Must-read: Tim Duy: “On The Dispersion, Or Lack Thereof, of Economic Weakness”

Must-Read: Tim Duy: On The Dispersion, Or Lack Thereof, of Economic Weakness: “I direct you to my fellow Oregon economist Josh Lehner…

…who correctly notes that in comparison to past recessions, the decline in manufacturing activity is not well-disbursed across the sector…. During a recession, the vast majority of manufacturing industries (or all!) are declining. We are nowhere near that point…. And if manufacturing is not even in recession, it is difficult to see that the US economy [as a whole] is in recession. Or even nearing it…. A recession in Texas does not a US recession make….

Aside from the recession risk, there is another important aspect of Davies’s chart–discounting manufacturing, it indicates growth of just 2% in the US…. I suspect that is the direction we will be heading by the end of the year if not sooner. Key sources of growth, such as autos, multifamily housing, and technology, that helped propel the economy closer to fully employment are likely leveling off. If so, that means the economy is at an inflection point as it transitions back to trend. The Fed expects that process will require addition tightening. The financial markets aren’t so confident.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Review of ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth’ by Robert J. Gordon”

Must-Read: I need to read and then come up with my own informed view of the book that ruled the American Economic Association meeting earlier this month: Robert Gordon’s Rise and Fall of American Growth. But until I do, I am going to steal Larry Summers’s and Paul Krugman’s reviews. Here’s Paul’s:

Paul Krugman: Review of ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth’ by Robert J. Gordon: “Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener’s ‘The Year 2000’ (1967)… offered…

…a systematic list of technological innovations Kahn and Wiener considered ‘very likely in the last third of the 20th century.’ Unfortunately, the two authors were mostly wrong. They didn’t miss much, foreseeing developments that recognizably correspond to all the main elements of the information technology revolution…. But a majority of their predicted innovations (‘individual flying platforms’) hadn’t arrived by 2000 — and still haven’t arrived, a decade and a half later.

The truth is that if you step back from the headlines about the latest gadget, it becomes obvious that we’ve made much less progress since 1970 — and experienced much less alteration in the fundamentals of life — than almost anyone expected. Why? Robert J. Gordon… has been arguing for a long time against the techno-optimism that saturates our culture… has argued that the I.T. revolution is less important than any one of the five Great Inventions that powered economic growth from 1870 to 1970: electricity, urban sanitation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the internal combustion engine and modern communication. In ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth,’ Gordon doubles down on that theme…. Is he right? My answer is a definite maybe. But whether or not you end up agreeing with Gordon’s thesis, this is a book well worth reading….

Techno-optimists… [say] official measures of economic growth understate the real extent of progress, because they don’t fully account for the benefits of truly new goods. Gordon concedes this point, but notes that it was always thus — and that the understatement of progress was probably bigger during the great prewar transformation than it is today…. Gordon suggests that the future is all too likely to be marked by stagnant living standards for most Americans, because the effects of slowing technological progress will be reinforced by a set of ‘headwinds’…. It’s a shocking prediction for a society whose self-image, arguably its very identity, is bound up with the expectation of constant progress. And you have to wonder about the social and political consequences…

Context may be everything when it comes to the Phillips curve

Olivier Blanchard speaks during a press briefing at a hotel in Beijing, China, Tuesday, January 20, 2015. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)

It’s been a few months since we last checked in on the Phillips curve, or the relationship between unemployment and inflation. The curve has been the center of many debates over the course of monetary policy, most recently due to the Federal Reserve’s decision to raise interest rates last month. Fed chair Janet Yellen cited Phillips curve-style thinking in her speech about inflation back in September.

Now, with U.S. wage growth seemingly accelerating over the end of 2015, it’s worth thinking about how the relationship between the strength of the labor market and inflation is holding up.

In a policy brief for the Peterson Institute of International Economics, Olivier Blanchard—senior fellow at the Institute and former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund—looks at the vitality of the Phillips curve in the United States. While he finds that the curve still has a pulse, the unemployment/inflation relationship is decidedly different from the curve’s previous incarnations.

First, the slope of the Phillips curve has declined. This means that inflation will increase less for a given decrease in the unemployment rate. At the same time, inflation expectations have become, in economics-speak, incredibly “well-anchored.” Investors believe quite strongly that U.S. inflation will stay around 2 percent and that the Fed will fight to maintain their (now explicit) target.

This anchoring means the curve resembles its 1960s form where changes in the unemployment rate affect the level of inflation, as opposed to its “accelerationist” form where changes in the unemployment rate affect the change in the inflation rate. To put this finding in the terms that University of Michigan economist Justin Wolfers used this past fall, it means we should be more focused on the level of wage growth than its trend at the moment.

Wage growth, of course, is one of the transmission mechanisms that links lower unemployment to higher inflation. But how much of wage growth gets translated into inflation? Research by Federal Reserve economists Ekaterina V. Peneva and Jeremy B. Rudd finds that wage growth actually doesn’t pass through that much to inflation anymore. This change is easy to see in the following graph (inspired by similar graphs from John Jay College economist J.W. Mason):

The accelerationist Phillips curve relied upon a relatively strong pass-through between wage growth and inflation. But increasing wages don’t have to go entirely toward boosting the inflation rate—higher wage growth might also result in a higher share of income going to labor. J.W. Mason makes this point quite well in another piece on the Phillips curve, or rather the varieties of the curve. Whether the increasing wage growth will go more toward inflation or a higher labor share of income, however, isn’t obvious from a theoretical perspective. In fact, the context of the increasing wage growth seems to make quite a bit of difference.

Given the declining share of income going to labor and the high share of income going to profits, perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that wage increases aren’t filtering on to accelerating inflation. The economic situation has changed quite a bit. Stronger wage growth today may do more to increase the labor share of income than spark inflation. And as Mason points out, wage growth that exceeds inflation and productivity growth would result in pushing income more toward wage earners.

Given the times, accelerating wage growth seems unlikely to spark accelerating inflation anytime soon. But if we give it more time, it may help reduce one form of inequality.

Nick Bunker is a Policy Analyst at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

 

Must-reads: January 26, 2016


Today’s economic history: Jeff Weintraub on Adam Smith’s conceptual sleight-of-hand

Jeff Weintraub (2013): Adam Smith’s conceptual sleight-of-hand on exchange, cooperation, and the foundations of social order: “This was a response to one section of a post by Brad DeLong containing Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox…

…The first snippet in this compilation.. posed the question ‘Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?’ and followed that with a justly famous quotation from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations…. Brad’s question zeroed in on some crucial issues. I was provoked to start writing a message… I thought would run a few lines… but it turned out to be a little longer, so I might as well share it.

Hi Brad,

Your post with ‘Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox’ for Econ 210a Spring 2014 (‘Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?’) begins by quoting one of Smith’s most theoretically important passages in The Wealth of Nations. That passage (from the second chapter in Book I of WN) also contains one of Smith’s most impressive, and cleverly deceptive, bits of conceptual and rhetorical sleight-of-hand. Too many readers, including quite sophisticated ones, uncritically accept this conceptual sleight-of-hand and take it at face value. Perhaps even Brad DeLong is one of them?  I notice that you actually collude in the deception (no doubt unintentionally) by selectively quoting from that passage.

Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog…. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilised society he stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons….

[Hum]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love….

Let’s start with those dogs, since that’s where the deceptive argumentation begins, and a more careful examination of what Smith says about dogs already begins to undermine his carefully constructed dichotomy.  Sure, it’s probably true that nobody ever saw two dogs exchange bones of equivalent value.  (Why would they want to do that?)  But so what?  That point is just a distraction from the real question.  The central agenda of this passage is to argue that the only two ways to get help or assistance from someone else are (a) self-interested exchange or (b) an appeal to their ‘benevolence’ by begging and ‘fawning’.  Let’s forget humans for a moment. Is that second option the only way dogs ever do it?  

Smith wants us to think the answer is yes, but the answer is obviously no.  To see why, we should pay attention to what happens in the three sentences immediately preceding the quotation.  Smith, in effect, denies that dogs (and presumably other canine species) hunt in packs. If you think I’m making that up, go back and re-read the relevant sentences.

Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert.  Each turns her toward his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her toward himself.  This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time.

No, dogs don’t trade one bone for another. But dogs and other animals definitely do cooperate (not just in pairs, but in packs) in obtaining things they could not obtain, or achieving things they could not achieve, as individuals. In the process of cooperation, they help each other out.  And they regularly do so in ways that do not involve market exchange (or servile fawning).

It’s probably correct to say that two dogs pursuing a hare together haven’t made a ‘contract’ (that would depend, in part, on precisely what Smith means by ‘contract’ here). But is that logically equivalent to claiming, as Smith implies by a cunning conceptual slide, that the two dogs aren’t really acting in ‘concert’? A moment’s reflection should be sufficient to make the answer embarrassingly obvious. In the real world, dogs—and other animals—frequently act in concert.

OK, perhaps Smith didn’t know dogs that well.  (Actually, I suspect that’s not so, but let’s just concede the possibility.)  But humans can hunt in packs, too, and do lots of other things in packs. Humans act in concert all the time, in ways that are not based on trucking and bartering. That may seem like an obvious fact, once it’s pointed out … but a major purpose of Smith’s discussion in the first several pages of that chapter is to obscure the theoretical significance of this obvious fact.

Why would Smith want to obscure that conceptual point?

We don’t need to try to read Smith’s mind, but we do know that Smith is a careful analytical system-builder and a writer of great rhetorical skill and sophistication.  (His writings on rhetoric are justly admired.)  And one can’t help noticing that obscuring, or evading, that conceptual point serves a useful function in helping Smith lay the foundations for his core theoretical argument in WN.

As I’ve already noted, Smith tries hard to convey the impression that the only significant basis for sustained mutually beneficial interaction between individuals is self-interested exchange, which on the one side is rooted in certain basic impulses or motivations built into human nature (self-interest + the impulse to exchange), and on the other side gives rise (unintentionally but intelligibly) to a dynamic system of self-interested exchange (the market) with its own distinctive laws & dynamics. Smith further wants to suggest that the only possible alternative basis for (intermittent) mutual aid or beneficial interaction is gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or (to use a later, 19th-century, word) altruism.

But that’s a false dichotomy, since it implicitly rules out other bases for concerted action and mutually beneficial interaction that do, indeed, play significant roles in real life.

What am I getting at? Well, let’s review the first sentence from the second paragraph you quoted:

[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.

Yes, man (or human) does have constant needs for coordinated action, mutually beneficial interaction, and assistance from others. (So do wolves.) And it’s true that gratuitous altruism or ‘benevolence’ cannot serve as the only basis for them, quite aside from the fact that constantly wheedling other people for favors or handouts is demeaning. But are those really the only two alternatives? No, of course not. This is a cleverly constructed, and rhetorically effective, false dichotomy.

Let me step back and point out that, in the most basic analytical terms, there are at least three ways to achieve sustained coordination of human actions—even if we just ignore ‘benevolence’ for the moment.  (I emphasize ‘at least’ because this isn’t meant to be a comprehensive or fully systematic typology, just something sufficient to begin moving beyond that false dichotomy.)

(1)  One obvious possibility is top-down command, or what we might euphemistically term ‘imperative coordination’ (to use Parsons’s idiosyncratic and somewhat bowdlerizing translation of Weber’s Herrschaft). And in fact this mode of coordination turns up right in Chapter 1 of Book I of WN, since that is precisely how the the division of labor within the famous pin factory is instituted and run. Yes, the rest of WN goes on to show how it is possible to have an effective division of labor (i.e., dynamic systems of simultaneous differentiation and coordination) without the necessity for conscious top-down coordination based on command—i.e., a division of labor can be coordinated by the impersonal system of the self-regulating market—and that’s a brilliant and profound theoretical achievement. But we shouldn’t forget that domination or authority plays a role in social and economic life, too. And, to repeat, the coordination of action within Smith’s pin factory (or any other formal organization) is not based, in principle, on either gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or the self-interested exchange of commodities.

(Marx, of course, hammers that point home with his analysis of the two complementary forms of the division of labor in the capitalist mode of production, and brilliantly spells out some of the implications.)

(2)  A second possible mode of coordinating human action is through the market—i.e., an impersonal, dynamic, and self-regulating system of self-interested exchange. Let’s be conceptually clear and precise here. Smith’s point about how the market operates as a system is that it allows tens, thousands, or millions of people to be connected in chains of mutually beneficial interaction without having to consciously coordinate their actions or reach agreements about them, without having to care about what those other people need or want, without even knowing they exist. In so far as those millions of mutual strangers ‘cooperate’ in the market system, that ‘cooperation’ is purely functional and metaphorical. In fact, the beauty of the market is precisely that it allows for systematic and beneficial coordination without the need for either conscious cooperation or conscious top-down ‘imperative coordination’ (i.e., domination).

(3) But that brings us to a third possible mode of coordinating human action, which is conscious cooperation. Humans can sometimes manage to pursue joint or common ends, not through the indirect mechanisms of self-interested exchange of commodities, nor by simultaneously submitting to a common superior who directs and coordinates their actions (the Hobbesian solution), but by engaging in concerted action guided by common agreement, custom, habituation, etc.. Not only can humans do it, even dogs and wolves can do it—despite what Smith’s second paragraph in Chapter 2 of Book I of WN might seem to imply.

Conscious cooperation, by the way, is not identical to gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or altruism. It may draw on emotions of fellow-feeling or solidarity (those frequently help), but it may also entail quite hard-headed calculations of material advantage and instrumental rationality. But the point is that, in this context, the interests of the participants can be pursued, not through exchange, but through actual (not virtual) cooperation. Furthermore, humans sometimes manage to build up complex systems for enabling large-scale and sophisticated forms of cooperation, including institutional mechanisms for collective deliberation and decision-making, representation, etc.

(In the real world, many human practices and institutions involve more or less complex mixtures of elements from more than one of those categories, or even from all three. But for the sake of conceptual clarity, and to avoid the typical conceptual obfuscations, it’s useful to begin by laying out those ideal-typical analytical distinctions sharply. To pretend, or imply, or even tacitly insinuate that option #2 is the only way to coordinate human activity in sustained and beneficial ways—and that the only conceivable alternative is gratuitous ‘benevolence’—is self-evidently wrong.)

And as long as we’re on the subject of the tacit exclusions underlying Smith’s foundational false dichotomy, let me mention just one more factor. Smith suggests in the passage you quoted that if we want someone else to do something that might be necessary or beneficial for us, there are two kinds of motivation, and only two kinds of motivation, that we might appeal to. We can appeal either to their individual self-interest or to their disinterested benevolence. Well, in the real world, we often make claims or recommendations, or have expectations that we regard as sensible and legitimate, based on people’s obligations (moral, legal, customary, religious, or whatever). Obligations are not individual psychological characteristics, but socially structured norms, and they are not simply reducible to motivations of generalized ‘benevolence’ or of the calculation of individual self-interest. (Of course, some people might want to argue for reducing them to the latter—those would be the kinds of ‘rational actor’ obsessives who would tautologically reduce everything to calculations of individual self-interest—but I don’t think I need to spell out to you the reasons why that won’t work.  Life is more complicated than that.) Also, it so happens that systems of obligation are of fundamental importance in shaping and coordinating all modes and areas of human social life, from what Smith calls the ‘early and rude state of society’ up to the present. (I suppose that’s a Durkheimian point, though it might also be treated as Burkean or Polanyian.)

=> OK, I could go on … but that should be sufficient to get the main points across.

Smith might well want to argue that coordinating human action through the market, based on the motivations and practices of self-interested exchange (and their indirect and unintended consequences), is (generally speaking, and all things being equal) better and more efficient than coordinating human action through domination, conscious cooperation, obligation, etc. Elsewhere in WN Smith does, in effect, make arguments along those lines.  And one could certainly find strong and plausible grounds for them (though I confess to having a soft spot for conscious coordination, where it’s practicable).

However, such arguments would be different from the explicit argument that Smith actually does make in the passage you quoted—i.e., that the only significant basis for the sustained and mutually beneficial coordination of human action is self-interested market exchange … and that the only conceivable alternative would be the throw-away residual category of gratuitous ‘benevolence’ (which present-day mainstream economists usually shove into the even-more-grab-bag residual category of ‘altruism’). The argument that Smith actually makes there is incorrect, is based on an obvious false dichotomy … and has proved to be a brilliantly successful and convincing piece of rhetorical and conceptual sleight-of hand. We should admire the brilliance, but we shouldn’t be taken in.

=> Nor is this a peripheral or merely technical point. One of the central arguments that runs through and structures Smith’s whole discussion in Books I-II of WN is that the market (based on the built-in human motivations and ‘natural’ practices of self-interested exchange) is not just one important basis of social order, but is the fundamental basis of social order (and of the main tendencies of long-term socio-historical development). That’s what it means to treat ‘exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society’.

Again, that’s a brilliant, powerful, and fascinating theoretical argument. But it’s wrong… and swallowing it uncritically has led many very intelligent people astray.

Yours for theory,
Jeff Weintraub

Must-read: Martin Sandbu: “Ask the big question on central banking”

Must-Read: Martin Sandbu: Ask the big question on central banking: “Mervyn King and Goodfriend… the controversial decision by the Riksbank to raise interest rates…

…We will not adjudicate whether the decision was ‘not unreasonable’, as King and Goodfriend claim, beyond noting that every rich-country central bank that raised rates early in the recovery (that includes not just Sweden, but Israel, Norway, Denmark, and the eurozone) had to lower it significantly later. For more on this point, read Andrew Haldane’s speech from last year on the challenges of being stuck at low interest rates…

Must-read: David Glasner: “The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet”

Must-Read: If you think that there is one chance in ten that the sky is falling with respect to the development of deflationary expectations, then you conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish that chance.

If you also think that there is one chance in two that in two years an inflationary spiral will have clearly begun… then you also conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish the chance of deflation, for there is plenty of policy time and policy space, plenty of sea room, to curb aggregate demand in the future should it attempt to blow us out to sea.

But there is next to no sea room and next to no policy space to boost aggregate demand if needed, for we are on a lea shore right now.

I am kinda thinking these days that only yachtsmen and yachtswomen should be allowed to hold central-banking policy jobs…

David Glasner: The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet: “The 2008 crisis. was caused by an FOMC that was so focused on the threat of inflation…

…that they ignored ample and obvious signs of a rapidly deteriorating economy and falling inflation expectations, foolishly interpreting the plunge in TIPS spreads and the appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies as an expression by the markets of confidence in Fed policy rather than as a cry for help. In 2008 the Fed at least had the excuse of rising energy prices and headline inflation….

This time, despite failing for over three years to meet its now official 2% inflation target, Dr. Yellen and her FOMC colleagues show no sign of thinking about anything other than when they can show their mettle as central bankers by raising interest rates again…. [But] Dr. Yellen’s problem is now to show that her top–indeed her only–priority is to ensure that the Fed’s 2% inflation target will be met, or, if need be, exceeded, in 2016 and that the growth in nominal income in 2016 will be at least as large as it was in 2015. Those are goals that are eminently achievable, and if the FOMC has any credibility left after its recent failures, providing such assurance will prevent another unnecessary and destructive financial crisis…

Must-read: Lars Svensson: “Two serious mistakes in the Goodfriend and King review of Riksbank monetary policy”

Must-Read: Is it really the case that Goodfriend and King never asked Svensson whether his dissents and calls for lower rates were statements about the direction in which policy tools should move or statements about what the optimal value of policy tools should be? If they never asked him, that seems to me to be quite unprofessional. If they did ask him, then it seems there was, somewhere along the way, a major failure to communicate:

Lars E.O. Svensson: Two serious mistakes in the Goodfriend and King review of Riksbank monetary policy: “Marvin Goodfriend and Mervyn King presented their review of the Riksbank’s monetary policy 2010-2015 on January 19….

…They unfortunately start their evaluation by making two serious mistakes…. When finding the Riskbanks response… ‘not unreasonable’, Goodfriend and King… confuse rates of change and levels…. GDP and exports had started to grow in 2010 (although the year-over-year growth rates in quarter 1 of 2010 were not exceptionally high, 2.9% for GDP and 4.2% for export). However, the more important levels were not high but quite low…. The unemployment rate, a more reliable indicator of slack in the economy, was about 9%… making the unemployment gap about 2.5%. To start a rate hike from 0.25% to 2% in such a situation, with large slack in the economy and inflation not far from its target, is definitely not reasonable…. Just stating that the Riksbank rate hike was ‘not unreasonable,’ ignoring the actual GDP and export level data as well as the unemployment rate known at the time, and not providing a thorough evaluation of the hike, is a first serious mistake….

A second serious mistake of Goodfriend and King [is] to state that the rate hikes were ‘broadly accepted by all members’…. I know for sure that I did not share the view, and this is evidenced in my November 2010 speech and repeatedly in the minutes…. I instead advocated a major redirection of policy. One may also note the headline ‘Disaster path’ (‘Katastrofbana’) on the front page of the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet on September 27, 2010. This referred to my warning about the dire consequences of the majority’s high policy-rate path in an interview (in Swedish) in the newspaper that day. The headline and interview hardly indicates that I ‘broadly accepted’ the rate hikes. As evidence supporting their conclusion, Goodfriend and King state….

The dissenters on the Executive Board never voted for a level of the current repo rate more than one quarter of a percentage point below that actually set by the majority….

A vote for a slightly lower rate than that adopted by the majority cannot subsequently be used as evidence that a dissenter did not believe that a very different repo rate was optimal…. The repo rate… I voted for was only the first step in the right direction towards an approximately optimal rate and path; it was not a complete step to such a rate and path…. I advocated a stepwise procedure towards a rate and path that would eventually make the corresponding forecasts for inflation and unemployment ‘look good’. Unfortunately, I never gained a majority for even the first step…. Voting for a rate of 1.25% or 2% didn’t mean that it was the best rate, but that it was better than 1.5% and 2.25%, and a first step to a much lower rate…

Must-read: John Plender: “Capitalists Excel at Giving Themselves a Bad Name”

Must-Read: (1) Cecil Rhodes stole a lot of stuff. (2) Cecil Rhodes got a lot of people dead. (3) Cecil Rhodes built a lot of stuff. (4) Cecil Rhodes tried hard to spend his money to create a peaceful, united, trading world in which people of different countries understood each other–and (5) understood that people of British culture and British race were boss.

It’s fine to celebrate (4). And it’s good to actually spend the pile of money that derives from Cecil Rhodes on (4). But if you want to have a big statue of Rhodes hanging around, shouldn’t it be part of an exhibit that also notes his role in (1), (2), (3), and (5), and puts it all in its proper place?

Monticello these days, I think, does that, and does that properly. Can Oriel College say that it does that? Does Plender have any constructive ideas as to how to do that? And is he willing to head up a fund-raising campaign?

John Plender: Capitalists Excel at Giving Themselves a Bad Name: “Oxford’s dilemma is indicative of how the system can create wealth but often in ways that offend…

…Cecil Rhodes, alas. Or so the governing body of Oriel College, Oxford, must feel as it confronts demands from the student-led Rhodes Must Fall movement…. Rhodes was, of course, a rampant colonialist, unprincipled mining entrepreneur and conspicuous racist. He also happened to establish the Rhodes scholarships to facilitate the celebrated international study programme at Oxford…. Back then I took for granted that the kind of people who endowed Oxbridge colleges were likely to be rich but noxious. Today I rationalise it less casually. Rhodes epitomises the paradoxical nature of capitalism. The genius of the system is that it has an extraordinary capacity for creating wealth and raising living standards. Yet it often does so in ways that many find morally offensive. The difficulty concerns the centrality of the money motive — greed, in a word — in driving economic growth….

There is, in the moral economy of entrepreneurship, a spectrum. At one extreme are those like the robber barons of the American gilded age, such as John D Rockefeller, JP Morgan and Henry Clay Frick…. These were exceptionally nasty men. Their career model consisted of a no holds barred, preferably monopolistic, money grab until old age when they atoned for their misdeeds through spectacular philanthropic largesse…. At the other end of the spectrum were such high-minded model employers as Matthew Boulton, the nonconformist steam entrepreneur who, among other things, pioneered workers’ insurance at the start of the industrial revolution…. The distinctive feature of the assault on Rhodes is that the outrage is retrospective. The question is where such retrospection leads. Should we now spurn the sculptures of Periclean Athens on the basis that its democracy was supported by slavery? And what to do about statues of Thomas Jefferson, owner of numerous slaves?…