Morning Must-Read: Martin Wolf: An Extraordinary State of ‘Managed Depression’

Martin Wolf: An Extraordinary State of ‘Managed Depression’: “In the US, UK and the eurozone…

…output has fallen far below what virtually everybody expected eight years ago. The same is true of Japan, though the trend in question ended two and a half decades ago. Yet, contrary to what we might also have expected, we do not observe accelerating deflation…. When we look at the high-income economies in this way, we must recognise that they are in a truly extraordinary state. The best way to describe it is as a managed depression: aggressive monetary policies have been sufficient to halt accelerating deflation, but they have been insufficient to produce a strong expansion. This is particularly true of the eurozone…. Recent suggestions by the ECB’s president, Mario Draghi, that the eurozone needs a radical shift in policy regime, is the self-evident truth. Yet the powers that be in the eurozone–notably, the German government–plan to do nothing about it…. We can, at last, see some reasons for optimism about the US and UK… though confidence… cannot be strong. More radical alternatives, such as higher inflation targets and debt restructuring, may yet be needed. In the eurozone and Japan, however, the picture looks more uncertain…

“Uncertain” is not the way I would put it, I must say…

Talking Points: Modern Capitalism: Growth and Equality: Friday Focus for October 10, 2014

J. Bradford DeLong: Talking Points for IIF: Modern Capitalism: Growth and Inequality”: 4:00-4:50 pm, Friday October 10, 2014, Ronald Reagan Building

  1. I am going to talk mostly about the U.S. and somewhat less about the North Atlantic, and say only one thing about the world as a whole.

  2. The one thing about the world as a whole: After the Qingming Festival of 1976, the rulers of China recognized that they had lost whatever legitimacy they had ever possessed, that Hua Guofeng and his allies could not manage the situation, and that they needed to adopt the successful-mouse-catchers development strategy, the world has become a more equal place because China and secondarily India have done well. But a continuation is not guaranteed for the next two generations. It may not even be ore likely than not.

  3. The United States primarily and the rest of the North Atlantic to a lesser degree are losing the race between technology and education. We do not need to slow technology; we do need to accelerate education if we are to ever reduce the gap between those at the 20th and 80th income percentiles to a magnitude that does not shame us.

  4. We may not be able to do so with our current educational technologies: we know how to get 1/3 of our populations reaching adulthood a useful college education–but the same educational strategies may well be much less effective for those outside our luckiest 1/3.

  5. A good deal of the rise in inequality outside of the 80-20 education-and-technology factor is also due to our technologies’ creation of winner-take-all contests within our economy. It is not clear to me why the economy of 1900 and the economy of 2000 did this, while the economy of 1960 did not.

  6. The rest of the rise is due to a feedback loop by which the rich use their wealth to acquire more political influence to secure the rents that make them even richer so that they can use their wealth to an even greater extent to acquire still more political influence to secure even more rents. We do stand in great danger of building a latifundista society, which will in due course bring with it our Perons, our Pinochets…


Martin Wolf, J. Bradford DeLong, Muhamed El-Erian, Jason Furman.

Where Is the Wage Growth?: (Late) Thursday Focus for October 9, 2014

Nick Bunker picks up the slack left when Reuters pulled the plug on its noble and very useful Counterparties:

Nick Bunker: Where is the wage growth?: “The lack of wage growth is on everyone’s mind…

…Catherine Rampell at The Washington Post considers a variety of reasons for this slow wage growth… but finds one more convincing… a considerable amount of slack in the labor market…. Justin Wolfers presents a related puzzle… at the historical relationship between the unemployment rate and average wage growth…. Jared Bernstein looks at the relationship between wage growth and… [a] labor market slack [measure] developed by… Andrew Levin… [and] finds that the… relationship between slack and wage growth has weakened…. Tim Duy… thinks that Wolfers’s puzzle… isn’t all that puzzling…. The meager wage growth of recent years is just a continuation of a long-term trend highlighted by The New York Times’ David Leonhardt…

Also worth putting on your must-read view is the Bruegel weekly Blogs Review by Jeremie Cohen-Setton…

I remember Robert Solow saying 35 years ago that the assumption that business cycles were stationary symmetric fluctuations around a trend that to first-order evolved independently of the cycle was analytically very convenient but was also quite possibly completely wrong, and that a good economist with know when it was time to throw that assumption overboard.

Looking at nominal wage growth since 1985:

Graph Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees Total Private FRED St Louis Fed
And looking at the difference between nominal wage growth and the core CPI since 1985:

Graph Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees Total Private FRED St Louis Fed

allows you to see the stakes at issue here: was there something going on on the supply-side that made 1997-2010 the only time period of positive real wage growth since the Carter administration?

Graph Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees Total Private FRED St Louis Fed

Or does the positive real-wage growth arise because Greenspan after the 1992 and 2003 unemployment-rate peaks is interested in producing a high-pressure economy and in doing whatever it takes in a way that Volcker and Bernanke/Yellen have not been? How much do social conventions of what real wages ought to be shape labor-market supply and demand in the medium- and the long-run, and how much do episodes of labor-market depression and labor-market boom shape those social conventions of what real wages ought to be?

You think that, having been in this business for 35 years, I would know–or at least have strong opinions that I regard as evidence-based…

Things to Read on the Afternoon of October 9, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Brian Blackstone and Hans Bentzien: Bundesbank’s Weidmann Criticizes ECB’s Stimulus Measures: “German Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann criticized the European Central Bank’s decision to buy private-sector bonds and signaled his fierce opposition to purchasing government bonds, underscoring his reluctance to back additional stimulus measures to combat weakness in the eurozone economy. Mr. Weidmann said he stands by the conservative principles that have characterized the Bundesbank throughout its nearly 60-year history: keeping inflation low; protecting the central bank’s balance sheet from risks and strict separation from the financial needs of governments…. Mr. Weidmann said he is aware of the risks of too-low inflation…. However, ‘the trough of inflation should soon be behind us’, Mr. Weidmann said…. He was similarly skeptical of fiscal stimulus, despite low government borrowing costs…. ‘The cyclical situation and outlook do not require fiscal stimulus’ in Germany, he said…. ‘The concept of an independent central bank clearly focused on price stability is neither old-fashioned nor outdated’, he said. ‘It is about not falling into the trap of “This time is different”‘.”

  2. Peter Piot: ‘In 1976 I discovered Ebola–now I fear an unimaginable tragedy’: “I still remember exactly. One day in September, a pilot from Sabena Airlines brought us a shiny blue Thermos and a letter from a doctor in Kinshasa in what was then Zaire. In the Thermos, he wrote, there was a blood sample from a Belgian nun who had recently fallen ill from a mysterious sickness in Yambuku, a remote village in the northern part of the country. He asked us to test the sample for yellow fever. We had no idea how dangerous the virus was. And there were no high-security labs in Belgium. We just wore our white lab coats and protective gloves. When we opened the Thermos, the ice inside had largely melted and one of the vials had broken. Blood and glass shards were floating in the ice water. We fished the other, intact, test tube out of the slop and began examining the blood for pathogens, using the methods that were standard at the time…”

  3. Martin Wolf: We are trapped in a cycle of credit booms: “The eurozone seems to be waiting for the Godot of global demand to float it off into debt sustainability…. China is struggling with the debt it built up…. Without an unsustainable credit boom somewhere, the world economy seems incapable of generating growth in demand sufficient to absorb potential supply…. Financial sectors have deleveraged in the US and UK… so, too, have households…. Meanwhile, public debt has risen sharply…. Since 2007 the ratio of total debt, excluding the financial sector, has jumped by 72 percentage points in China, to 220 per cent of GDP…. Credit cycles matter because they frequently prove so damaging…. [Maybe] the pre-crisis trend was unsustainable… the damage to confidence… the debt overhang…. Mass bankruptcy, as in the 1930s, is devastating. But working out of debt is likely to generate a vicious circle from high debt to low growth and back to even higher debt…. Managing the post-crisis predicament requires a combination of prompt recognition of losses, recapitalisation of the banking sector and strongly supportive fiscal and monetary policies… use both blades of the scissors: direct debt reduction and recapitalisation on the one hand and strong economic growth on the other…. Yet the biggest lesson of these crises is not to let debt run ahead of the long-term capacity of an economy to support it in the first place. The hope is that macroprudential policy will achieve this outcome. Well, one can always hope…

  4. William Langewiesche: Should Airplanes Be Flying Themselves?: “The Human Factor: Airline pilots were once the heroes of the skies. Today, in the quest for safety, airplanes are meant to largely fly themselves. Which is why the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, which killed 228 people, remains so perplexing and significant. William Langewiesche explores how a series of small errors turned a state-of-the-art cockpit into a death trap.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Steven Levy: Why I Started Backchannel: “I think… the secret is… not going away. That’s been my somewhat accidental strategy to making a mark as a technology writer…. This broad world of tech writing is crowded and confusing. Much of it is redundant…. Millions of readers are lured by sensational headlines, only to be disappointed to find a superficial dispatch with no new information, dashed off by a harried journalist tasked with producing three stories a day… wonderful, well-researched and written stories… [are] all too often… buried by the flotsam…. That’s why I am starting Backchannel…. We won’t even try to cover everything…. If there’s nothing original to say, we’ll keep quiet…”

  2. Richard Mayhew: Who doesn’t like higher wages?: “Sally Pipes at Forbes is spewing fear, uncertainty and doubt at Forbes magazine on Obamacare again.  Her ‘argument’ this time is that Obamacare is bad for wage earners and she commits the usual sins of trusting Avik Roy and his ilk to be good faith brokers…”

  3. Paul Krugman: The Long Cryptocon: “Bitcoin prices are down by two-thirds from their peak, and Izabella Kaminska, who has stayed with the subject, finds the sad story of a gullible rube who appears to have impoverished himself by believing in the hype. She comments: ‘Some extremely wealthy libertarians have a lot to answer for if these sorts of ppl lose all due to believing in them’. But this is nothing new. Back in 2012 Rick Perlstein published an eye-opening piece titled The Long Con, in which he documented the close association that has always existed between right-wing organizing and direct-mail commercial scams–in fact, it’s pretty much impossible to tell where one ends and the other begins. Send us money to keep Obama from imposing Sharia law; invest in this sure-fire scheme to profit from the coming hyperinflation. Was Glenn Beck selling paranoid politics or Goldline? Yes. Bitcoin… solve[s] an interesting information problem…. But the psychology and sociology of the phenomenon are the same old same old.”

  4. Paul Krugman: The Deficit Is Down, and Nobody Knows or Cares: “The CBO tells us that the federal deficit is way down — under 3 percent of GDP. And Jared Bernstein notes that Obama seems to get no credit. You may ask, what did you expect? But the truth is that a few years ago many pundits claimed that Obama would reap big political rewards by being the grownup, the responsible guy who Did What Had To Be Done. Worse, some reports said that the White House political staff believed this. It was, of course, nonsense on multiple levels. While pundits may like to script out elaborate psychodramas about voter perceptions, real perceptions bear no relationship to their scripts — in fact, a majority think the deficit has gone up on Obama’s watch, while only a small minority know that it’s down. And the deficit scolds themselves are unappeasable — nothing that doesn’t involve severely damage Social Security and/or Medicare will satisfy them. Why, it’s almost as if shredding the safety net, not reducing the deficit, was their real goal. Deficit obsession has been immensely destructive as an economic matter. But it has also involved major political malpractice.”

Evening Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Trapped in a Cycle of Credit Booms

Martin Wolf: We are trapped in a cycle of credit booms: “The eurozone seems to be waiting for the Godot of global demand…

…to float it off into debt sustainability…. China is struggling with the debt it built up…. Without an unsustainable credit boom somewhere, the world economy seems incapable of generating growth in demand sufficient to absorb potential supply…. Financial sectors have deleveraged in the US and UK… so, too, have households…. Meanwhile, public debt has risen sharply…. Since 2007 the ratio of total debt, excluding the financial sector, has jumped by 72 percentage points in China, to 220 per cent of GDP…. Credit cycles matter because they frequently prove so damaging…. [Maybe] the pre-crisis trend was unsustainable… the damage to confidence… the debt overhang…. Mass bankruptcy, as in the 1930s, is devastating. But working out of debt is likely to generate a vicious circle from high debt to low growth and back to even higher debt…. Managing the post-crisis predicament requires a combination of prompt recognition of losses, recapitalisation of the banking sector and strongly supportive fiscal and monetary policies… use both blades of the scissors: direct debt reduction and recapitalisation on the one hand and strong economic growth on the other…. Yet the biggest lesson of these crises is not to let debt run ahead of the long-term capacity of an economy to support it in the first place. The hope is that macroprudential policy will achieve this outcome. Well, one can always hope…

A Note on Pre-2008 Unemployment-Rate Mean-Reversion: Wednesday Focus for October 8, 2014

Back before 2008, we neoclassical new Keynesian-new monetarist types were highly confident that the U.S. macroeconomy as then constituted had very powerful stabilizing forces built into it: if the unemployment rate rose above the so-called natural rate of unemployment, the NAIRU, it would within a very few years return to normal.

This is why we were confident:


1948-2014: Share of Deviation of Unemployment from Trend Erased After…

...1 Yr    ...2 Yrs    ...3 Yrs    With NAIRU trend...

33.7%      67.4%       88.3%       Cubic
32.4%      63.6%       84.1%       Quadratic
31.8%      61.5%       80.5%       Linear
27.8%      52.5%       69.2%       No Trend

Standard errors? Bootstrapping the three-year forecast cubic-trend model with 10,000 replications produced a mean estimated coefficient of 84.3% with a standard error of the estimate of 17.4%-points–half again as large as the OLS estimated standard error.

Dropbox 2010906 R Markdown and R Pres 2014 09 29 Unemployment Rate Mean Reversion Simple Bootstrap html

We were wrong.


If you have R, and wish to play with the Rmarkdown files, take a look:

Financial Stability and Instability, Ultra-Low Interest Rates, Quantitative Easing, and the Mammon of Unrighteousness: (Late) Tuesday Focus for October 7, 2014

NewImageLarry Elliott: IMF warns period of ultra-low interest rates poses fresh financial crisis threat: “The Washington-based IMF said…

…that… the risks to stability… c[o]me from the… shadow banking system… hedge funds, money market funds and investment banks that do not take deposits from the public. José Viñals, the IMF’s financial counsellor, said:

Policymakers are facing a new global imbalance: not enough economic risk-taking in support of growth, but increasing excesses in financial risk-taking posing stability challenges…. Risks are shifting to the shadow banking system in the form of rising market and liquidity risks. If left unaddressed, these risks could compromise global financial stability.

The stability report said low interest rates were “critical” in supporting the economy because they encouraged consumers to spend, and businesses to hire and invest. But it noted that loose monetary policies also prompted investment in high-yield but risky assets and for investors to take bigger bets. One concern is that much of the high-risk investment has taken place in emerging markets, leaving them vulnerable to rising US interest rates…. The IMF said there was a trade-off between the upside economic benefits of low interest rates and the money creation process known as quantitative easing and the downside financial stability risks… developments in high-yielding corporate bonds were “worrisome”, that share prices in some western countries were high by historical norms, and that there were pockets of real estate over-valuation…

I have come to the conclusion that those who say that quantitative easing has increased systemic financial-market risks have simply not thought hard enough about what quantitative easing is. In quantitative easing the central bank takes duration risk off of the private sector’s balance sheet and onto the governments, that is, the taxpayers’. The ratio of risk to be borne to private-sector risk-bearing capacity falls. The presumption is that this makes financial markets less, not more, vulnerable to systemic risk. You could tell some kind of complex contrarian story with demand and supply curves that slope in non-obvious ways. But none of those who say that quantitative easing increases systemic risk make such arguments–and if they understood quantitative easing properly, they would understand that they need to and feel impelled to do so.

The argument that ultra-low interest rates and the anticipated continuation of ultra-low interest rates for a considerable time period raises systemic financial risks is less mired in the, well, mire. But it, too, is not obvious. An economy sinks into depression when households, savers, and businesses in aggregate believe that they are short of the assets they need to hold to ensure liquidity–that after subtracting off assets they are holding as savings vehicles they do not have enough cash and enough safe nominal assets that could be pledged to immediately raise cash. As a result, the aggregate of households, savers, and businesses try to cut their spending below their income in order to build up their liquid cash and safe collateral balances; but since my income is nothing more than your spending, they fail and so production, income, and spending fall until the private sector finds itself so poor that it no longer seeks to build up its liquid cash and safe collateral balances.

In such a situation the government, by trading its cash and its safe collateral liabilities for risky financial assets and four currently-produced goods and services both:

  1. creates more of what the private sector wants to hold, and so reduces or eliminates the gap between current and desired holdings of liquid cash and safe collateral.

  2. lowers interest rates and so increases the value of the future relative to the present, providing a direct financial incentive both to spend now on the creation of long-duration real assets and to spend now out of what are now more valuable anticipations of future income.

On the one hand, higher asset valuations and higher levels of production and income greatly reduce the risks associated with financial assets backed by real wealth of one form or another. On the other hand, the tilting of the intertemporal relative price structure greatly increases the incentive to create long-duration financial assets–which will inherently be speculative, and some of which will partake to some degree of the unhedged out-of-the-money put or even the Ponzi nature. Which of these effects will be larger? For small reductions in interest rates, the first-order effect on the value of existing collateral assets in making finance safer will outweigh the second-order creation of new long-duration assets in making finance riskier. To the extent that prudential regulation is effective–or even exists–the range over which reductions in interest rates will improve stability is larger. To the extent that the economy is already flush with long-duration financial assets–which it is–the range over which reductions in interest rates will improve stability is larger.

The first-class study of this I know finds no evidence of the IMF’s contention that policies of ultra-low interest rates have laid the foundations for increased risks of systemic financial instability in the United States. Outside the United States? Yes, times of low interest rates in the core are times of opportunity–cheap financing is available to finance economic development–but also times of danger–are their financial markets robust enough to control and manage the hot-money fluctuations?–in the periphery. But how much weight does the argument that prudential policy in the periphery may go wrong have in militating against policies that–correctly–aim at appropriate internal balance in the core?

I am now more inclined to view worries that ultra-low interest rate and quantitative easing policies raise risks of future financial instability as the last-gasp argument of the austerians–as one more attempt to find an argument, any argument, to justify universal bankruptcy and the war on the Keynesian Mammon of Unrighteousness.

Is infrastructure spending a free lunch?

The International Monetary Fund is having its annual meeting in Washington, DC this weekend, which includes a variety of talks and panels about the state of the global economy. Before attending one of these panels focusing on public spending and economic growth, Paul Krugman posted a graph of construction spending in the United States in recent years. The clear downward trajectory of the spending juxtaposed with declining inflation-adjusted interest rates demonstrates the clear case for increased infrastructure spending, according to Krugman.

Making this point before attending an IMF panel on the topic is fitting given recent work by the international economic agency. As part of its World Economic Outlook for this year, IMF staffers argue that spending on infrastructure can actually pay for itself by boosting growth in the short term and the long term. For an organization well known for advocating for fiscal austerity, it’s quite the turnaround.

At The Washington Post, Larry Summers, the Harvard University professor and former Treasury Secretary, lays out part of the IMF’s argument. In essence, he says the investments can fund themselves when interest rates are very low. Summers gives a numerical example: if the real return on infrastructure investment is 6 percent, the government would receive about 1.5 percent, or 25 percent of the total return. And since real interest rates, or the cost of borrowing, for the United States is about 1 percent, this means the government would earn an extra return of about 0.5 percent.

The IMF’s conclusion is similar to one made by Summers and our own Brad DeLong in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. The case made by DeLong and Summers, however, is even bolder. They argue that all expansionary fiscal policy can be self-financing—not only infrastructure spending but also other forms of government spending and transfers. DeLong and Summers’s argument rests on the idea of hysteresis, the idea that workers and other resources idled in a recession can become unproductive and reduce the long-term growth rate of the economy. If this hysteresis effect is large enough then current fiscal policy that quickly puts the economy back toward its long-run potential will be paid for by the future output it created.

Crucially, these arguments rely on low interest rates and a very weak economy. These facts are the reality at the moment, but they haven’t always been that way and mostly likely won’t be that way in the future. The IMF and DeLong and Summers aren’t arguing that infrastructure investment or fiscal policy is self-financing everywhere at all times. They work best in periods of economic slack and unused resources. Sadly, our times fit that description all too well.

How are economic inequality and growth connected?

In the mid-20th century, economists began witnessing inequality’s decline in the developed world. Prior to the two World Wars and Great Depression, rising inequality was characteristic of most of the developed world, but in the aftermath of the upheavals, the trend reversed. At the time, many reasoned that declining inequality was a natural outgrowth of the development process: As countries become more economically mature, inequality would fall. This trend led Nobel Laureate economist Simon Kuznets to write:

 “One might thus assume a long swing in the inequality characterizing the secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases.”

Given the narrowing of inequality in the more economically developed nations, Kuznets’ analysis suggested that the inequality in poorer countries was a transitional phase that would reverse itself once these nations became more economically developed. Thus, similar to how the level of inequality was decreasing in wealthy nations, inequality would eventually decline in poorer countries as they became richer. In fact, some economists theorized that inequality in the less developed world was actually good for growth because it meant that the economy was generating select individuals wealthy enough to provide the savings necessary for investment-led growth.

Download the full pdf report

Today, the world looks very different than it did in 1955 when Kuznets made his famous assertion. In the past several decades, economic inequality in the United States and other wealthy nations has risen sharply, spurring renewed interest in the question of whether and how changes in income distributions affect economic wellbeing. Over the same time period, economic inequality has persisted and even grown in many poorer economies.

These trends have sparked economists to conduct empirical studies, analyzing data across states and countries, to see if there is a direct relationship between economic inequality, and economic growth and stability. Early empirical work on this question generally found inequality is harmful for economic growth. Improved data and techniques added to this body of research, but the newer literature was generally inconclusive, with some finding a negative relationship between economic growth and inequality while others finding the opposite.

The latest research, however, provides nuance that can explain many of the conflicting trends within the earlier body of research. There is growing evidence that inequality is bad for growth in the long run. Specifically, a number of studies show that higher inequality is associated with slower income gains among those not at the top of the income and wealth spectrum.

Economists and policymakers today should not be surprised that empirical studies were inconclusive given the broad theoretical (and sometimes contradictory) reasons that hypothesized inequality would both promote growth and inhibit growth. On the one hand, hundreds of years of economic theory has been built on the hypothesis that inequality in outcomes creates incentives for individuals to work hard or be more productive than others in order to receive greater incomes—activity that spurs growth. In addition, many theorized that inequality would help individuals become rich enough to save some of their earnings and fund investments necessary to produce economic growth.

On the other hand, economic theory also suggests the opposite—that inequality may inhibit the ability of some talented but less fortunate individuals to access opportunities or credit, dampen demand, create instabilities, and undermine incentives to work hard, all of which may reduce economic growth. Growing inequality could also generate a relatively larger group of low-income individuals who are less able to invest in their health, education, and training, thereby retarding economic growth.

In this paper, we review the recent empirical economic literature that specifically examines the effect inequality has on economic growth, wellbeing, or stability. This newly available research looks across developing and advanced countries and within the United States. Most research shows that, in the long term, inequality is negatively related to economic growth and that countries with less disparity and a larger middle class boast stronger and more stable growth. Some studies do suggest that in the short run, inequality may spur growth before hindering it over the longer term, but overall there is growing evidence that, in the long run, more equitable societies are associated with higher rates of growth.

In looking at studies that directly estimate the effect of inequality on growth, there are concerns about data quality and statistical methodology. The purpose of these studies is to establish whether economic inequality has some effect on economic growth or stability. For researchers, there are important two questions: is there a causal relationship between inequality and growth? If so, can researchers actually identify this factor, or are they actually measuring the effect of some other factor. Establishing causality is exceptionally difficult in the social sciences and the standard approach employed for studying relationships between inequality and growth has been to look at the level of inequality preceding the growth period being measured. This does not firmly establish causality but can be indicative of it. On the other hand, the approaches for detecting the relationship vary widely by the statistical design, the data, controls included. Given enough time and flexibility in their specifications, economists have demonstrated an ability to draw a variety of conclusions. The best practices in this area are evolving and so it is important to look at the breadth of the literature, rather than focus on a single paper or approach.

Important as well for the purposes of this paper is this—the latest economic research we reviewed only examines the outcome of whether there are results for regressions that demonstrate positive or negative relationships between inequality and economic growth and stability. This means the paper cannot provide clear guidance for policymakers on exactly how to address inequality or mitigate its effects on growth. In other words, the research examined in this paper generally does not identify the channels or mechanisms by which inequality affects growth.

An additional issue (above and beyond the challenges of how to specify a model) is the paucity of data to evaluate questions about inequality and growth. Ideally, economists would want a variety of measures for inequality, including earnings, income, and wealth, that can be compared across a large number of countries over a long period of time. Sadly, such a perfect data set does not exist. Therefore, econ- omists are left to do the best estimates with the data at hand. Over time, though, the data sets that have been used to perform these analyses have been improving.

Other scholars who have examined this literature have also come to the conclu- sion that to inform policymaking, we need to do more than search for a mechanis- tic relationship between inequality and growth. Dani Rodrik, the former Harvard University professor now at the Institute of Advanced Studies, underscores the limitations of this kind of research, arguing that methods for analyzing data that span across places and time are ill-suited to address the fundamental questions about the relationship of government policy and inequality with growth outcomes. This conclusion is echoed by University of Melbourne economist Sarah Voitchovsky in her recent review of the literature in the “Oxford Handbook on Economic Inequality,” where she says:

 “While data constraints continue to limit the type of empirical analyses that can be undertaken, investigations that focus on specific channels generally provide more robust conclusions than evidence from reduced form analyses.”

This paper does not contain policy advice. Instead, it contains analysis that largely demonstrates there are direct, and possibly causal, relationships between economic inequality and growth—places that begin with a lower level of inequality subsequently tend to grow faster and have longer periods of growth than those with a higher level of inequality. In future research, we will focus on the channels through which inequality could or does affect economic growth.