The melting-away of North Atlantic social democracy

This has been available in full exclusively at the magnificent and well worth subscribing-to Talking Points Memo.

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But now let me let it out into the wild here–and promise to imminently (well, maybe in a month…) write about the whole symposium of which it is a part:

The Melting Away of North Atlantic Social Democracy: Hotshot French economist Thomas Piketty, of the Paris School of Economics, looked at the major democracies with North Atlantic coastlines over the past couple of centuries. He saw five striking facts:

  • First, ownership of private wealth—with its power to command resources, dictate where and how people would work, and shape politics—was always highly concentrated.
  • Second, 150 years—six generations—ago, the ratio of a country’s total private wealth to its total annual income was about six.
  • Third, 50 years—two generations—ago, that capital-income ratio was about three.
  • Fourth, over the past two generations that capital-income ratio has been rising rapidly.
  • Fifth, the flow of income to the owner of the dollar capital did not rise when capital was relatively scarce, but plodded along at a typical net rate of profit of about 5% per year generation after generation.

He wondered what these facts predicted for the shape of the major North Atlantic economies in the 21st century. And so he wrote a big book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that was published last year.

It has been a surprise bestseller. Thomas Piketty’s English-language translator, Art Goldhammer, reports that there are now 2.2 million copies in print and e-book form in 30 different languages scattered around the globe.

Piketty’s big surprise best-selling book has one central claim: Two generations ago the major North Atlantic economies were all four stable social democracies—relatively egalitarian places when viewed in historical perspective (for native-born white guys, at least), with political voice widely distributed throughout the population, the claims of wealth to drive political directions and shape economic structures not neutralized but kept within bounds. That was the North Atlantic economy that we lived in and had grown used to as recently as one generation ago. That, Piketty argues, was an unstable historical anomaly. It is now passing away.

Piketty believes that the rising inequality trends we have seen over the past generation and see now are simply returning us to what is the pattern of unequal income distribution and dominant plutocracy that is normal for an industrialized market economy in which productivity growth is not unusually fast. We had thought otherwise, and grown used to the social-democratic structure of two generations ago only because it came at the end of an era in which productivity growth had been unusually fast; the various political, depression, and revolutionary shocks to overturn established and inherited wealth had been atypically large.

The social democratic economy model the major North Atlantic economies followed as recently as a single generation ago had five salient features:

  1. For one, that labor was important relative to ownership of wealth as a source of income.
  2. Next, enterprise and savings were important relative to inheritance as a source of accumulated wealth.
  3. Opportunity, while constrained by race and gender, was not that constrained by class—there was upward mobility.
  4. Economic growth—both numbers of workers and the productivity of the average worker—was relatively rapid, with each generation clearly larger and more productive than its predecessor.
  5. And, finally, politics were relatively democratic, in that while the rich spoke with a louder voice, their concerns did not drown out the economic interests of others.

And Thomas Piketty’s central claim is that all five of these once-salient features of our social democracy are vanishing. We are, he believes, on a long-run historical trajectory to return us to a situation more like the nineteenth century, in which ownership of capital is more important relative to labor as a source of income; inheritance dominates enterprise and savings as a source of wealth; opportunity is tightly constrained by class of birth; economic growth is slow (both because of declining technological invention and birth rates on the one hand, and because established wealth, which is hostile to the creative destruction that drives economic growth, possesses a bigger voice in shaping the political economy); and politics is dominated by plutocrats.

Capital in the Twenty-First Century has struck a chord—hence its 2.2 million copies. And it has excited a fierce debate, with more and more people finding it worth arguing about both for the reasons that it struck a chord and because of the fact that it has struck a chord.

The first question is: Do we care?

Some—perhaps many—say that we do not care. There is one often-made thread of argument that we simply should not care about inequality, which is good as an engine of faster economic growth and not a problem for an economy, a society, or a country at all. What is a problem, this thread maintains, is poverty. And because we are now much richer than our predecessors of six generations ago, the amount of inequality that back then caused poverty and so was a problem does not cause poverty and so is not a problem today.

I think this is wrong. I think we do care.

  • First, anyone who has looked at the distribution of medical care in the United States and our abysmal health outcome statistics relative to other rich countries cannot help but see that inequality is a factor that leads enormous investments of resources to deliver little of ultimate value in the sense of human well-being and human satisfaction. The point generalizes beyond the health sector: an unequal economy is one that is lousy at turning productive potential into societal well-being. We could be doing better—and with a more equal income and wealth distribution would be.

  • Second, as noted above, established wealth, especially inherited wealth, is by its nature hostile to the creative destruction that accompanies rapid economic growth, for it is established wealth that is creatively destroyed. Plutocrats and their ideologues like to claim that too equal an income distribution destroys incentives to work and turns us into a ‘nation of takers.’ But a return to the inequality levels of the 1960s would not turn us into Maoist China. In the relevant range of levels of inequality, it is much more likely that higher inequality will slow growth by depriving the non-rich of the resources to invest in themselves, their children, and their enterprises; It will further slow growth by focusing effort on helping the rich keep what they have at the cost of squelching the development of the new.

  • Third, a society in which plutocrats deploy their resources to have not just a loud but an overwhelming voice will be a society in which government sets about to solve problems of concern the plutocrats and not the people. And that is unlikely to be a good society.

So: Yes, we care.

The second, relevant, question is then: Is he right?

The only possible answer is ‘perhaps’.

Everything hinges on what ‘on our current political-economic trajectory’ means. So what might we take that phrase to mean? And under which interpretations of that phrase is Piketty right, and under which is he wrong?


Our Current Trajectory: Piketty’s View

Piketty’s view is that our current trajectory has five elements:

  1. For one thing, we now have a demographic pattern determined by literate women’s preference to have two or fewer children. Thus we have slow—or zero—population growth.
  2. For another, the pace of technological progress may well be slowing from its 20th-century white-heat intensity. Thus slower population and slower productivity growth combine to produce slower overall growth, and so wealth accumulated in the past when the economy was smaller looms larger in the present than it would were the economy expanding more rapidly.
  3. In addition, ever since—even before—the start of the Industrial Revolution, we have seen the system of property rights continually tweaked, via a politics in which money talks loudly, in order to keep the rate of profit on wealth roughly at 5% per year. The British economist John Maynard Keynes was one of many who thought that a world of more wealth accumulation would also be one of a more equal income distribution. As capital accumulated, he thought, that capital would have to bid for the services of workers to operate it. It would do that by offering to accept a lower rate of profit in order to pay higher wages and salaries. The profit rate would, he thought, fall more rapidly than the stock of capital would grow, and we would have what he called the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’: even though the rich might be very rich indeed in terms of assets, their relative share of income would, over time, fall. But, Piketty documents, this seems to be wrong: The overall profit rate did not rise when economies went from the wealth-to-annual income ratio of six that it was six generations ago to the one of three that it was two generations ago. The overall profit rate has not fallen as wealth-to-annual-income ratios have risen.
  4. Yet another factor is the concentration of savings among the rich, for—contrary to economists’ standard life-cycle theories—the proportion of income saved does not decline with increasing wealth. And so a higher stock of wealth does not induce forces that tend to spread it around, but rather induces forces that concentrate it.
  5. And, last, Piketty sees money as talking even louder in politics than it used to and thus preventing, with increasing strength over time, the implementation of policies that might redistribute wealth and so keep the social-democratic political-economic order alive.

In Piketty’s view, we are now more than a full generation into this process of the passing away of North Atlantic social democracy.

This process, however, has not yet come to an end. It will, he thinks, take another two generations or more for the logic he sees driving us on our current trajectory to work itself through to its completion. We haven’t, in Piketty’s view, seen anything yet, at least support as far as plutocracy is concerned.


The Demand for Bad Critiques of Piketty

A substantial number of critics have offered differing strongly negative views of Piketty’s theories.

There is, for example, Greg Mankiw from Harvard and his (2015) ‘Yes, r > g. So What?’:

There is… good reason to doubt… the ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’ that concerns Piketty…. The worrisome ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’… [requires] the return on capital r to exceed the economy’s growth g by at least 7 percentage points per year…. There is no ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’…’

I presume Mankiw picked up the phrase ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’ from Piketty’s introduction, where the phrase is not a prediction of the necessary consequences that follow from r > g. It is, instead, a description of what the data Piketty has compiled and analyzed tells us about the pre-WWI Belle Époque:

1870–1914 is at best a stabilization of inequality at an extremely high level, and in certain respects an endless inegalitarian spiral…

Mankiw’s critique was pre-butted not just in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, but also in Piketty’s (2015) ‘Putting Distribution Back at the Center of Economics’ in which he explicitly refers critics to Stanford economist Charles Jones and to Piketty’s online appendix. An economy with a larger gap between the rate of profit r and the rate of economic growth g will indeed be an economy with more concentrated wealth. Mankiw’s implicit claim that we should remain unconcerned with wealth inequality and concentration unless and until it is growing without bound toward infinity—even among a brazen goalpost-moving exercises, that is a remarkably brazen one.

There is also, for example, a paper from Daron Acemoglu of MIT and James Robinson of Chicago (2015), ‘The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism’. It claims that the theoretical mechanisms stressed by Piketty cannot be seen in the real world. To this Piketty responds by arguing that they are looking at changes over much too short a time period to see what is and will in the future be going on:

The process of intergenerational accumulation and distribution of wealth is very long-run process, so looking at cross-sectional regressions between inequality and r − g may not be very meaningful…

There is Stanford’s Allan Meltzer, and his 2014 ‘The United States of Envy’:

The Obama administration has drawn the political discussion away from its unpopular and flawed… Obamacare… income redistribution… based heavily on research by two French economists named Thomas Piketty and Emanuel Saez. The two worked together… at MIT, where the current research director of the IMF, Olivier Blanchard, was a professor…. He is also French. France has, for many years, implemented destructive policies…

There is Clive Crook’s 2014 ‘The Most Important Book Ever Is Wrong’, which I will leave to the Economist’s Ryan Avent:

You don’t even have to read hundreds of pages to get the qualification Mr. Crook wants; you can start with the page on which r>g is first mentioned…. I suppose if you only read the book’s conclusion you could miss these details, but who would do that?’

If there is a worst critique of Piketty from a technical economics standpoint, it is made by Per Krusell of Gothenberg and Anthony A. Smith of Yale in their 2015 ‘Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?’. They assume—without presenting evidence or data—that their key parameter is 10% per year when Piketty documents that it appears to be less than 2% per year. When challenged, they write only:

DeLong’s main point is that the rate we are using is too high (we use 10% in one place and 8% in another place…. (We conducted a quick survey among macroeconomists at the London School of Economics, where Tony and I happen to be right now, and the average answer was 7% [per year]…

This response seems to me to be remarkably weak. This response seems to me to indicate only that the macroeconomists they talk to have neither carried out aggregate growth-accounting calculations nor reflected on what share of society’s productive assets are machines that depreciate at 7% per year, as opposed to land, buildings, and infrastructure that depreciate much more slowly.

When I look at these—and other—critiques of Piketty and assess their quality, I find myself quite surprised. And I find myself strongly tempted to agree with what Piketty said at the January 2015 American Economic Association meeting about billionaires:

We know something about billionaire consumption, but it is hard to measure some of it. Some billionaires are consuming politicians, others consume reporters, and some consume academics…

The Demand for Piketty

I do find it disappointing that so many critiques, indeed what appear to me to be the standard critiques, of Piketty, do not look much like academic analyses. Instead, they look more like things designed to reassure standard billionaires hoping to establish a dynasty. If Piketty is wrong, it is important to figure out why. For his book has definitely struck an immense nerve: people want answers to questions, and they hope Piketty will provide them.

So let me turn to Capital in the Twenty-First Century as a sociological-intellectual phenomenon.

I did not expect Capital in the Twenty-First Century to go, in a sense, viral.

I expected the book to sell ten copies to libraries and professors here at Berkeley, and a couple hundred copies to students here—10,000 copies worldwide.

Art Goldhammer quotes William Sisler, head of Piketty’s English-language publisher, Harvard University Press, as being more optimistic and expecting total sales in the 10-20,000 copy range ‘if we were lucky’.

Capital in the Twenty-First Century does indeed have many excellences. Its logic is clear and powerful. It is comprehensively documented by very skillful extraction and presentation of the data. It deals with very big and important questions. It takes a broad historical and moral-philosophical view.

But I thought it would be a book for a narrow audience: myself and a few others.

You had to like mathematical economic growth theory, economic history, going deep into the weeds of data construction, plus have read Balzac and Jane Austen to be comfortable in the intellectual world of the book. It seemed to me that there were very few people whose interests were as broad as Thomas Piketty’s. Given that the book makes few concessions to and demands much of its audience, I expected that audience to be small—not large.


Better Critiques of Piketty

So it is in a way fortunate that there are some better critiques of Piketty’s argument out there. An MIT graduate student has mounted the best sustained critique: Matthew Rognlie points to a set of considerations that John Maynard Keynes called the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’:

  • As capital accumulation proceeds, more and richer people seek to entrust their larger and larger wealth to entrepreneurs to buy machines relative to the number of workers who seek to be hired by entrepreneurs to work the machines.
  • Thus by simple supply-and-demand the rate of profit declines.
  • Thus increasing wealth accumulation enriches workers-their productivity at the margin rises and entrepreneurs are willing to bid more for their services.
  • And increasing wealth accumulation does not impoverish the wealthy, but it does make their wealth less salient as a source of income.

Thomas Piketty’s response to this is, roughly: Rognlie’s argument sounds very good in neoclassical economic theory, but fails in historical practice. Supply-and-demand tells us that when the economy’s wealth-to-annual income ratio varies, the rate of profit should vary in the opposite direction. But history tells us that the rate of profit sticks at 5% per year, across eras with very different wealth-to-annual-income ratios.

Piketty, however, does not tell us why.

Perhaps this is because at a technological level capital does not empower and complement but rather competes with and thus substitutes for labor. Perhaps this is because of successful rent-seeking by the rich who control the government and get it to award them monopoly rents. Perhaps it is because of a social structure that leaves wealth holders believing that a 5% per year is the ‘fair’ rate of profit and are unwilling to underbid each other. Piketty is agnostic here.

This makes his argument both difficult to criticize, and less than fully satisfactory. For, Rognlie points out, the big news so far in the accumulation of wealth and the surge in income received by wealth holders comes from housing, which has risen from 3% of total income to 8% of total income here in the U.S. since World War II. Similar forces are at work in England and France: simply look at rents these days in central London or central Paris. And the collapse of the wealth of European Belle Époque elites after 1900—though not of American Gilded Age elites—owed a lot to the falling value of their broad-acre agricultural-land estates as globalization and rapid improvements in farm productivity enriched the economy as a whole but left agriculture relatively impoverished. In Rognlie’s view, the connection between wealth inequality and income inequality is largely a reflection of the dynamics of housing prices—and, I would add, in Europe agricultural land values. And, in Rognlie’s and Piketty’s view, the rise in U.S. income inequality at the top up until now is only tangentially related to the concentration of wealth. Rather, it is the superincomes of corporate executives, anesthesiologists and allied specialties, and financiers that we have seen so far—and they have not had to have much wealth of their own to grasp these prizes. (Although, of course, their children will then start out with a great deal of wealth.)

There are additional complaints that I regard as serious:

  • First, as James K. Galbraith has most aggressively noted, Piketty tacks back-and-forth between a market value—the capitalized current value of all claims on income that are not brow-sweat—and a physical quantity conception of capital in a way that cannot be completely legitimate.
  • Second, I would be much more comfortable with a framework in which, instead of talking about ‘tendencies’ that can be counteracted by ‘special factors,’ Piketty included the ‘special factors’ in the model and then forecast the economy’s destiny.
  • And, third and most important of all, Piketty badly needs a political-economic theory of the constancy of the rate of profit that he finds in his data. He does not have one.

I think these critiques have force, all of them: from the ‘euthanization of the rentier’ as a possibility that needs to be considered, to the need to understand housing and agriculture separately rather than lumping them into ‘wealth,’ the need to be clear about the units—dollars on the one hand or acres and machines on the other—of measurement, my economist’s preference for predictions of equilibrium points rather than identification of tendencies, and the need for a political economy-based theory of how government capture by the rich means that wealth accumulated is not spent invested in projects that make us richer, but rather in better ways of raising the share of a constant-sized pie that is carved up for the rich.


Assessment

When I try to evaluate the state of the debate over Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century two years after its first (French) publication, I find myself driven to three conclusions. The factors that Piketty identifies as leading to the melting-away of the social-democratic North Atlantic economy are operating, but so far their effects on income and wealth inequality have been smaller than other largely-unrelated factors that have been operating in the past generation and generating the rise of housing as a source of wealth and the rise of the super-incomes. Piketty’s factors have been supercharged by other forces over the past generation, but that does not mean that they are not at work—and, in fact, reinforces the chances that Piketty’s inequality-driving factors will be of decisive importance over the next seventy years. The question of whether our road leads to Piketty (2014)—a new Belle Époque plutocracy—or Keynes (1936)—a euthanization of the rentier in which the wealth of the rich is outlandish but their incomes are not due to low rates of profit—hinges on our politics. And our politics is something we can control.

We as a civilization could decide that we are not willing to let money talk so loudly in politics. We could keep our politics from being one of establishing monopoly after monopoly and rent-extraction chokepoint after rent-extraction chokepoint. If we manage that, then the forecasts of Keynes (1936) and Rognlie (2015 will come true, and a rise in wealth accumulation will carry with it a fall in the rate of profit, and a highly-productive not-too-unequal society.

But right now money talks very loudly indeed. And I leave the Piketty debate more depressed about our ability to keep it from talking so loudly. What makes me more depressed? The Piketty debate itself does: The eagerness of so-many economists to aggressively make so many shoddy arguments that Piketty does not know what he is talking about–that makes me think that Piketty does indeed know what he is talking about.

Must-read: Brad Hershbein: “A College Degree Is Worth (Disproportionately) Less If You Are Raised Poor”

Must-Read: Brad Hershbein: A College Degree Is Worth (Disproportionately) Less If You Are Raised Poor: “Boosting college education is… seen by many—including me…

…as a way to lift people out of poverty, combat growing income inequality, and increase upward social mobility. But how much upward lift does a bachelor’s degree really give to earnings? The answer turns out to vary by family background…. It turns out that the proportional increase for those who grew up poor is much less than for those who did not. College graduates from families with an income below 185 percent of the federal poverty level (the eligibility threshold for the federal assisted lunch program) earn 91 percent more over their careers than high school graduates from the same income group. By comparison, college graduates from families with incomes above 185 percent of the FPL earned 162 percent more over their careers (between the ages of 25 and 62) than those with just a high school diploma…. This earnings gap between poor and non-poor college graduates also widens as time passes. Bachelor’s degree holders from low-income backgrounds start their careers earning about two-thirds as much as those from higher-income backgrounds, but this ratio declines to one-half by mid-career…

A college degree is worth less if you are raised poor Brookings Institution

Must-read: Nick Bunker: “Abundance and the Direction of Technological Growth”

Must-Read: Cf. the debate about North Atlantic technological development in the nineteenth century started by the most amazingly-named Sir Hrothgar John Habakkuk, or, indeed Robert Allen’s The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Most new technologies will not–at least not initially–involve movements of the PPF up and to the right, but rather the creation of new techniques that fall, relative to current ones, in quadrants II and IV. Whether those are profitable will turn very heavily on what current factor prices and factor availabilities are:

Nick Bunker: Abundance and the Direction of Technological Growth: “In a piece from two years ago, Ryan Avent of The Economist fleshes out a deeper argument…

…that in incentivizing work from low-wage workers, wages remain low and reduces the incentive to innovate. If these workers were able to live without earning wages from work, wages might rise and spark labor-saving innovation. Jared Bernstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities floats the idea that during periods of full employment, when the labor market and the economy as a whole use labor and capital to their capacity, productivity can be boosted as companies innovate in response to higher wages.

These arguments are similar to the idea of directed technical change…. The relative prices of the factors of production affect the kind of innovation and productivity growth in an economy…

Must-read: Noah Smith: “Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth”

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth: “After many decades of essentially ignoring the role of land…

…economists are starting to reconsider. Some are worried that landlords are hurting growth by making it too expensive to live in highly productive cities. Now, some are starting to think about how land figures in the rise in inequality. The basic idea is that landlords use their local political power to stack the deck…. That unpleasant narrative might now be playing out in the U.S. Jason Furman, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers…. According to Furman, some of the change may be due to more zoning. Since the late 1970s, land-use regulation has skyrocketed in the U.S….

The new spotlight on zoning is causing even traditional proponents of government intervention to call for regulatory reform. Paul Krugman… “[T]his is an issue on which you don’t have to be a conservative to believe that we have too much regulation. … New York City can’t do much if anything about soaring inequality of incomes, but it could do a lot to increase the supply of housing, and thereby ensure that the inward migration of the elite doesn’t drive out everyone else.”… [But] existing landlords have lots of power in local politics, while potential landlords and tenants, because they are still living elsewhere, have zero…

What to teach the undergraduates about business cycles

Let me promote this to “highlighted” status, and flag it: it is time I once again tried to think hard about just what the “macro” weeks of introductory economics are for:

Time to Start Teaching the Undergraduates About Business Cycles: How to begin? What is the vision I went them to take away and remember?

How about this:

For some reason–it can be any of a large number of reasons, this time it is the blowback from excessive leverage and irrational exuberance, but it can be for any of a large number of reasons–the people in the economy decide that they are spending too much on currently-produced goods and services. They decide that they want to spend less and so build up their holdings of financial assets. People cut back on their spending on currently-produced goods and services, planning to use the margin they will create between income and spending to build up their holdings of financial assets.

The problem is that one person’s spending is another person’s production, and that one person’s production is another person’s income. Businesses see demand for what they produce fall off. They see their inventories of unsold goods rise. Businesses thus lay workers off in order to avoid making even more stuff that they cannot sell: production falls.

And as production falls businesses stop paying the workers they have laid off: incomes fall.

People spend what they had planned on currently-produced goods and services. But they find that their incomes are less than they had thought they would be. Thus the margin they had hoped to create between their incomes and their spending does not exist. People find that they have not managed to carry out their plans to build up their holdings of financial assets. But they still want to. So people try to cut back on their spending on currently produce goods and services yet again to build up their holdings of financial assets. And the process repeats. Spending, production, and incomes fall again.

Why don’t spending and production and incomes and production fall to zero in this downward spiral?
Because at some point incomes drop so low that people give up on the idea of building up their stocks of financial assets.
They still would like to build up their stocks of financial assets–if their incomes were normal. But keeping their standard of living from falling too much becomes a higher priority.

The economy settles down at a spot where spending on currently-produced goods and services once again equals production and income. It finds itself at a short-run macroeconomic equilibrium where inventories are neither rising and causing businesses to fire more workers or falling and causing businesses to hire more workers. This equilibrium, however, has a lot of unemployment: a lot of unemployed workers looking for jobs, and few vacancies looking for workers.

How bad do things get as a result of this collective decision to try to build up stocks of financial assets?

For that we need to build an economic model. And we need to build different economic model then the production function base growth economic model we been dealing with over the past two weeks…

Must-read: Stumbling and Mumbling: “Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives”

Must-Read: Stumbling and Mumbling: Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives: “What happened in both cases is motivational crowding out…

…financial incentives can displace intrinsic ones. Small fines crowded out parents’ desire to help kindergarten staff by being punctual, just as a small prize pot crowded out O’Sullivan’s desire to play brilliantly. This is no mere curiosity. One reason for banks’ serial criminality… is that bonus culture has driven out any sense of professional ethics.Daniel Pink, author of Drive, has described this crowding out as ‘one of the most robust findings in social science’….

Tim Worstall is right to say that the core concept in economics is that incentives matter. However, they can matter in unpredictable ways. The point here is a simple one. Designing incentives – in companies, sport, public services or wherever – require careful thought. More thought, in fact, than is often given. I fear that, in the real world, ‘incentives’ in fact serves an ideological function described by George Carlin:

Conservatives say if you don’t give the rich more money, they will lose their incentive to invest. As for the poor, they tell us they’ve lost all incentive because we’ve given them too much money.

No: We can’t wave a magic demand wand now and get the recovery we threw away in 2009

The estimable Mike Konczal writes:

Mike Konczal: Dissecting the CEA Letter and Sanders’s Other Proposals: “I would have done Gerald Friedman’s paper backwards…

…He gives a giant headline number and then you have to work into the text and the footnotes to gather all the details. But a core assumption within the paper is that we are capable of getting back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand. We can get the recovery we should have gotten in 2009…

He is wrong.

We cannot get back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand alone.

For one thing, demand for investment spending has now been low for almost a decade. Since 2007, we have foregone relative to the then-trend:

  1. 16%-point-years of GDP of housing investment.
  2. 6%-point-years of GDP of equipment investment
  3. 5%-point-years of government purchases–of which roughly half have been investments.
  4. 4% of our labor force from their attachments to the labor market.
  5. A hard-to-quantify amount of development of business models and practices.
FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

These are principal causes of “hysteresis”. I do not believe that the output gap is the zero that the Federal Reserve currently thinks it is. But it is very unlikely to be anywhere near the 12% of GDP needed to support 4%/year real growth through demand along over the next two presidential terms.

We could bend the potential growth curve upward slowly and gradually through policies that boosted investment and boosted the rate of innovation. But it would be very difficult indeed to make up all the potential output-growth ground that we have failed to gain during the past decade of the years that the locust hath eaten

Must-reads: February 21, 2016


Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue”

Must-Read: Very nice. But why “Galilean”, Gavyn? I do note that in the end Gavyn’s “insider” argument boils down to “we must keep the hawks on the FOMC on board with policy”, which is a declaration that:

  1. The Obama administration has made truly serious mistakes in speed of action and in personnel in its Fed governor nominations;
  2. The Bernanke-Yellen Board of Governors has made truly serious mistakes in Fed Bank President selection; and
  3. The high priority given to keeping (nearly) the entire FOMC on board with the policy path should, perhaps, be revisited.

Also, “we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time” is simply incoherent: sunk costs do not matter for future actions.

The dialogue:

Gavyn Davies: Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue: “As Paul Krugman pointed out a year ago…

…a sharp difference of views about US monetary policy has developed between two camps of Keynesians who normally agree about almost everything. What makes this interesting is that, in this division of opinion, the fault line often seems to be determined by the professional location of the economists concerned. Those outside the Federal Reserve (eg Lawrence Summers, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong) tend to adopt a strongly dovish view, while those inside the central bank (eg Janet Yellen, Stanley Fischer, William Dudley, John Williams) have lately taken a more hawkish line about the need to ‘normalise’ the level of interest rates [1]. My colleague David Blake suggested that this blog should carry a Galilean ‘Dialogue’ between representatives of the two camps. Galileo is unavailable this week, but here goes”

Fed Insider: The US has now reached full employment and the labour market remains firm. The Phillips Curve still exists, so wage inflation is headed higher. Core inflation is not far below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. While the economy is therefore close to normal, interest rates are far below normal, so there should be a predisposition to tighten monetary conditions gradually from here. That would still leave monetary policy far more accommodative than normal for a long period of time.

Fed Outsider: I am not so sure about the Phillips Curve. It seems much flatter than it was in earlier decades. But in any case you do not seem to have noticed that the economy is slowing down. This is probably because of the increase in the dollar, which has tightened monetary conditions much more than the Fed intended. The Fed should not make this slowdown worse by raising domestic interest rates as well.

Insider: I concede that the economy has slowed, and I am worried about the tightening in financial conditions caused by the dollar. But I think that this will prove temporary. The dollar effect will not get much worse from here, and the economy has also been affected by inventory shedding and the drop in shale oil investment. As these effects subside, GDP growth will return to above 2 per cent. The pace of employment growth may slow, but remember that payrolls need to grow by under 100,000 per month to keep unemployment constant at the natural rate. Some slowdown is not only inevitable, it is desirable.

Outsider: I do not know how you can be so confident that growth will recover. All your forecasts for growth in recent years have proven far too optimistic. You should be worried that the economy is stuck in a secular stagnation trap. The equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the actual rate of interest. To emerge from secular stagnation, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising them.

Insider: The case for secular stagnation is a bit extreme. Economies tend to return to equilibrium after shocks. The US has been held back by a series of major headwinds since 2009, but these are now abating. Fiscal policy is easing, the euro shock is healing and deleveraging is ending. As these headwinds abate, the equilibrium real rate of interest will return to its normal level around 1.5 per cent, so the nominal Fed funds rate should be 3.5 per cent. It is right to warn people now that this is likely to happen.

Outsider: The hawkish forward guidance shown in your ‘dot plot’ will slow demand growth further. It is unnecessary – in fact, outright damaging. I am pleased that you are rethinking the presentation of the dots. But, more important, the economic recovery is already long in the tooth. There is a 60 percent chance of a recession within 2 years. In a normal recession, the Fed has to cut interest rates by 4 percentage points. Because of the zero lower bound, it will not be able to do so in the next recession, so it needs to avoid a recession at all costs.

Insider: Oh dear. Recoveries do not die of old age, as Glenn Rudebusch at the San Francisco Fed has just conclusively proved. Expansions, like Peter Pan, do not grow old. Provided that we avoid a build up of inflation pressures, or excessive risk taking in markets, there is no reason to believe that this recovery will spontaneously run out of steam. It is much more likely to persist.

Outsider: Maybe, but have you ever considered the possibility that you might be wrong? The future path of the equilibrium interest rate is subject to huge uncertainty, as your own estimations demonstrate. If you kill this recovery, it will subsequently be impossible to use monetary policy to get out of recession. If, on the other hand, you allow inflation to rise, you can easily bring it back under control, simply by raising interest rates. So the risks are not symmetrical.

Insider: Well, we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time. And anyway I do not agree with you about inflation risks. If we allow inflation to become embedded in the system, we will then have to raise interest rates abruptly. That is the most likely way that this recovery can end in a severe recession.

Outsider: Inflation cannot rise permanently unless inflation expectations rise as well. In case you have not noticed, inflation expectations have been falling and are now out of line with your 2 per cent inflation target. This is dangerous because real (inflation adjusted) interest rates are actually rising when they should be falling.

Insider: I used to worry a lot about the inflation expectations built into the bond market, but I now think that these are affected by market imperfections that should be downplayed. Inflation expectations in the household and corporate sectors are still broadly in line with the Fed target. And, anyway, I am increasingly concerned that inflation could rise because productivity growth is now so low. With the economy at full employment, inflation pressures could be building, even with GDP growth still very subdued.

Outsider: I am also very worried about the slowdown in productivity growth. But I think this could be happening because you have allowed the actual GDP growth rate to be so low for so long. Because of hysteresis, you may be making things progressively worse. You may have permanently shifted the equilibrium of the economy in a bad direction.

Insider: I am not so sure about this hysteresis stuff. I would not rule it out entirely. But you cannot rely on the Fed to solve all of our economic problems. At the moment, the Fed’s main priority is to return monetary policy to normal, and I am determined to continue this process unless something really bad happens to the economy.

Outsider: In that case, something bad is quite likely to happen. It seems that it will take a disaster to shake your orthodoxy. Do you really want to be responsible for making a historic economic mistake?

Insider: It is easy for you on the outside to make dramatic points like that. If you had been entrusted with the responsibility of office, you would be more circumspect. Although we went to the same graduate school, we are now in different positions. The hawks on the FOMC need to be kept on board with the majority. And I do not want to inflame the Fed’s Republican critics in Congress by appearing soft on inflation. That means I sometimes have to make difficult compromises that you do not have to make.

Outsider: The hawks are giving too much weight to the health of the banks. You should be worrying more about Main Street, and less about Wall Street.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “What Have We Learned since 2008?”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned since 2008?: “Some annoying propositions…

…”Complex” econometrics never convinces anyone. “Complex” includes multiple regression. Natural experiments rule. But so do “surprising” ex-ante predictions that come true…. “In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences.” — Frank Graham…. Demand side: The liquidity trap as a baseline…. Predictions: * Little or no effect of even very large increases in monetary base. * No crowding out from deficits * Large fiscal multipliers. These were controversial predictions!….

Very little effect of monetary expansion. Certainly no inflation. Did QE do anything?… Feel the [debt] crowding out!… Things we didn’t expect: crucial role of liquidity…. Things we didn’t expect: negative rates…. But there is still presumably a lower bound set by storage costs for currency….

The supply side: what was the baseline? Probably the accelerationist Phillips curve…. But what’s missing is the acceleration, not the unemployment => inflation causation…. Strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (courtesy Olivier Blanchard)…. Things we didn’t expect: Very strong hysteresis (maybe)….

What is the post-2008 experience trying to tell us? * Liquidity-trap economics passes with flying colors. * Fiscal policy effectiveness confirmed. * Monetary iffy at best. * Neo-paleo-Keynesian aggregate supply in short run. * Long run seems to reinforce, not diminish, that case.