Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Scam They Am

Scam They Am The New York Times

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Scam They Am: “Eric Lipton and Jennifer Steinhauer… find that the…

[Tea Party] PACs… [of] the Freedom Fraud caucus are basically in it for the money… consultants’ fees… paid to the… people organizing the drives…. As Rick Perlstein pointed out several years ago, the modern conservative movement is in large part a ‘strategic alliance of snake-oil vendors and conservative true believers’ with ‘a cast of mind that makes it hard for either them or us to discern where the ideological con ended and the money con began.’… Goldbuggism, for example, is intimately tied to direct-marketing schemes for gold coins and gold certificates…. The American Seniors Association… bills itself as a conservative… AARP… [but] is a for-profit enterprise whose goal is to sell me insurance. And so on. This is surely a[n]… important part of our political story…. Obama- and Hillary-hatred… much of it is generated by scammers out to make a buck off the racism and misogyny of some–sad to say, fairly many–older white men.

The two classic readings on this are: Rick Perlstein**: [The Long Con](http://thebaffler.com/salvos/the-long-con); **David Frum**: [The Fox News Wink](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/08/fox-news-email-chains.html). It is an attempt to identify those Americans with the very-poorest reality testing and mobilize them politically–but only tertiarily to get them to vote. The primary objective is to scam them directly. The secondary objective is to terrify them, and so keep their eyeballs glued so that they can be sold to advertisers.

Central Banks Are Not Agricultural Marketing Boards: Depression Economics, Inflation Economics and the Unsustainability of Friedmanism

Central Banks Are Not Agricultural Marketing Boards: Depression Economics, Inflation Economics and the Unsustainability of Friedmanism

Insofar as there is any thought behind the claims of John Taylor and others that the Federal Reserve is engaged in “price controls” via its monetary policy actions.

Strike that.

There is no thought at all behind such claims at all.

Insofar as one did want to think, and so construct an argument that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy operations are destructive and in some ways analogous to “price controls”, the argument would go something like this:

The Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee’s operations are like those of an agriculture marketing board–a government agency that sets the price for, say, some agricultural product like butter or milk. Some of what is offered for sale at that price that is not taken up by the private market, and the rest is bought by the government to keep the price at its target. And the next month the government finds it must buy more. And more. And more.

Such policies produce excess supplies that then must be stored or destroyed: they produce butter mountains, and milk lakes.

The resources used to produce the butter mountains and milk lakes is wasted–it could be deployed elsewhere more productively. The taxes that must be raised to pay for the purchase of the butter and milk that makes up the mountains and the lakes discourages enterprise and employment elsewhere in the economy, and makes us poorer. Taxes are raised (at the cost of an excess burden on taxpayers) and then spent to take the products of the skill and energy of workers and… throw them away. Much better, the standard argument goes, to eliminate the marketing board, let the price find its free-market equilibrium value, provide incentives for people to move out of the production of dairy products into sectors where private demand for their work exists, and keep taxes low.

Now you can see that a central bank is exactly like an agricultural marketing board, except for the following little minor details:

  1. An agricultural marketing board must impose taxes to raise the money finance its purchases of butter and milk. A central bank simply prints–at zero cost–the money to finance its purchase of bonds.
  2. The butter mountains and milk lakes that the agricultural marketing board owns cannot be sold without pushing the price down below its free-market equilibrium and thus negating the purpose of the board. A central bank does not want to sell its bond mountains, but merely to collect interest and hold them to maturity, at which point they are simply money mountains.
  3. The butter mountains and milk lakes are useless for the agricultural marketing board: all it can do with them is simply watch them rot away. The bond mountain turns into a money mountain–seigniorage–which the central bank then gives to the government, which lowers taxes as a result.

So a central bank is exactly like an agricultural marketing board–NOT!!! They are identical–except that they are completely different.

But, somewhat smarter John Taylor and others might say, a central bank is like an agricultural marketing board. The extra money it puts into circulation when its bonds mature and it transfers profits to the government devalue and debauch the currency. It raises the real resources needed to finance its bond purchases by levying an “inflation tax” on money holders–by reducing the value of their cash just as an income tax reduces the (after-tax) value of incomes.

And I would agree, if the inflation comes. Under conditions of what I like to call Inflation Economics, money-printing and bond purchases do push the interest rate below the natural rate of interest–push bond prices above their natural price–as defined by Knut Wicksell. Money-printing and bond purchases then do indeed cause economic problems somewhat analogous to those of a marketing board that keeps the prices of butter and milk above their natural price.

But what if the inflation does not come? What if our economy’s phase is one of not Inflation Economics but Depression Economics, in which the central bank is not pushing the interest rate below its Wicksellian natural rate but is instead stuck trying to manage a situation in which the Wicksellian natural rate of interest is less than zero?

Then the analogies break down completely. Money-printing is then not an inflationary tax but instead a utility-increasing provision of utility services. Bond purchases do not create an overhang that cannot be sold without creating an opposite distortion from the optimal price but instead push the temporal slope of the price system toward what a benevolent central planner would want the temporal slope of the price level to be.

Milton Friedman was very clear that economies could either have too much money (Inflation Economics) or too little money (Depression Economics)–and that a central bank was needed to try to hit the sweet spot. He hoped that hitting the sweet spot could be made into a somewhat automatic rule-controlled process, but he was wrong.

So trying to construct a thinking argument that central banks are engaged in something analogous to “price controls” via their monetary policy actions leads even a substantially sub-Turing entity to the conclusion: Sometimes, under conditions of “Inflation Economics”, but not now.

And let me offer all kudos to those like David Beckworth, Scott Sumner, and Jim Pethokoukis who are trying to convince their political allies of these points that I regard as basic and Wicksellian–cutting-edge macro from 125 years ago. But I think that Paul Krugman is right when he believes that they are going to fail. Let me turn the mike over to Paul Krugman to explain why he thinks they are going to fail:

Paul Krugman: More Artificial Unintelligence: “David Beckworth pleads with fellow free-marketeers to stop claiming that…

…low interest rates are “artificial” and comparing them to price controls…. The Fed isn’t imposing a price ceiling… monetary policy… nothing at all like price controls…. What interest rates would be in the absence of distortions and rigidities [is] the Wicksellian natural rate…. The actual interest rate, at zero, is above the natural rate…. But… Beckworth should be asking… why almost nobody on the right is willing to think… not just… ignoramuses like Rand Paul and George Will. The “low interest rates = price controls” meme is bang-your-head-on-the-table stupid–but… John Taylor…. [It’s] a line of argument that people on the right really, really like….

Beckworth is… tak[ing] the… Friedman position… trusting markets… except… [for] the business cycle…. This is… [intellectually] problematic…. You need… market failure to give monetary policy large real effects, and… why… is the only important failure?…

Let me, as an aside, point out that it could indeed be the case that monetary policy joins police, courts, and defense as they only significant areas in which the costs of rent-seeking, regulatory-capture, and other government failures are less than the costs of the market failures that the government could successfully neutralize. It’s unlikely. But it’s possible. Indeed, Milton Friedman thought that that was the case. And he was not at all a dumb man. And laying down general rules sector-by-sector about the relative magnitudes of market and government failures is almost surely a mistake. As John Maynard Keynes wrote in his “The End of Laissez-Faire”:

We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail what Burke termed: “one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion…”

But let’s give the mike back to Krugman to make his major point:

More important… this position turns out to be politically unsustainable. “Government is always the problem, not the solution, except when it comes to monetary policy” just doesn’t cut it for modern conservatives. Nor did it cut it for traditional conservatives. Remember, during the 1930s people like Hayek were liquidationists, with Hayek specifically denouncing expansionary monetary policy during a slump as “the creation of artificial demand.” The era of Friedmanism, of free-market views paired with tolerance for monetary stimulus, was a temporary and unsustainable interlude, and no amount of sensible argumentation will bring it back.

But this doesn’t mean that Jim, Scott, David, and company should not try, no? It is not just the Milton Friedman was a galaxy-class expert at playing intellectual Three-Card Monte, no? It is true that at times my breath is still taken away at Friedman’s gall in claiming that a “neutral” and “non-interventionist” monetary policy was one which had the Federal Reserve Bank of New York buying and selling bonds every single day in a frantic attempt to make Say’s Law, false in theory, true in practice. But he wiped the floor with the Hayekians intellectually, culturally, academically, and politically for two generations.

Krugman’s line “claiming that laissez-faire is best for everything save monetary policy (and property rights, and courts, and police, and defense) is intellectually unstable and unsustainable in the long-run” may well be true. But as somebody-or-other once said:

This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again…


UPDATE: And I should add a link to Krugman’s original:

Paul Krugman: Artificial Unintelligence: “In the early stages of the Lesser Depression…

…those of us who knew a bit about the… 1930s… felt… despair…. People who imagined themselves sophisticated and possessed of deep understanding were resurrecting 75-year-old fallacies and presenting them as deep insights…. [Today] I feel an even deeper sense of despair–because people are still rolling out those same fallacies, even though in the interim those of us who remembered and understood Keynes/Hicks have been right about most things, and those lecturing us have been wrong about everything. So here’s William Cohan in the Times, declaring that the Fed should ‘show some spine’ and raise rates even though there is no sign of accelerating inflation. His reasoning….

The price of borrowing money–interest rates–should be determined by supply and demand, not by manipulation by a market behemoth….

[However,] the Fed sets interest rates, whether it wants to or not–even a supposed hands-off policy has to involve choosing the level of the monetary base somehow…. How would you know if the Fed is setting rates too low? Here’s where Hicks meets Wicksell: rates are too low if the economy is overheating and inflation is accelerating. Not exactly what we’ve seen in the era of zero rates and QE…. There are arguments that the Fed should be willing to abandon its inflation target so as to discourage bubbles. I think those arguments are wrong-but… they have nothing to do with the notion that current rates are somehow artificial, that we should let rates be determined by ‘supply and demand’. The worrying thing is that… crude misunderstandings… are widespread even among people who imagine themselves well-informed and sophisticated. Eighty years of hard economic thinking, and seven years of overwhelming confirmation of that hard thinking, have made no dent in their worldview. Awesome.

Must-Read: Matt Phillips: Bernanke: I’m not really a Republican anymore

Must-Read: As I have said before and will stay again, the Republican Party could be taking a serious policy victory lap right now, not just with respect to health policy–as Mitt Romney tried to do yesterday before losing his nerve and pulling back–and with respect to monetary policy. they could be pointing out right now that the most successful recovery in the North Atlantic from 2008-9 was engineered by Republican Ben Bernanke following Friedmanite countercyclical monetary policies.

But no!

They would rather be Hayekians, predicting imminent hyperinflation…

Why? I think it’s the Fox News-ification of political discourse: terrify people in the hope that you will then gain their attention and they will give you money…

Matt Phillips: Bernanke: I’m not really a Republican anymore: “Ben Bernanke has publicly broken ranks with the Republican party…

…In one of the more revealing passages of… The Courage to Act… [he] lays out his experience with Republican lawmakers during the twin financial and economic crises….Continual run-ins with hard-right Republicans… pushed him away from the party that first put him in charge of the Fed….

[T]he increasing hostility of the Republicans to the Fed and to me personally troubled me, particularly since I had been appointed by a Republican president who had supported our actions during the crisis. I tried to listen carefully and accept thoughtful criticisms. But it seemed to me that the crisis had helped to radicalize large parts of the Republican Party….

The former Princeton economics professor said he had:

lost patience with Republicans’ susceptibility to the know-nothing-ism of the far right. I didn’t leave the Republican Party. I felt that the party left me.

He later concludes: ‘I view myself now as a moderate independent, and I think that’s where I’ll stay’…

And Mitt Romney Throws Off the Mask!

Mitt Romney: [The late Staples founder Thomas Stemberg was] an extraordinarily creative and dynamic visionary…. Mr. Stemberg was one of the great business leaders…

…of our state and our nation,’ Romney said. ‘He was not only the founder, but someone who grew the company to a multi-billion dollar enterprise. He built an industry that employs thousands and thousands of people…. Without Tom pushing it, I don’t think we would have had Romneycare. Without Romneycare, I don’t think we would have Obamacare. So, without Tom a lot of people wouldn’t have health insurance…

Mind you, Romney could claim he was criticizing the late Tom Stemberg–“without Tom, a lot of people wouldn’t have health insurance through RomneyCare and ObamaCare, and that would be a better world than this.” But somehow I don’t think Romney is going to go there.

I mean… Romney had so many opportunities over the past six years to play a constructive role… He took advantage of none of them… I… I can’t even…

Weekend reading

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

A number of recent studies point toward the importance of “rents”—extra returns above and beyond what’s expected in a competitive market—and market power in the U.S. economy. The chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers and the former director of the Office of Management and Budget link the rise of rents to the rise in income inequality.

Whether you think the U.S. government needs more revenue to help deal with balancing the budget or to expand government programs, increasing taxes on the rich seems to be a likely answer. A look at different potential tax rates for those at the top shows that raising their taxes could generate quite a bit of revenue.

Entrepreneurship is widely praised in the United States. But policy trying to spur it isn’t well-targeted. And economists really don’t know what causes it.

Economist Arthur Okun famously asked people to consider how much money they’d be willing to lose as part of the redistribution of income. For most of the past 40 years, it was an interesting thought experiment. Now, thanks to a new paper, we can put some numbers on the amount of leakage.

Links from around the web

“There simply isn’t enough room in the limited financial pipelines flowing into new businesses, to accommodate the immense gusher of cash coming from established ones.” J.W. Mason continues his investigation into what happens to corporate funds paid out as share buybacks. [the slack wire]

The decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate since the beginning of the Great Recession has made some people question what people outside of the labor force are doing. Are they all unemployed? Josh Zumbrun digs into the data and tells us what we know about the 92 million Americans not in the labor force. [wsj]

U.S. short-term interest rates have been at zero for almost seven years now, but when the Federal Reserve starts hiking rates, they might not go up that much. Interest rates have been falling for decades now, and it’s time to get used to it, says Noah Smith. [bloomberg view]

Restaurants in America seem to be having trouble recruiting more chefs. Or at least they’re claiming they are. Like the economy at large, the answer to getting the right talent may simply require raising wages for workers, argues Shane Ferro. [huff post]

Young Americans are less likely to own homes today than previous generations were when they were young. While the housing market is recovering, the trends are ugly for both potential buyers and renters. Jordan Weissmann shows it’s hard out there for a Millennial. [slate]

Friday figure

Figure from “A tale of three U.S. employment-to-population ratios” by Nick Bunker.

Noted for the Morning of October 23, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Michael Clemens: The South Pacific Secret to Breaking the Poverty Cycle

Must-Read: Michael Clemens: The South Pacific Secret to Breaking the Poverty Cycle: “The average Tongan household that participated was earning just NZ$1,400 per year…

…before these jobs. The average worker who participated earned NZ$12,000 for just a few months of work. It multiplied low-income workers’ earnings by a factor of 10. Almost no other antipoverty project you’ve ever heard of can claim that. Imagine what that did to poverty…. This project was ‘among the most effective development policies evaluated to date.’ And it did that not by taking money away from New Zealanders, but by adding value to the New Zealand economy. What’s working against poverty? International labor mobility….

The last time the United Nations set global goals to fight poverty, back in 2000, it completely ignored the power of labor mobility. The Millennium Development Goals, bizarrely, mentioned migration exclusively in negative and harmful terms…. This time… [they] at least mention migration…. But they decline to mention any possibility of actually facilitating migration…. The authors… still think that mobility doesn’t matter much for global poverty. That just does not make sense in a world where remittances to poor countries are several times as large as foreign aid. It does not make sense in a world where barriers to mobility cost the world trillions of dollars every year. What’s working against poverty is international mobility. And it will keep working to help meet the Global Goals for fighting poverty–largely in spite of them.

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Lunch with Ben Bernanke

Martin Wolf: Lunch with the FT: Ben Bernanke: “Critics complain that the Fed… let ordinary people drown…

…How does he respond? ‘Rising inequality… is a long-term trend that goes back at least to the 1970s. And the notion that the Fed has somehow enriched the rich through increasing asset prices doesn’t really hold up… [because] the Fed basically has returned asset prices… to trend… [and] stock prices are high… because returns are low…. The same people who criticise the Fed for helping the rich also criticise the Fed for hurting savers…. Those two… are inconsistent. But what’s the alternative? Should the Fed not try to support a recovery?… If people are unhappy with the effects of low interest rates, they should pressure Congress to do more on the fiscal side, and so have a less unbalanced monetary-fiscal policy mix. This is the fourth or fifth argument against quantitative easing after all the other ones have been proven to be wrong. And this is certainly not an argument for the Fed to do nothing and let unemployment stay at 10 per cent.’

Other critics argue, I note, that the Fed’s intervention prevented the cathartic effects of a proper depression. He… respond[s]… that I have a remarkable ability to keep a straight face while recounting… crazy opinions. I add that many critics still expect hyperinflation any day now. ‘Well, we were quite confident from the beginning there would be no inflation problem. And, of course, the greater problem has been getting inflation up to target. As for allowing the economy to go into collapse, this is the Andrew Mellon [US Treasury secretary] argument from the 1930s. And I would think that, certainly among mainstream economists, it has no credibility. A Great Depression is not going to promote innovation, growth and prosperity.’ I cannot disagree, since I also consider such arguments mad….

Neither he nor the Fed expected the meltdown. Does the blame for these mistakes lie in pre-crisis monetary policy?… Had interest rates not been kept too low for too long in the early 2000s?… ‘[Was] monetary policy… in fact, a major contributor to the housing bubble[?]…. Serious studies that look at it don’t find that to be the case…. Shiller… who has a lot of credibility… says that: it wasn’t monetary policy at all…. The Fed had some complicity… in not constraining the bad mortgage lending and excessive risk-taking that was permeating the system. This, together with the structural vulnerabilities in the funding markets….’ Thus, lax regulation was to blame. Has the problem been fixed? ‘I think it’s an ongoing project,’ he replies. ‘You can’t hope to identify all the vulnerabilities in advance. And so anything you can do to make the system more resilient is going to be helpful.’…

Some argue that the financial sector is riddled with perverse incentives: limited liability; excessive leverage; ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks; and a range of explicit and implicit guarantees. How far does he agree? ‘I think that there was, for rational or irrational reasons, an upsurge in risk-taking. And if you’re taking risks, then I have to take the same risks, or else I get left behind. There’s two ways to get rid of ‘too-big-to-fail’. One is by having a lot of capital. And the other approach is via the liquidation authority in… Dodd-Frank….’ But, he adds, ‘if you break the firms down to the size of community banks, you lose a lot of functionality. At the same time, you don’t necessarily stop financial panics, because we had financial panics in the 1930s.’… I push a little harder on the costs of financial liberalisation. He agrees that, in light of the economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘I don’t think you could rule out the possibility that a more repressed financial system would give you a better trade-off of safety and dynamism.’

What about the idea that if the central banks are going to expand their balance sheets so much, it would be more effective just to hand the money directly over to the people rather than operate via asset markets?… A combination of tax cuts and quantitative easing is very close to being the same thing.’ This is theoretically correct, provided the QE is deemed permanent…

Calculating the leak in Okun’s bucket

Large blue bucket with money spilling by 350jb, veer.com

Forty years ago, Arthur Okun proposed an interesting thought experiment in his book Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off. He imagined the redistribution of income like moving water in a bucket with holes in it, and then posed this question: How much water would you be willing to lose as the water moved from the rich to the poor? In other words, how leaky of a bucket would you tolerate before you would stop redistributing income?

Like most thought experiments, the leaky bucket is supposed to spark thinking rather than be a specific test of policy. That was until a recent paper came up with a way of calculating how leaky our current buckets are.

The paper, by Harvard University economist Nathaniel Hendren, tries to figure out how society values an additional dollar going to a specific person based on the causal effects of policies. By looking at these causal effects, Hendren bridges a bit of a divide in economics between those who rely on a theoretical approach verses those who are driven more by empiricism. Hendren is able to provide a theoretical framework that lets economists use empirical results from analyses of specific policies. In particular, Hendren looks at how policy changes affect the U.S. federal budget.

You might think that raising $1 in government revenue simply requires taking $1 from a person through taxes. But that’s not true—the person from whom you take the $1 reacts to the change in their income, resulting in unintended consequences. A person who has their taxes raised, for example, might work less because their incentive to work—has declined. Getting $1 in government revenue requires taking more than $1 from the person being taxed as they are making less income. This means the cost of raising $1 in additional tax revenue is greater than $1.  At the same time, if less than 100 percent of the value of a program goes to the beneficiary then providing $1 of benefit increases their income by less than $1.

Hendren crunches the numbers on policy changes such as tax increases on those at the top of the income ladder; expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC; the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as food stamps); and Section 8 housing vouchers. This model, based on previous empirical research on the causal responses to these programs, gives a number that shows the social value of government money going to each policy. The higher the number, the more money society is willing to take from that person to raise an additional dollar of revenue.

These numbers are interesting on their own, but the really interesting results come when the marginal values of these programs are used to estimate the trade-off between each other. Hendren looks specifically at the hypothetical of increasing top marginal tax rates to finance a larger EITC payment. He figures that increased distribution in this case is “desirable” if we prefer for $0.44 or $0.66 (depending upon which research estimate is used) to go to an EITC recipient over $1.00 going to a person making at least $400,000. To put this in Okun’s terms, are we okay with $0.56 or $0.34 leaking out of the bucket in this case?

Of course, redistribution is just one way to reduce our current levels of income inequality. Growth that flows more to those at the middle and low ends of the income ladder would reduce the need for redistribution through taxes and transfers. On the other hand, policies that affect the distribution of income before taxes and transfers but have little efficiency costs might be used more often.

Hendren’s work depends on the underlying estimates of the causal effects from empirical economics papers, so more of that research will help pin down the specific numbers to think about. This would help clarify our thinking even more about the potential trade-offs.