Thomas Piketty, depreciation and the elasticity of substitution

When “Capital in the 21st Century” was published in English earlier this year, Thomas Piketty’s book was met with rapt attention and constant conversation. The book was lauded but also faced criticism, particularly from other economists who wanted to fit Piketty’s work into the models they knew well (Equitable Growth’s Marshall Steinbaum replied to many of those criticism here.) Now, a new working paper by the National Bureau of Economic Research shows how one of the more effective critiques of the book might not be as powerful as once thought.

A particularly technical and effective critique of Piketty is from Matt Rognlie, a graduate student in economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Rognlie points out that for capital returns to be consistently higher than the overall growth of the economy—or “r > g” as framed by Piketty—an economy needs to be able to easily substitute capital such as machinery or robots for labor. In the terminology of economics this is called the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which needs to be greater than 1 for r to be consistently higher than g. Rognlie argues that most studies looking at this particular elasticity find that it is below 1, meaning a drop in economic growth would result in a larger drop in the rate of return and then g being larger than r. In turn, this means capital won’t earn an increasing share of income and the dynamics laid out by Piketty won’t arise.

Here are the technical details for Rognlie’s critique. He argues that Piketty doesn’t account for depreciation, or the wearing down of capital and machinery over time. Because firms need to replace this old capital, net investment in capital is lower than gross investment. This in turn means the net elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is necessarily lower than the gross elasticity. Rognlie argues that because Piketty cares about net measures, the elasticity of substitution between net capital and labor needs to be greater than 1. But if Piketty’s story depends upon an assumption of a net elasticity that is higher than 1, then that is far too high given what Rognlie finds in the empirical evidence.

Enter the new paper by economists Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, both of the University of Chicago. Karabarbounis and Neiman previously documented the global decline in the share of income going to labor. The pair of scholars find that technology, through declines in the prices of investment goods, is responsible for the decline in the labor share.

Their new paper investigates how depreciation affects the measurement of labor share and the elasticity between capital and labor. Using their data set of labor shares income and a model, Karabarnounis and Neiman show that the gross labor share and the net labor share move in the same direction when the shift is caused by a technological shock—as has been the case, they argue, in recent decades. More importantly for this conversation, they point out that the gross and net elasticities are on the same side of 1 if that shock is technological. In the case of a declining labor share, this means they would both be above 1.

This means Rognlie’s point about these two elasticities being lower than 1 doesn’t hold up if capital is gaining due to a new technology that makes capital cheaper. To be clear, Rognlie is aware that this could happen, but Karabarbounis and Neiman’s data shows that it is happening. And as Karabournis and Neiman find a gross elasticity greater than 1, the net elasticity is greater than 1 as well.

In short, this new paper gives credence to one of the key dynamics in Piketty’s “Capital in the 21st Century”—that the returns on capital can be higher than growth in the economy, or r > g. But this isn’t to say the case is closed. Far from it. The results as detailed by Karabournis and Neiman don’t hold up if the share of labor has declined for reasons other than technological change, such as globalization or institutional changes.

But for the second time in two weeks, a new empirical paper shows that Piketty’s work has strong empirical grounding.

Morning Must-Read: Daniel Drezner: Five Known Unknowns About the Future of the Global Economy

Daniel Drezner: Five Known Unknowns About the Future of the Global Economy: “Here are my top five known unknowns…

…about the future of the global economy…. 1) The Summers/Gordon Question…. What if the elevated rates of economic growth that started with the Industrial Revolution are now petering out in the developed world? What if all the low-hanging fruit that have kept growth high for the last two centuries have been exhausted? 2) The Eichengreen/Rodrik Question. The default assumption that most economists make is that the developing world in general, and the BRICS in particular, will converge towards the affluence level of the developed world. This might not be the case… there is a very real ‘middle income trap’ that can lead to a serious growth slowdown in the advanced developing countries. Even more disturbing is Dani Rodrik’s contention that while globalization has led to a true convergence in manufacturing productivity, it hasn’t caused any convergence in the rest…. 3) The Angell/Gartzke Question…. What if geopolitical tensions force a re-ordering of economic ties? This could erode the pacifying effects of commercial liberalism that scholars from Norman Angell to Erik Gartzke have observed…. 4) The Fukuyama/Kirshner Question…. Jonathan Kirshner’s new book… argu[es] that China and others are now rejecting the U.S. financial model. If Kirshner is right, what will this mean for the future of economic growth? More radically, what if other countries reject the capitalist model wholesale?…. 5) The Piketty/Freeland… argument… that, left to its own devices, capitalism will produce a dystopia where elites will grab an ever-growing share of the economic pie. What happens to the global economy if he’s right?  What kind of political backlash will it produce?…. Enjoy the week!

On the Proper Inflation Target: Monday Focus for October 20, 2014

Banners and Alerts and Graph 3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate FRED St Louis Fed

In the 60 years since 1954, the Federal Reserve has been moved to cut the 3-Mo. T-Bill rate when a recession threatens by 2.0%-points or more 13 times–once every 4.6 years. There have been eight cuts of 4.0%-points or more–once every 7.5 years. There have been five cuts of 5.0%-points or more–once every 12 years.

To me that suggests that the Greenspan-Bernanke policies–aim for 2.0%/year inflation, with a 300 basis-point “natural” short-term safe real interest rate on top of that when the economy is in the growth-along-the-potential-path phase of the business cycle–were already too restrictive. Once every 12 years is too often to run into ZLB problems, unless you are a strong believer in Coibion and Gorodnichenko arguments that price inertia is due to serious costs to businesses of altering price paths.

If you hold, with Jeremy Stein, that you are asking for trouble when T-Bill rates drop below 2%/year, and if you believe that secular factors have reduced the “natural” short-term safe real interest rate when the economy is in the growth-along-the-potential-path phase of the business cycle to 2%, and if you wish to have a 600 basis-point cushion to allow for appropriate cutting in a recession, then you should aim for a 6%/year inflation target.

If you don’t mind kissing the zero lower bound when you cut interest rates by 600 basis points, you could get away with a 4%/year inflation target.

And if you don’t mind dissing the zero lower bound and do not buy the argument that the “natural” short-term safe real interest rate when the economy is in the growth-along-the-potential-path phase of the business cycle is now not 3%/year but 2%/year, then you could get away with a 3%/year inflation target.

But I do not see how you can justify a 2%/year inflation target today.

Suppose that you want a 200-basis point cushion–that you are not happy with putting your commercial banks in a situation in which their business model requires that they take huge risks to even try to cover the costs of maintaining their ATMs and their branches–and buy the 2%/year “natural” short-term safe real interest rate when the economy is in the growth-along-the-potential-path phase of the business cycle, but recoil at a 6%/year inflation target as too high? What then? Then you have to go for régime change:

  1. Reform fiscal policy so that–unlike 2008-present–it does its stimulative job to boost aggregate demand when interest rates are at their zero lower bound.
  2. Move to some form of level targeting so that the inflation target is no longer fixed, but rises and rises sharply whenever aggregate demand or the price level undershoots its previously-expected growth path.
  3. Allow the central bank to engage in expansionary fiscal policy on a large scale on its own say-so, via helicopter drops–the Social Credit solution.
  4. Move to Miles Kimball Land

Those are the options…


Memo: Interest-rate cutting episodes since 1954: 2.9%-points, 2.1%, 2.0%, 5.0%, 2.2%, 4.5%, 8.5%, 9.0%, 3.2%, 2.5%, 5.0%, 4.3%, 9.5%-points (assuming the interest-rate rule called for cutting nominal rates in 2009 to -4.5%).

Morning Must-Read: Paul Kasriel: The Monetary Base and the Money Multiplier: U.S. and Eurozone

Paul Kasriel: A Tale of Two Economies–It Was the Better of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: “As quantitative easing comes to an end (apparently)…

…by the Fed and is taken up by the European Central Bank (ECB), let’s compare the behavior of nominal domestic demand in each central bank’s economy and venture a reason for any differences. Plotted in Chart 1 are index values of the nominal Gross Domestic Purchases in the U.S. and the eurozone, respectively…. Now, let’s examine the behavior of credit created by the central banks and depository institutions in each of these economies. This is credit that is created figuratively out of thin air. When central banks purchase securities in the open market, such as they do when they engage in quantitative easing (QE), they create credit out of thin air. When the depository institution system expands its loan and securities portfolios, it creates credit out of thin air. Credit created out of thin air enables the borrower to increase his/her current nominal spending while not requiring any other entity to reduce its current spending…

A Tale of Two Economies It Was the Better of Times It Was the Worst of Times The Big Picture

A Tale of Two Economies It Was the Better of Times It Was the Worst of Times The Big Picture

Morning Must-Read: Daniel Davies: European Banking Stress Tests–Pour Encourager les Autres?

Daniel Davies: European Banking Stress Tests–Pour Encourager les Autres?: “It will turn out, I think…

…that a lot of banks will fail on the front cover, but pass at the back of the book–this would happen, for example, if a bank was made aware early in the year that it was at risk, and decided to do something about it. I think I can see the thinking behind this way of presenting the results. The Euroland supervisors are hoping that the headline news will be made by the front pages of the reports, so they will be able to have it both ways–a big headline in the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal saying that their test was credible because it failed so many big names, while at the same time tipping the wink to market analysts that most of the ‘failures’ were not really failures at all, and that nearly all of the required recapitalisations have already happened. To be honest, I find this communication strategy rather clever…

Exploding wealth inequality in the United States

There is no dispute that income inequality has been on the rise in the United States for the past four decades. The share of total income earned by the top 1 percent of families was less than 10 percent in the late 1970s but now exceeds 20 percent as of the end of 2012.  A large portion of this increase is due to an upsurge in the labor incomes earned by senior company executives and successful entrepreneurs. But is the rise in U.S. economic inequality purely a matter of rising labor compensation at the top, or did wealth inequality rise as well?

Before we answer that question (hint: the answer is a definitive yes, as we will demonstrate below) we need to define what we mean by wealth. Wealth is the stock of all the assets people own, including their homes, pension saving, and bank accounts, minus all debts. Wealth can be self-made out of work and saving, but it can also be inherited. Unfortunately, there is much less data available on wealth in the United States than there is on income. Income tax data exists since 1913—the first year the country collected federal income tax—but there is no comparable tax on wealth to provide information on the distribution of assets. Currently available measures of wealth inequality rely either on surveys (the Survey of Consumer Finances of the Federal Reserve Board), on estate tax return data, or on lists of wealthy individuals, such as the Forbes 400 list of wealthiest Americans.

Download the pdf version of this brief for a complete list of sources

In our new working paper, “Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data,” we try to measure wealth in another way.  We use comprehensive data on capital income—such as dividends, interest, rents, and business profits—that is reported on individual income tax returns since 1913. We then capitalize this income so that it matches the amount of wealth recorded in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds, the national balance sheets that measure aggregate wealth of U.S. families. In this way we obtain annual estimates of U.S. wealth inequality stretching back a century.

Wealth inequality, it turns out, has followed a spectacular U-shape evolution over the past 100 years. From the Great Depression in the 1930s through the late 1970s there was a substantial democratization of wealth. The trend then inverted, with the share of total household wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent increasing to 22 percent in 2012 from 7 percent in the late 1970s. (See Figure 1.) The top 0.1 percent includes 160,000 families with total net assets of more than $20 million in 2012.

Figure 1

102014-wealth-web-01

Figure 1 shows that wealth inequality has exploded in the United States over the past four decades. The share of wealth held by the top 0.1 percent of families is now almost as high as in the late 1920s, when “The Great Gatsby” defined an era that rested on the inherited fortunes of the robber barons of the Gilded Age.

In recent decades, only a tiny fraction of the population saw its wealth share grow. While the wealth share of the top 0.1 percent increased a lot in recent decades, that of the next 0.9 percent (families between the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent) did not. And the share of total wealth of the “merely rich”—families who fall in the top 10 percent but are not wealthy enough to be counted among the top 1 percent—actually decreased slightly over the past four decades. In other words, family fortunes of $20 million or more grew much faster than those of only a few millions.

The flip side of these trends at the top of the wealth ladder is the erosion of wealth among the middle class and the poor. There is a widespread public view across American society that a key structural change in the U.S. economy since the 1920s is the rise of middle-class wealth, in particular because of the development of pensions and the rise in home ownership rates. But our results show that while the share of wealth of the bottom 90 percent of families did gradually increase from 15 percent in the 1920s to a peak of 36 percent in the mid-1980, it then dramatically declined. By 2012, the bottom 90 percent collectively owns only 23 percent of total U.S. wealth, about as much as in 1940  (see Figure 2.)

Figure 2

102014-wealth-web-03

The growing indebtedness of most Americans is the main reason behind the erosion of the wealth share of the bottom 90 percent of families. Many middle class families own homes and have pensions, but too many of these families also have much higher mortgages to repay and much higher consumer credit and student loans to service than before. For a time, rising indebtedness was compensated by the increase in the market value of the assets of middle-class families. The average wealth of bottom 90 percent of families jumped during the stock-market bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But it then collapsed during and after the Great Recession of 2007-2009.  (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

102014-wealth-web-02

Since the housing and financial crises of the late 2000s there has been no recovery in the wealth of the middle class and the poor. The average wealth of the bottom 90 percent of families is equal to $80,000 in 2012—the same level as in 1986. In contrast, the average wealth for the top 1 percent more than tripled between 1980 and 2012. In 2012, the wealth of the top 1 percent increased almost back to its peak level of 2007. The Great Recession looks only like a small bump along an upward trajectory.

How can we explain the growing disparity in American wealth? The answer is that the combination of higher income inequality alongside a growing disparity in the ability to save for most Americans is fuelling the explosion in wealth inequality. For the bottom 90 percent of families, real wage gains (after factoring in inflation) were very limited over the past three decades, but for their counterparts in the top 1 percent real wages grew fast. In addition, the saving rate of middle class and lower class families collapsed over the same period while it remained substantial at the top. Today, the top 1 percent families save about 35 percent of their income, while bottom 90 percent families save about zero.

The implications of rising wealth inequality and possible remedies

If income inequality stays high and if the saving rate of the bottom 90 percent of families remains low then wealth disparity will keep increasing. Ten or twenty years from now, all the gains in wealth democratization achieved during the New Deal and the post-war decades could be lost. While the rich would be extremely rich, ordinary families would own next to nothing, with debts almost as high as their assets. Paris School of Economics professor Thomas Piketty warns that inherited wealth could become the defining line between the haves and the have-nots in the 21st century. This provocative prediction hit a nerve in the United States this year when Piketty’s book “Capital in the 21st Century” became a national best seller because it outlined a direct threat to the cherished American ideals of meritocracy and opportunity.

What should be done to avoid this dystopian future? We need policies that reduce the concentration of wealth, prevent the transformation of self-made wealth into inherited fortunes, and encourage savings among the middle class. First, current preferential tax rates on capital income compared to wage income are hard to defend in light of the rise of wealth inequality and the very high savings rate of the wealthy. Second, estate taxation is the most direct tool to prevent self-made fortunes from becoming inherited wealth—the least justifiable form of inequality in the American meritocratic ideal. Progressive estate and income taxation were the key tools that reduced the concentration of wealth after the Great Depression. The same proven tools are needed again today.

There are a number of specific policy reforms needed to rebuild middle class wealth.  A combination of prudent financial regulation to rein in predatory lending, incentives to help people save—nudges have been shown to be very effective in the case of 401(k) pensions—and more generally steps to boost the wages of the bottom 90 percent of workers are needed so that ordinary families can afford to save.

One final reform also needs to be on the policymaking agenda: the collection of better data on wealth in the United States. Despite our best efforts to build wealth inequality data, we want to stress that the United States is lagging behind in terms of the quality of its wealth and saving data. It would be relatively easy for the U.S. Treasury to collect more information—in particular balances on 401(k) and bank accounts—on top of what it already collects to administer the federal income tax. This information could help enforce the collection of current taxes more effectively and would be invaluable for obtaining more precise estimates of the joint distributions of income, wealth, saving, and consumption. Such information is needed to illuminate the public debate on economic inequality. It is also required to evaluate and implement alternative forms of taxation, such as progressive wealth or consumption taxes, in order to achieve broad-based and sustainable economic growth.

Emmanuel Saez is a professor of economics and director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California-Berkeley. Gabriel Zucman is an assistant professor of economics at the London School of Economics.

Morning Must-Read: Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez: Unemployment, and Product and Labour-Market Tightness

Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez: Unemployment, and product and labour-market tightness: “We do not have a model that is rich enough…

…and simple enough to lend itself to pencil-and-paper analysis…. Michaillat and Saez (2014)… retains the architecture of the Barro-Grossman model but replaces the disequilibrium framework on the product and labour markets with an equilibrium matching framework…. Both meal prices and product market tightness can adjust to equilibrate supply and demand for meals…. Both wages and labour market tightness adjust to equilibrate labour supply and demand…. If product and labour market tightness remain constant, the equilibrium is reached by price adjustment…. If prices are rigid, the equilibrium is reached by adjustment of product and labour market tightness…. A negative labour demand shock leads to falls in both employment and labour market tightness…. A negative labour supply shock leads to a fall in employment but an increase in labour market tightness…. Output and product market tightness move in the same direction with demand shocks…. Output and product market tightness move in opposite direction with technology shocks…. Through the lens of our simple model, the empirical evidence suggests that price and real wage are somewhat rigid, and that unemployment fluctuations are mainly driven by aggregate demand shocks…

Things to Read on the Morning of October 19, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Jeremy Hodges: Poker Pro Says He Didn’t Cheat in $12.4m Baccarat Haul: “Phil Ivey… 38, won the money playing a form of Baccarat called Punto Banco… using a technique known as edge sorting, at Genting’s Crockfords casino in London, according to his lawyers. Genting refused to pay up, saying the practice is unfair. A casino ‘is a cat and mouse environment, it is an adversarial environment,’ Richard Spearman, Ivey’s lawyer said in court. ‘It doesn’t mean you have to be dishonest.’ Ivey, who sued Genting last year, argues that edge sorting isn’t dishonest and he should be paid the money…. Both sides agree that Ivey was in the casino in August 2012 and that he won the money…. Edge sorting is a way a card player can gain an advantage by working out the value of a card by spotting flaws or particular patterns on the back of certain cards…. It’s agreed ‘in the present case that there are legitimate strategies that may used by skilled players which have the purpose and effect of providing the player, rather than the casino, with the advantage on particular bets,’ Spearman said in court documents…”

  2. Jennifer Allaway: #Gamergate Trolls Aren’t Ethics Crusaders; They’re a Hate Group: “My name is Jennifer Allaway…. I’ve been working on a new study on the importance of diversity in game content to game players, and whether or not the game industry is able to predict this desire. Game developers can be hard to reach…. By September 25th, I basically had all the data I needed. And then I got this email: ‘Hey diddle-doodle, Ms. Allaway! A heads-up: your project has been targeted for extensive “vote brigading” (possibly ranging into the tens of thousands of entries). Use that knowledge however you will. Cheers’…. I went into 8chan—the movement’s current and primary forum for coordinating their efforts—and found a discussion on a ‘secret developer survey,’ referring to my questions…. In under four hours, the developer survey jumped from around 700 responses, which had been collected over the course of a month, to over 1100 responses. The responses were not… subtle…. It appeared that less than 5 percent of the new responses had actually come from developers…. Responses like this…. Gamergate Trolls Aren t Ethics Crusaders They re a Hate GroupI set about locking down accounts, emailing professors, contacting campus safety, and calling family. It was an exhausting process, but I considered it necessary. The attack could get out of hand…. If you’re even asking about equality or diversity in games, being shouted down in a traumatizing manner is now a mandatory step that you have to sit back and endure. But I don’t hate #Gamergate for what they’ve done to me. I’m a researcher; my goal is to analyze and to understand. And after two weeks of backtracking through the way they’ve carried out their operations, this is the conclusion I’ve reached: #Gamergate, as we know it now, is a hate group…”

  3. Economist s View Changes in Labor Force ParticipationMark Thoma: Economist’s View: Melinda Pitts: Changes in Labor Force Participation

  4. Steve Randy Waldmann: Econometrics, Open Science, and Cryptocurrency: “Mark Thoma wrote the wisest two paragraphs you will read about econometrics and empirical statistical research in general: ‘You are testing a theory you came up with, but the data are uncooperative and say you are wrong. But instead of accepting that, you tell yourself ‘My theory is right, I just haven’t found the right econometric specification yet. I need to add variables, remove variables, take a log, add an interaction, square a term, do a different correction for misspecification, try a different sample period, etc., etc., etc.’ Then, after finally digging out that one specification of the econometric model that confirms your hypothesis, you declare victory, write it up, and send it off (somehow never mentioning the intense specification mining that produced the result). Too much econometric work proceeds along these lines. Not quite this blatantly, but that is, in effect, what happens in too many cases. I think it is often best to think of econometric results as the best case the researcher could make for a particular theory rather than a true test of the model.'”

  5. Mark Strauss: Bootstrapping A Solar System Civilization: “Tom Kalil… notes [that] NASA is already working on printable spacecraft, automated robotic construction using regolith and self-replicating large structures. As a stepping stone to in-space manufacturing, NASA has sent the first-ever 3D printer to the International Space Station. One day, astronauts may be able to print replacement parts on long-distance missions. And building upon the success of the Mars Curiosity rover, the next rover to Mars–currently dubbed Mars 2020–will demonstrate In-Situ Resource Utilization on the Red Planet. It will convert the carbon dioxide available in Mars’ atmosphere to oxygen that could be used for fuel and air…. Launching everything we need from Earth is too expensive…. The longer term goal of what Metzger calls ‘bootstrapping a solar system civilization…. Ultimately what we need to do is to evolve a complete supply chain in space, utilizing the energy and resources of space along the way…. We need to realize we live in a solar system with literally billions of times the resources we have here on Earth and if we can get beyond the barrier of Earth’s deep gravity well then the civilization our children and grandchildren will build shall be as unimaginable to us as modern civilization once was to our ancestors…'”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Charlie Stross: Some Thoughts on Turning 50:: “These days I’m convinced that the reputation grumpy old men have for being grumpy (not to mention old) is a side-effect of the way chronic low-grade pain goes with the ageing process. It’s a sad fact that once you pass your thirties you get increasingly creaky: and constant low-grade aches and twinges do bad things to your temper. It’s another sad fact that, for better or worse, most of our world leaders are middle-aged or elderly men, who should be presumed grumpy due to low-grade pain until proven otherwise…”

  2. Nick Rowe: Inflation derps are people from the concrete steppes: “The people from the concrete steppes see central banks print lots of money. That’s a real concrete step, and real concrete steps have real concrete consequences. Printing lots of money causes lots of inflation. And the fact that lots of inflation hasn’t happened yet simply means it’s a lagged effect…. But if printing lots of money did cause people to spend it and cause inflation, then central banks would immediately put the printing presses into reverse…. And people expect they would do this. And no individual will spend unless he expects other individuals to spend. So nobody spends. It’s a credit deadlock, created by counterfactual conditional expectations about what central banks would do if people did something that they won’t do, because of those expectations…. They cannot see the thing that is causing their predictions to fail, because that thing is not a concrete thing…. A commitment by the central bank not to do what people to expect it to do, to change those counterfactual conditional expectations, would change things. Something like an NGDP level path target. ‘Yes, we will let you spend that $1,000 we lent you at 0% interest’.”

Morning Must-Read: Apropos of Damon Runyon: Nothing Between Humans Is More than 3-1

Jeremy Hodges reports:

Jeremy Hodges: Poker Pro Says He Didn’t Cheat in $12.4m Baccarat Haul: “Phil Ivey… 38, won the money playing a form of Baccarat called Punto Banco…

using a technique known as edge sorting, at Genting’s Crockfords casino in London, according to his lawyers. Genting refused to pay up, saying the practice is unfair. A casino ‘is a cat and mouse environment, it is an adversarial environment,’ Richard Spearman, Ivey’s lawyer said in court. ‘It doesn’t mean you have to be dishonest.’ Ivey, who sued Genting last year, argues that edge sorting isn’t dishonest and he should be paid the money…. Both sides agree that Ivey was in the casino in August 2012 and that he won the money…. Edge sorting is a way a card player can gain an advantage by working out the value of a card by spotting flaws or particular patterns on the back of certain cards…. It’s agreed ‘in the present case that there are legitimate strategies that may used by skilled players which have the purpose and effect of providing the player, rather than the casino, with the advantage on particular bets,’ Spearman said in court documents…