Must-Read: Ben Thompson: Google and the Shift From Web to Apps, Indexing App-Only Content, Streaming Apps

Must-Read: The walled gardens of the pre-1995 .net strike back. I am left curious: why are browsers good enough on the desktop and the laptop to wipe the floor with walled gardens, but not so on smart phones?

Ben Thompson: Google and the Shift From Web to Apps, Indexing App-Only Content, Streaming Apps: “The core reality that drove Google’s dominance…

…the public availability of linked information… [is] at least weakening…. The first phase was the shift in usage from the web to apps… [where] the actual infrastructure and logic for displaying content is downloaded and installed when you get the app from the App Store. Then… the app simply downloads… content… and drops the content into the pre-existing templates. It’s super fast. This was certainly an annoyance for Google… [which] has focused on deep linking… to a mobile web site….

Now we are into the second phase in the shift from the web to apps: apps that don’t exist on the web at all…. “Up until now, Google has only been able to show information from apps that have matching web content. Because we recognize that there’s a lot of great content that lives only in apps, starting today, we’ll be able to show some ‘app-first’ content in Search as well….”

This is a far graver threat to Google than someone simply starting their search in a vertical app like Yelp or Trip Advisor: Google can win that fight by delivering a superior experience, and they’ve made great strides in that regard over the past few years…. There’s one big problem with Google’s new capability, though: how do you actually show said content to users? The app installation problem remains a significant one: there is simply too much friction in expecting a search user to download an app to see a result. Enter app streaming…

How much has the decline in the labor share affected income inequality?

Photo by Twixx, veer.com

Researchers have put a lot of time and effort into the search for the root causes of rising inequality. Technology, changes in educational levels, labor market institutions, and globalization are among the potentially important reasons why income inequality has risen in many countries over the past several decades. But if you’ve been paying attention to the debates about income inequality, you might realize that the kind of inequality being studied isn’t always the same.

Sometimes it’s the variance in wages earned by individuals. Sometimes it’s the declining share of labor. Or sometimes it’s the Gini index of household income. These measures tell us, respectively, about the distribution of labor income, the distribution of income between labor and capital, or the distribution of all income. So let’s say we’re ultimately interested in the distribution of all income. How much of this inequality is affected by changes in the distribution of labor income (wages and salaries) and how much is affected by a declining labor share?

Luckily, two researchers at the International Monetary Fund worked through the data to answer this question for recent decades. The working paper, by Maura Francese and Carlos Mulas-Granados, looks at the change in household income inequality in a number of countries—93, to be exact—from 1970 to 2013. The two economists break down how much of the rise in income inequality during this 43-year period was due to rising inequality within labor income (rising inequality of wages) and how much of it was due to income shifting away from labor to capital.

Francese and Mulas-Granados find that rising income inequality has been predominantly driven by rising wage inequality rather than a declining share of income going to labor. In other words, the change in the income distribution within labor was a much bigger factor than the change in the income distribution between labor and capital.

While the importance of these two factors will obviously vary among the countries Francese and Mulas-Granados examined, the authors also break out results for specific countries. In fact, their research shows that, in the United States, the declining labor share had no effect at all on rising income inequality from 1970 to 2013.

For those who think we shouldn’t be concerned about the decline in the labor share given these results, however, take a look at the years studied. The years between 1970 and 2013 show a number of different trends in income inequality. We only saw signs of a declining labor share in the United States until 2000, for example, but a decomposition of the factors affecting income inequality since 2000 might show a greater role for the labor share. At the same time, the analysis uses the Gini index as its measure of inequality. The Gini understates changes in tail-end inequality, so countries where inequality has been mostly at the top will appear to have less inequality to decompose. And finally the analysis assumes that changes in within-labor inequality and the changes in the labor share are independent. That might not be true.

Even then, the much larger importance of wage and salary inequality may still remain. While digging into the causes of the decline in the labor share is interesting and worthwhile, we should be keeping our eye on the inequality within labor.

Must-Reads Up to the Wee Hours of December 3, 2015

  • Stephen S. Roach: China’s Macro Disconnect: “Speedy implementation of the shift from production to consumption will be vital if the country is to remain on course and avoid the middle-income trap…” :: I really wish that I thought I understood China. Strike that: I really wish that I actually understood China.
  • Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford (2003): The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy: “any failure of… credib[ility] will not be due to skepticism about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its commitment…” :: [Are] those who think (1) that Bernanke shot himself in the foot… correct[?]
  • Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited: “[We] do not find convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers… during the sovereign debt crisis (2012-2013) or during the tepid recovery thereafter…” :: Seizing the high ground of the null hypothesis for oneself, and then running tests with no power, is undignified…

Must-Read: Stephen Roach: China’s Macro Disconnect

Must-Read: I really wish that I thought I understood China. Strike that: I really wish that I actually understood China.

Stephen S. Roach: China’s Macro Disconnect: “China has been highly successful in its initial efforts to shift the industrial structure of its economy from manufacturing to services…

…But it has made far less progress in boosting private consumption…. After bottoming out at 36% of GDP in 2010, private consumption’s share of GDP inched up to 38% in 2014…. China has always been adept at engineering shifts in its industrial structure…. But China apparently is far less proficient in replicating the DNA of a modern consumer culture…. China’s high and rising urban saving rate in a climate of vigorous per capita income growth reflects a persistent preference for precautionary saving over discretionary consumption… a rational response to the uncertain future faced by the majority of Chinese families…. Over the past 35 years, China’s powerful growth model has yielded extraordinary progress in terms of economic growth and development. But speedy implementation of the shift from production to consumption will be vital if the country is to remain on course and avoid the middle-income trap…

Must-Read: Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford: The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy

Must-Read: The reality-based piece of the macroeconomic world is right now divided between those who think (1) that Bernanke shot himself in the foot and robbed himself of all traction by refusing to embrace monetary régime change and a higher inflation target, and thus neutered his own quantitative-easing policy; and (2) that at least under current conditions markets need to be shown the money in the form of higher spending right now before they will give any credit to factors that make suggest they should raise their expectation of future inflation. What pieces of information could we seek out that would help us decide whether (1) or (2) is correct?

Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford (2003): The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy: “Our dynamic analysis also allows us to further clarify the several ways…

…in which the central bank’s management of private sector expectations can be expected to mitigate the effects of the zero bound. Krugman emphasizes the fact that increased expectations of inflation can lower the real interest rate implied by a zero nominal interest rate. This might suggest, however, that the central bank can affect the economy only insofar as it affects expectations regarding a variable that it cannot influence except quite indirectly; it might also suggest that the only expectations that should matter are those regarding inflation over the relatively short horizon corresponding to the term of the nominal interest rate that has fallen to zero. Such interpretations easily lead to skepticism about the practical effectiveness of the expectations channel, especially if inflation is regarded as being relatively “sticky” in the short run.

Our model is instead one in which expectations affect aggregate demand through several channels…. Inflation expectations, even… [more than] a year into the future… [are] highly relevant… the expected future path of nominal interest rates matters, and not just their current level… any failure of… credib[ility] will not be due to skepticism about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its commitment…

How do you solve a problem like profit shifting?

Turkey G-20 Summit (Anadolu Agency via AP Pool)

In the acronym-heavy world of economic policymaking, even the phrase “the OECD and G-20’s new BEPS project” can furrow some brows. In clearer terms, it’s a project focused on the problems of base erosion and profit shifting in corporate taxation, put forward by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Group of Twenty, a forum for the world’s largest economies.

Even after sorting through the jargon, the plain-English description still doesn’t jump out at the average reader. But the proposed reforms are a good window into the complicated world of corporate taxation—and the possible paths to reforming the system.

To pull back slightly, let’s address what base erosion and profit shifting actually are. In essence, the two problems are really one. With the current global corporate taxation system, companies have found ways to shift their profits to countries that have very low corporate tax rates or even no corporate tax rate at all. This, in turn, erodes the tax base for the country where the economic activity actually occurred. In short, profits get taxed at a lower rate, and the home countries have a smaller amount of money to potentially raise revenue from.

These two trends make the tax system less progressive in two ways. The first way is by reducing the taxation of profits that will end up going to the shareholders, who are disproportionately higher-income households. The second way is by reducing the amount of potential tax revenue—and raising the same amount of revenue from the population may require increasing taxes on households lower down on the income ladder.

So how would the BEPS project go after the problem of profit shifting? The proposals are numerous and varied, including very specific calls for changing specific tax treatments. But the central call is to make sure that so-called “stateless income,” or income that can’t be traced back to a specific country, is no longer stateless. One suggestion from the proposal is to make companies report where they pay corporate taxes, and how much they pay. Such reporting would make corporate taxation more transparent and allow governments see where profits are flowing.

The idea of more centralized information sharing about the flows of corporate profits has spooked some in the business community. But for some critics of the current corporate taxation system, the reforms don’t go far enough. In a piece for The Guardian, University of California, Berkeley economist Gabriel Zucman writes that the reforms just paper over the inherent flaws in the system. A move toward formulary apportionment at the international level, says Zucman, would help make sure profits are taxed where the economic activity actually occurs.

The problem of opacity isn’t restricted to the profits of public corporations, however—business income in the United States is increasingly shifting toward forms of businesses that are less transparent, such as partnerships. In a paper tracing the source of business income, researchers found that 30 percent of partnership income was hidden in some way.

The process of reforming the global corporate tax system will be a complex and lengthy process. But it seems clear that having stateless income hidden from the light isn’t a solid state of affairs moving forward. Income that’s got it made in the shade should, perhaps, be taxed.

Must-Read: Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited

Must-Read: Naughty, naughty!

Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited: “[We] do not find convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers for EU countries…

…during the sovereign debt crisis (2012-2013) or during the tepid recovery thereafter…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 but not for 2011-2012…. For 2012-2013 we find a larger estimate than Blanchard and Leigh, but due to the higher standard error the estimated coefficient is no longer significant at the 5% level…. In the two periods we added, our estimated coefficients are close to zero…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a statistically significant negative coefficient in the panel forecast for 2009-2013. This result holds for the prolonged period 2009-2015. However, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient when we perform the panel analysis for the period 2011-2015.

Nowhere in their piece do Mohlmann and Suyker report their estimated coefficient and its standard error for the entire period 2009-2015.

Repeat: nowhere in their piece do they report estimates for their entire sample.

Trying to back out estimates from the information they do give, if they had reported it they would have reported a number like -0.60 with a standard error near 0.23. Compare that to the Blanchard-Leigh estimates for 2009-2013 of a number of -0.67 with a standard error of 0.16.

See that a good and true lead is not “[There is no] convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers… during… 2012-13 or thereafter…”

See that a good and true lead would be: “There is no statistical power at all over 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 to test whether excess fiscal multipliers in those years are different than the strong excess fiscal multipliers found by Blanchard and Leigh…”

Seizing the high ground of the null hypothesis for one’s favored position, and then running tests with no power, is undignified…

Blanchard leigh Google Search

Must-Reads Up to the Wee Hours of December 2, 2015

  • Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed: “The Fed will repeatedly change the rule… [or] stick to the rule longer than it should…” :: It does boggle my mind that John Taylor and Paul Ryan would take the 2004-today experience as suggesting that the Federal Reserve should be even loosely bound by any sort of policy “rule”
  • Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Pre-Industrial Inequality: “Compare… inequality to the maximum feasible inequality that… might have been ‘extracted’ by those in power…’ :: And the ‘winner’ for all time–in terms of success at extracting as much wealth from the workers as possible given resources, population, and technology–is Mughal India in 1750!

At What Time Scale, If Any, Does the Long Run Come?

Paul Krugman: Is The Economy Self-Correcting?: “Brad DeLong… has this wrong…

…The proposition of a long-run tendency toward full employment isn’t a primitive axiom in IS-LM. It’s derived… under certain assumptions… [with] good reason to believe that even under ‘normal’ conditions it’s… very weak…. And under liquidity-trap conditions it’s not a process we expect to see operate at all….

Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers… find… a half-life for output gaps of around 6 years. [In] the long run… we might not all be dead, but most of us will be hitting mandatory retirement…. [And] at the zero lower bound the process doesn’t work… [but] bring[s] on a debt-deflation spiral. Yes, a sufficiently large price fall could bring about expectations of future inflation–but that’s not the droid we’re looking for mechanism we’re talking about here…. Slumps usually don’t last all that long… [because] central banks… push back…. The economy isn’t self-correcting… [but] relies on Uncle Alan, or Uncle Ben, or Aunt Janet to get back to full employment. Which brings us back to the liquidity trap, in which the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…

But, I say, Uncle Ben did try to come to the rescue!:

Graph St Louis Adjusted Monetary Base FRED St Louis Fed
  • A doubling of the monetary base…
  • Followed by the 20% increase in the monetary base that was QE I…
  • Followed by the 30% increase in the monetary base that was QE II…
  • Followed by the 50% increase in the monetary base that was QE III…

These are big increases. If you think that only 1/10 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 36% rise in the long-run money stock and thus the long-run price level. If you think that only 1/25 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 15% increase in the long-run price level.

It is true that some of us thought that Uncle Ben should go double again after QE III–that he should push the monetary base up from $4 trillion to $8 trillion to see what happens. But Ben’s decision to call a halt to base-expansion was not clearly wrong, given the limited benefits and the unknown unknowns associated with such derangement of the structure of asset duration, after a 360% increase in the monetary base.

Paul will say that this is what his “in the liquidity trap… the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…” means. And Paul Krugman is (surprise! surprise!) right. To lose that much traction, however? To have the default assumption be that none of quantitative easing is going to stick for the long run, whenever the long run comes?

The failure of the full-employment long run to come “soon” once extraordinary quantitative easing was on the policy menu may not have surprised Paul. It certainly has surprised me…

Hoisted from the Archives from Five Years Ago: Department of “HUH?!?!?!?!?!?!

Every once in a while I think that our austerian intellectual adversaries could not have been as clueless in the aftermath of 2008 as I remember them being. But then I go back through my archives, and find things like this:


Department of “HUH?!?!?!?!?!?!”: Does David Andolfatto really think that the speed with which unemployed workers found jobs sped up as the recession hit?

Apparently so:

Is the Deficient Demand Hypothesis Consistent with the Facts on Labor Market Turnover

In a typical quarter, roughly 2,000,000 workers per month exited unemployment into employment. When the recession hits… look at what happens to the UE flow. While it does not rise as sharply as the EU flow, it rises nevertheless… and continues to remain high even as the EU flow declines. Is this surge in job finding rates among the unemployed consistent with the deficient demand hypothesis?

Wow. Just wow.

The pace of new hires falls by 30% as the recession hits. Firms just don’t see the demand to justify hiring at the normal pace.

But when firms hire, they hire from employed and the not-in-the-labor-force as well as the unemployed. With more than twice as many unemployed, a greater share of new hires now come from the currently-unemployed than used to, and so a greater number of people make the unemployment-to-employment transition.

But that is not any “surge in job finding rates among the unemployed.”

Your average unemployed person has a harder time and a lower chance of finding a job when the recession hits. Andolfatto has forgotten–or never bothered to learn–that a “job-finding rate” has a denominator as well as a numerator. There is no surge in the job finding rates among the unemployed–rather, the reverse.

This really is not rocket science, people…

The Importance of Unemployment Insurance for American Families and the Economy Brookings Institution