives believe enough to carry the day in the Supreme Court, when the stakes are this high?’ Cannon’s argument use of Pelosi’s argument that passing the bill will show that conservative descriptions of it were a lie in order to defend making up additional lies about it is my favorite example.”

Morning Must-Read: Nick Bunker: The Future of Retirement Savings

Can we finally all admit that even though the defined-benefit pension system was inadequate the 401(k) system is worse? And that we need not a smaller but a larger Social Security system?

Nick Bunker: The Future of Retirement Savings: “Devlin-Foltz… Henriques, and… Sabelhaus…

…focus… on… participation…. The participation rate among working-age households… was close to 80 percent between 1989 and 2007. But… has dropped to… 75 percent…. [And] younger workers’ participation rate has fallen below the level of previous generations of young workers—today’s young workers aren’t saving as much younger workers in years past… [with] the biggest decline… among workers in the bottom half…

Morning Must-Read: Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz: Forecasting Trend Growth: Living with Uncertainty

I draw somewhat different conclusions from the wavering track of potential GDP than do the vires illustres Steve Cecchetti and Kermit Schoenholtz. But let me reserve that until some moment later on in the day when I am more awake…

Forecasting Trend Growth Living with Uncertainty Money Banking and Financial Markets

Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz: Forecasting Trend Growth: Living with Uncertainty: “We should all be wary of anyone…

…who claims to be able to forecast trend growth accurately and reliably. Even after the fact, it takes some time to discern the underlying trend. As a result, we need to build decision frameworks–for businesses and for policymakers–that are robust to the sorts of forecast errors we have seen in the past. Consider that approach the economist’s version of Keats’ negative capability. Second, our inability to get a precise fix on the output gap presents significant challenges for monetary policy, as this is commonly used as a prime indicator of inflationary pressures in the economy. If central bankers are unsure of the size of the output gap (or even its sign), then the likelihood of policy errors rises substantially. That reinforces the view of monetary policy setting as a problem of risk management in which policymakers must balance the hazards and costs associated with potentially large errors.

The future of retirement savings after the Great Recession

One of the many fears in the wake of the Great Recession was that the large decline in the stock market and housing prices would permanently damage personal retirement savings accounts in the United States. The decline in asset prices did reduce aggregate retirement levels, but the stock market today is now at a level higher than before the recession began in late 2007 and total retirement savings as a percent of total personal income is at an all-time peak. Yet the deep, two-year economic downturn and subsequently tepid recovery appears to have troubling, longer-term implications for retirement in the United States.

A new paper by economists at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors looks at trends in retirement wealth over the past several decades. The authors, Sebastian Devlin-Foltz, Alice M. Henriques, and John Sabelhaus, focus primarily on the distribution and changes in the rate of participation among workers in retirement plans.

According to the authors, the participation rate among working-age households—those with a chief income earner between the ages of 25 and 59—was close to 80 percent between 1989 and 2007. But after 2007, participation has dropped to a lower level, closer to 75 percent.

Lurking within this aggregate-level statistic is perhaps an even more disturbing trend. Namely, participation rates vary quite a bit by age during a single year. This dispersion isn’t surprising as we’d expect household’s savings decisions to change as they go through life. Younger workers will likely have the lowest participation rate as they see retirement far in the distance, but participation increases with age as households plan for retirement. And when workers actually retire, their participation in plans will of course end.

But when the three authors of the new study compare the participation trends across different age groups, they find something troubling. Younger workers’ participation rate has fallen below the level of previous generations of young workers—today’s young workers aren’t saving as much younger workers in years past.

Digging further into the data, Devlin-Foltz, Henriques, and Sabelhaus look at where the participation rate has fallen the most. They find that the biggest decline, compared to earlier generations of workers, is among workers in the bottom half of the income distribution. So the workers who most likely need the most help saving for retirement are the ones who aren’t saving at all.

Why have these workers pulled back on savings? The slow growth in incomes in the aftermath of the Great Recession is surely responsible to some extent. Given the option between saving for retirement decades away or meeting day-to-day needs, younger workers with lower incomes seem to be choosing the latter option.

But outside of stronger income and wage growth, other avenues to increased participation rates exist. For workers who are offered a retirement savings plan through their employer, the default option for these plans could be set so workers would have to opt out of saving. Research has found that plans such as these to be quite successful in boosting savings. And for workers without access to these types of employer-provided plans, access to streamlined retirement plans could be opened up.

What this new paper makes clear is that concern about retirement savings needs to account for the prospect that fewer households are saving than in the past. A disconcerting trend, to say the least.

ICYMI: Milanović on how US income distribution changed between 2007 and 2013

Branko Milanović – How US income distribution changed between 2007 and 2013:

As one would expect, this new interest in the matters of distribution has proven to be politically very contentious. And since people have strong political opinions and since income and wealth inequality have become the topic of the day, many people who otherwise never dabbled in income distribution have had their field day. This is best seen in the proliferation of income, consumption and wealth measures. I have written a bit on it here, and I do not want to go into all details of definitions in this short post. But some people have acted as if no standards existed on how income and income distributions are measured. More than half-a-century of work on the topic was ignored (or more likely, those who wrote about it did not even know it existed), Thus all kinds of bizarre measures have been proposed as if the entire corpus of knowledge had to be reinvented, or as if America were an island which needs to have its own measures of income and inequality unrelated to what is done in the rest of the world. One could, I guess, as well start inventing American concept of Gross Domestic Product.

 

Read more here.

If the Rise of the Robots Is Moved from the Ten-Year to the Fifty-Year Agenda, What Replaces It on the Ten-Year Agenda?: Focus

There are the different agendas at different time frames–say two years, ten years, and fifty years. The smart young whippersnapper Marshall Steinbaum reports on the growing consensus that dealing with the Rise of the Robots is on our fifty-year agenda, and not on our two-year or our ten-year agenda. On the two-year and ten-year agendas, he says, are dealing with and reversing the enormous upward redistribution that has taken place with the rise in the social, political, and economic power of the Overclass. That is:

  • Restoring full employment as a priority…
  • Rebalancing the corporation so that shareholders and the financiers top managers who can initiate corporate control transactions are no longer the only stakeholders that matter…
  • Restore long-run productive investment as a priority in public budgeting…

Underlying this position is a belief, perhaps, that so much of what is produced is so close to a joint Leontief product that something like the marginal product theory of distribution is profoundly unhelpful, and that questions of distribution are overwhelmingly resolved by economic bargaining power conditioned by social mores and politically-chosen institutions. Perhaps there used to be three sources of bargaining power, and thus three sources of durable advantage:

  1. Possession of the intellectual property and expertise needed to construct the high-throughput mass-production assembly lines of what used to be called “Fordist” capitalism…
  2. Control over the brands and other distribution channels necessary in order to sell the products of high-throughput mass-production factories to the middle classes of the North Atlantic who could afford to buy them at a good price…
  3. A blue-collar working class that had sufficient class consciousness to bargain for itself, and that was insulated by the requirement that the factories be located near to the engineers and to the corporate headquarters which needed to be placed so as to keep their eyes on the market…

And then, perhaps, over the past generation the third has dropped away, with the coming of globalization and the successful war against private sector unions. The rest are now themselves in flux. And perhaps they have been joined as a source of rent-extraction by those with the ability to tap into the savings produced in this age of the Global Savings Glut…

But I think that the sources of this enormous upward redistribution have not yet been properly sorted-out.

Marshall Steinbaum:

Marshall Steinbaum: The Future of Work Is Up to Us: “‘Big Thinkers’… are roughly divided into two camps…

…when it comes to the consequences of rapid technological change on the U.S. workforce… techno-optimist[s].. [and] the pessimistic view that better technology substitutes for workers and… harms them. A debate between the two… was probably what the organizers intended for an event last week hosted by The Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project entitled ‘The Future of Work in the Age of the Machine.’… Yet the debate last week actually highlighted a third position. If either the techno-optimists or the techno-pessimists are right, then we should see a major positive impact on worker productivity. But it just isn’t there… [even though] we definitely see worker displacement, stagnant earnings, a failing job ladder, rising inequality at the top, ‘over-education’ (workers taking jobs for which they’re historically overqualified), and declining rates of employment-to-population and household and small business formation…. Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers made this point forcefully….

So if not technology, what explains labor displacement?… Market practices and public policies that favor managers over workers, and those who make their living by owning capital over those who make their living by earning wages. That choice lurks behind the decline in full employment as a priority… a shift in the legal standards, mores, and incentives of corporate management in favor of the interests of [equity] owners over other stakeholders… the abandonment of long-term productive investment as a priority in public budgeting…. In 1988, Summers wrote an article fleshing out the idea that the division of rents between corporate stakeholders is what drives rising inequality. More than a quarter century later, he could not have been more prescient. The good news is that if such a profound shift played out over only three or four decades, then it’s reversible. That wouldn’t be true if it were the result of the technological trends detailed in [Brynjolffson and McAfee’s] ‘The Second Machine Age.’… We know what needs to be done and how to do it, because we’ve done it before…

Morning Must-Read: Larry Mishel: Even Better Than a Tax Cut

Lawrence Mishel: Even Better Than a Tax Cut: “The challenge is to ensure that a typical worker’s wages…

…grow along with profits and productivity. There is no silver bullet, but the key is… to reverse decades of decisions that have undercut wage growth. We need to start with monetary policy…. The most important decisions… are those of the Federal Reserve Board…. Before raising rates, it is essential we achieve a robust recovery, with roughly 3.5 to 4 percent annual [nominal] wage growth…. Another short- to medium-term policy decision affecting wage growth is to avoid trade deals, such as the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, that would further erode Americans’ wages and send jobs overseas. And… bolster… labor standards and institutions… [by] raising the minimum wage… rais[ing] the salary threshold for overtime…. Protecting and expanding workers’ right to unionize… moderniz[ing] our New Deal-era labor standards to include earned sick leave and paid family leave… stronger laws and enforcement to deter and remedy wage theft…. Wage stagnation is… a result of a policy regime that has undercut the individual and collective bargaining power of most workers. Because wage stagnation was caused by policy, it can be reversed by policy, too.

Morning Must Look-At: Nick Bunker: The Case for Inaction on Interest Rates

The case for inaction on interest rates Washington Center for Equitable Growth

Nick Bunker: The Case for Inaction on Interest Rates: “Equitable Growth’s Ben Zipperer…

[argued] average wage growth should be at least 3.5 percent a year…. Wen does wage growth cross above this threshold?… Not until the employment rate for workers ages 25 to 54 crosses 79 percent…. As of January 2015, this prime-age employment to population ratio was 77.2 percent. The ratio has been on the rise, but it still has a ways to go before it hits 79 percent. Growing at its current rate, that rate won’t hit 79 percent until 2017 at the earliest…. With inflation below its target, worries about stalled or slowing economic growth abroad, a strengthening dollar, and an incomplete labor market recovery, the Federal Open Markets Committee should consider the consequences of raising interest rates too soon. Perhaps the best move is to do nothing and simply wait…

The future of work in the second machine age is up to us

“Big Thinkers” about the role of technology in the U.S. economy are roughly divided into two camps when it comes to the consequences of rapid technological change on the U.S. workforce. There is the techno-optimist view that better technology complements workers and hence benefits them by raising wages. And there’s the pessimistic view that better technology substitutes for workers and therefore displaces and harms them. A debate between the two views was probably what the organizers intended for an event last week hosted by The Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project entitled “The Future of Work in the Age of the Machine.”

The impetus for the forum was the influential 2014 book “The Second Machine Age” by professors Erik Brynnjolfsson and Andrew McAfee at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The authors argue that increasingly “smart” technology displaces workers by reducing the range of tasks that require human ingenuity, and by enabling economic arrangements such as off-shoring that rely on instantaneous global communication and replicability. Brynnjolfsson and McAfee are clearly in the pessimists’ camp.

Until recently, economists were largely in the optimist camp. Sure, some jobs—think buggy whip manufacturers, typists, or travel agents—might disappear, but others would arise to take their place. In the long run, increased productivity would benefit everyone in the form of higher wages.

Yet the debate last week actually highlighted a third position. If either the techno-optimists or the techno-pessimists are right, then we should see a major positive impact on worker productivity. But it just isn’t there in the data. If anything, the rate of technological change in the United States has decreased since at least 2003, specifically in the technology sectors widely thought to be most innovative.

In contrast, we definitely see worker displacement, stagnant earnings, a failing job ladder, rising inequality at the top, “over-education” (workers taking jobs for which they’re historically overqualified), and declining rates of employment-to-population and household and small business formation. What we do not see are the productivity gains, either on a micro or macro level, that are supposedly driving worker displacement. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

 

fernald-graphic

Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers made this point forcefully at the Hamilton Project event. He said “people see there’s already a lot of disemployment but not a lot of productivity growth.” And he continued by asserting that “the core problem is that there aren’t enough jobs,” and that it’s hard to believe the future promise of labor-supplanting technology is driving current displacement. The reason, he said, is that we’d expect to see the installment of new labor-saving systems that would cause a temporary increase in labor demand during the transition.

Summers noted that back when he was an undergraduate at MIT in the 1960s, his professors said labor would not be displaced by technology. In those days, the non-employment rate for prime-age male workers was 6 percent. Now it’s 16 percent. Summers’ co-panelist David Autor added that since 2000, the education wage premium has reached a plateau and the rate of over-education has increased, both of which are hard to square with the argument that the reason for rising inequality is the advance of technology. Summers added that the idea that more education solves the problem of displaced labor is “fundamentally an evasion.” Summers’ arguments and Autor’s observation imply that if we’re wondering how things got so bad for workers, it’s not because we live in the Second Machine Age.

So if not technology, what explains labor displacement?

Broadly speaking, the explanation is this: market practices and public policies that favor managers over workers, and those who make their living by owning capital over those who make their living by earning wages. That choice lurks behind the decline in full employment as a priority in macroeconomic policymaking. It’s also behind a shift in the legal standards, mores, and incentives of corporate management in favor of the interests of owners over other stakeholders. That choice is also evident in the abandonment of long-term productive investment as a priority in public budgeting in favor of upper-income tax breaks and retirement programs for the elderly.

As Summers noted at the Hamilton Project’s event, there seems to be a lot of so-called rents—economics speak for excessive payment for something beyond its actual value—in corporate profits that can’t be understood as the fruits of productive investment. The big question is: who gets those rents? In 1988, Summers wrote an article fleshing out the idea that the division of rents between corporate stakeholders is what drives rising inequality. More than a quarter century later, he could not have been more prescient.

The good news is that if such a profound shift played out over only three or four decades, then it’s reversible. That wouldn’t be true if it were the result of the technological trends detailed in “The Second Machine Age.” So what should be the focus of public policy is to figure out ways for workers to accrue more of corporate earnings, for more unemployed and underemployed people to find full-time, productive jobs, and for the broader economy to serve the interests of the actual people who inhabit it—those who overwhelmingly derive their living from their labor.

We know what needs to be done and how to do it, because we’ve done it before. (See Figure 2.) But it’s a lot harder to actually do than doubling the number of logic gates on a computer chip every two years—the ostensible tech explanation for our current economic woes.

Figure 2

incomegrowth-quintile1

The case for inaction on interest rates

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen later this week will testify before Congress about the state of the U.S. economy. Hanging over her testimony will be whether the Federal Open Markets Committee, the arm of the Federal Reserve that sets monetary policy, is ready to raise interest rates later this year. Interest rates have been at zero since late 2008. But has the time arrived to take this major step toward normal monetary policy?

Part of the Federal Reserve’s mission is to promote maximum employment. Amid the current, five-year-long economic recovery, economists have debated the natural rate of unemployment. Basically, what’s the unemployment rate at which inflation becomes untethered and the Fed needs to start reigning in economic growth?

Wage growth has been stalled at around 2 percent for several years now, despite hints and hopes of acceleration. The latest data from 2014 shows that low-wage earners saw their wages increase, despite declines for other workers. So the question is this—what will spark stronger wage growth?

The answer, in short, is tighter labor markets. As more workers get jobs, wage growth should accelerate. Another way to look at this question is to see how wage growth changes at the employment rate moves around.

Earlier this month, Equitable Growth’s Ben Zipperer looked at that very relationship. If we assume long-run productivity growth is about 1.5 percent and inflation is 2 percent, in line with the Fed’s target, then average wage growth should be at least 3.5 percent a year.

So when does wage growth cross above this threshold? According to the data Zipperer looked at, not until the employment rate for workers ages 25 to 54 crosses 79 percent. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

020615-employment

As of January 2015, this prime-age employment to population ratio was 77.2 percent. The ratio has been on the rise, but it still has a ways to go before it hits 79 percent. Growing at its current rate, that rate won’t hit 79 percent until 2017 at the earliest.

The U.S. labor market is growing stronger, but that is not a sign of a finished job. With inflation below its target, worries about stalled or slowing economic growth abroad, a strengthening dollar, and an incomplete labor market recovery, the Federal Open Markets Committee should consider the consequences of raising interest rates too soon.

Perhaps the best move is to do nothing and simply wait. Normalcy, it appears, has not returned quite yet.