A semi-platonic dialogue about secular stagnation, asymmetric risks, Federal Reserve policy, and the role of model-building in guiding economic policy

Sanzio 01 jpg 3 820×2 964 pixels

Sokrates: You remember how I used to say that only active dialogue–questions-and-answers, objections-and-replies–could convey true knowledge? That a flat wax tablet covered by written words could only convey an inadequate and pale simulacrum of education?

Aristoteles: Yes. And you remember how I showed you that you were wrong? That conversation is ephemeral, and very quickly becomes too confused to be a proper educational tool? That only something like an organized and coherent lecture can teach? And only something like the textbooks compiled by my lecture notes can make that teaching durable?

Aristokles: But, my Aristoteles, you never mastered my “dialogue” form. My “dialogue” form has all the advantages of permanence and organization of your textbooks, and all the advantages of real dialectic of Sokrates’s conversation.

Sokrates: How very true, wise Aristokles!

Aristokles How am I to take that?

Xanthippe: You now very well: as snark, pure snark. That’s his specialty.

Hypatia: This is all complicated by the fact that in the age of the internet real, written, permanent dialogues can spring up at a moment’s notice:

Sokrates: And with that, let’s roll the tape:


Other things linked to that are highly relevant and worth reading:


Things I did not find and place outbound links to, but should have:

  • Polya
  • Dennis Robertson
  • Donald Patinkin

Looking at the whole thing, I wince at how lazy people–especially me–have been with their weblog post titles. I should find time to go back and retitle everything, perhaps adding an explanatory sentence to each link…

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard et al.: “Macro Effects of Capital Inflows: Capital Type Matters”

Olivier Blanchard et al.: Macro Effects of Capital Inflows: Capital Type Matters: “Some scholars view capital inflows as contractionary…

…but many policymakers view them as expansionary. Evidence supports the policymakers. This column introduces an analytic framework that knits together the two views. For a given policy rate, bond inflows lead to currency appreciation and are contractionary, while non-bond inflows lead to an appreciation but also to a decrease in the cost of borrowing, and thus may be expansionary….

How can we reconcile the models and reality? [Our] answer… relies on… allowing for both ‘bonds’ (the rate on which can be thought of as the policy rate) and ‘non-bonds’… which are imperfect substitutes…. Capital inflows may decrease the rate on non-bonds and reduce the cost of financial intermediation…. Capital inflows may in this case be expansionary even for a given policy rate. In emerging markets, with a relatively underdeveloped financial system, the effect of a reduction in the cost of financial intermediation may dominate, leading to a credit boom and an output increase despite the appreciation. In more advanced economies, the appreciation may dominate, and capital inflows (even into non-bonds) may be contractionary (e.g. the Swiss case)….

The appropriate policies vis-à-vis capital inflows depend very much on the nature of the inflows.

Sterilised foreign exchange (FX) market intervention, if done through bonds (as is usually the case), can fully offset the effects of bond inflows…. When, however, sterilised foreign exchange intervention is used in response to non-bond inflows… FX intervention… by reducing upward pressure on the currency… increases capital inflows, and thus increases the effects of inflows on credit and the financial system….

The policymaker may have several objectives in mind – with respect to credit growth (given the risk of financial crisis); the currency (given the risk of Dutch disease); and output (given nominal rigidities in the system). The issue is really one of matching the policy instrument (there are three) to deliver on the most important objectives, without too much cost in terms of the other objectives…. If the central bank is worried about both appreciation and unhealthy or excessive credit growth, FX intervention or capital controls are preferable to the use of the policy rate in response to an increase in bond inflows…. In response to non-bond inflows, our framework suggests that if the goal is to maintain exchange rate stability with minimum impact on the return to non-bonds, capital controls do the job best, followed by FX intervention, followed by a move in the policy rate….

[We] use global flows to all emerging market countries together with the VIX as instruments…. We find that, while bond inflows have a negative effect on economic activity, non-bond inflows have a significant and positive effect. We also find that non-bond inflows (excluding FDI) have a strong positive effect on credit…. FDI inflows, while they increase output, have a negative impact on credit, perhaps because some of the intermediation which would have taken place through banks is replaced by FDI financing…

Must-read: Roger Farmer: “Global Sunspots and Asset Prices in a Monetary Economy”

Must-Read: Roger E.A. Farmer: Global Sunspots and Asset Prices in a Monetary Economy: “A simple model in which asset price fluctuations are caused by sunspots…

…I construct global sunspot equilibria. My agents are expected utility maximizers with logarithmic utility functions, there are no fundamental shocks and markets are sequentially complete. Despite the simplicity of these assumptions, I am able to go a considerable way towards explaining features of asset pricing data that have presented an obstacle to previous models that adopted similar assumptions. My model generates volatile persistent swings in asset prices, a substantial term premium for long bonds and bursts of conditional volatility in rates of return.

Must-Read: Joshua M Brown: The Woes of the Asset Managers

Must-Read: Passive diversified portfolios with an eye toward overweighting factors that have historically offered high returns is what nearly all investors should be doing.

Joshua M Brown: The Woes of the Asset Managers: “I would say that the pressure on fees and the transparency around what you pay vs what you get makes most of the sector uninvestable…

…Multi-million dollar ad budgets and the typical PR campaigns are failing to counter the power of the internet. The jig is up; investors have gotten too savvy (or skeptical, either way) for these businesses to bounce back as they used to…. Last week I sat with someone from Goldman Sachs who showed me what they’re doing within Smart Beta ETFs and it looks just like what everyone else is doing–multi-factor passive portfolios emphasizing value, small, quality and momentum. The difference is, Goldman is charging 9 basis points (9!). I had to be picked up off the floor. Goldman is going slash-and-burn for factor investing market share with a pricing structure that rivals what State Street, Schwab, Vanguard and BlackRock are charging for plain-vanilla index exposure…. I’m not sure how Smart Beta ETFs (or active managers mimicking these styles) will be able to hold the line on charging more than 50 basis points in a world where Goldman gives it away for free…

Musing on one’s intellectual responsibilities…

Live from Evans Hall: Musing on One’s Intellectual Duties: Apropos of David Romer’s teaching Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and other things this morning…

Those who state that they are worried about zero interest-rate policy and financial stability are not worried about the excessive new risky lending. New risky lending is far from excessive–and boosting it is, in fact, one of the principal aims of low interest rate policy. We want there to be more of.

What they might be worried about is a model in which there are two groups of investors: those who can assess risks and those who cannot. The second group are easily phished. And zero interest-rate policy induces them to “reach for yield”. The complaint is not that there is too much new risky lending, but that the wrong people are undertaking risky lending, and financial instability may result when the tide goes out and they see how phoolish they have been.

The problem with the previous “what they might be worried about…” paragraph is that those who claim to be worried about zero interest-rate policy and financial stability do not make this “phishing for phools” argument, and do not present any evidence that zero interest rate policy materially adds to the problem of phools who are easily phished.

As a matter of dialogue and debate and the advancement of knowledge, how much work should I be doing not just to acknowledge and express the strongest wrong arguments I think are being made, but to go one step further and develop even stronger arguments then are currently being made if those stronger arguments are along lines that I think of as fundamentally wrong?

Today’s Economic History: Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised

Today’s Economic History: Roth is very good on “money” defined as a unit of account.

But there are, of course, other perfectly-fine definitions of “money”: “means of payment”, “medium of exchange”, “that which you need to hold to take advantage of or avoid suffering from market disequilibrium”, “even store of value”.

To say that the definition attached to how you use the word “money” is the only correct definition and that everyone with a different definition is doing it wrong–well, that’s just doing it wrong yourself…

Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised: “The earliest uses of money in recorded civilization were not coins…

…or anything like them. They were tallies of credits and debits (gives and takes), assets and liabilities (rights and responsibilities, ownership and obligations), quantified in numbers. Accounting. (In technical terms: sign-value notation.)

Tally sticks go back twenty-five or thirty thousand years. More sophisticated systems emerged six to seven thousand years ago (Sumerian clay tablets and their strings-of-beads predecessors). The first coins weren’t minted until circa 700 BCE — thousands or tens of thousands of years after the invention of ‘money.’

These tally systems give us our first clue to the nature of this elusive ‘social construct’ called money: it’s an accounting construct. The earliest human recording systems we know of — proto-writing — were all used for accounting.* So the need for social accounting may even explain the invention of writing.

This ‘accounting’ invention is a human manifestation of, and mechanism for, reciprocity instincts whose origins long predate humanity. It’s an invented technique to do the counting that is at least somewhat, at least implicitly, necessary to reciprocal, tit-for-tat social relationships. It’s even been suggested that the arduous work of social accounting — keeping track of all those social relationships with all those people — may have been the primary impetus for the rapid evolutionary expansion of the human brain. ‘Money’ allowed humans to outsource some of that arduous mental recording onto tally sheets.

None of this is to suggest that explicit accounting is necessary for social relationships. That would be silly. Small tribal cultures are mostly dominated by ‘gift economies’ based on unquantified exchanges. And even in modern societies, much or most of the ‘value’ we exchange — among family, friends, and even business associates — is not accounted for explicitly or numerically. But money, by any useful definition, is so accounted for. Money simply doesn’t exist without accounting.

Coins and other pieces of physical currency are, in an important sense, an extra step removed from money itself. They’re conveniently exchangeable physical tokens of accounting relationships, allowing people to shift the tallies of rights and responsibilities without editing tally sheets. But the tally sheets, even if they are only implicit, are where the money resides.

This is of course contrary to everyday usage. A dollar bill is ‘money,’ right? But that is often true of technical terms of art. This confusion of physical tokens and other currency-like things (viz, economists’ monetary aggregates, and Wray’s ‘money things’) with money itself make it difficult or impossible to discuss money coherently.

What may surprise you: all of this historical and anthropological information and understanding is esoteric, rare knowledge among economists. It’s pretty much absent from Econ 101 teaching, and beyond. Economists’ discomfort with the discipline’s status as a true ‘social science,’ employing the methodologies and epistemological constructs of social science — their ‘physics envy’ — ironically leaves them bereft of a definition for what is arguably the most fundamental construct in their discipline. Likewise for other crucial and constantly-employed economic terms: assets, capital, savings, wealth, and others.

Now to be fair: a definition of money will never be simple and straightforward. Physicists’ definition of ‘energy’ certainly isn’t. But physicists don’t completely talk past each other when they use the word and its associated concepts. Economists do when they talk about money. Constantly.

Physicists’ definition of energy is useful because it’s part of a mutually coherent complex of other carefully defined terms and understandings — things like ‘work,’ ‘force,’ ‘inertia,’ and ‘momentum.’ Money, as a (necessarily ‘social’) accounting construct, requires a similar complex of carefully defined, associated accounting terms — all of which themselves are about social-accounting relationships.

At this point you’re probably drumming your fingers impatiently: ‘So give: what is money?’ Here, a bloodless and technical term-of-art definition:

The value of assets, as designated in a unit of account.

Which raises the obvious questions: What do you mean by ‘assets’ and ‘unit of account’? Those are the kind of associated definitions that are necessary to any useful definition of money. Hint: assets are pure accounting, balance-sheet entities, numeric representations of the value of goods (or of claims on goods, or claims on claims on…).

Must-Read: William Poole: Don’t Blame the Fed for Low Rates

Must-Read: You know, given the demographic headwinds of this decade, the consensus of economic historians is likely to say that job growth under Obama was not weak, but quite possibly the second-strongest relative to baseline since the Oil Shock of 1973–somewhat worse than under Clinton, a hair better than under Carter or Reagan, and massively superior to job growth under either Bush:

Graph All Employees Total Nonfarm Payrolls FRED St Louis Fed

William Poole: Don’t Blame the Fed for Low Rates: “Long-term rates reflect weak job creation and credit demand, both a result of President Obama’s poor economic stewardship…

…The frequent claim that Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and her colleagues are responsible for continuing low rates of interest may be correct in the small, but not in the large…. The real villain behind low interest rates is President Obama. Long-term rates reflect weak job creation and credit demand…. The real rate of interest, currently negative for short-term interest rates and only slightly positive for long rates, is a consequence of non-monetary conditions that have held the economy back….

Disincentives to business investment deserve special notice…. The Obama administration has created one disincentive after another… the failure to pursue tax reform… insistence on higher tax rates… environmental activism… growth-killing overreach in the Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Labor Department….

The Fed is responsible, however, for not defending itself by explaining to Congress and the public what is going on. The Fed is too afraid politically to mention any details of its general position that it cannot do the job on its own. Yes, there are “headwinds,” but they are largely the doing of the administration…. The Obama administration didn’t create Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for instance, or the government’s affordable-housing goals—both of which fueled the 2008 financial crisis. But the Obama administration has failed to correct the economic problems it inherited. It has simply piled on more and more disincentives to growth. These disincentives have kept long-term rates low.

It seems to me that very little of William Poole’s argument makes any sense at all.

If the factors he points to were there and were operating, they would operate by lowering the future profits of both new capital and old capital. They should thus produce both (a) a fall in interest rates and (b) a fall in the equity values of established companies. We have the first. We do not have the second. Thus I find it very hard to understand in what sense this is made as a technocratic argument. It seems, instead, to be some strange fact-light checking off of political and ideological boxes: Obama BAD! Federal Reserve GOOD!!

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Clinton on Glass-Steagall: Right or Wrong?

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Clinton on Glass-Steagall: Right or Wrong?: “Hillary Clinton said she opposed reimplementing the Glass-Steagall Act…

…which had been repealed in 1999. When the financial crisis struck in 2008, many people blamed the disaster on the removal of the restrictions Glass-Steagall had imposed on banks. However, the evidence doesn’t support this claim, which makes Clinton correct. But that doesn’t mean ending Glass-Steagall was a good idea or that repeal could never cause the kinds of problems that lead to a financial crisis, which makes her wrong…. Even though the repeal of Glass-Steagall didn’t cause the most recent financial crisis, why leave the risk in place?

Those opposed to reimplementing the Glass-Steagall sort of restrictions argue it would hamper bank activities and leave them at a disadvantage. But that’s largely because the banks aren’t the ones who will pay the bill if they’re wrong. In fact, they would likely get bailed out…. The costs associated with Glass-Steagall restrictions on bank activities are small relative to the benefits of avoiding another financial crisis, and the objections of the financial industry shouldn’t stand in the way of a more stable financial system.

Must-Read: John Authers: Number-Crunchers Lift Lid on Investor Choice

Must-Read: This is what Akerlof and Shiller’s Phishing for Phools is about…

John Authers: Number-Crunchers Lift Lid on Investor Choice: “Retail investors…fatally drawn to chasing performance…

…buying high, selling low… heighten[ing] the peaks and lower[ing] the troughs…. In aggregate, all the money attracted by funds in that era went to funds that could show the strongest ratings (which are largely a function of performance)…. Past performance does not predict future performance. But it utterly controls what the consumer will ultimately buy….

Given a choice between two otherwise identical funds, Americans will take the cheaper one. Europeans will not…. In the US, investment advisers tend to be paid by fee, rather than commission, and have no incentive to advise otherwise…. But Americans are not as smart as all that. High turnover… is a bad idea…. Yet funds with a high turnover in the US tend to attract more than 0.5 per cent more in inflows each month…. Most counter-intuitively, and alarmingly… older than average funds… suffer outflows at a rate of 2.77 per cent of their assets each month….

Ultimately, funds are sold the same way as other branded goods. Marketers spot where the demand is moving, and launch something new that can be hyped. All the interest and selling action focuses on recent launches, while older products are gradually neglected, and watch money ebb out over time. It is not a great way to allocate capital…

Must-Read: Megan McArdle: Why Democrats Fixate on Glass-Steagall

Must-Read: The reason to repeal the repeal of Glass-Steagall is that (1) it has not led to increased competition and lower fees in investment banking, and (2) it creates a point of vulnerability at which financiers can make bets with the government’s money. narrow-banking advocate Milton Friedman was especially shrill on this point: that deposit insurance was necessary, but that banks with government-insured deposits should be restricted to buying Treasuries and only Treasuries:

Megan McArdle: Why Democrats Fixate on Glass-Steagall: “Team Steagles… seem[s] to have become a powerful force in the Democratic Party…

…The provisions limiting the entrance of commercial banks into investment activities (and vice versa) were gradually relaxed, and then abolished with Gramm-Leach-Bliley (the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999). Calls to ‘bring back Glass-Steagall’ are, in fact, almost always calls to bring back this one provision…. It would be an amusing and depressing exercise to get any of these candidates in a room with some economists and ask them to explain how Glass-Steagall could have prevented the 2008 crisis. For there is a small problem with the Steagles argument: It’s very hard to think of the mechanism by which the repeal of this rule made any significant contribution to the meltdown….

This is why you don’t hear a lot of experts calling for the return of this rule. Those who do want it reinstated don’t claim that it would have prevented the financial crisis. For example, I quote Raj Date and Mike Konczal of the left-wing Roosevelt Institute, from their paper ‘Out of the Shadows: Creating a 21st Century Glass Steagall’: ‘The loosening of Glass-Steagall prohibitions did not directly lead to the financial crisis of the past few years.’ Why, then, do so many people want it back?  Fighting ‘Too Big to Fail.’… Moral hazard/protecting the taxpayer…. Exotic political economy arguments… [that] are hard to prove or disprove….

Glass-Steagall… is the perfect Washington Issue: a proposal of negligible impact but great popular charm. It is a way for politicians to sound as if they are addressing some major problem without having to go to the trouble of actually doing so. Glass-Steagall’s major appeal is not that it would work, but that it can be explained in under a minute to someone who doesn’t know anything about financial markets…