Must-Read: Scott Lemieux: Why Did Obama Do so Well at the Supreme Court?

Must-Read: Scott Lemieux: Why Did Obama Do so Well at the Supreme Court?: “The last week of the Supreme Court’s last full term of the Obama era…

…was a microcosm of his administration’s relationship with the Roberts Court…. In a one-sentence opinion, the Supreme Court left in place a lower court ruling that the president’s DAPA immigration program… was illegal, meaning that it will almost certainly not be implemented before President Obama leaves office. Still, the news… was good. A surprising majority opinion upheld the University of Texas’s affirmative action program, and a somewhat less surprising majority opinion struck down Texas’s draconian abortion statute…. Looking at the Supreme Court’s major decisions during the Obama administration as a whole, the story is similar. The last time a Democratic president successfully passed an ambitious progressive agenda with a Republican-controlled Supreme Court, the result was a constitutional crisis…. [But] the Roberts Court left Obama’s domestic agenda mostly intact, while delivering the Democratic coalition some major victories it would not have been able to win any other way, most notably on abortion and LGBT rights.

One interpretation of the Court’s behavior is that it is isolated from the pressures that have caused the other institutions of American politics to become cripplingly polarized. This interpretation, however, is probably wrong. The relative moderation of the Roberts Court is likely the last gasp of the previous partisan order…. There have been plenty of… major conservative judicial victories during the Obama era, most notably the gutting of the most important civil rights statute since Reconstruction in the 2013 decision Shelby County…. Even worse than the result of the case was the shoddiness of Roberts’s opinion…. Since then, many Republican-controlled states have wasted little time passing discriminatory voting restrictions, undercutting the Court’s conclusion that the strong enforcement of the Voting Rights Act was no longer necessary. While the Roberts Court has permitted the states to engage in a wide array of vote suppression tactics on the one hand, it has prevented state and federal governments from passing campaign finance restrictions on the other. And in lower-profile cases, the Court has consistently ruled against the interests of consumers and the rights of employees when interpreting federal law….

With the admittedly crucial exception of Sebelius, the liberal victories of the Roberts Court were due to one man: Anthony Kennedy…. Since early in the Nixon administration, the median vote on the Court on the most politically salient issues has been a Republican, but a moderate, country-club Republican: Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, Sandra Day O’Connor, and now Kennedy. The issue going forward is that this kind of Republican is rapidly going extinct…. Future Republican nominees are going to be in the mold of Samuel Alito and Roberts….

The Supreme Court has historically been a centrist institution… [because] elites—from whose ranks Supreme Court justices are generally chosen—tend to have less polarized views than ordinary members of the party…. A decade from now, the Supreme Court will almost certainly not be controlled by either a moderate Republican like Anthony Kennedy or a heterodox liberal like Byron White…. The median vote on the Court will almost certainly be a conservative in the mold of Alito or Roberts, or a liberal in the mold of Ruth Bader Ginsburg…. This polarization is not symmetrical…. Alito is further to the right than Ginsburg is to the left…. Could anything stop the Court from becoming as polarized as the rest of the political order? If current party polarization persists, probably not…. In the short term… whether the Court will be controlled by a liberal Democratic faction or a conservative Republican one… means that the presidential and Senate elections in November will be high-stakes contests indeed.

Must-Read: John Holbo: Podcasts I Just Listened to

Must-Read: John Holbo: Podcasts I just listened to: “I just listened to a Federalist podcast interview with Randy Barnett…

…Not my cup of tea, usually, but I have an interest in Barnett’s stuff. The guy really has a bug in his ear about John Roberts. A couple months back he was blaming Roberts for Trump and I was like–fine, fine, you lost your Obamacare case. You are a bit bitter, venting steam. But he’s still banging on about how Roberts is the betrayer-in-chief of the Constitution, hence to blame for Trump. This is polemically unfair, in ways I could spell out, but won’t. (If you really want to ask, that’s what comments are for.)

But I’ve got to wonder whether this sort of thing isn’t really pissing off Roberts. It would piss me off, if I were Roberts. Barnett isn’t just some guy. He’s like the brain and soul of the Federalist Society, these days. A bit of on-again, off-again grousing about Roberts’ ‘bad’ decisions is one thing. But Roberts is shaping up to be this consistent, vile Judas in the conservative imaginary. Roberts is going to be Chief for a while, I expect. Dale Carnegie would suggest that the way to work the refs effectively is not this. If Roberts actually turns into some flaming Living Constitutionalist slave-to-the-democratic-mob in 20 years, maybe you can give Barnett half credit.

Corey Robin: “It might piss Roberts off to hear this kind of talk now from Barnett…

…But it might also make him think twice and wonder whether, in his drive to be the conservative Court’s steward and statesman, he’s not in fact betraying the values and vision he came on the Court to pursue.

John Holbo: “I think the chance that Roberts doesn’t realize that Barnett is really uncharitably caricaturing Roberts’ position is slight…

…I don’t really think Roberts is going to move left, but I fully expect him to stick by his guns, and to realize that his guns are actually firing at the Federalist Society now.

Must-Read: Stephen Breyer (2010): NLRB v. Canning

Must-Read: Stephen Breyer (2014): NLRB v. Canning: “Ordinarily the President must obtain “the Advice and Consent of the Senate”…

…before appointing an “Office[r] of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2. But the Recess Appointments Clause creates an exception. It gives the President alone the power “to fill up all Vacan cies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Art. II, §2, cl. 3. We here consider three questions about the application of this Clause.

The first concerns the scope of the words “recess of the Senate.” Does that phrase refer only to an inter-session recess (i.e., a break between formal sessions of Congress), or does it also include an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in the midst of a session? We conclude that the Clause applies to both kinds of recess.
The second question concerns the scope of the words “vacancies that may happen.” Does that phrase refer only to vacancies that first come into existence during a recess, or does it also include vacancies that arise prior to a recess but continue to exist during the recess? We conclude that the Clause applies to both kinds of vacancy.

The third question concerns calculation of the length of a “recess.” The President made the appointments here at issue on January 4, 2012. At that time the Senate was in recess pursuant to a December 17, 2011, resolution providing for a series of brief recesses punctuated by “pro forma session[s],” with “no business… transacted,” every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012. S. J., 112th Cong., 1st Sess., 923 (2011) (hereinafter 2011 S. J.). In calculating the length of a recess are we to ignore the pro forma sessions, thereby treating the series of brief recesses as a single, month-long recess? We conclude that we cannot ignore these pro forma sessions.

Our answer to the third question means that, when the appointments before us took place, the Senate was in the midst of a 3-day recess. Three days is too short a time to bring a recess within the scope of the Clause. Thus we conclude that the President lacked the power to make the recess appointments here at issue…

An intersession recess on January 3, 2016, no? Seems to me that there should be some hard bargaining going on right now between Obama and McConnell on getting appointments done under threat of inter-session recess appointments at noon next January 3. For example, Obama should be offering McConnell a Romer-Clarida deal on Fed Governors, under threat of inter-session recess Romer-Gagnon…