Must-Reads: May 23, 2016

Must-Read: Thomas Philippon

Must-Read: An absolutely key issue: why doesn’t the logic of cost-reduction via scale and technology work for finance as a whole? It certainly works for commissions…

Thomas Philippon: Finance vs. Wal-Mart: Why are Financial Services so Expensive?, in Rethinking the Financial Crisis, edited by Alan Blinder, Andrew Lo, and Robert Solow (Russell Sage Foundation, 2012): “Despite its fast computers and credit derivatives…

…the current financial system does not seem better at transferring funds from savers to borrowers than the financial system of 1910. “I would rather see Finance less proud and Industry more content…” –Winston Churchill, 1925

Monetary Policy 201

This from Paul Volcker strikes me as substantially wrong:

Paul Volcker and Cardiff Garcia: AlphaChatterbox Long Chat:

[My] first economics course… at Harvard… Arthur Smithies…. Session after session he would drill into our head that a little inflation was a good thing. And I could never figure out why. But I know he kept saying it, so already at the time I for some reason had an allergy to what he was saying. But it’s interesting, his lectures, it’s the same thing that central banks are saying today….

I would never interpret it as you have to have [inflation] exactly zero. Prices tend to go up or down a little bit depending upon whether the economy’s booming or not booming. And I can’t understand making a fetish of a particular number, frankly. What you do want to create is a situation where people don’t worry about prices going up and they don’t make judgments based upon fears of inflation instead of straightforward analysis of what the real economy is doing.

And I must confess, I think it’s something of a moral issue…. You shouldn’t be kind of fooling people all the time by having inflation they didn’t expect. Now, they answer, well, if they expect it, it’s okay. But if they expect it, it’s not doing you any good anyway. Those arguments you set forward don’t hold water if you’re expecting it…

There are three major considerations:

  1. In any economy with debt contracts that fix principal in nominal terms, it is easier to fall into a destructive Fisherian debt-deflation chain of bankruptcies when you have a zero rate of inflation than when you have positive inflation and so some normal-time upward drift in the price level.
  2. Sometimes the Wicksellian “neutral” or “natural” short-term safe real interest rate will be less than zero. That’s the rate consistent with full employment and no price-level surprises. That’s the rate at which the economy wants to be, and the rate that a central bank properly performing its stabilization policy mission will aim for. But whenever the Wicksellian “neutral” rate is, say, -x%, no central bank can get the economy there unless the inflation rate is +x%.
  3. People really, really hate having their nominal wages cut. Firms would thus rather reduce costs by firing people than reduce costs by cutting nominal wages: in the first case, at least the people who hate you are no longer around to cause trouble and disrupt operations. Getting your nominal wages cut is a psychological diss with substantial sociological consequences. In an environment of moderate inflation firms thus have an extra degree of effective freedom at their disposal in reacting to changing circumstances: they can raise their prices by the amount of ongoing inflation, but not give the the corresponding inflation-compensating nominal wage increases. That extra degree of freedom is worth a considerable amount to employers. And it is worth a considerable amount to workers as well–for workers hate getting fired, especially in a slack economy, much, much more than they hate having their real wages eroded by inflation.

Paul Volcker, although he would not put it this way, seems to be working with a Lucas aggregate supply curve: that the unemployment rate is equal to the natural rate of unemployment minus or plus a slope parameter times how much people have been positively or negatively surprised by inflation, and that workers’ utility is highest when unemployment is at its natural rate, and lower when unemployment is either more or less than the natural rate.

Volcker, however, would not call it a Lucas aggregate supply curve. He would call it a Smithies aggregate supply curve, or a Viner (1936) aggregate supply curve:

In a world organized in accordance with Keynes’ specifications, there would be a constant race between the printing press and the business agents of the trade unions, with the problem of unemployment largely solved if the printing press could maintain a constant lead…

It has never been clear to me why this Viner aggregate supply function has such a hold on the economics profession as a benchmark model from which you start–and, in this case, stop–thinking.

I do not think it is clear to Cardiff Garcia either. In his conversation with Volcker, he raised these points:

Cardiff Garcia: If you have zero percent inflation, then you’re closer to having a [destructive] deflationary spiral…. If you have a little bit of positive inflation, then interest rates will be correspondingly a bit higher, so if there’s a downturn, you have room to lower them. And… if you have a little bit of inflation, then it’s easier for companies to give real wage cuts to their employees without laying them off, if they just freeze their wages and then they go down because of inflation…

But Volcker does not pick up on any of these–sea-room to avoid deflationary spirals, more freedom to move the Wicksellian “neutral” rate to where it wants to be, more labor-market flexibility. He simply takes immediate refuge in the Viner aggregate supply function, according to which it’s only unexpected inflation that ever matters for anything…

Must-Read: Paul Volcker: Cardiff Garcia’s Long Chat with Paul Volcker

Must-Read: This from Paul Volcker strikes me as really substantially wrong:

Paul Volcker: Cardiff Garcia’s Long Chat with Paul Volcker: “I would never interpret it as you have to have [inflation] exactly zero…

Prices tend to go up or down a little bit depending upon whether the economy’s booming or not booming. And I can’t understand making a fetish of a particular number, frankly. What you do want to create is a situation where people don’t worry about prices going up and they don’t make judgments based upon fears of inflation instead of straightforward analysis of what the real economy is doing. And I must confess, I think it’s something of a moral issue…. You shouldn’t be kind of fooling people all the time by having inflation they didn’t expect. Now, they answer, well, if they expect it, it’s okay. But if they expect it, it’s not doing you any good anyway. Those arguments you set forward don’t hold water if you’re expecting it…

Must-Read: Tim Duy: This Is Not a Drill. This Is the Real Thing

Must-Read: Again. I do not understand Janet Yellen and Stan Fischer’s thinking at all. A 25 basis-point rate hike is a small contractionary thing. But it is a thing. The credibility gained by sticking to a bad policy long past the point where its badness ought to have been recognized is not the credibility worth gaining. The rest of the world is shaky–and the last thing it needs is to have risk-bearing capacity pulled out of it by a U.S. rate hike. And whatever interest-rate hikes might be made this summer could be made up with ease next spring, after the situation becomes clear.

Yet they continue:

Tim Duy: This Is Not a Drill. This Is the Real Thing: “The June FOMC meeting is live…

…That message came through loud and clear in the minutes, and was subsequently confirmed by New York Federal Reserve President William Dudley…. Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren… gave a strong nod to June…. The Fed broadly agrees that the economic recovery… is sufficient to drive further improvement in labor markets…. Still, the risks are [seen by the Fed as] either balanced or to the downside….

The Fed’s plan had been to let the economy run hot enough for long enough to eliminate underemployment. One sizable camp within the Fed thinks this largely been accomplished…. The Fed is also split on the inflation outlook but most believe inflation is set to trend toward target…. June is on the table…. There is a rate hike likely in the near-ish future…. I think we narrowly avoid a rate hike, but at the cost of moving forward the next hike to the July meeting.

Social Credit and “Neutral” Monetary Policies: A Rant on “Helicopter Money” and “Monetary Neutrality”

Must-Read: Badly-intentioned or incompetent policymakers can mess up any system of macroeconomic regulation. And we now have two centuries of history of demand-driven business cycles in industrial and post-industrial economies to teach us that there is no perfect, automatic self-regulating way to organize the economy at the macroeconomic level.

Over and over again, the grifters, charlatans, and cranks ask: “Why doesn’t the central bank simply adopt the rule of setting a “neutral” monetary policy? In fact, why not replace the central bank completely with an automatic system that would do the job?”

Over the decades many have promised easy definitions of “neutrality”, along with rules-of-thumb for maintaining it. All had their day:

  • advocates of the gold standard,
  • believers in a stable monetary base,
  • devotees of a constant growth rate for the (narrowly defined) supply of money;
  • believers in a constant growth rate for broad money and credit aggregates;
  • various “Taylor rules”.

And the answer, of course, is that by now centuries of painful experience have taught central bankers one thing: All advocates, wittingly or unwittingly, were simply selling snake oil. All such “automatic” rules and systems have been tried and found wanting.

It is a fact that all such rule-based central bank policies and all such so-called automatic systems have fallen down on the job. They have failed to properly manage “the” interest rate to set aggregate demand equal to potential output and balance the supply of whatever at that moment counts as “money”, in whatever the operative sense of “money” is at that moment, to the demand for it.

Nudging interest rates to the level at which investment equals savings at full employment is what a properly “neutral” monetary policy really is.

Things are complicated, most importantly, by the fact that the business-cycle patterns of one generation are never likely to apply to the next. Consider: At any moment in the past century, the macroeconomic rules-of-thumb and models of economies’ business-cycle behavior that had dominated forty, thirty, even twenty years before–the ones taught then to undergraduates, assumed as the background for op-eds, and including in the talking points of politicians whose aides wanted them to sound intelligent in answer to the first question and fuzz the answer to the follow-up before ducking away. We can now see that, for fifteen years now, central banks have been well behind the curve in their failure to recognize that the business-cycle pattern of the first post-World War II generations has definitely come to an end. The models and approaches developed to understand the small size of the post-WWII generation’s cycle and its bias toward moderate inflation are wrong today–and are worse than useless because they propagate error.

And this should not come as a surprise. Before World War I there were the truths of the gold standard and its positive effect on “confidence”–the ability of that monetary system to, as Alfred and Mary Marshall put it back in 1885, induce:

confidence [to] return, touch all industries with her magic wand, and make them continue their production and their demand for the wares of others…

and so restore prosperity.

Yet those doctrines proved unhelpful and destructive to economies trying to deal with the environment of the 1920s and 1930s.

Those scarred by the 1970s have, ever since, been always certain that another outbreak of inflation was on the way. They have been certain that central bankers need to be, first of all, hard-nosed men. And so those scarred missed the great tech and stock booms of the end of the first millennium. Their advice was bad then. It is bad now.

More recently, there were those who drew the lesson from the twenty years starting in the mid-1980s that central bankers had finally learned enough to be able to manage an economy to keep the business cycle small–the so-called “Great Moderation”. They were completely unready for 2007-9. And they have had little or nothing useful to say since. Their advice was bad then. It is bad now.

And looking back at this history, right now the odds must be heavy indeed that people are barking up the wrong tree when they, today, fixate on the need for higher interest rates to fight the growth of bubbles. Or when they, today, talk about the danger that central bankers will be unable to resist pressure from elected governments to finance substantial government expenditures via the inflation tax.

The cross-era successes of macroeconomic theory as relevant to policy have been very limited. The principles that have managed to remain true enough to be useful across eras take the form of principles of modesty:

  1. There is the Mill-Fisher insight: We should look closely at the demand for and supply of liquid cash money, because a large excess demand for cash is likely to trigger a large demand shortfall of currently-produced goods and services. But Milton Friedman and others’ attempts to turn this into a rigid mechanical forecasting rule and a rigid mechanical k%/year money-growth policy recommendation blew up in their face.

  2. There is the Wicksell-Keynes insight: We should look closely at the supply of savings and the demand for finance to fund investment. But, again, Walter Heller’s and others’ attempts to turn this into a model that could then be used to guide fine tunings of policy blew up in their face.

  3. There are the Bagehot-Minsky insights: The insights about leverage, debt, and the macro economic consequences of sudden psychological phase transitions of assets from from rock-solid to highly-risky. But so far nobody in the Bagehot-Minsky tradition has even tried to construct a counterpart to the mechanical Keynesianism of the 1960s or the mechanical monetarism of the 1980s.

And by now this has become far too long to be a mere introduction to one of today’s must-reads: the very sharp Adair Turner:

Adair Turner: The Helicopter Money Drop Demands Balance: “Eight years after the 2008 financial crisis…

…the global economy is still stuck…. Money-financed fiscal deficits — more popularly labelled ‘helicopter money’ — seems one of the few policy options left…. The important question is political: can we design rules and responsibilities that ensure monetary finance is only used in appropriate circumstances and quantities?… In the real world… most money is… created… by the banking system… initial stimulus… can be multiplied later by commercial bank credit and money creation… [or] offset by imposing reserve requirements….

The crucial political issue is the danger that once the taboo against monetary finance is broken, governments will print money to support favoured political constituencies, or to overstimulate the economy ahead of elections. But as Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, argued recently, this risk could be controlled by giving independent central banks the authority to determine the maximum quantity of monetary finance….

Can we design a regime that will guard against future excess, and that households, companies and financial markets believe will do so? The answer may turn out to be no: and if so we may be stuck for many more years facing low growth, inflation below target, and rising debt levels. But we should at least debate…

Adair Turner is very sharp. But this is, I think, more-or-less completely wrong: There is no set of institutions that can leap the hurdle that he has set–there never was, and there never will be. But it is madness to say: “Since we cannot find institutions that will guarantee that we follow the right policies, we must keep our particular institutions and policies that force us to adopt the wrong ones.” Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Fix that evil now–with an eye on the future, yes. But don’t tolerate evils today out of fear of the shadows of future evils that are unlikely to come to pass.

Must-Reads: May 22, 2016

Must-Read: Jeremiah Dittmar and Ralf R Meisenzahl: The Protestant Reformation, Economic Institutions, and Development

Must-Read: Jeremiah Dittmar and Ralf R Meisenzahl: The Protestant Reformation, Economic Institutions, and Development: “Origins of growth: How state institutions forged during the Protestant Reformation drove development…

…Throughout history, most states have functioned as kleptocracies and not as providers of public goods. This column analyses the diffusion of legal institutions that established Europe’s first large-scale experiments in mass public education. These institutions originated in Germany during the Protestant Reformation due to popular political mobilisation, but only in around half of Protestant cities. Cities that formalised these institutions grew faster over the next 200 years, both by attracting and by producing more highly skilled residents.

The state can be a rent-extracting institution or a provider of public goods. What happens when the state becomes the provider of public goods?

Recent research suggests that where states have greater capacity to provide public goods, economic outcomes may be superior (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010, Acemoglu et al. 2015). The economics literature has emphasised expansions of state capacity that emerged for geostrategic and military reasons in European history ‘from above’.

In a recent paper (Dittmar and Meisenzahl 2016), we study a unique experiment that shifted legal institutions at the local level – the institutional public goods programme of the Protestant Reformation in Germany.

The institutions that we study were city-level laws that established Europe’s first large-scale experiments with mass public education and significantly expanded the social welfare bureaucracies and state capacities of cities. These legal institutions established a fundamental innovation in funding and oversight for municipal activities – the ‘common chest’, a literal box of funds used to support public services. Significantly, the adoption of these institutions reflected popular political mobilisation.

In our research, we study the local variation in institutions and answer three interrelated questions:

  1. How did these innovations shape development?
  2. Why did some but not all cities adopt these institutions?
  3. What was the political process driving these transformations in German society?

Mapping an institutional upheaval: The local adoption of these new legal institutions was highly variable. In fact, fewer than 55% of cities that adopted Protestantism established legal institutions to support the provision of public goods. We observe variation across neighbouring cities in the same territory, subject to the same territorial lord.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

The impact of institutions on long-run development: We test the hypothesis that cities with city-level Reformation laws by 1600 subsequently grew relatively quickly. Our first finding is that cities that adopted the Reformation institutions grew to be at least 25% larger in 1800 than observably similar cities. In contrast, we find no variation in growth associated with Protestant religion conditional on public goods institutions.

Historical evidence suggests that migration drove city growth in pre-industrial Europe (de Vries 1986, Bairoch 1991, Reith 2008). Existing quantitative evidence on migration is limited. We collect novel microdata on the migration and local formation upper tail human capital (Mokyr 1999, Squicciarini and Voigtlander 2015). Our data, drawn from the Deutsche Biographie, comprise thousands of the most important cultural and economic figures in German history between 1300 and 1800 – jurists, merchants, writers, artists, composers, and educators. We use the data to document the human capital response to institutional change.

Figure 2 shows how migration responded to institutional change by plotting the number of upper tail human capital migrants observed in cities that adopted public goods laws, cities that became Protestant but did not formalise public goods provision, and Catholic cities. These cities were attracting similarly small numbers of migrants before the Reformation, which is marked by the vertical line at 1518. A large shift in migration towards cities with public goods institutions appears in the 1520s, as legal reforms were passed. This gap persisted over the next 200 years and notably was driven by differences in migration from small towns to cities, not by a ‘brain drain’ from less to more desirable cities.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

We similarly find that cities with public goods institutions began producing more upper tail human capital starting after 1520. We find no differences in the local formation of upper tail human capital before the Reformation and 50-200% higher formation of upper tail human capital after the Reformation when we compare cities with laws supporting public goods provision to cities without these institutions.

Why not all cities adopted public goods institutions: The Protestant Reformation was both a religious revival movement and an anti-corruption movement with an institutional agenda. The institutional agenda was designed to expand the provision of public services.

Popular political mobilisation drove the Protestant Reformation. Local elites and city councils initially resisted the introduction of Protestantism (Cameron 1991, Dickens 1979). Civil disobedience and unrest pushed policymakers to meet citizen demands and pass laws establishing the public goods institutions of the Reformation. Differences in institutional outcomes across municipalities reflected differences in local preferences and in political mobilisation, which varied across cities even within the same territory.

How plague outbreaks shifted politics and institutions:The very features that led some communities to welcome religious innovation and to mobilise in support of institutional change may have had independent implications for economic development.

To untangle cause and effect, we study how plague outbreaks in the critical juncture of the early 1500s shifted local politics and pushed otherwise similar cities towards institutional change.

During plague outbreaks incumbent wealthy elites typically fled their home cities or died, reducing their political power (Dinges 1995). Following plague outbreaks, migration into cities increased, changing the composition and politics of the population (Isenmann 2012). During these periods, suffering was acute and civic order could break down. Before the Reformation, plagues led to religious innovations within Catholicism – such as the development of penitential rituals and marches and the construction of church altars to ‘plague saints.’

During the Reformation – with the introduction of political and religious competition – plagues suddenly operated as institutional shifters. Plagues operated as institutional shifters not only because they caused extreme suffering, but specifically because Protestants and Catholics were differentiated in the market for religion in their institutional programme and teachings regarding the plague.

We study local plague outbreaks in the early 1500s as a source of plausibly random variation in institutional change. The intuition is that plagues that hit the generation in place when the Reformation broke across German cities were random, conditional on long-run levels and trends. In the data, we find that an additional plague in the early 1500s increased the probability of adopting the new legal institutions by 10-25%.

To illustrate the research design, Figure 3 shows the timing of plague outbreaks in select cities. In Figure 3, we highlight the period 1500 to 1522, which serves as the baseline period that we use to study the implications of the plague for institutional change.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

To document the unique relationship between plagues in the early 1500s, institutions, and growth, we study plague outbreaks across the entire period from 1400 to 1600. Figure 4 plots the point estimates from rolling instrumental variable (IV) regressions that study log city population in 1800 as the outcome. We estimate these regressions shifting the time period, which we use as the plague exposure IV for institutional change year-by-year. There is no significant relationship between plagues across the 1400s and subsequent institutional change and the 2SLS estimates of the population growth impact of induced variation in institutions are insignificant. In the early 1500s, these relationships change. With the introduction of religious and political competition, we see plague exposure being activated as an institutional shifter with development consequences in the early 1500s.

The Protestant Reformation economic institutions and development VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

Conclusion: During the Protestant Reformation, some but not all German cities adopted new municipal legal institutions. These institutions expanded state capacity and established public schooling. The cities that adopted these institutions grew faster over the next 200 years. These cities attracted and produced more upper tail human capital individuals and embarked on more dynamic development trajectories. Cities that adopted Protestantism but did not formalise public goods institutions in law had no similar advantage.

Our results strongly suggest that human capital was not dormant, waiting to be ‘activated’ during the Industrial Revolution – it was instead a fundamental driver of growth over the early modern period. More broadly, our findings suggest that the Protestant Reformation was a canonical model of the emergence and implications of state capacity driven by political movements that challenge elites.

Authors’ note: The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.


References:

Acemoglu, D, C Garcia-Jimeno and J Robinson (2015) ‘State capacity and economic development: A network approach’, American Economic Review, 105: 2364-2409.

Bairoch, P (1991) Cities and economic development: From the dawn of history to the present, University of Chicago Press.

Besley, T and T Persson (2009) ‘The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics’, American Economic Review, 99: 1218-44.

Besley, T and T Persson (2010) ‘State capacity, conflict, and development’, Econometrica, 78: 1-34.

Cameron, E (1991) The European Reformation, History Reference Center, Clarendon Press.

De Vries, J (2006) European Urbanization, 1500-1800, Routledge.

Dickens, A (1979) ‘Intellectual and social forces in the German Reformation’, in Mommsen, W (ed), Stadtburgertum und Adel in der Reformation, Ernst Klett.

Dinges, M (1995) ‘Pest und Staat: Von der Institutionengeschichte zur Sozialen Konstruktion?‘, in Dinges, M and T Schilch (eds) Neue Wege in der Seuchengeschichte, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart.

Dittmar, J and R Meisenzahl (2016) ‘State capacity and public goods: Institutional change, human capital, and growth in early modern Germany’, Working paper, LSE Centre for Economic Performance and Federal Reserve Board.

Isenmann, E (2012) Die Deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter 1150-1550, Bohlau.

Mokyr, J (2009) The enlightened economy: An economic history of Britain, 1700-1850, New Economic History of Britain, Yale University Press.

Reith, R (2008) ‘Circulation of skilled labour in late medieval Central Europe’, in Epstein, S and M Prak (eds) Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Squicciarini, M and N Voigtlander (2015) ‘Human capital and industrialization: Evidence from the age of Enlightenment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130: 1825-83.”

Must-Read: Dietrich Vollrath: Can We Get Rich by “Doing Business” Better?

Must-Read: Dietrich Vollrath: Can We Get Rich by “Doing Business” Better?: “Below I’m going to get to the gory details of why the Doing Business (DB) indicators generally suck…

…But let me start with this note. The DB index [John] Cochrane uses is a ‘distance to the frontier’ index. Meaning you get a number that tells you how close to best practices in business conditions a country gets. If you are at the best practices in all categories, you’d get a 100. Cochrane says, and I quote, ‘If America could improve on the best seen in other countries by 10%, a 110 score would generate $400,000 income per capita…’. Stew on that for a moment. Think about how that DB frontier index is constructed.

Cochrane went there. He said it could go to 11….

[…]

It Gets Worse: In the follow up post, Cochrane appeals to a graph from my textbook with Chad Jones… the relationship of an index of ‘social infrastructure’ and TFP…. I calculated it, graphed it, and stuck it on the slide that Cochrane linked to. I simply scaled and averaged the 6 different components of the World Bank’s governance indicators, much like the DB index. It has all the issues I described above, except worse. This figure tells us very little. Which is why in the book we immediately say that you cannot infer anything causal from it, and then go on to talk about some of the better studies done looking at specific institutions and their effects on economic outcomes…

Can we get rich by Doing Business better Dietrich Vollrath