Grant Category

Market Structure

Are markets becoming less competitive and, if so, why, and what are the larger implications?

The premise of a market economy is that broad-based economic gains come from a well-functioning market. Yet there is evidence that growing economic inequality is undermining our society’s ability to act collectively in pursuit of the nation’s welfare. When stakeholders who comprise economic systems subvert institutions for their own gain, the economy loses. If markets are becoming less competitive, the resulting increase in monopoly power could be contributing to these problems.

New data-driven research provides more evidence that markets are increasingly concentrated and that, in many cases, this is indicative of a reduction in competition. Markups, the traditional measure of monopoly power, are growing. Investment and new business start-ups have been falling steadily even as corporate profits are rising. At the same time, labor income as a share of national income is falling. Does the economy suffer from a monopoly problem and, if so, why, and what are the larger implications?

We are interested in research from an aggregate perspective, which has been common in the macroeconomic and labor literatures, as well as sectoral analysis that has been the focus of industrial organization literatures.

  • The causes of increased concentration
  • Consequences of concentration for productivity, investment, and economic growth
  • Consequences of concentration for labor markets and power

Explore the Grants We've Awarded

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Competitive Implications of Generative AI Terms & Conditions: An Empirical Study

Grant Year: 2025

Grant Amount: $48,000

Grant Type: academic

Firms in the generative AI ecosystem offer their products with strings attached: terms and conditions that purport to impose legal restrictions on user behavior. This project will study the terms and conditions of more than 100 genAI firms and would be the first large-scale effort to document this issue systematically. Research in other digital markets and exploratory research in the genAI space indicate that these terms could pose at least two significant competition problems. First, by effectively depriving users of the right to bring private antitrust claims against genAI firms, genAI terms and conditions could erode one of the three pillars of an effective antitrust enterprise. Second, genAI firms have begun to impose noncompete restrictions on users. These restrictions could raise entry barriers and lead to more highly concentrated markets—a recipe for less dynamism and dampened innovation. Yet policymakers and researchers currently know very little about how ubiquitous or restrictive these genAI terms actually are in practice. This research will offer data-driven analysis and responsive policy prescriptions for these nascent, critically important markets.

Market Power in Homebuilding and the U.S. Housing Shortage

Grant Year: 2025

Grant Amount: $15,000

Grant Type: academic

This project brings together two important U.S. economic policy areas: the housing shortage and market power. The author will use cutting-edge tools from industrial organization to test firm conduct and answer the question of whether market power among homebuilders can explain the under-supply of new housing, particularly entry-level units, or whether their economies of scale reduce costs.

Labor Market Collusion through Common Leadership

Grant Year: 2024

Grant Amount: $30,000

Grant Type: academic

This project studies how firms collude in labor markets, studying an overlooked potential mechanism: common leadership, in which the same person holds high-level leadership positions in two competing firms. Common leadership is prohibited by antitrust law, but until the past few years, enforcement was nearly nonexistent. This study focuses on collusion in labor markets in the form of no-poach agreements—specifically, how entry into such agreements affects worker mobility and career trajectories. Preliminary results find entry into collusive agreements in the years following connection through common leadership. No-poach agreements are extremely difficult to study since they are secret in nature. The author will use the largest known case of labor market collusion to overcome this data challenge. In the late 2000s, more than 50 tech companies entered into no-poach agreements. She will use three primary sources of data: court documents, data on worker histories, and biographical data on company executives.

Big Daycare: The Impact of Private Equity-Owned Child Care Businesses on the Market for Early Care and Education

Grant Year: 2024

Grant Amount: $30,000

Grant Type: academic

This project aims to fill the gap on the impact that private-equity-owned child care businesses have on the structure and functioning of the early child care market. The author seeks to answer the following questions: How does private equity affect the market for early career and education? In particular, how different are private-equity-backed child care centers from other child care centers? How do centers change when taken over by a private equity firm? How does the entrance of a private-equity-backed center impact other private and public providers? This research is poised to fill a large void in the child care literature: the role of for-profit providers and, in particular, the effects of new entrants and private-equity-owned operations into child care markets.   

Geospatial Heterogeneity in Inflation: A Market Concentration Story

Grant Year: 2023

Grant Amount: $15,000

Grant Type: doctoral

This project will examine whether there are heterogenous inflation rates across the United States. If so, the authors plan to identify which areas face higher rates of inflation and what mechanisms drive the observed differences. More specifically, the authors will use regional Nielsen Retail Scanner data from 2006–2016 to measure food inflation. This project will also analyze the effects of local market concentration on inflation, adding to the evidence base needed to effectively measure the heterogeneous effects of inflation.

Tracking Hospital Mergers and Understanding Which Markets are Changing

Grant Year: 2023

Grant Amount: $55,000

Grant Type: academic

This project will create a database of hospital mergers over the past 40 years. The database will detail the following: where health systems are merging or divesting to understand which areas/people (including demographic differences) are affected; whether that differs between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals; and whether higher-priced hospitals continue to provide higher-quality care. Beyond the dataset construction, the project will map areas with 2+, 3+, and 4+ hospitals and produce descriptive statistics at various geographic levels. The research team will track the growth in health systems that resulted from acquisitions by analyzing whether for-profit health systems were strategically acquiring hospitals in regions with more affluent, privately insured patients. This project will contribute to our understanding of the impacts of hospital mergers on equity, patient access, and quality of care.

Experts

Grantee

David Levine

University of California, Berkeley

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Ashvin Gandhi

University of California, Los Angeles

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Lee Tucker

U.S. Census Bureau

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Stephen Roll

Washington University in St. Louis

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Jacob Robbins

University of Illinois at Chicago

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