The relationship between U.S. productivity growth and the decline in the labor share of national income

Photo of classroom by Derek Bruff, flickr, cc

One of the ongoing debates about the state of the U.S. economy is the extent to which the profits from productivity gains are increasingly going to the owners of capital instead of wage earners. These researchers are debating the extent to which the labor share of income, once considered a constant by economists, is on the decline.

But what if the decline of national income going to labor actually affects the measured rate of U.S. productivity growth? In a blog post published last week, University of Houston economist Dietz Vollrath sketches out a model showing just that scenario. Vollrath’s post contains the full math for those who are interested, but his analysis rests on the idea that the labor share of income is declining due to the increased market power of businesses.

Vollrath argues that businesses with more market power are able to charge higher markups on their goods and services, meaning their pricing is higher than the cost of producing an additional goods or services compared to pricing in a perfectly competitive market. So in this situation where markups are high, goods and services are being produced less efficiently, with the increased profits going to the owners of capital.

Vollrath argues that this is how measured productivity growth is affected by the decline of the labor share of income. Market power is important for thinking about measured productivity growth because, as Vollrath says, it “dictates how efficiently we use our inputs.” Remember, productivity growth is measured by the residual—or the part unexplained by additional workers or capital—of economic growth. Impeding the most efficient use of capital and labor via marked-up prices will reduce measured productivity.

But let’s be clear: Vollrath’s point is about measured productivity.  In his model, the decline of the share of income going to wage earners in the U.S. economy wouldn’t necessarily affect the true underlying pace of innovation in the economy that is not captured by current measures of productivity. So it could be that innovation is happening, but companies’ increased market power means these innovations aren’t showing up as an increasingly better usage of capital and labor in producing gross domestic product. Perhaps this could explain some of the reason why measured productivity growth looks so meager in the seeming age of innovation in Silicon Valley.

But Vollrath’s story isn’t a complete explanation of the fall in measured productivity, as he acknowledges.. For example he  cites research by University of Chicago economists Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, which points to the falling price of investment goods as the main reason for the decline in share of income going to wage earners. Put another way, the declining price of computers is resulting in a higher share of income going to profits.

Another potential reason is a change in the kind of technological growth the U.S. economy is experiencing, an argument put forth by Harvard University economist Robert Z. Lawrence. He argues that technology is increasingly tilted toward labor instead of capital, which actually reduces labor’s share of income.

And of course there’s economist Thomas Piketty’s version of events, where capital deepening is at the center of his argument in “Capital in the 21st Century.” The Paris School of Economics professor contends that the historically constant rate of return will allow capital to gain more of income as economic growth slows down.

But Vollrath’s market power explanation for falling productivity growth, alongside the falling share of national income going to wage earners, is supported by some evidence.  Work by Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate student Matt Rognlie, for example, found evidence of higher markups.

Whether and how the decline of the labor share of income affects productivity growth is obviously a topic far too large for a couple of blog posts. But Vollrath’s model is especially interesting for connecting two important trends in recent years: the slowdown in productivity growth and the declining labor share. It’s worth, at the very least, a bit more investigation.

Noted for Lunchtime on September 30, 2015

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Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Torsten Slok: DB: Expect More Hawkish Fedspeak

Must-Read: Remember, relative to Fed beliefs less than four years ago, we have already seen 75 basis points of tightening relative to the benchmark of the estimated natural rate:

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The more likely it is that we are in a régime of secular stagnation, the more important it is to take the 2%/year inflation target as an average rather than a ceiling, and the less-wise is the Federal Reserve’s expressed commitment to start raining interest rates come hell or high water. The markets appear to think–quite reasonably–that the Federal Reserve is gradually moving month-by-month toward a more reality-based Larry Summers-like view of the macroeconomic situation, and that when December comes around the current FOMC consensus for raising interest rates then will have sublimed away.

And if the market is wrong, the most likely reason for it to be wrong is if the Federal Reserve decides to be contrary and to stop its ongoing rethinking process, just to show that it can and that it is boss…

Torsten Slok: DB: Expect More Hawkish Fedspeak: “Before Yellen’s speech last week, the probability of a rate hike by the end of 2015 was 42%…

…Today it is 41%. The market continues to believe that the Fed will not hike rates later this year despite 13 out of 17 FOMC members expecting a hike in 2015. Why does the market not believe the Fed? One reason is likely that the Fed for several years now has been too optimistic… has had to revise down their forecasts of not only near-term growth but also longer-term growth prospects…. This one-way revision in forecasts over many years has probably had an impact on how market participants interpret Fed communication…. We continue to expect a rate hike in December and we continue to expect Fedspeak in the coming weeks will repeat their expectation of liftoff coming in 2015..

Must-Read: Sylvia Allegretto, Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich and Ben Zipperer: Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies: A Response to Neumark, Salas and Wascher

Must-Read: At this stage, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher’s are only hurting themselves–and hurting confidence not just in their minimum-wage work but their non-minimum wage work as well–by their refusal to acknowledge that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that Card and Krueger were right: that increases in the minimum wage from levels currently present in the United States have at most very small disemployment effects.

Sylvia Allegretto, Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich and Ben Zipperer: Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies: A Response to Neumark, Salas and Wascher: “We assess the Neumark, Salas and Wascher (NSW) critique of our minimum wage findings…

…Recent studies, including one by NSW, obtain small employment elasticities for restaurants, -0.06 or less in magnitude. The substantive critique in NSW thus centers primarily upon teens. Using a longer (1979-2014) sample than used by NSW and in our own previous work, we find clear evidence that teen minimum-wage employment elasticities from a two-way fixed-effects panel model are contaminated by negative pre-existing trends. Simply including state-specific linear trends produces small and statistically insignificant estimates (around -0.07); including division-period effects further reduces the estimated magnitudes toward zero. A LASSO-based selection procedure indicates these controls for time-varying heterogeneity are warranted. Including higher order state trends does not alter these findings, contrary to NSW. Consistent with bias in the fixed-effects estimates from time-varying heterogeneity, first-difference estimates are small or positive. Small, statistically insignificant, teen employment elasticities (around -0.06) obtain from border discontinuity design with contiguous counties. Contrary to NSW, such counties are more similar to each other than to other counties. Synthetic control studies also indicate small minimum wage elasticities (around -0.04). Nearby states receive significantly more weight in creating synthetic controls, providing further support for using regional controls. Finally, NSW’s preferred new matching estimates are plagued by a problematic sample that mixes treatment and control units, obtains poor matches, and shows the largest employment drops in areas with relative minimum wage declines.

Must-Read: Ed Kligore: The Brand: What You See Is What You Get

Ed Kilgore: The Brand: What You See Is What You Get): “Ann Friedman has written a piece for TNR that will be of great interest to all of us who have had to grapple with the idea…

…of a personal ‘brand’… back in the day… called a ‘voice.’… Friedman shares with us the hilarious and sobering tale of her own wrestling match with ‘branding’…. Personally, I find it easier to remain ‘authentic’… by letting people absorb my unique characteristics organically, rather than spending time each day trying to figure out how to improve the lefty-cracker-Christian-bloviator-with-a-surprisingly-good-vocabulary brand…. We’re not entirely immune to the logic of ‘branding,’ but for the most part, what you see is what you get.

Must-Read: Mariana Mazzucato: Jeremy Corbyn’s Necessary Agenda

Mariana Mazzucato: Jeremy Corbyn’s Necessary Agenda: “We must drop the false dichotomy of governments versus markets…

…and begin to think more clearly about the market outcomes we want. There is plenty to learn from public investments that were mission-oriented, instead of focused on ‘facilitating’ or ‘incentivizing’ business. Policy should actively shape and create markets, not just fix them when they go wrong. Indeed, policies traditionally considered ‘business friendly,’ such as tax credits and lower tax rates, can be bad for business in the long run if they limit governments’ future ability to invest in areas that increase innovation-led growth…. Moreover, we need more patient, long-term finance. Most existing finance is too speculative and too focused on short-term outcomes. Exit-driven venture capital might be appropriate for gadgets; but technological revolutions have historically required patient, committed public financing…. When the public sector takes key risks along the innovation chain… we should think more creatively about the kinds of contracts that enable the public to share not only the risks, but also some of the rewards. We must also shape a new narrative on debt. Rather than focus on budget deficits, we should concentrate on the denominator of debt-to-GDP ratios…

Must-Read: Scott Sumner: The Case for Tightening Is Getting Weaker and Weaker

Graph 10 Year Breakeven Inflation Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Scott Sumner: The Case for Tightening Is Getting Weaker and Weaker: “The recent plunge in TIPS spreads is reaching frightening proportions…

…5 year = 1.09%. 10 year = 1.42%. 30 year = 1.61%. Yes, I know they can be distorted by illiquidity, but they are not THAT far off market expectations. And don’t forget they predict CPI inflation, which runs about 0.3% above the Fed’s preferred PCE. In essence, the Fed has a 2.3% inflation target. They aren’t likely to hit it. Also recall that since 2007 the Fed’s been consistently overly optimistic… markets have been more pessimistic, and more accurate. Also recall that Fed policy has a big impact on the global economy. Also recall that the global economy seems to be moving into a disinflationary cycle…. Given there is basically no upside from tightening now, the Fed’s got to ask itself one question: “Do I feel lucky today?”

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: What is Medium Doing?

Must-Read: I had written, apropos of Medium: “I keep hoping that someone like Ben Thompson will write a dazzling piece on his daily newsletter to make everything clear to me.”

Lo and behold! Ben Thompson delivers!

What a strange new world, that has such people the ability to order up on whim a 2000-word essay from one of keenest of analysts exactly prepared to write on exactly the topic I am curious about in it!

Ben Thompson: What is Medium Doing?: “There are a huge number of publishers on the Internet….

…I believe [Medium’s] goal is to collate…. If the company can get the long tail to publish on their platform… a massive amount of really crappy posts… a not-insignificant number of really compelling pieces… from a theoretically endless supply of authors… if edited and curated properly… a very compelling stream of content…. Medium is suddenly a big publisher with an attractive proposition for advertisers….

That’s part one: the other part is… publisher of choice for the future John Grubers or Ben Thompsons… hosting, design, ad sales, subscription management… efficiently done at scale…. I do think this type of blogging has a bright future, but for now… [largely] inaccessible…. A platform that handles everything but the writing could make this path much more accessible…. It’s a vision I’m really excited about, particular the last segment….

That said, success is by no means assured…. [The] elephant in the room…. Facebook’s… redesign of its blog-like Notes tool… is now rolling out… [with] a design that will look familiar to anyone who has ever read a post on Medium…. The most potential readers are on Facebook. The most potential writers are on Facebook. Advertisers are on Facebook…. Facebook isn’t just the long tail, it’s the entire damn curve…. Notes is simply another piece of Facebook’s efforts to colonize the entire Social-Communication map. The company already mostly killed… blogging… because… most blog posts were little more than status updates, links, or photos. Notes is simply coming for the essays.

Must-Read: Ken Pomeranz: Review of Li Bozhang: Agricultural Development in Jiangnan

Must-Read: The extremely-sharp Kenneth Pomeranz reviews Li Bozhang. It is another point for the coal-empire-metalworking view of the causes of the British Industrial Revolution, and against mentalité- or political institutions-based interpretations…

Ken Pomeranz:

Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850: “Chinese… economic history suffered badly during the 1960s and 1970s…

…In the generation that began rebuilding… probably the single most productive scholar has been Li Bozhong…. Yet only a fraction of Li’s massive scholarly output is available to those who do not read Chinese….

The economy of the Yangzi Delta (or Jiangnan)… the richest region in China… among the richest regions in the world from roughly 1000 until the mid-nineteenth century…. Li argues forcefully against two basic views of the Delta’s agriculture in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) periods: 1) the claims of some Chinese Marxist scholars that the Delta remained a subsistence-oriented “feudal” economy in which most peasants had very limited contact with the market until the nineteenth century; 2) the claim of some Western scholars that Malthusian pressures and very limited technological change produced a slow but steady trend of immiseration… from roughly 1250 (when the rate of technological progress seems to have slowed considerably) until at least the mid-nineteenth century…. In contrast to an older version of Chinese economic history… which saw an enormous spurt of technological change during the Song dynasty (960-1279), followed by stagnation or even regression thereafter…. Li argues that the combination of proto-industrialization and rising yields in agriculture (discussed above) propelled a significant improvement in per capita income and standard of living between 1550 and 1850… disagree[ing] with the still-regnant Chinese Marxist orthodoxy, which insists that China remained essentially a subsistence economy until the Opium War… [and] with American partisans of “involution,” who maintain that the late imperial period was characterized by miniscule gains in income achieved at the expense of very large increases in labor inputs….

Why [did not] the highly productive agriculture, commerce and handicrafts he describes… spawn something more like classical English industrialization[?]… He argues that institutional structure, surplus available for investment, and the educational level of the workforce were all quite adequate, and that there was widespread interest in productivity-enhancing technological change…. [He] finds his answers in geography and the supply of natural resources. In particular, he emphasizes a dearth of energy sources that he says gave Jiangnan production a marked bias away from anything energy-intensive, creating what he calls “a super light industrial” economy… few trees… not very many large work animals… no coal or peat, and, being at sea level, relatively little water power. Conditions were even unfavorable for the large-scale use of wind…. Thus, Jiangnan did what it was best at: sustaining a very productive agriculture (especially in rice: cotton yields do not seem to have been outstanding), mobilizing the large numbers of people it could feed to produce handicrafts, and taking advantage of its location at the mouth of a river system draining roughly a third of China, plus the coastline and the one thousand mile Grand Canal…