Why Does the Federal Reserve Take 2%/Year Inflation to Be a Ceiling Rather than a Target?

Preview of Central Banks and Economic Structure Since 2009 the Federal Reserve and other global north

A Hypothesis: Some (many?) Federal Reserve policymakers seem to believe that if there is a recession, they lose.

And they also believe that if inflation gets above 2%/year they will be unable to reduce it to 2%/year without a recession.

Thus they do not take an “optimal control” view of the situation at all. Instead, they seek above all else to avoid getting into a situation in which they will have to take active steps to reduce the inflation rate, because they do not believe they can do so without generating something that will be called a recession.

This is a dangerous and a bad habit of thought for them to have…

Should-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Public Investment and Fiscal Rules

Should-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Public Investment and Fiscal Rules: “When I started writing this paper with Jonathan Portes…

…I was genuinely unclear about whether fiscal targets should be for the total deficit… or for the current balance (which excludes it)…. By the time the paper was finalised, and later when it came to proposing a rule that the Labour party could adopt, it was clear to me that any target should be for the current balance, with a separate target for the public investment to GDP ratio.

We can see a very strong argument for doing that right now. Jean Pisani-Ferry is one of a steady stream of economists saying that it really is time to increase public investment, and they are backed up by international organisations. But despite all this being true for some time, there is very little sign of governments taking much notice. As Pisani-Ferry notes: “On average, governments are using the gains implied by lower interest rates to spend a bit more or to reduce taxes, rather than to launch comprehensive investment programs.” The political economy reason… is straightforward enough…. Both current and capital spending have been squeezed…. In a recession it is generally easier and less painful to cut an investment project than fire some nurses or teachers. The danger with deficit targets is therefore than whenever these targets bite, public investment is the first to suffer…

Must-Read: Nathan Lane: Manufacturing Revolutions: Industrial Policy and Networks in South Korea

Must-Read: Nathan Lane: Manufacturing Revolutions: Industrial Policy and Networks in South Korea: “This paper uses a historic big push intervention and newly digitized data from South Korea to
study the effects of industrial policy on (short- and long-run) industrial development…

…In 1973 South Korea transitioned to a military dictatorship and drastically changed their development strategy. I find industries targeted by the regime’s big push grew significantly more than non-targeted industries along several key dimensions of industrial development. These developmental effects persisted after industrial policies were retrenched, following the 1979 assassination of the president. Furthermore, I estimate the spillovers of the industrial policies using exogenous variation in the exposure to the policy across the input-output network. I find evidence of persistent pecuniary externalities like those posited by big push development theorists, such as Albert Hirschman. In other words, I find that South Korea’s controversial industrial policy was successful in producing industrial development, the benefits of which persisted through time and in industries not directly targeted by the policies.

Must-Read: Cosma Shalizi: Ernest Gellner, 1925-1995

Must-Read: Cosma Shalizi: Ernest Gellner, 1925-1995: “Most of these themes themselves revolve around the ‘great hump’ or ‘great ditch’, which divides the modern world from pre-modern civilizations…

…On the far side… from us lies Agraria, a realm of “agro-literate polities” subject to “the tyranny of kings or cousins (or both)”, consisting mostly of highly isolated, custom-bound, illiterate rural producers with magical, ritualistic, socially-oriented religions, dominated and exploited by “the red and the black,” expert coercers and literate classes practicing various technically ineffective, self-confirming, meaningful or enchanted forms of cognition, which tended more towards universalism, rule-boundedness and scripturalism than did the folk-cults. Those of us on this side of the ditch have “escaped from the idiocy of rural life”… through a lucky accident, a “miracle”… in an otherwise none-too-promising penninsula of Asia, circumstances conspired to bring forth a kind of cognition which was cumulative, technically effective, and of no value as either a social cement or an emotional comfort–science, and the epistemologies descended from Descartes (in Gellner’s view, much better as charters for science, and prescriptive accounts of how to go about it, than as descriptions of how the world works or how messy human beings actually think)….

Combined with classes of people… more interested in producing wealth than in either theological or political disputes, and polities…. in exchange for tax[es that] were willing to let them alone… production became dominant… eventually buying off the population at large…. Socially, these societies are (at least relative to their predecessors) liberal, permissive, rich, powerful, secularized, engaged in “single-stranded” activities (e.g., in buying food we worry about taste and cost, not marriage alliances or the need not to alienate our grocer lest he not stand with us in the next feud), peaceful, atomized, economically unstable and culturally homogenous. The last two, economic change and cultural homogeneity, are, Gellner claims, connected, and together give rise to nationalism: his theory of how this happens is brilliant, innovative and convincing….

There’s more, of course… thoughts on how to get beliefs to spread without their passing proper tests of cognitive legitimacy… the effects of crossing the ditch on the former “artisans of cognition”… the “Rubber Cage” of advanced industrialism, where rationality in science and production co-exists with exuberant nonsense in the rest of life… Ibn Khaldun… society; why contemporary Islamic societies are not secularizing; the problems with… Popper, Quine…. I’d recommend starting with… Plough, Sword, and Book, and Nations and Nationalism.

Should-Read: Simon Johnson: The Politics of Job Polarization

Should-Read: Simon Johnson: The Politics of Job Polarization: “Highly educated people at the top of the income distribution are doing better than ever…

…people with only a high school education face declining incomes, living standards, and prospects for themselves and their children. The middle class is being torn apart…. Many middle-skill, middle-income, middle-class jobs have disappeared. The new jobs that have emerged are well paid for highly educated people and poorly paid for people who have only a high school education. A leading symptom–but only a symptom–is the disappearance of well-paid factory jobs…. This technology-driven trend has been compounded by the effects of decreased transportation and communication costs, making it cheaper to move goods over long distances… easier to move manufacturing activity overseas to lower-wage locations….

The Republicans[‘]… policies… lowering personal and corporate taxes…. Repeal of… health-care reform… financial deregulation… confrontational trade measures…. Given the role of technology in displacing workers, protectionism–tearing up trade agreements and imposing tariffs on Chinese and Mexican goods–won’t bring back high-paying manufacturing jobs, and Trump has no plan B…

Missing the Economic Big Picture

Project Syndicate: Missing the Economic Big Picture: BERKELEY – I recently heard former World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy paraphrasing a classic Buddhist proverb, wherein China’s Sixth Buddhist Patriarch Huineng tells the nun Wu Jincang: “When the philosopher points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger.” Lamy added that, “Market capitalism is the moon. Globalization is the finger.” With anti-globalization sentiment now on the rise throughout the West, this has been quite a year for finger-watching… **Read MOAR at Project Syndicate

Should-Read: Abhijit Bannerjee: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India

Should-Read: Abhijit Bannerjee: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India: “Sometimes you hear people say ‘RCTs are so small: how can you generalize?’ There are so many people in this RCT that we could populate two small European countries with them.”

Should-Read: Brad Setser: China’s Dual Equilibria

Should-Read: Brad Setser: China’s Dual Equilibria: “Not just multiple possible exchange rate equilibria… at least two different possible macroeconomic equilibria…

…In the “strong” yuan equilibrium, outflows are kept at a level that China can support out of its current goods trade surplus…. A larger “on-budget” central government fiscal deficit—together with an expansion of social insurance—keep demand up, even as investment falls. In the “weak” yuan equilibrium, China lets the market drive its currency lower—and a weaker currency increases the trade and current account surplus. Such surpluses would finance sustained capital outflows in excess of half a trillion dollars a year without the need to dip further into China’s reserves. The resulting surpluses would be shockingly large…. A larger trade surplus would also provide support for the economy. As investment slows, China would in effect pivot back to exports–and it wouldn’t need to use the central government’s fiscal space to support demand. Both are plausible…

The modern way to maintain an undervalued currency isn’t to intervene to weaken your currency. It is to step back and allow the market to drive your currency down–-And then intervene to resist subsequent pressure to appreciate (and rebuild reserves) when the market turns…

Must-Reads: November 29, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Is the cost of childcare driving women out of the U.S. workforce?

In this May 6, 2015, file photo Saryah Mitchell, sits with her mother, Teisa, Gay, left, a rally calling for increased child care subsidies at the Capitol in Sacramento, Calif. In much of the U.S., families spend more on child care for two kids than on housing. And if you’re a woman, it’s likely you earn less than your male colleagues even though one in four households with kids relies on mom as the sole or primary breadwinner.

The U.S. unemployment rate now stands at 4.9 percent, a seemingly healthy level last experienced prior to the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Yet what is not reflected in this statistic is the growing number of Americans who have dropped out of the labor force altogether. Economists are still puzzled by this decline in the so called “labor force participation rate”—meaning the percentage of Americans that either have a job or are actively looking—especially among Americans between the ages of 25 to 54, who are supposed to be at the peak of their working life.

Scholars and policymakers interested in this trend mostly focus on the U.S. labor force’s “guy problem,” but the number of women in the labor force is amid a two-decade-long decline that began just as the cost of childcare began to rise. Are the two trends related? And if so, how big an effect does higher childcare costs have on women’s employment?

A recently released job market paper by So Kubota, a Ph.D. candidate in economics at Princeton University, attempts to tackle these questions. Kubota looks at women’s employment from 1985 to 2011. At the beginning of this period, women were entering the workforce in droves, and by the early 1990s the United States had one of the highest female labor force participation rates in the world. Today, however, many of our peer countries, economically speaking, have far surpassed the United States in this realm. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

What happened? Research by economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn at Cornell University finds that the United States’ lack of family friendly policies to support women in their prime childbearing and career years explains one-third of the decrease in women’s labor force participation. The U.S. political landscape contrasts with many European countries, which have enacted and expanded policies such as paid parental leave, childcare subsidies, and part-time work entitlements to encourage women’s employment.

Kubota’s work complements Blau and Kahn’s work, and finds that large increases in the costs of childcare in the United States also play a role. Between 1990 and 2010—a period in which wages stagnated for many workers—the hourly cost of childcare rose 32 percent. (Childcare workers did not experience a corresponding rise in wages and today make about 40 percent less than the national median wage.) There are many theories about why costs rose as much as they did, but Kubota suggests that it was largely driven by a series of state and federal policy changes over the same period.

Kubota finds that rising childcare expenditures by families resulted in an estimated five percent decline in total employment of women and a 13 percent decline in the employment of working mothers with children under the age of five. In many ways, these results are unsurprising. Childcare is the single biggest monthly expense for some families (it exceeds the average cost of in-state college tuition in more than half of the states) while one third of parents who use childcare say that it has caused a financial problem for their household.

As prices rose, many parents began to rely less on fee-based childcare, instead seeking out other informal arrangements such as grandparents or other family member. But these kinds of arrangements are less reliable. And when they fall through, women are more likely than men to be the one to pick up the slack.

Kubota points out that his paper examines the effects of rising childcare costs on female labor supply, but adds that “it also has a significant factor on total labor supply.” Among today’s families, work-family conflict is no longer just a “women’s issue.” Women are breadwinners in 40 percent of families, and men are taking on more housework and childcare than ever before (although still significantly less than women). In fact, 60 percent of fathers in dual-earner couples reported work-family conflict.

The drop in the U.S. labor force participation rate among men and women should concern policymakers for several reasons. First of all, it has a considerable impact on U.S. economic performance and growth. And, considering most families now rely on two incomes to stay afloat, more women leaving the workforce threatens family economic security. Women’s long-term earnings and financial well-being also are at risk, reducing their accumulation of long-term savings and the ability to be financially viable in the case of divorce or a partner’s death.

Addressing the growing childcare crisis in the United States as well as helping parents by enacting other work-family supports are critical to helping more women stay in the labor force, bolstering family economic security and ensuring more robust and sustained economic growth.