Morning Must-Read: Dylan Scott: The Toughest Questions The GOP Should Have To Answer On Obamacare

Dylan Scott: The Toughest Questions The GOP Should Have To Answer On Obamacare: “Three Questions For Republicans…

…Who Want To Repeal The Affordable Care Act: 1. How would any alternative policy account for the millions of previously uninsured people who have gotten health coverage under Obamacare?… 2. Do you think covering the uninsured should be the goal of federal policy? If so, how would your alternative policy achieve that and keep insurance costs stable without an individual mandate?… 3. You have criticized President Obama for canceled policies under Obamacare. If your alternative policy is intended to expand health coverage, how would it achieve that without causing the same kind of disruption in the market?… Three Questions For Republicans Who Don’t Want To Repeal The Affordable Care Act: 1. Would you oppose continued efforts by Republican leadership to repeal Obamacare or intentionally undercut its effectiveness?… 2. What serious improvements to the law are you ready to propose that could win support from congressional Democrats and the White House?… 3. If your state has not expanded Medicaid under the law, what are you willing to do to persuade GOP state leaders to accept expansion?

Morning Must-Read: Charlie Stross: Amazon: Malignant Monopoly, or Just Plain Evil?

Charlie Stross: Amazon: malignant monopoly, or just plain evil?: “Last week, Amazon.com began removing…

…the pre-order links from titles by the publishing group Hachette. This is a cruel and unpleasant action, from an author’s point of view; if you’re a new author with a title about to come out, it utterly fucks your first-week sales and probably dooms your career from the outset. And if you’re someone like me, with a title about to come out, it frustrates and irritates your readers and also damages your sales profile and screws your print run…. Forbes mostly calls it right, at least at the corporate level, and until the end of this paragraph, where their ‘free-market’ knee-jerk kicks in and they bottle it:

What we’re really seeing is a battle between the people who make the product and the people who distribute it as to who should be getting the economic surplus that the consumer is willing to hand over. Like all such fights it’s both brutal and petty. Amazon is apparently delaying shipment of Hachette produced books, insisting that some upcoming ones won’t be available and so on. Hachette is complaining very loudly about what Amazon is doing, entirely naturally. The bigger question is what should we do, if anything, about it? To which the answer is almost certainly let them fight it out and see who wins.

Planet earth calling: Hachette is the publishing arm of… Lagardère… annual turnover of €7.37Bn…. Hachette turned over €2.1Bn in 2012…. Amazon’s sales… €45-50Bn)…. It’s a big-ish corporation being picked on by a Goliath more than ten times its size, in an attempt to extort better terms…. Forbes seem to think that Hachette is a producer and Amazon is a distributor. This isn’t quite true. I am a producer…. Amazon’s strategy (as I noted in 2012) is to squat on the distribution channel… eventually… leaving just Amazon as a monopoly distribution channel retailing the output of an atomized cloud of highly vulnerable self-employed piece-workers like myself….

Economic inequality and the parenting time divide

Members of Congress across the political spectrum agree with the Obama administration on the importance of a quality education for all of our nation’s children. Indeed, there may well be a bipartisan consensus in Washington that all children, including low- and moderate-income ones, should have access to pre-kindergarten. Certainly academic research demonstrates that high quality education programs for young children are associated with improved outcomes later in life—even decades later—which is why growing up in a low-income family often consigns those kids to being low-wage earners when they grow up.

But learning in fact begins at home at a very early age and remains fundamental to success through high school. To break the cycle of economic disadvantage, we must consider the evidence on inequality and parenting. When we talk about economic inequality, we should remember how current conditions are likely to exacerbate inequality for future generations given the key role family plays in the intergenerational transmission of economic status. Few people believe that there should be complete independence between parents’ and children’s economic success, but in the race to the top, new research shows highly-educated families are at an ever-greater advantage.

Economists, psychologists, and others who study children’s achievement and well-being often talk about investments that parents make in their children—both money and time—the myriad things parents do to help their children develop successfully and reach their full potential. But researchers have not until recently thought about parents’ time investments in children as a mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of economic status. Yet we know that the amount of parents’ time spent talking, playing, reading, helping with homework, facilitating positive interactions with peers and other adults, and exploring the outside world are all important ingredients of parenting that help to ensure children’s development and long-term prospects.

We are learning more about how parents across the income spectrum spend their time with their children. The economist Jonathan Guryan and his colleagues used data from national time diaries to show that mothers with a college education or greater spend roughly 4.5 hours more per week directly interacting with their children than mothers with a high school degree or less. This relationship is noteworthy because higher-educated parents also spend more time working outside the home.

Interestingly, based on mothers’ patterns of time use across a variety of activities, these researchers posited that highly educated parents, more so than less-educated parents, view time with children as an investment behavior with which to increase children’s human capital. My own national time use research, with Professor Rebecca Ryan and one of our students, Michael Corey, finds evidence for this. Highly educated parents not only spend more time with their children than do less-educated parents, they spend that time differently. College-educated mothers are more efficient in their parental time investments by tailoring specific activities to children’s developmental stage.

In other words, highly educated mothers shift the composition of their time as the child grows in ways that adapt to children’s development at different developmental stages. When children are in preschool, for example, college-educated mothers focus their time with children on reading and problem solving. This is precisely when time spent in learning activities best prepare children for school entry. During the middle school years, college-educated parents shift their attention to the management of children’s life outside the home – at precisely the ages when parental management is a key, developmentally appropriate input.

Research indicates that non-college educated parents do not match their time investments to children’s developmental stage in this fashion. To the extent that highly educated parents increasingly adopt these patterns of investing in their children, the destinies of the children of college-educated parents may diverge even farther from those of their less-advantaged peers.

We still don’t know precisely why these patterns have emerged. It is possible that mothers learn about child development during college—such that highly educated mothers are consciously acting on knowledge attained in formal schooling. But college-educated mothers are also more likely to have higher incomes, to be married, and to have spouses who are more involved in child rearing; they may also have more flexible work schedules due their different types of employment. Unlike less-educated mothers, they can marshal all of these resources to help their children explore their full potential.

Regardless of the reason, we do know there are many direct and indirect policy measures to help support families and promote more equal access to opportunities for children. This why Congress and the Obama administration need to keep their eye on what matters for children and how we can support parents from all kinds of families be the best parents they can be. From providing access to high-quality education and health care for all children, to helping ensure parents who work can rise above poverty, as a society, we must consider our role in supporting every child’s ability to reach his or her full potential.

Ariel Kalil is a Professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, where she directs the Center for Human Potential and Public Policy.

 

Can letting kids watch TV make them better students?

With the end of the 2013-14 school year, families across the nation are turning to decisions about what to do with their kids over summer vacation. Some will be looking at summer camps away from home, others at summer sports or academic camps in their communities, and still others at how to keep track of their kids in the neighborhood while at work.

For those families at the low and middle rungs of the economic ladder, those without the resources to send children to camp or to other organized activities, the decision sadly is often whether to park the kids in front of the TV all summer or leave them to roam the neighborhood. But how will letting kids watch TV affect their academic performance?

This year’s winner of the John Bates Clark Medal—known as the ‘Baby Nobel’ prize in Economics because it is awarded annually to the best economist under forty—may have an answer. Matt Gentzkow, a Professor of Economics at the Chicago Booth School of Business won his award in part because of his application of empirical methods in microeconomics to interesting questions.

This announcement may also be celebrated by TV-loving children across America, who would likely approve of the findings in his 2008 paper Preschool Television Viewing and Adolescent Test Scores: Historical Evidence from the Coleman Study (with fellow Chicago Professor Jesse Shapiro). In this paper, Gentzkow and Shapiro find that watching TV in early childhood did not negatively affect standardized test scores in adolescence for the first generation raised watching TV, born between 1948 and 1954.

Those children are now the grandparents and great-grandparents of today’s children, who can happily point to these research findings as they attempt to convince their elders not to take away the remote (with the argument that learning from television is even remotely possible). Of course, what is shown on TV these days is not the same as what was shown on TV then, but kids might argue that whether TV today is more or less educational is a question that can only be resolved with further observation.

Seriously though, the paper finds that the (marginally statistically significant) positive impact of TV-viewing at a young age was largest for children from underprivileged households, including those where English was not the primary language and where mothers had less than a high school education. In contrast, according to Gentzkow and Shapiro, “children whose home environments were more conducive to learning were more negatively impacted by television.”

The reason they provide is that for children in privileged households, time spent not watching TV was more likely to be spent on activities conducive to higher test scores: “this evidence would lead one to expect that television is more beneficial to children from more disadvantaged backgrounds, because for such children the activities crowded out by television are likely to be less cognitively stimulating.”

Even if the authors find that watching TV may not be as harmful as the vast majority of pediatricians believe, their assessment of the differential impact of television on children from privileged and underprivileged households suggests that there are things other than excessively watching television that children could be doing that might help their cognitive development more than sitting in front of a television screen.

For example, children could attend pre-school or other forms of organized educational programming. They could read or engage in physical exercise. In addition, they could use digital technology, which has created a whole host of other activities that might foster cognitive development more effectively than television, such as certain interactive games and applications. Of course, whether these activities are mostly beneficial for the children depends crucially on what they are trying to teach.

If Gentzkow’s research on how watching television in early childhood affects later educational outcomes can lead some to consider alternatives to television for their educational value, then someday children may appreciate this Clark Medalist not for the excuse to watch television, but for the excuse not to.

 

Pedro Spivakovsky-Gonzalez is a junior economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth

Extended unemployment insurance remains critical

Unemployment Insurance is designed to help workers who are displaced, through no fault of their own, until they can find new jobs. It is natural to extend these benefits when the labor market is weak and job searches take longer to result in a new job. But benefits should not be so generous that the recipients delay taking new jobs.

Balancing these two policy prescriptions is difficult politically. Yet new analyses of recent data covering unemployed workers during the Great Recession and its aftermath indicate that the impact of unprecedented extensions of Unemployment Insurance on job uptake were smaller than previously thought while the benefits were extremely important to maintaining family incomes. The program helped sustain families and communities during an unusually long period of weak labor demand, helping to promote long-term labor market resiliency and higher future prosperity by helping the long-term unemployed remain out of poverty and attached to the labor market.

Extended Unemployment Insurance benefits expired at the end of 2013, and Congress is now considering whether and how to reinstate them. The new data and analysis detailed in this issue brief—based on the roll-out of extended benefits in 2008-2010 and the roll-back that began in late 2011—indicate that old views of the design of Unemployment Insurance need some updating. Specifically, the downsides of UI extensions are smaller than in past economic downturns, and there are some previously unanticipated upsides. Congress should take these findings seriously as it considers a possible reauthorization of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program this year.

Read a PDF of the full document

 

Current labor market conditions

Unemployment insurance extensions are only authorized in weak labor markets, and understanding their effects requires understanding the context in which they operate. Although the Great Recession officially ended in 2009, a full five years later the labor market is still quite weak. The unemployment rate has fallen, from a peak of 10.0 percent in October 2009 to 6.7 percent in March 2014. But the share of the adult population that is employed is only 58.9 percent, down a full 4.0 percentage points from before the Great Recession and lower than at any point between 1984—when female labor force participation was much lower than today—and 2009.  And the long-term unemployment rate, the share of the labor force that has been out of work for six months or longer, remains extremely high.

This crisis has been devastating for working people. More than 30 million “person-years” of employment were lost.[1]  This represents potential earnings that vanished without a trace, cutting deeply into family budgets. And the overhang from the extended period of extreme labor market weakness will extend the pain much further, in at least three distinct ways.  First, the weak labor market held down wages even for those workers who kept their jobs—the median full-time worker has not had a real wage increase in a decade. Second, workers who lost their jobs will probably see long-run declines in their earnings, as high as 20 percent per year for as long as 20 years.[2] Third, the cohorts of young people who have entered the labor market since the crisis began have had trouble getting their feet on the bottom rungs of the career ladder. This, too, will have long-lasting effects, depressing wages for much of their lives.[3]

The most important component of the policy response to a shock of this magnitude must be to ensure that the economy recovers quickly so that the damage does not continue. On this score, policymakers in Washington have done exceptionally poorly.

A second important component is to cushion people from the ill effects of the crisis while it lasts. Unemployment Insurance is a very important part of this cushion. Ideally, it should help fill in the hole in household budgets that is created when a worker is laid off, allowing the family to maintain its consumption during the job search.

The design of unemployment insurance policy trades off two objectives: We want to insure workers against job losses, but we don’t want to create incentives for workers who have lost their jobs to delay finding new work. The former pushes us toward more generous benefits—higher replacement rates and longer durations—while the latter consideration pushes in the opposite direction.

There has always been good reason to think that the insurance function of Unemployment Insurance is more important in weak labor markets. When there are few jobs to be had, it takes displaced workers a long time to find new jobs and job seekers thus need more support. At the same time, incentive problems are less severe in weak labor markets—jobless workers will be loathe to turn down an available job in the hope of something better, and even if these incentives do dissuade a worker from taking a job, there will be a long line of other workers ready to fill the open position, with little net impact.

This argument provides a rationale for a policy of making Unemployment Insurance more generous in downturns. And indeed this is what we saw early in the Great Recession:  Where traditional UI benefits have averaged about $300 per week for no more than 26 weeks during the early years of the crisis, Congress both raised benefit levels, by $25 per week as part of the 2009 Recovery Act, and dramatically extended their duration, to as many as 99 weeks through much of 2010 and 2011.

Although this expansion was entirely consistent with the best understanding of optimal policy, it was quite controversial. Opponents argued that it would dissuade displaced workers from taking new jobs, and some have even attributed nearly the entire rise in unemployment during 2007-2009 to the disincentive effects created by extended Unemployment Insurance. [4] But these arguments are not well founded in the evidence. New data indicate that the recent extensions reduced job-finding rates [or job search efforts] only minimally.

Examining the most recent data

The roll-out of extended Unemployment Insurance benefits in 2008-2010 and the roll-back that began in late 2011—UI durations are now only about a quarter of their 2009-10 maximum—created a natural experiment allowing researchers to study the effects of extended UI benefits in weak labor markets. These studies indicate that old views of the design of Unemployment Insurance need some updating. Specifically, the downsides of UI extensions are smaller than in the past, and there are some previously unanticipated upsides.

The evidence indicates that extended Unemployment Insurance does reduce the likelihood that an unemployed worker will find a job in any given month, but by much less than we previously thought.  Moreover, extended UI benefits have an important countervailing effect:  Many unemployed workers who would have given up their job searches and exited the labor force are persuaded to remain in the job market because benefits are available only to those actively searching for work.  This effect is at least as large as the effect on job finding.[5]

The effect of Unemployment Insurance extensions on labor force participation may turn out to be very important in the long run.  An important concern as the weak labor market drags on is that workers who have been out of work for years or more may become detached from the labor market and unable to return to work. Any such effect would cast a long shadow over our future prosperity.[6] Although evidence is limited, the data appear to indicate that UI extensions help to reduce worker disconnection from the labor market, [7] and thus play an important role in returning our economy to eventual health.

Despite the accumulation of evidence that UI benefits are doing little to dissuade displaced workers from finding jobs, and may even be having a positive net effect on the labor market, the UI extensions put in place in 2008-2010 have been allowed to expire. Benefit durations have fallen to only 26 weeks in most states, just over a quarter of their peak level, and in some states they are much lower. North Carolina, for example, has cut durations to as short as 12 weeks, and has reduced benefit levels as well. As a consequence of these cuts, hundreds of thousands of workers have been thrown off Unemployment Insurance who might otherwise have received it.

Not surprisingly, this has done nothing to improve the labor market, which is limping along just as slowly now as it was in 2012 and 2013, before the UI extensions expired. There remains no sign that employers are having trouble filling most jobs, as would be expected if UI benefits were discouraging recipients from taking work. The evidence still points overwhelmingly to labor demand shortfalls as the primary problem.

The cutback in UI benefits has, however, imposed great hardships on families and their communities. In recent work with Rob Valletta of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, I examined the trajectory of family incomes from initial employment, through job losses to spells of UI receipt, and then through UI exhaustion at the end of the spell.[8]  We found what one would expect: Earnings fall dramatically when a worker loses his or her job, and UI benefits make up only about half of that loss on average.

052614-UI-webgraphic

When these benefits expire, family income takes another dramatic fall.  Some families turn to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly called food stamps) or other government assistance programs, while others turn to early retirement and Social Security payments for support. But most families are able to do neither, and thus must live with sharply reduced incomes. The average recent UI exhaustee’s family has only 70 percent of its pre-displacement income. Many families, particularly those that previously had a single earner, have much less than this. These families are likely to have exhausted their savings long before, and thus face real hardship. Well over one-third of exhaustee families fall below the poverty line.

This is devastating to families. It also hurts their communities: Families without income to spend cannot support local merchants or service providers or make rent or mortgage payments, so the expiration of UI sends ripples throughout the local economy. Needless to say, few local economies can afford this right now, and the drag created by the expiration and exhaustion of Unemployment Insurance threatens to bring an already slow recovery to a dead stop.

Extended UI benefits cannot be the whole of our policy response to the ongoing weakness of the labor market. Many workers displaced in the downturn have outlasted even the maximum benefit extensions, and will need other forms of support to allow them to survive. And UI extensions alone will not provide enough of a fiscal boost to support a robust recovery. But the fact that this one tool will not finish the job cannot justify not starting. And the evidence that has accumulated during the Great Recession and the subsequent tepid recovery demonstrates that Unemployment Insurance is a useful and important tool, and that the recovery would have been even weaker and slower without it.

Jesse Rothstein is associate professor of public policy and economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He joined the Berkeley faculty in 2009. He spent the 2009-10 academic year in public service, first as Senior Economist at the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers and then as Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of Labor. Earlier, he was assistant professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University. He received his Ph.D. in economics from UC Berkeley in 2003. 

Endnotes

[1] A person-year represents one person employed for one year. I calculate this as the increase in the number of person-years of unemployment from what would have obtained had the unemployment rate remained at its November 2007 level of 4.7%. This assumes that the weakness of the labor market was not responsible for the sharp decline in the labor force participation rate, so is a substantial underestimate.

[2] See Jacobson, Louis S., Robert J. LaLonde, and Daniel G. Sullivan. “Earnings losses of displaced workers.” The American Economic Review (1993): 685-709; von Wachter, Till M., Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester. “Long-Term Earnings Losses due to Job Separation During the 1982 Recession: An Analysis Using Longitudinal Administrative Data from 1974 to 2004.” Working paper (2009).

[3] See Oreopoulos, Philip, Till von Wachter, and Andrew Heisz. “The short-and long-term career effects of graduating in a recession.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4.1 (2012): 1-29; Oyer, Paul. “The making of an investment banker: Stock market shocks, career choice, and lifetime income.” The Journal of Finance 63.6 (2008): 2601-2628; Kahn, Lisa B. “The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy.” Labour Economics 17.2 (2010): 303-316.

[4] Barro, Robert.  “The Folly of Subsidizing Unemployment,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703959704575454431457720188. See also, Hagedorn, Marcus, Fatih Karahan, Iourii Manovskii, and Kurt Mitman, “Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects.” National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 19499, 2013.

[5] Rothstein, Jesse. “Unemployment insurance and job search in the Great Recession.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall (2011): 143-213; and Farber, Henry S., and Robert G. Valletta. Do extended unemployment benefits lengthen unemployment spells? Evidence from recent cycles in the US labor market. Working paper no. W19048, National Bureau of Economic Research (2013).

[6] See DeLong, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. “Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2012): 233-297.

[7] Rothstein (2011); Farber and Valletta (2013).

[8] Rothstein, Jesse, and Robert G. Valletta. Scraping by: Income and program participation after the loss of extended unemployment benefits. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco working paper no. 2014-6 (2014).

 

Things to Read on the Morning of May 25, 2014

Should-Reads:

  1. Julie Rovner: The Politics Of Health In 2014 Aren’t What You Think: “Last year, the GOP playbook for keeping the U.S. House in 2014 and winning the Senate consisted of a fairly simple strategy: Run against Obamacare. But now… that strategy is looking not so simple…. Republicans face two key problems using the law as a political cudgel, analysts say. One is that with millions of people now signed up for coverage, making the law go away would result in taking away something tangible for a large and growing group of voters. ‘So in short order it’s going to be about what you lose as a consequence’, Jennings says. The second problem is with the back half of what Republicans have continually branded as a ‘repeal and replace’ strategy, says Clancy. ‘In my 20 years of following health care policy, (Republicans) have never been able to coalesce around en electorally inspiring alternative on health care…. [Republicans are] fundamentally divided between pro-market and pro-business factions’ when it comes to health care… ‘that makes it difficult for Republicans to come together over truly pro-patient reforms.'”

  2. Carola Conces Binder: Kocherlakota’s Case for Price Level Targeting: “Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, described the benefits of price level targeting to the Economic Club of Minnesota on May 21…. ‘The low inflation in the United States tells us that resources are being wasted. What exactly are these wasted resources?…. The biggest and most disturbing answer is our fellow Americans…. The FOMC is undershooting its price stability objective and is expected to continue to do so. But we should all keep in mind that this outcome–and especially the forecast for continued undershootin–typically means that the FOMC is also underperforming on its other objective of promoting maximum employment…. If my inflation forecast is right, the price level in 2018 will be about 2.5 percent below what it would have been had the FOMC hit its inflation target over the preceding six years’…. He describes two main benefits of adopting price level targeting…. ‘The first reason is that price level targeting makes long-term contracts safer’…. The second reason that the FOMC might want to use price level targeting is that it would serve as an automatic stabilizer…. I don’t think a switch to price level targeting is likely in the near term. It would (nearly) be a global first. Only the Swedish Riksbank, from 1931-37, has explicitly targeted the price level. The Bank of Canada, an inflation-targeting regime since 1991, seriously considered switching to price level targeting, but decided against it in 2011…. A shift to treating the [inflation] target as a true target, with symmetric costs of overshooting and undershooting, and sufficient weight on the employment part of the mandate, may be an easier-to-implement solution than an explicit price-level target.”

Should Be Aware of:

And:

Continue reading “Things to Read on the Morning of May 25, 2014”

Physiocracy and Robotocracy: Not the Focus But Rather for My Clarification of Thought: May 24, 2014

The physiocrats of eighteenth-century France saw the country as having four kinds of jobs:

  1. Farmers
  2. Skilled artisans
  3. Flunkies
  4. Landowning aristocrats

Farmers, they thought, produced the net value in the economy–the net product. Their labor combined with water, soil, and sun grew the food they and others ate. Artisans, the physiocrats thought, were best seen not as creators but as transformers of wealth–transformers of wealth in the form of food into wealth in the form of manufactures. Aristocrats collected this net product–agricultural production in excess of farmers’ subsistence needs–and spent it buying manufactured goods and, when they got sated with manufactured goods, employing flunkies.

Set the wage needed to attract people into the artisan professions as numeraire: set it equal to 1. Then in this framework, the key economic variables are:

  • the fraction of the population who are farmers: f.
  • the net product per farmer: n.
  • the fraction of the population who can be set to work making manufactured goods that aristocrats can consume before becoming sated: m.

The key equilibrium quantity in this system is:

(nf-m)/(1-f-m) = w

This gives the standard of living of the typical flunky–say, a runner for His Grace the Cardinal. The numerator is the amount of resources on which flunkies can subsist: the net product received by landlords minus the amount of the net product spent employing artisans. The denominator is the flunky share of the population. The quotient of the two is the flunky wage: w.

If this flunky wage w is low, the country is poor. Flunkies are then ill-paid. Begging and thievery are then rampant. Moreover, the reserve army of underemployed and potentially-unemployed flunkies puts downward pressure on artisan and farmer living standards as well.

If this quantity w is high, the country is prosperous.

The physiocrats saw a France undergoing a secular decline in the farmer share f. They worried. A fall in f produced a sharper decline in w. Thus they called for:

  • Scientific farming to boost n, and so boost the net product nf.
  • A reallocation of the tax burden to make it less onerous to be a farmer–and so boost the farmer share f and thus the net product nf.

With the unquestioned assumption that there were limits on how high the net product per farmer n could be pushed, the physiocrats would have forecast that France of today, with only 5% of the population farmers, would be a hellhole: enormous inequality and absolute poverty, with huge numbers of ill-paid flunkies sucking up to the aristocratic landlords.

Well, the physiocrats were wrong about the decline of the agricultural share of the labor force…

And let us hope that the techno-pessimists are similarly wrong about the rise of the robots…

Heather Boushey reviews “House of Debt”

Heather Boushey, executive director and chief economist of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, reviews “House of Debt: How They (And You) Caused the Great Recession, And How We Can Prevent it From Happening Again” by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, in The Atlantic.  

Why are nearly 10 million people still out of work today? Was it because in September 2008, the U.S. government failed to bail out the insolvent investment bank Lehmann Brothers? Was it because the two U.S. housing finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed too many mortgages securitized by Lehman and other Wall Street firms to low-income borrowers in the run up to the housing and financial crises? Or does blame rest with the Federal Reserve’s too-easy-money policies in the wake of the brief dotcom recession in the early 2000s?

Princeton University professor Atif Mian and University of Chicago Booth School of Business professor Amir Sufi pin the blame squarely on policymakers, but not for any of these three reasons, all of which are variously popular with policymakers on different sides of the political divide in Washington. Instead, in their just-released book, House of Debt, they argue that the Great Recession was the result of a sharp fall-off in consumption due to the unevenly accumulated household debt in the first six years of the 21st century. In that period, mortgage-credit grew more than twice as fast in neighborhoods with low credit scores than in neighborhoods with high credit scores, a marked departure from the experience of previous decades. When the housing bubble popped, the economic consequences were sharply magnified by the way debt was distributed across households and communities.

Click here to read the full review.