Must-reads: January 25, 2016


The corporate savings glut and the economic possibilities of the future

For decades, non-financial corporations were net borrowers from the financial system. If they wanted to hire more workers, expand investment, or acquire another company, they’d have to borrow funds from savers elsewhere in the economy via the financial system. Since 2000, however, the corporate sector has moved from borrowing funds from the rest of the economy to being a net saver. This dramatic transformation, sometimes called the “corporate savings glut,” is something economists and policymakers are still getting a handle on. But if one interpretation of these events is correct, it’s a sign for concern about future economic growth.

In a column last week for The New York Times Magazine, Adam Davidson—also a co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money”—wrote about the tremendous amount of savings U.S. corporations have these days. In total, U.S. corporations are sitting on $1.9 trillion worth of cash. And some of the largest and most-famous companies (Davidson highlights Google, Apple, and General Motors in particular) are holding on to colossal amounts of cash.

This immediately raises the question: “Why?” Davidson runs through a number of potential reasons—such as tax avoidance—and finds pretty much all of them lacking. But looking at specific industries that are rewarded by the stock market for holding onto cash, he finds an optimistic message. He thinks that companies are holding on to more cash as a precautionary measure in order to leap onto the next big idea.

There’s evidence, however, that exactly the opposite is happening. Think about the other side of the increase in net savings by corporations: the slowdown in investment growth. Since the turn of the century, investment has declined as a share of GDP across the advanced economies of the world. So as firms have held onto more cash, they’ve pulled back on investment.

In a working paper, economists Joseph W. Gruber and Steven B. Kamin of the Federal Reserve try to understand what caused this investment pullback. One interpretation of increased corporate savings is that companies are becoming more risk averse—they’re stocking up on cash because they want to strengthen their balance sheets in case a bad time hits. But Gruber and Kamin rule out that explanation: At the same time that firms were pulling back on investment, they were also increasing their payouts to shareholders in the form of share buybacks and dividends. Firms that are concerned about their balance sheets aren’t going to give money away.

Instead, the two economists think the corporate savings glut is a sign that companies are quite pessimistic about the future. They don’t see any feasible investment opportunities around, so they are passing money out to shareholders.

Of course, the increased payouts could also be part of the structure of a financial system that prioritizes immediate payouts over long-term investment. That’s the argument John Jay College economist J.W. Mason makes in his “disgorge the cash” paper. But that’s not an optimistic story either. Regardless of the amount of possible investment opportunities, corporations aren’t seizing them.

A third narrative, and one that doesn’t necessarily conflict with the last two, is that the increasing concentration of industries into oligopolies is increasing the amount of profits corporations can earn these days. Not only are companies sending more money to shareholders, but they are also increasingly using money for mergers and acquisitions. “M&A” activity is up 40 percent from its 2007 pre-recession level, according to analysis by Macquarie reported on by Bloomberg’s Luke Kawa.

So, unfortunately, the corporate savings glut in the United States and abroad may not be a positive sign for the future of the economy. Rather, it may be a sign of decreasing potential economic growth, a finance sector misallocating resources, or the rise of market power among a few corporations. Or some combination of the three. Not exactly a bright vision of the future.

(AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)

Must-read: Diane Coyle (2013): “Learning Economic Lessons from Asia”

Must-Read: Diane Coyle (2013): Learning Economic Lessons from Asia: “Studwell… conclude[s]… successful economic development… follow[s]…

…(1) An initial land reform… family-based labour on small farms has proven a far better footing than greater use of capital equipment at large scale for improving productivity…. In addition, the increased incomes of largely rural populations are vital for growing the domestic market for manufactures…. Land reform is politically difficult… needs to be accompanied by… extension support, rural credit and infrastructure investment.

(2) The next stage is to grow domestic manufacturing… [via] ‘industrial policy’… much subtler than the [mere] use of trade barriers… (i) a willingness to use government funding to support domestic manufacturers until they reached a scale that would make them globally competitive… (ii) opening domestic markets to imports of key inputs for exporters….

(3) The third stage extending the role of financial services, while keeping finance on a short leash…. Any economist who thought globalisation was a turbulent but broadly good thing (this includes me) surely has to accept that there was too much liberalisation of cross-border portfolio flows, and that emerging economies should keep the ability to control these flows in their policy armoury….

It’s a model of tying together historical knowledge, empirical evidence and analysis. It is also a good complement to Justin Yifu Lin’s The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off, which sets out a Chinese policy maker’s perspective…

Must-read: Cardiff Garcia: “China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough”

Cardiff Garcia: China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough: “[My] reaction was to be startled by [Justin Yifu Lin’s] comparison of China’s current position…

…to that of Japan in 1951 and South Korea in 1977…. Japan and Korea started rebalancing and liberalising their economies much later in the process than China did. Distortions… continued to linger for a long time after the rebalancing… the eventual opening is also challenging both in terms of timing and execution…. Japan and Korea are nonetheless held up as success stories of fast catchup growth in living standards. The best account… is Joe Studwell’s How Asia Works — check out Diane Coyle’s summary. Why were Japan and Korea able to pursue this model until per capita living standards were closer to those of rich countries, while China is undergoing this wrenching process so much sooner?…

A note by Credit Suisse economists offers a convincing explanation….

[A]fter growing at a steady pace of around 11% over the decade up until 2001, the pace of real Chinese export growth more than doubled in the period up to the Great Recession…. The problem with an increase in market share is that the adjustment is likely to be a one-off…. For China, this ‘adjustment’ back to a more normal growth model has been made much more difficult by external events and by the sheer size of the Chinese economy…. Despite GDP per capita only increasing to a still-modest 25% of that seen in the US, China now accounts for fully a third of global industrial production (up from only 5% as recently as the 1990s)….When you are that big, it becomes increasingly difficult to grow exports and production at a pace materially faster than growth in final global demand….

Finally… the Great Recession was a tremendous setback to the ultimate objective of more balanced growth…. The main policy mechanism for fighting the slowdown in 2008 and 2009 was a massive increase in investment, which we now know occurred at just the time that the export-driven growth model was breaking down….

The issue is complicated…. Automation… raises the prospect that premature de-industrialisation will be forced on countries who try this strategy anew…. Demographic changes surely also matter…. Still, what I take from the note is that China was just too big (or the world ex-China too small, if you prefer) for the model to ever work as well as it did in Japan and Korea…. That’s not to suggest that China was either right or wrong to follow this particular approach to catchup growth. Given this development strategy’s record in the case of Japan and Korea, maybe it made sense to try. Who can say what a counterfactual approach would have yielded?…

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard et al.: “Inflation and Activity–Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications”

Must-Read: Olivier Blanchard, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence Summers: Inflation and Activity–Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications: “Since the mid-1970s, short-run inflation expectations have become more stable…

…(λ has increased), and… the slope of the Phillips curve (θ) has flattened over time, with nearly all of the decline taking place from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s…. For most countries, the coefficient θ today is not only small, but also statistically insignificant…

Https www imf org external pubs ft wp 2015 wp15230 pdf

Must-read: David Warsh: “Whose ‘Rules?'”

David Warsh (1998): Whose `Rules?’: “For the last year, hardly a week has passed without…

…some bright new book fetching up on my desk promising to explain some aspect of the business dynamics of the new age of information…. In all this stack of books on managing knowledge, intellectual capital, the ecology of information and the like, the single volume most worth reading — and, for many persons having, for it bears consulting again and again — is ‘Information Rules.’…

Shapiro and Varian are professors at the University of California at Berkeley. Shapiro served for a time in Washington, D.C., as deputy assistant attorney general for economics. Varian is dean of Berkeley’s School of Information Management and Systems, an expert on Internet economics and the author of a leading microeconomics text as well.

As they increasingly were drawn into the policy battles of the information age, Shapiro and Varian heard the constant refrain from entrepreneurs, consultants, and journalists: the old rules had been broken; a new set of principles was required to guide business strategy and public policy.

They write in their introduction:

But wait, we said. Have you read the literature on differential pricing, bundling, signalling, licensing, lock-in, or network economics? Have you studied the history of the telephone system or the battles between IBM and the Justice Department?

Our claim: You don’t need a brand-new economics. You just need to see the really cool stuff, the material they didn’t get to when you studied economics.’

And so they wrote their book.

The battle over incompatible standards, for example, is as old as North vs. South in railroad track gauges; between Edison and Westinghouse in electricity. True, the old story had been given some new twists, by Sony vs. Matsushita in videotape players, or 3Com vs. Rockwell and Lucent in modems. The jury is still out on DVD and Divx (both of which play CDs). But same as it ever was, standards wars may end in truce, as with modems; in duopoly, as with video games; or in annihilation of one of the parties, as with videotape players.

The keys to the analysis of networks are the twin concepts of positive feedback and network externalities, the authors say. Neither one is a recent arrival. Network externalities — when the value of a product to one user depends on how many other users there are — have long been recognized as keys to transportation and communications industries.

For example, a handful of telephones will have only limited value. Then positive feedback sets in: as the installed base of telephones grows, more and more users find it worthwhile to tap into the network. Eventually growth levels off, but only after a successful technology has taken over the market. Railroads, highways, electricity grids, television, e-mail: all obey the same basic principles.

‘Information Rules’ has something to say about nearly every aspect of today’s business terrain; it is hard to exaggerate how pervasive is the logic of positive feedback. Among the most interesting chapters are those on recognizing and managing ‘lock-in,’ the widespread situation in which choices today are hemmed in by selections made in the past. The cost of abandoning your Toyota for a Ford may not be great, but just try switching from a Macintosh to a Windows PC.

Savvy marketers, moreover, are trying to raise the switching costs to their customer base, and not just through tricks of engineering, training, and design. Frequent-flier miles are an especially successful device for increasing lock-in, a subtle form of volume discount. Consumer loyalty programs are proliferating everyday as computation power creates ‘synthetic frictions,’ little barriers designed to influence your choice. Those supermarket cards, for example, that gain you sale prices, in return for the windfall of information about your tastes that store owners receive, are a prime example.

The overriding virtue of ‘Information Rules’ is that it is clearly written but deeply grounded in a sense-making discipline that has evolved over a couple hundred years. If you want to know more about the whys and wherefores of ‘Goldilocks’ pricing — if your market doesn’t segment naturally, choose three versions, just like Goldilocks — you are referred to a paper by Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversy (and to the three sizes of peanut butter in your supermarket!). Got a question about the virtues of standardization through committees vs. the market? See the recent work by Joe Farrell and Garth Saloner.

Economics isn’t perfect — far from it. But it has raced ahead in the last 25 years in topics of the greatest concern in industrial organization. This book is the best available introduction to the nuts and bolts of new learning.

Must-read: Robert Skidelsky: “The Optimism Error”

Robert Skidelsky: The Optimism Error: “When a slump threatened… a government could stimulate spending…

…by cutting interest rates and by incurring budget deficits. This was the main point of the Keynesian revolution…. In the 1980s… unemployment prevention became confined to interest-rate policy… by the central bank, not the government. By keeping… inflation constant, the monetary authority could keep unemployment at its ‘natural rate’. This worked quite well for a time, but… the world economy collapsed in 2008. In a panic, the politicians, from Barack Obama to Gordon Brown, took Keynes out of the cupboard, dusted him down, and ‘stimulated’ the economy like mad. When this produced some useful recovery they got cold feet….

Why had the politicians’ nerve failed and what were the consequences? The answer is that in bailing out leading banks and allowing budget deficits to soar, governments had incurred huge debts that threatened their financial credibility. It was claimed that bond yields would rise sharply, adding to the cost of borrowing. This was never plausible in Britain, but bond yield spikes threatened default in Greece and other eurozone countries early in 2010. Long before the stimulus had been allowed to work its magic in restoring economic activity and government revenues, the fiscal engine was put into reverse, and the politics of austerity took over. Yet austerity did not hasten recovery; it delayed it and rendered it limp when it came.

Enter ‘quantitative easing’ (QE). The central bank would flood the banks and pension funds with cash. This, it was expected, would cause the banks to lower their interest rates, lend more and, by way of a so-called wealth effect, cause companies and high-net-worth individuals to consume and invest more. But it didn’t happen. There was a small initial impact, but it soon petered out…. Institutions sat on piles of cash and the wealthy speculated in property. So we reach the present impasse…. Monetary expansion is much less potent than people believed; and using the budget deficit to fight unemployment is ruled out by the bond markets and the Financial Times. The levers either don’t work, or we are not allowed to pull them….

How much recovery has there been in Britain?… The OECD’s most recent estimate of this [output] gap in the UK stands at a negligible -0.017 per cent. We might conclude from this that the British economy is running full steam ahead and that we have, at last, successfully recovered from the crash…. But… although we are producing as much output as we can, our capacity to produce output has fallen…. Growth in output per person in Britain (roughly ‘living standards’) averaged 2.25 per cent per year for the half-century before 2008. Recessions in the past have caused deviations downward from this path, but recoveries had delivered above-trend growth…. This time it was different. The recovery from the financial crisis was the weakest on record, and the result of this is a yawning gap between where we are and where we should have been. Output per head is between 10 and 15 per cent below trend….

Why is it that the recession turned spare capacity into lost capacity? One answer lies in the ugly word ‘hysteresis’…. The recession itself shrinks productive capacity: the economy’s ability to produce output is impaired…. Much of the new private-sector job creation lauded by the Chancellor is… in such low-productivity sectors. The collapse of investment is particularly serious, because investment is the main source of productivity. The challenge for policy is to liquidate the hysteresis – to restore supply. How is this to be done?…

On the monetary front, the bank rate was dropped to near zero; this not being enough, the Bank of England pumped out hundreds of billions of pounds between 2009 and 2012, but too little of the money went into the real economy. As Keynes recognised, it is the spending of money, not the printing of it, which stimulates productive activity, and he warned: ‘If… we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which stimulates the system to activity, we must remind ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the lip.’ That left fiscal policy… deliberately budgeting for a deficit. In Britain, any possible tolerance for a deficit larger than the one automatically caused by a recession was destroyed by fearmongering about unsustainable debt. From 2009 onwards, the difference between Labour and Conservative was about the speed of deficit reduction…. From 2009 onwards the main obstacle to a sensible recovery policy has been the obsession with balancing the national budget…. ‘We must get the deficit down’ has been the refrain of all the parties….

It is right to be concerned about a rising national debt (now roughly £1.6trn). But the way to reverse it is not to cut down the economy, but to cause it to grow in a sustainable way. In many circumstances, that involves deliberately increasing the deficit. This is a paradox too far for most people to grasp. But it makes perfect sense if the increased deficit causes the economy, and thus the government’s revenues, to grow faster than the deficit…. In our present situation, with little spare capacity, the government needs to think much more carefully about what it should be borrowing for. Public finance theory makes a clear distinction between current and capital spending. A sound rule is that governments should cover their current or recurrent spending by taxation, but should borrow for capital spending, that is, investment. This is because current spending gives rise to no government-owned assets, whereas capital spending does. If these assets are productive, they pay for themselves by increasing government earnings, either through user charges or through increased tax revenues. If I pay for all my groceries ‘on tick’ my debt will just go on rising. But if I borrow to invest in, say, my education, my increased earnings will be available to discharge my debt….

Now is an ideal time for the government to be investing in the economy, because it can borrow at such low interest rates. But surely this means increasing the deficit? Yes, it does, but in the same unobjectionable way as a business borrows money to build a plant in the expectation that the investment will pay off. It is because the distinction between current and capital spending has become fuzzy through years of misuse and obfuscation that we have slipped into the state of thinking that all government spending must be balanced by taxes – in the jargon, that net public-sector borrowing should normally be zero. George Osborne has now promised to ‘balance the budget’ – by 2019-20. But within this fiscal straitjacket the only way he can create room for more public investment is to reduce current spending, which in practice means cutting the welfare state.

How can we break this block on capital spending? Several of us have been advocating a publicly owned British Investment Bank. The need for such institutions has long been widely acknowledged in continental Europe and east Asia, partly because they fill a gap in the private investment market, partly because they create an institutional division between investment and current spending. This British Investment Bank, as I envisage it, would be owned by the government, but would be able to borrow a multiple of its subscribed capital to finance investment projects within an approved range. Its remit would include not only energy-saving projects but also others that can contribute to rebalancing the economy – particularly transport infrastructure, social housing and export-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Unfortunately, the conventional view in Britain is that a government-backed bank would be bound, for one reason or another, to ‘pick losers’, and thereby pile up non-performing loans. Like all fundamentalist beliefs, this has little empirical backing….

George Osborne has rejected this route to modernisation. Instead of borrowing to renovate our infrastructure, the Chancellor is trying to get foreign, especially Chinese, companies to do it, even if they are state-owned. Looking at British energy companies and rail franchises, we can see that this is merely the latest in a long history of handing over our national assets to foreign states. Public enterprise is apparently good if it is not British….

Setting up a British Investment Bank with enough borrowing power to make it an effective investment vehicle is the essential first step towards rebuilding supply. Distancing it from politics by giving it a proper remit would create confidence that its projects would be selected on commercial, not political criteria. But this step would not be possible without a different accounting system. The solution would be to make use of comprehensive accounting that appropriately scores increases in net worth of the bank’s assets…

Must-read: Kevin Drum: “Global Warming Went On a Rampage in 2015”

Must-Read: Let the record show that there was never any honest and honorable statistical or smoothing model-based way of extracting global-warming trends that would even hint that there was some kind of “pause” in global warming starting at the very end of the twentieth century:

NewImage NewImage

And let the record show that those I ran across who were claiming that there was such a “pause”–the Tobin Harshaws and the Clifford Assesses and the Tom Campbells and the Steve Levitts and the Steve Dubners and the Russ Robertses the Richard Mullers and the George Wills–ought to be profoundly ashamed of themselves, and would be if they were capable of shame:

Kevin Drum: Global Warming Went On a Rampage in 2015: “Remember that old chestnut, the climate chart that starts in 1998…

…and makes it look like climate change has been on a ‘pause’ ever since? It was always nonsense produced by cherry picking an unusually high starting point, but it was still effective propaganda. But those days are gone for good. Last year was already considerably warmer than 1998, and this year has now blown away everything…. George Will is now going to have to find some other way to lie about global warming. I don’t doubt that he’s up to it, but at least he’ll have to work a little harder.

Must-read: Narayana Kocherlakota: “It’s Time to Make a Hard U-Turn”

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: It’s Time to Make a Hard U-Turn.: “Market-based measures of long-term inflation compensation…

…have fallen persistently and dramatically since mid-2014. This decline means that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)  is confronting a significant risk to its credibility. It must act aggressively in the near-term to eliminate this risk. 

It is true that there are two possible explanations for this decline in market-based measures of long-term compensation. The first explanation is that should be viewed as a transitory phenomenon, due to some mysterious (to me) interaction between the market for inflation-protected TIPS bonds and declining oil prices. The second is that the decline means that market participants believe that the FOMC will be unable or unwilling to keep inflation as high as 2% on a sustainable basis.  This interpretation seems a lot less mysterious to me, since the FOMC continues to tighten policy in the adverse of severe disinflationary headwinds (associated in part with the decline in oil prices). 

There’s no easy way to tell these stories apart in the data.  But this challenge is irrelevant for policymakers.  The first story simply tells policymakers to ignore the decline in longer-term breakevens. Because the first story makes no specific policy recommendation, policymakers can simply ignore the possibility that it is true.  (Things would be different if, for example, the first story argued in favor of tighter monetary policy.)

In contrast, as long we put the slightest weight on the second story of declining credibility being true, it matters considerably for policy.  The FOMC’s tightening cycle is systematically lowering longer-term inflation expectations generally, and especially during future recessions.   The erosion of credibility means that real interest rates will be higher whenever the Fed is at the zero lower bound in the future – and that means lower employment and prices in those times.  (You can start to see the potential for a self-fulfilling trap that has so many so concerned.)

All central bankers agree that, without anchored inflation expectations, a central bank cannot be effective at achieving its price and employment objectives.   That’s why the main mission of a central bank is to keep inflation expectations well-anchored.  The evidence continues to mount that the FOMC is failing at this task. The Committee needs to confront this significant credibility threat by reversing its tightening cycle quickly and decisively.

Graph 5 Year 5 Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate FRED St Louis Fed