Very Sorry That I Missed: Charles C. Mann and Annalee Newitz: From the Neolithic Era to the Apocalypse: How to Prepare for the Future by Studying the Past

Very Sorry That I Missed: Charles C. Mann and Annalee Newitz: From the Neolithic Era to the Apocalypse: How to Prepare for the Future by Studying the Past: “Thursday, October 8, 2015 5:00 – 7:00 pm 3-270…

…For thousands of years, humans have experienced cycles of empire building and retreat, from the neolithic settlers of Levant and the Indus Valley to the ancient Cahokia and Maya civilizations. What can new discoveries teach us about how to plan our next thousand years as a global civilization?… How ancient civilizations shed light on current problems with urbanization, food security, and environmental change.

Charles C. Mann is the author, most recently, of 1493, a New York Times best-seller, and 1491, winner of the National Academies of Science’s Keck award for best book of the year. His next project, The Wizard and the Prophet, is a book about the future that makes no predictions. An early version of the introductory chapter was a finalist for a National Magazine Award.

Annalee Newitz writes science nonfiction and science fiction. She’s editor-in-chief of Gizmodo.com and founding editor of io9.com. She’s the author of Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction, which was a finalist for a Los Angeles Times Book Award. Her work has appeared in publications from The New Yorker and Technology Review to 2600 and Lightspeed Magazine. Her next book is a novel about robots, pirates, and the future of property laws.

Weekend reading

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

The unemployment rate is just above 5 percent, close to many economists’ estimates of its long-run level, but wage growth hasn’t picked up. Perhaps we need to look at new labor market measures. Enter: the Z-POP.

Wealth inequality in the United States is about more than the share of wealth captured by the top 0.1 percent of families—inequality by race and ethnicity is also quite profound. A new paper tries to understand the roots of the racial and ethnic wealth gap.

In our era of slow U.S. economic growth and declining productivity gains, many think that magic might be the only way to boost our future prospects. But while economists aren’t sure what exactly boosts growth, we aren’t entirely in the dark.

After the housing bubble burst during the Great Recession, the amount of time it took for a house to go through foreclosure increased significantly. Two economists show how these delays acted like an extension of credit, helping unemployed workers weather a lack of a job, and actually increased wages.

Links from around the web

“The effects of hysteresis — where recessions are not just costly but stunt the growth of future output — appear far stronger than anyone imagined a few years ago.” Larry Summers argues the case for expansion in an era of secular stagnation. [ft]

Recent debates about the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and new research on the effects of trade are starting to crack an old consensus, says Noah Smith. “The simple logic of free trade, so familiar from Econ 101, is either failing or ceasing to be relevant.” [bloomberg view]

For decades, women in the United States participated in the labor market at rates that led the league tables for high-income economies. While women in Japan have historically participated in the labor market at much lower rates, their employment rate is now higher than the rate for U.S. women. Danielle Paquette looks into how this happened. [wonkblog]

If monopolies and market power have been increasing in the United States, does that have any influence on the decline in interest rates over the last several decades? Carleton University economist Nick Rowe looks into the possible connection. [worthwhile canadian initiative]

Policymakers, economists, and market participants have started to fear the global economy is slowing down. Digging out some charts from a report by Citibank, David Keohane sees inflation cooling off across the globe—and it’s not because of declining energy prices. [ft alphaville]

Friday figure

Figure from “Where is the U.S. labor market recovery for prime-age workers?” by Ben Zipperer.

I Really Really Do Not Understand the Mental Universe of Today’s Federal Reserve

I suppose my big problem is I keep getting hung up on the following optimal control principle: If you know in which direction your next turn of the wheel is going to be, then either you are steering around an immediate obstacle, or you are headed in the wrong direction. And if you are headed in the wrong direction, you should already have turned your wheel so that you are headed in the right direction.


At the zero lower bound, this principle does not directly apply. You are trying to steer around an immediate obstacle. Thus you know in which direction your next turn of the wheel is going to be. But a corollary to this general principle does apply, and applies very clearly: Optimal-control tells you to stay at the zero lower bound until you are confident that the economy is strong enough. Then you quickly move to point the economy in the right direction–to an interest rate where you are not sure whether your next turn of the wheel will be left or right.

The’s “lift off and pause”–turn the wheel a little bit right, and then wait for a while even though you know your next turn is going to be to the right–seems to me to make absolutely no sense at all. I cannot write down any optimal control exercise in which it does. I cannot even do so if I put my thumb on the scale via assuming an unmotivated substantial aversion to ever making 50 basis-point meeting moves in interest rates…

Health Policy: The Intellectual Collapse of the Right Continues…

Live from Crow’s Coffee: A correspondent emails:

You apparently didn’t arrive at the Kansas City Medicaid expansion event last night in time to hear:

(1) Cato’s Michael F. Cannon denounce ObamaCare for not eliminating employer-sponsored insurance, and thus getting people the kind of insurance that vanishes when they get sick and lose their job.

(2) Cato’s Michael F. Cannon denouncing Medicaid expansion for giving insurance to people even when they are not employed, and so eliminating the necessity to find and keep a job if you want health insurance.

You see what he did there? You are right about Think Tanks staffed by those more desperate to please ideologically-rigid billionaires than to actually think about the issues.

Dysfunctional Debate Over Medicaid Expansion in Kansas City

I actually made it to the second half of the Medicaid expansion in Kansas/Missouri panel last night:

Brad DeLong: Must-See: UMKC Medicaid Panel, and Think-Tanks: “Must-See: Alas! I seem to be missing the Kathleen Sibelius panel…

…on Medicaid expansion this evening at UMKC American Public Square: Dinner at the Square A Dose of Reality: A Medicaid Status Report…

Reactions:

  1. Tarren Bragdon, the President and CEO of the Foundation for Government Accountability, didn’t seem to either (a) know enough, (b) have gotten himself well enough briefed, or(c) be able to think fast enough to do anything other than regurgitate right-wing talking points. But, then, would anyone who could do (a), (b), or (c) want his job?

  2. Kathleen Sibelius and MO Hospital Association Senior VP of Governmental Relations Daniel Landon said about what I expected them to–and were, by and large, accurate and on point.

  3. Michael F. Cannon of the Cato Institute surprised me in a number of ways.

  4. Cannon claimed that Amy Finkelstein et al.‘s Oregon Medicaid study had found “no effect of getting Medicaid on physical health”. Not “no statistically-significant effect”. Not “effects quite possibly due to sampling error, but in line with clinical expectations”. Not “effects that might have been due to chance”. Not “effects that might not pass a sensible benefit-cost test”. Instead, he said “no effect”–over and over again, a couple of times qualified as “no discernible effect”. I wonder if he would have dared to so mischaracterize the Oregon Medicaid study–which found statistically significant and substantial effects on family finances, statistically significant and clinical substantial effects on depression (which is, mind you, a physical illness: brain chemistry plus, you know), clinically substantial but statistically not significant (due to low statistical power) effects reducing unhealthy blood sugars, and clinically substantial but statistically not significant (due to low statistical power) effects reducing unhealthy blood pressure–if Amy Finkelstein or their coauthors had been in the audience or on the panel?

  5. Cannon’s big argument–made over and over again–was that the Affordable Care Act was bad because it did not eliminate insurance companies’ ability to engage in adverse selection via insurance plan design, and that the regulations in the ACA to limit such simply showed that it was a serious problem. Now if you really do believe that adverse selection by insurance companies via insurance plan design is a fatal flaw in the ACA, that has consequences. Getting rid of the ACA makes adverse selection a much bigger problem, and thus a much more fatal flaw. If that is your objection to the ACA, then you are a single payer advocate. If you are intellectually consistent. Sibelius nailed him: “Now I do not understand whether you object to the ACA because it regulates insurance companies too much or too little.”

  6. Cannon’s slip-up when he said “the ACA is not going to be repealed”–apparently the start of the argument that he should not be held accountable for the consequences of the ACA appeal that he advocates. He stopped in mid-sentence, however, apparently realizing that was not a road he really wanted to go down.

  7. Cannon’s claim that his 48-year-old developmentally-disabled cousin in New Jersey did not deserve to have and should not have a Medicaid card because he came from “a large Irish Catholic family with lots of relatives to take care of him”. Presumably female relatives. Again, Sibelius nailed him: “New Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie disagrees–he expanded Medicaid.”

  8. The “should Kansas/Missouri expand Medicaid?” argument is over before it starts. Kansas’s and Missouri’s taxpayers are paying for Medicaid expansion elsewhere. The question is whether they pay the taxes and get the benefits, or pay the taxes and don’t get the benefits. Thus the only argument that can be made is that there are no benefits–hence the misrepresentation of the Oregon Medicaid study that Medicaid does no good, the claim that those who qualify for Medicaid under the expansion do not “deserve” it, attacks on overpaid health-care providers who receive Medicaid payments. Plus, most recently, Kansas’s Governor Brownback’s claim that the real purpose Obama has in mind with Medicaid expansion is to keep urban hospitals that treat Black people open. (False, by the way: the hospitals most at risk from the absence of Medicaid expansion in Kansas right now are rural hospitals that treat poor people.)

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Did The Fed Save The World?

Must-Read: Looking back at my archives, I find that my own ratio of “Paul Krugman is right” to “Paul Krugman is wrong” posts is not in the rational range between 10-1 and 5-1, but is 15-1. So I am looking for an opportunity to rebalance. And I find one this morning: Here I think Paul Krugman is wrong. Why? Because of this:

2015 10 06 for 2015 10 07 DeLong ULI key

Housing crashes. And does not bounce back quickly by the end of 2010–or, indeed, at all. And Paul Krugman is correct to write that “Even a total collapse of home lending couldn’t have subtracted more than a point or two more off aggregate demand”:

2015 10 06 for 2015 10 07 DeLong ULI key

But exports collapse as the financial crisis hits, and then bounce back very rapidly as the financial crisis passes:

2015 10 06 for 2015 10 07 DeLong ULI key

And roughly one-third of the financial-crisis associated collapse in business investment is quickly reversed after the financial crisis passes:

2015 10 06 for 2015 10 07 DeLong ULI key

Together these two factors plausibly associated with the reuniting of the web of financial intermediation look to me to be five times as large as the fiscal stimulus measured by government purchases. Now fiscal stimulus worked through channels other than government purchases. And without the Recovery Act we would have seen states and localities not holding their purchases constant over 2008-2011 but cutting them by 1% of GDP or so. And not all of the export and business investment bounce-back in the two years after the 2009 trough can be attributed to lender-of-last-resort and easy-money policies.

But it looks to me like the balance is that–even with housing left to rot on the stalk–monetary and banking policy did more than fiscal policy to stem the downturn and promote recovery up to 2011. And it looks to me that, since 2011, it is the reknitting of the financial system and easy money that has kept the extraordinary austerity that the states and the Republicans imposed and that Obama has bought into from sending the U.S., at least, into a renewed and deeper downturn.

Paul Krugman: Did The Fed Save The World?: “Bernanke’s basic theme is that the shocks of 2008 were bad enough that we could have had a full replay of the Great Depression…

…the reason we didn’t was that in the 30s central banks just sat immobilized while the financial system crashed, but this time they went all out to keep markets working. Should we believe this?… I very much agree with BB that pulling out all the stops was the right thing to do…. But I’m not persuaded that the real difference between 2008 and 1930-31 (which is when the Depression turned Great) lies in central bank action, or related bailouts. It’s true that the 30s were marked by a big financial disruption…. Shadow banking rapidly shriveled up, with repo and other alternatives to bank financing shrinking very fast; liquidity for everything but the safest of assets disappeared even though the big financial firms remained in being. And if we’re looking for effects of the tightening in credit conditions, remember that credit policy usually exerts its biggest effects through housing — and housing investment fell more than 60 percent as a share of GDP….

So really, was putting a limit on the financial crisis the reason we didn’t do a full 1930s? Or was it something else? And there is one other big difference between the world in 2008 and the world in 1930: big government…. Again, Bernanke and company were right to step in forcefully. But I’d argue that the fiscal environment was probably more important than monetary actions in limiting the damage. Oh, and since 2010 officials everywhere, but especially in Europe, have been doing all they can to undo the favorable effects…. And the result is that in Europe economic performance is at this point considerably worse than it was at this point in the 1930s.

Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: The Mirage of Structural Reform

Must-Read: If you set out to take Vienna, take Vienna. If you want to balance the foreign exchange account, give people incentives to boost exports and cut back imports. Any economy that might suddenly need to balance its foreign exchange account needs to have a flexible currency–or partners who are willing to take steps to do the job themselves. Greece lacks both.

Dani Rodrik: The Mirage of Structural Reform: “If structural reforms have not paid off in Greece…

…it is not because Greek governments have slacked off…. Instead, the current disappointment arises from the very logic of structural reform: most of the benefits come much later, not when a country really needs them. There is an alternative strategy…. A selective approach that targets the ‘binding constraints’…. So, which binding constraints in the Greek economy should be targeted? The biggest bang for the reform buck would be obtained from increasing the profitability of tradables–spurring investment and entrepreneurship in export activities, both existing and new. Of course, Greece lacks the most direct instrument for achieving this–currency depreciation…. But… tax incentives to special zones to targeted infrastructure projects… an institution close to the prime minister that is tasked with fostering a dialogue with potential investors… [with] authority to remove the obstacles it identifies, rather than having its proposals languish in various ministries. Such obstacles are typically highly specific–a zoning regulation here, a training program there–and are unlikely to be well targeted by broad structural reforms…

Must-Read: Ben Casselman: It’s Getting Harder To Move Beyond a Minimum-Wage Job

Must-Read: Ben Casselman: It’s Getting Harder To Move Beyond a Minimum-Wage Job: “Minimum-wage jobs are meant to be the first rung on a career ladder…

…But a growing number of Americans are getting stuck…. Anthony Kemp is one of them. In 2006, he took a job as a cook at a Kentucky Fried Chicken in Oak Park, Illinois. The job paid the state minimum wage, $6.50 an hour at the time, but Kemp figured he could work his way up. ‘Normally, a good cook would make $14, $15, $17 an hour,’ Kemp said. ‘I thought that of course I’d make a better wage.’ He never did; nine years later, the only raises Kemp, 44, has seen have been the ones required by state law. He earns $8.25, the state’s current minimum wage…

Is There a Valid “Stop the Misallocation of Capital” Argument for Raising Interest Rates Right Now?

Kristi Culpepper: @munilass: “Best explanation of difference between people who believe Fed…

…should raise rates vs people who think Fed should hold tight…. People who think Fed should raise rates think Fed is only making things worse by encouraging misallocation of capital. People who think Fed should hold tight are obsessed with inflation measures, pressures from global economy. So Fed is caught between narratives of two groups that are essentially always going to be talking past each other.

That was the keen-eyed observer Kristi Culpepper tweeting a few days ago. It struck me as incisive and insightful both about those who do and about those who do not want the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates.

I think she is correct about what those who want the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates are thinking: they are thinking that the prices that are interest rates are somehow wrong, and are leading people who are responding them to do things that are stupid for society as a whole.

But how stupid?

The argument is that the incentives to create long duration assets generated by extremely low interest-rate’s are too high. Therefore we as a society are creating too many long duration assets. But are we? The standard long duration asset is a building. And residential construction is still deeply depressed, well below anything we might think of as its normal equilibrium level. From the standpoint of residential construction, low interest rates are only partially compensating for other market failures that are currently leading us to build too few houses, not too many.

NewImage

When I make this argument to those who want the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, they move on. They point to non-residential construction–which is indeed healthy. but they cannot point to anyother long-duration investments in physical objects or organizations. And, indeed, in a world where the chief complaint about business is its short-termism, a configuration of market prices that puts a thumb in the scale in favor of projects of long-duration would seem to be a thing we need, not a thing to avoid.

And so they move on further: The argument becomes a claim that the Federal Reserve has made debt too valuable, and So the Federal Reserve is inducing overleverage. But too cheap relative to what? Issuing debt is richly valued. But the proceeds are not being used to build long-duration physical or organizational assets in excessive amounts. The proceeds are being used to buyback equities, but equities are also richly valued. So where is the incentive to overleverage? I do not see it.

NewImage

And so we come to the last argument: Commercial banks are being squeezed between the zero floor on deposits and the low rates they earn in their traditional relatively-safe loan habitats. Commercial banks should be focused on running their banking branch-and-ATM networks efficiently, and efficiently lending on a large scale to loan customers where they understand the risks. But, now, because low safe interest rates and the zero lower bound on what they can pay deposits, commercial banks have to become judges of risk–a task that they are not well qualified to do, which pits them against people who can and do adversely-select and moral-hazard this.

This is, I think, correct: Low interest-rate are bad for the commercial banking sector. But they are very good for labor and for capital. And, as long as they do not induce undue inflationary pressures, for the economy as a whole.

So are we supposed to sacrifice the health of the economy as a whole simply to make life easier for the commercial banking sector?

Now do not get me wrong. I wish that interest rates were higher. I think it expansionary fiscal policy to push up interest rates is clearly the first best policy.

But we are not going to get that–at least not until 2017 at the earliest.

And the scary thing is that the Federal Reserve does indeed seem to contain a great many people whose answer to that question is: Yes: we do want to sacrifice the health of the rest of the economy in order to make life easier for the commercial banking sector. Therefore we are going to raise interest rates now:

  • even though inflationary pressures are not yet visible on the horizon,
  • even though the Federal Reserve has ample ability to raise interest rates in order to catch up should inflationary pressures appear, and
  • even though the Federal Reserve has no ability to reverse course and offset the damage done should raising interest rates to be a mistake.

Carter Glass and Louis Brandeis are rolling in their graves…

Must-Read: Daniel Kahneman: Thinking, Fast and Slow

Must-Read: Daniel Kahneman (2012): Thinking, Fast and Slow: “As interpreted by the important Chicago school of economics…

faith in human rationality is closely linked to an ideology in which it is unnecessary and even immoral to protect people against their choices. Rational people should be free, and they should be responsible for taking care of themselves The assumption that agents are rational provides the intellectual foundation for the libertarian approach to public policy: do not interfere with the individual’s right to choose, unless the choices harm others.… I once heard Gary Becker [argue] that we should consider the possibility of explaining the so-called obesity epidemic by people’s belief that a cure for diabetes will soon become available…

Much is therefore at stake in the debate between the Chicago school and the behavioral economists, who reject the extreme form of the rational-agent model. Freedom is not a contested value; all the participants in the debate are in favor of it. But life is more complex for behavioral economists than for true believers in human rationality. No behavioral economist favors a state that will force its citizens to eat a balanced diet and to watch only television programs that are good for the soul. For behavioral economists, however, freedom has a cost, which is borne by individuals who make bad choices, and by a society that feels obligated to help them.

The decision of whether or not to protect individuals against their mistakes therefore presents a dilemma for behavioral economists. The economists of the Chicago school do not face that problem, because rational agents do not make mistakes. For adherents of this school, freedom is free of charge.