Note to Self: Regulatory Uncertainty and Housing Finance

The U.S. Treasury seized Fannie and Freddie in 2008, and said that housing finance would be differently organized in the future.

Private Residential Fixed Investment FRED St Louis Fed

It is now more than eight years later. There is still no plan for how housing finance is going to be different. Would you make a thirty-year fixed nominal rate loan to anyone in such an environment?

I think it is a miracle that Wells Fargo is willing to make mortgage loans.

I think that U.S. residential investment is one place where regulatory uncertainty may genuinely be having massive effects. We now have had nine years of seriously depressed residential construction–nine years’ worth of household formation of pent up demand. And yet U.S. residential construction continues to be substantially subnormal. Housing prices have recovered to 2004 mid-boom levels. Yet construction has not.

Some Questions About Low Investment, to Some of Which I Have Half-Adequate Answers…

Gross Private Domestic Investment FRED St Louis Fed

I think the big part of the story is that the investment accelerator is a big thing, even though our models say it should not. Businesses do wait to invest until they are running flat out to invest. It’s a puzzle why they do this–they ought to act like the foresighted agents in our models, shouldn’t they?

I think a large part of the rest of the story of depressed investment is the growth of radical uncertainty. We used to see one 40% real collapse in the value of an important asset class every generation.

Now we have seen three in a decade.

Call it radical uncertainty, call it the collapse of risk tolerance, call it moral hazard in the credit channel’s ability to do the risk transformation as nobody will believe that investment banks produce AAA assets rather than sell you unhedged puts–the failure to satisfactorily mobilize the collective risk bearing capacity of the world to support risky investment is one of the biggest financial stories of the past decade. You look at the bonds of exorbitant privilege possessing reserve currency sovereigns and at the U.S. equity yield hanging up there at 5% real, and we have an equity return premium of the magnitude of the immediate post-WWII years and not seen since.

For residential investment, of course, we have to add regulatory uncertainty. Would you sell thirty-year fixed-rate nominal callable loans when there was no plan for how the mortgage finance GSEs will operate in a decade?

Private Residential Fixed Investment FRED St Louis Fed

Questions to which I do not have any good answers:
Why is it that capital is so very expensive for risky businesses and so cheap for the exorbitant privilege possessing reserve currency sovereigns? How much do we dare ask those sovereigns to take over the business of boosting investment globally via infrastructure for the next decade or so?

Gross Private Domestic Investment Fixed Investment Nonresidential Equipment FRED St Louis Fed

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Don’t Give Up on Equality of Opportunity

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Don’t Give Up on Equality of Opportunity: “The purpose of an ideal of equality isn’t to serve as a blueprint for the creation of a utopia…

…but to nudge us in the direction of policies that will make society feel more fair. And it’s here that I think equality of opportunity shines. What the focus on opportunity has consistently led to is prioritizing children… more resources have been devoted to education, child-care assistance and childhood health. This has been good, because children’s mental and emotional plasticity means that their lives can be improved a lot with early intervention. Universal public education is one of government’s greatest successes, and it’s an institution that has been adopted in almost every society. Public health is certainly another. Nowadays, the emphasis on child care has led to policies like paid parental leave, which other developed countries have already adopted. Equality of opportunity also entails more government investment, instead of consumption…. Redistribution is important. But during the last two centuries, government has been at its most effective when it concentrated on investment and on children. Medicare and Social Security Disability payments have eased the suffering of many poor, elderly and ill people. But schools, roads, electrical grids, public health and research transformed the country…. Thus, let’s hold on to the notion of equality of opportunity. For all its faults, it has been very good at keeping the country pointed in the right policy directions.

Must-read: Nick Bunker: How concerned should we be about business investment and productivity growth?

Must-Read: Non-residential investment is not that low given the low-pressure economy. In fact, on some measures, business equipment and structures investment is relatively high.

FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

It’s residential investment and productivity growth that appear to me to be disappointingly low. The first is due, in some part at least, to administrative malpractice on the part of the Obama Treasury. The second is a puzzle , for it is a lot lower than could be plausibly accounted for by lower business investment…

Nick Bunker: How concerned should we be about business investment and productivity growth? – Equitable Growth: “The changes in business behavior in recent decades…

…are factors in the recent slowdown in productivity growth. But how concerned should we be about these trends? Are they cyclical problems that will soon be corrected? Or are they deeper structural changes we should grapple with more?… Jason Furman… provide[s] a good starting point…. He points out that since 2010 the decline in labor productivity growth in the United States has been driven mostly by a… slowdown in business investment…. How do we boost business investment?… [The] ‘accelerator’ view of the slowdown makes sense…. What are firms doing with all these profits they’re earning and not investing, then? The data show that a large chunk of these profits are being distributed to shareholders in the form of increased dividends and stock buybacks…. Declining business investment and dynamism, insomuch as they are affecting productivity growth, should concern policymakers and everyday Americans. Stronger productivity is a necessary requirement for higher living standards…

Must-read: Laura Tyson: “Closing the Investment Gap”

Must-Read: Investment has been weak because demand growth has been weak–and because the residential-investment credit channel broke in 2007, and neither Barack Obama nor Tim Geithner nor Jack Lew nor Ed de Marco nor Mel Watt nor any congressional coalition has taken any steps to fix it.

This is a very important channel for “hysteresis”–especially if, like me, you believe in powerful external benefits from investment, especially equipment investment:

Laura Tyson: Closing the Investment Gap: “BERKELEY – The weakness of private investment in the United States and other advanced economies is… worrisome… perplexing…

…Through 2014, private investment declined by an average of 25% compared to pre-crisis trends.
The shortfall in investment has been deep and broad-based, affecting not only residential investment but also investment in equipment and structures. Business investment remains significantly below pre-2008 expectations, and has been hit hard again in the US during the last year by the collapse of energy-sector investment in response to the steep drop in oil prices….

The investment shortfall in the US coincides with a strong rebound in returns to capital. By one measure, returns to private capital are now at a higher point than any time in recent decades. But extensive empirical research confirms that at the macro level, business investment depends primarily on expected future demand and output growth, not on current returns or retained earnings. According to the IMF, this ‘accelerator’ theory of investment explains most of the weakness of business investment in the developed economies since the 2008 crisis. In accordance with this explanation, investment growth in the US has been in line with its usual historical relationship with output growth. In short, private investment growth has been weak primarily because the pace of recovery has been anemic….

As the accelerator theory of investment would predict, much R&D investment is occurring in technology-intensive sectors where current and future expected demand has been strong. There is also evidence that the distribution of returns to capital is becoming increasingly skewed toward these sectors…

Must-read: Robert Skidelsky: “The Optimism Error”

Robert Skidelsky: The Optimism Error: “When a slump threatened… a government could stimulate spending…

…by cutting interest rates and by incurring budget deficits. This was the main point of the Keynesian revolution…. In the 1980s… unemployment prevention became confined to interest-rate policy… by the central bank, not the government. By keeping… inflation constant, the monetary authority could keep unemployment at its ‘natural rate’. This worked quite well for a time, but… the world economy collapsed in 2008. In a panic, the politicians, from Barack Obama to Gordon Brown, took Keynes out of the cupboard, dusted him down, and ‘stimulated’ the economy like mad. When this produced some useful recovery they got cold feet….

Why had the politicians’ nerve failed and what were the consequences? The answer is that in bailing out leading banks and allowing budget deficits to soar, governments had incurred huge debts that threatened their financial credibility. It was claimed that bond yields would rise sharply, adding to the cost of borrowing. This was never plausible in Britain, but bond yield spikes threatened default in Greece and other eurozone countries early in 2010. Long before the stimulus had been allowed to work its magic in restoring economic activity and government revenues, the fiscal engine was put into reverse, and the politics of austerity took over. Yet austerity did not hasten recovery; it delayed it and rendered it limp when it came.

Enter ‘quantitative easing’ (QE). The central bank would flood the banks and pension funds with cash. This, it was expected, would cause the banks to lower their interest rates, lend more and, by way of a so-called wealth effect, cause companies and high-net-worth individuals to consume and invest more. But it didn’t happen. There was a small initial impact, but it soon petered out…. Institutions sat on piles of cash and the wealthy speculated in property. So we reach the present impasse…. Monetary expansion is much less potent than people believed; and using the budget deficit to fight unemployment is ruled out by the bond markets and the Financial Times. The levers either don’t work, or we are not allowed to pull them….

How much recovery has there been in Britain?… The OECD’s most recent estimate of this [output] gap in the UK stands at a negligible -0.017 per cent. We might conclude from this that the British economy is running full steam ahead and that we have, at last, successfully recovered from the crash…. But… although we are producing as much output as we can, our capacity to produce output has fallen…. Growth in output per person in Britain (roughly ‘living standards’) averaged 2.25 per cent per year for the half-century before 2008. Recessions in the past have caused deviations downward from this path, but recoveries had delivered above-trend growth…. This time it was different. The recovery from the financial crisis was the weakest on record, and the result of this is a yawning gap between where we are and where we should have been. Output per head is between 10 and 15 per cent below trend….

Why is it that the recession turned spare capacity into lost capacity? One answer lies in the ugly word ‘hysteresis’…. The recession itself shrinks productive capacity: the economy’s ability to produce output is impaired…. Much of the new private-sector job creation lauded by the Chancellor is… in such low-productivity sectors. The collapse of investment is particularly serious, because investment is the main source of productivity. The challenge for policy is to liquidate the hysteresis – to restore supply. How is this to be done?…

On the monetary front, the bank rate was dropped to near zero; this not being enough, the Bank of England pumped out hundreds of billions of pounds between 2009 and 2012, but too little of the money went into the real economy. As Keynes recognised, it is the spending of money, not the printing of it, which stimulates productive activity, and he warned: ‘If… we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which stimulates the system to activity, we must remind ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the lip.’ That left fiscal policy… deliberately budgeting for a deficit. In Britain, any possible tolerance for a deficit larger than the one automatically caused by a recession was destroyed by fearmongering about unsustainable debt. From 2009 onwards, the difference between Labour and Conservative was about the speed of deficit reduction…. From 2009 onwards the main obstacle to a sensible recovery policy has been the obsession with balancing the national budget…. ‘We must get the deficit down’ has been the refrain of all the parties….

It is right to be concerned about a rising national debt (now roughly £1.6trn). But the way to reverse it is not to cut down the economy, but to cause it to grow in a sustainable way. In many circumstances, that involves deliberately increasing the deficit. This is a paradox too far for most people to grasp. But it makes perfect sense if the increased deficit causes the economy, and thus the government’s revenues, to grow faster than the deficit…. In our present situation, with little spare capacity, the government needs to think much more carefully about what it should be borrowing for. Public finance theory makes a clear distinction between current and capital spending. A sound rule is that governments should cover their current or recurrent spending by taxation, but should borrow for capital spending, that is, investment. This is because current spending gives rise to no government-owned assets, whereas capital spending does. If these assets are productive, they pay for themselves by increasing government earnings, either through user charges or through increased tax revenues. If I pay for all my groceries ‘on tick’ my debt will just go on rising. But if I borrow to invest in, say, my education, my increased earnings will be available to discharge my debt….

Now is an ideal time for the government to be investing in the economy, because it can borrow at such low interest rates. But surely this means increasing the deficit? Yes, it does, but in the same unobjectionable way as a business borrows money to build a plant in the expectation that the investment will pay off. It is because the distinction between current and capital spending has become fuzzy through years of misuse and obfuscation that we have slipped into the state of thinking that all government spending must be balanced by taxes – in the jargon, that net public-sector borrowing should normally be zero. George Osborne has now promised to ‘balance the budget’ – by 2019-20. But within this fiscal straitjacket the only way he can create room for more public investment is to reduce current spending, which in practice means cutting the welfare state.

How can we break this block on capital spending? Several of us have been advocating a publicly owned British Investment Bank. The need for such institutions has long been widely acknowledged in continental Europe and east Asia, partly because they fill a gap in the private investment market, partly because they create an institutional division between investment and current spending. This British Investment Bank, as I envisage it, would be owned by the government, but would be able to borrow a multiple of its subscribed capital to finance investment projects within an approved range. Its remit would include not only energy-saving projects but also others that can contribute to rebalancing the economy – particularly transport infrastructure, social housing and export-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Unfortunately, the conventional view in Britain is that a government-backed bank would be bound, for one reason or another, to ‘pick losers’, and thereby pile up non-performing loans. Like all fundamentalist beliefs, this has little empirical backing….

George Osborne has rejected this route to modernisation. Instead of borrowing to renovate our infrastructure, the Chancellor is trying to get foreign, especially Chinese, companies to do it, even if they are state-owned. Looking at British energy companies and rail franchises, we can see that this is merely the latest in a long history of handing over our national assets to foreign states. Public enterprise is apparently good if it is not British….

Setting up a British Investment Bank with enough borrowing power to make it an effective investment vehicle is the essential first step towards rebuilding supply. Distancing it from politics by giving it a proper remit would create confidence that its projects would be selected on commercial, not political criteria. But this step would not be possible without a different accounting system. The solution would be to make use of comprehensive accounting that appropriately scores increases in net worth of the bank’s assets…

Must-read: Danny Yagan: “Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut”

Must-Read: Danny Yagan: Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut: “This paper tests whether the 2003 dividend tax cut…

…stimulated corporate investment and increased labor earnings, using a quasi-experimental design and US corporate tax returns from years 1996–2008. I estimate that the tax cut caused zero change in corporate investment and employee compensation…. The statistical precision challenges leading estimates of the cost-of-capital elasticity of investment, or undermines models in which dividend tax reforms affect the cost of capital…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Investment Accelerator and the Woes of the World

Must-Read: I must say, I want to go back to Larry Summers’s and my discussants for our 2012 paper, and ask them whether they want to amend their remarks, or whether they still stand by them.

Valerie Ramey: Do you still believe that any valid inferences can be made about long-run properties from AR models that match the first several autocorrelations? And do you still believe that the rate of long-run potential output growth is invariant to whether the short-run sees depression or boom?

Marty Feldstein: Do you still believe that a downturn like the one that began in 2008 is “cleansing” and leads potential output onto a higher growth path in the long run?

Paul Krugman: The Investment Accelerator and the Woes of the World: “Jason Furman… refuting the ‘Ma! He’s looking at me funny!’ school…

…which attributes US economic weakness to the way the Obama administration has created uncertainty, or hurt businessmen’s feelings, or something…. It’s a global slowdown, very much consistent with the ‘accelerator’ model, in which the level of investment demand depends on the rate of growth of overall demand…. If weak demand leads to lower investment, which it does, and if fiscal austerity is contractionary, which it is, then in a depressed economy deficit spending… crowds investment in…. Austerity policies [then] don’t release resources for private investment… [but] reduce future capacity in addition to causing present pain, [while] stimulus… supports, not hinders, long-run growth…

And let me say two further things to Jason Furman:

  1. Housing: the failure of the Obama administration to do anything to set the pattern of housing finance in stone may well be boosting uncertainty, and retarding investment in housing

  2. Investment and interest rates: If you are unhappy with a Federal Reserve that thinks that investment is growing too rapidly and needs to be cooled-off with interest rate increases, there is, on January 4, 2017, a recess of the Congress, during which recess appointments can be made.