Must-Read: Gideon Rachman: Xi Jinping Has Changed China’s Winning Formula

Must-Read: Gideon Rachman: Xi Jinping Has Changed China’s Winning Formula: “What Mr Xi has done is essentially to abandon the formula that has driven China’s rise…

…created by Deng Xiaoping… and then refined by his successors…. In economics, Deng and his successors emphasised exports, investment and the quest for double-digit annual growth. In politics, China moved away from the charismatic and dictatorial model created by Mao Zedong and towards a collective leadership. And in foreign affairs, China adopted a modest and cautious approach to the world that became colloquially known in the west as hide-and-bide…. Under Mr Xi, who assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communist party towards the end of 2012, all three key ingredients of the Deng formula have changed….

China has moved back towards a model based around a strongman leader…. The years of double-digit growth are over…. The Xi era has seen a move away from hide-and-bide towards a foreign policy that challenges US dominance of the Asia-Pacific region….

In economics… the shift to a new model is perilous… an unsustainable splurge of credit and investment…. China still has to get used to lower rates of growth…. A healthy economy is crucial…. The country’s leaders have relied on rapid economic growth to give the political system a ‘performance legitimacy’, which party theorists have argued is far deeper than the mandate endowed by a democratic election…. When it comes to politics, in the post-Mao era the Communist party has… embrace[d] a collective style of government, with smooth transitions…. Mr Xi has broken with this model…. Many pundits believe that Mr Xi is now determined to serve more than two terms in office…. At the same time as economic and political tensions within China have risen under Mr Xi, so the country’s foreign policy has become more nationalistic….

The key to the Deng formula that created modern China was the primacy of economics. Domestic politics and foreign policy were constructed to create the perfect environment for a Chinese economic miracle. With Mr Xi, however, political and foreign policy imperatives frequently appear to trump economics. That change in formula looks risky for both China and the world.

Must-Read: Andrew J. Nathan

Must-Read: Wilhelmine China: a rapidly-industrializing country ruled by a social caste that has lost its role…

Andrew J. Nathan: Who Is Xi Jinping?: “Xi Jinping’s respect for Mao is not a personal eccentricity…

…It is shared by many of the hereditary Communist aristocrats who… form most of China’s top leadership today as well as a large section of its business elite….. Contrary to the Western consensus that Deng saved the system after Mao nearly wrecked it, Xi and many other red aristocrats feel that it was Deng who came close to destroying Mao’s legacy…. The children of the founding elite see themselves as the inheritors of… a vast world that their fathers conquered under Mao’s leadership. Their parents came from poor rural villages and rose to rule an empire. The second generation… do not propose to be the generation that ‘loses the empire.’… They see no irony in cheering Xi Jinping’s attack on corrupt bureaucrats although Mao purged their own fathers as ‘capitalist roaders in power.’ Mao’s purges they excuse as a mistake. But they see today’s bureaucrats as flocking to serve the Party because it is in power and not because they inherited a spirit of revolutionary sacrifice from their forebears. Such opportunists are worms eating away at the legacy of revolution.

The legacy is threatened by other forces… a slowing economy… laid-off workers… underperforming giant state-owned enterprises… bad bank loans… climate change and environmental devastation… downsize and upgrade the military…. Any leader who confronts so many big problems needs a lot of power, and Mao provides a model of how such power can be wielded…. Xi emulates Mao in exercising power through a tight circle of aides whom he can trust because they have demonstrated their personal loyalty in earlier phases of his career…. Xi wants ‘rule by law,’ but this means using the courts more energetically to carry out political repression and change the bureaucracy’s style of work. He wants to reform the universities, not in order to create Western-style academic freedom but to bring academics and students to heel (including those studying abroad). He has launched a thorough reorganization of the military, which is intended partly to make it more effective in battle, but also to reaffirm its loyalty to the Party and to him personally. The overarching purpose of reform is to keep the Chinese Communist Party in power….

Deng built a system… senior leaders were limited to two terms… divided leadership roles… made decisions in consultation with other leaders and retired elders. By overturning Deng’s system, Xi is hanging the survival of the regime on his ability to bear an enormous workload and not make big mistakes. He seems to be scaring the mass media and officials outside his immediate circle from telling him the truth. He is trying to bottle up a growing diversity of social and intellectual forces that are bound to grow stronger. He may be breaking down… the consensus about China’s path of development…. He has broken the rule that retired leaders are safe once they leave office, throwing into question whether it can ever be safe for him to leave office. As he departs from Deng’s path, he risks undermining the adaptability and resilience that Deng’s reforms painstakingly created for the post-Mao regime.

As the members of the red aristocracy around Xi circle their wagons to protect the regime, some citizens retreat into religious observance or private consumption, others send their money and children abroad, and a sense of impending crisis pervades society. No wonder Xi’s regime behaves as if it faces an existential threat. Given the power and resources that he commands, it would be reckless to predict that his attempt to consolidate authoritarian rule will fail. But the attempt risks creating the very political crisis that it seeks to prevent.

Must-read: The Economist: “Chairman of Everything”

Must-Read: I do not understand China. But it now looks more likely than not to me that Xi Jinping’s rule will lose China a decade, if not half a century…

The Economist: Chairman of Everything: “Two curious articles appeared in government-linked news media…

…The first [was] written in an allegorical style traditionally used in China to criticise those in power, in this case in the form of an essay praising the seventh-century emperor, Taizong, for heeding a plain-talking courtier… [and] called for more debate and freer speech at a time when China’s president, Xi Jinping, has been restricting both. ‘The ability to air opinions freely often determined the rise and fall of dynasties,’ it said. ‘We should not be afraid of people saying the wrong things; we should be afraid of people not speaking at all.’ The second article, in the form of an open letter, ran—fleetingly—on a state-run website. ‘Hello, Comrade Xi Jinping. We are loyal Communist Party members,’ the letter began. It called on Mr Xi to step down and eviscerated his record in office. The president, it said, had abandoned the party’s system of ‘collective’ leadership; arrogated too much power to himself; sidelined the prime minister, Li Keqiang; caused instability in equity and property markets; distorted the role of the media; and condoned a personality cult….

The historical essay was reposted on the disciplinary commission’s website (where it remains); it was clearly more than the work of a single disgruntled editor. The letter may have been planted by a lone dissident who managed to hack into an official portal, but it raised many eyebrows in China. The police have reportedly detained around 20 people…. When he became the party’s leader in 2012, more was known about Mr Xi’s family and personal qualities than about his politics. He was a princeling…. Mr Xi had spent almost 20 years in Fujian, a southern province far from political nerve-centres. More is now clear. As Geremie Barmé, an Australian academic, puts it, Mr Xi is China’s ‘COE’, or chairman of everything….

Mr Hu was a wooden leader whose rule was overshadowed by the retired Mr Jiang; Mr Jiang, while in power, had to bow to his retired predecessor, Deng Xiaoping; even Deng trod carefully for fear of upsetting fellow party elders. Mr Xi, like Mao, appears unfettered by such concerns. He wants the country to know it, too…. Mr Xi is no Mao, a man whose whims caused the deaths of tens of millions and who revelled in the hysteria of his cult. But he rules in a way unlike any leader since the Great Helmsman. After Mao’s death, Deng tried to create a leadership of equals in order to push China away from Maoist caprices. Mr Xi is turning from that system back towards a more personal one. Indeed, he is more of a micromanager than Mao ever was….

The anti-corruption campaign has involved a radical change in the unwritten rules that have held the party together since the near civil war that Mao inflicted on it…. The anti-graft campaign is popular with the public, which suffers hugely from officials’ corruption, negligence and incompetence (a scandal that came to light in March involved rampant corruption in the state’s oversight of the sale and use of vaccines). But it has dismayed officials, many of whom have responded with passive resistance and fear-driven inertia…. Mr Xi has also sown alarm throughout the 2.3m-member People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the collective name for the armed forces. He has arrested generals for graft who were once considered untouchable, announced a trimming of the ranks by 300,000, shaken up the outdated command structure and slimmed down the top-heavy high command. Any one of these moves would have been impressive…. Mr Xi’s willingness to take on these tasks simultaneously suggests remarkable confidence….

Both in his reforms of the PLA and in his fight against corruption, Mr Xi’s actions aim first and foremost at tightening control: both the party’s over the army and his own over the party. It is similar in other areas of politics…. Mr Xi is determined to reimpose discipline on a querulous society that in recent years, thanks to the rapid spread of social media, has become much better equipped to organise itself independently of the party and to evade official controls. In the war against dissent, however, Mr Xi is facing visible resistance. Ren Zhiqiang, a property mogul turned commentator, said the media should serve readers and viewers, not the party….

Mr Xi has been even more hesitant in his handling of the economy. Months after taking power, he proclaimed that under his leadership markets would play a ‘decisive’ role. Since last year he has begun to talk of a need for ‘supply-side’ reforms, implying that inefficient, debt-laden and overstaffed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—ie, most of them—need shaking up. But his approach has been marked by uncertainty, U-turns and, occasionally, incompetence…. Mr Xi’s lack of clear focus on the economy, and his unwillingness to let people more expert in such matters (namely, the prime minister, Mr Li) handle it, have caused a series of errors…. Markets are unpredictable and no Chinese leader (including Mr Xi) has any experience of the way they work in Western economies. But it is also likely that Mr Xi’s desire to hog power is partly to blame…. Mr Xi understands power, is not afraid to use it and is willing to take risks. He understands less about the new complexities of a changing society and worries about social unrest, so plays safe. He does not understand the economy well, is not sure what to do and does not trust others to act for him.

The way Mr Xi rules has three broad implications. The first is that problems common to all dictatorships will grow…. Another implication is that it is no longer reasonable to argue that China is a model of an authoritarian country opening up economically without doing so politically…. The third is that Deng’s policy of putting ‘economic construction at the centre’ is no longer the country’s most hallowed guiding principle. For Mr Xi, politics comes first every time…. The success of Mr Xi’s rule will rest not just on whether he wins the battles he has chosen to fight, but on whether he has picked the right ones. Seen from the point of view of China as a whole, it does not look as if he has. Mr Xi seems bent on strengthening his party and keeping himself in power, not on making China the wealthier and more open society that its people crave.

Must-Read: Ian Johnson: Xi’s China: The Illusion of Change

Lights of Shanghai” by David Almeida, flickr, cc

Must-Read: Ian Johnson: Xi’s China: The Illusion of Change: “Xi[‘s]… goal has been to recreate the early years of Communist rule…

…in the early to mid-1950s when his father was part of the ruling elite. Back then, according to official mythology, the party was clean and officials were upright, and the populace was content. Returning to this imagined past means strengthening, not weakening party control. If we briefly survey Xi’s actions… we can see this as the primary goal of his reforms. Most obvious and probably the most disappointing for optimists is the economy…. Most of Xi’s changes—such as incremental bank rate liberalizations or opening the stock market a bit wider to foreign investors—can more properly be viewed as technocratic tinkering. It’s true that a lot of small repairs can lead to an overhaul, but only if the changes are part of a broader plan with a clear goal. There has been no indication that such a plan exists—at least not one that would lead to a more open economy. It is possible that Xi might reverse course… but signs are not promising. A recent, outstanding piece of fly-on-the-wall reporting in The Wall Street Journal shows that despite Xi’s anger about the slowing economy, the slow growth itself has made him cautious and even less willing to push reforms…