Must-Read: Ta-Nehisi Coates: President Obama on Color-Blind Policy and Color-Conscious Morality

Must-Read: My assorted progeny complain that I have not referred enough things from Ta-Nehisi Coates recently. They are correct. In America today, unfortunately, formally race-blind policy discourse on poverty and inequality is and will not for a long time be truly race-blind at all:

Ta-Nehisi Coates: President Obama on Color-Blind Policy and Color-Conscious Morality: “You will hear no policy targeted toward black people…

…coming out of the Obama White House…. The standard progressive approach… is to mix color-conscious moral invective with color-blind public policy…. Asserting the moral faults of black people tends to gain votes. Asserting the moral faults of their government, not so much. I am sure Obama sincerely believes in the moral invective he offers. But I suspect he believes a lot more about his country which he chooses not to share….

Consider that in a conversation about poverty, featuring America’s first black president, one of its most accomplished progressive political scientists, and one of its most important liberal columnists, the word ‘racism’ does not appear in the transcript once…. This is not a ‘both/and.’ It is a bait and switch. The moral failings of black people are directly addressed. The centuries-old failings of their local, state, and federal government, less so. One need not imagine what a ‘both/and’ approach might sound like, to understand why a president of the United States can’t actually offer one. At best, one can hope for reference to ‘past injustice.’… Perhaps the progressive approach, no matter how intellectually dishonest, is ultimately politically prudent. I don’t wish to minimize the difficulty, rhetorical and otherwise, of being the first black president of a congenitally racist country. In that business, Obama has gotten a lot right. But his ‘both/and’ approach has been very wrong. One way around the conundrum is for the president to say as little as possible….

These people have never tired of hearing is another discourse on the lack of black morality or on the failings of black culture. It saddens me to see the president so sincerely oblige.”

Would graduating more college students reduce wage inequality?

In their influential 2010 book, The Race between Education and Technology, Harvard University economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz offer an explanation for the United States’ decades-long rise in wage inequality. In their view, the main reason that inequality has increased so much is because the supply of educated workers has not kept pace with an ever-growing demand–especially for workers with a college degree. The short supply of college-educated workers has driven up their price relative to the rest of the workforce, accounting for most of growing gap between workers at the top and the bottom of the earnings ladder. The research implies that the most direct and effective way to reduce the wage gap is to expand the share of the workforce with a college degree.

Goldin and Katz’s diagnosis and prescription represent the predominance of rising wage inequality within academic and Washington policy circles. But, this spring, first in public remarks and later in an interview with the Washington Post, Harvard economist Lawrence Summers declared that focusing on education and training as a way to reduce inequality is “whistling past the graveyard” and “fundamentally an evasion.”

After making these informal comments, Summers–together with Melissa Kearney and Brad Hershbein, both of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution–produced a more formal analysis of how much increasing the share of college-educated workers could aid in reducing inequality. Their more formal analysis concluded “Increasing educational attainment will not significantly change overall earnings inequality” but would “reduce inequality in the bottom half of the earnings distribution, largely by pulling up the earnings of those near the 25th percentile.”

We argue that Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers get it right when they conclude that even a large jump in college attainment would have little impact on overall earnings inequality. But we also believe that they are overly optimistic in their assertion that increasing college attainment will reduce inequality at the bottom.

As Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers correctly argue, expanding the college-educated workforce would do little to lower inequality because “a large share of earnings inequality is at the top of the earnings distribution, and changing college shares will not shrink those differences.” The reason that the top one percent earn so much more than the rest of the workforce is not fundamentally because they have a college or advanced degree. About one third of workers already have a college degree or more, and inequality has increased substantially within that group between 1979 and 2014. As Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers maintain, even a sharp increase in the share of the college-educated population is not likely to put meaningful downward pressure on the earnings of those at the very top.

Their analysis is too sanguine, however, with respect to non-college-educated workers. The authors’ conclusions about workers at the bottom and the middle rest on two assumptions: First, that arbitrarily giving some non-college-educated workers a college degree will automatically give them access to earnings equal to those of existing graduates, and second, that reducing the supply of non-college-educated workers (by turning some of them into college graduates) will boost the earnings of the remaining non-college workers substantially. Both assumptions are unlikely to be true. As a result, the hypothetical plan to bestow 10 percent of non-college-educated men with a diploma would do nowhere near as much for inequality between the middle and the bottom as Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers suggest.

We note that Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers limit their analysis to men, because the period over which they estimate the effect of education attainment on wages is characterized by a large increase in the share of women in paid work, which complicates the analysis. Since the default for working-age men has been market labor throughout the period they analyze, it’s sensible to consider the effect of attainment on the wage distribution of men only, while understanding there are implications for women as well.

To help understand the Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers’ thought experiment, imagine that there are two bowls: one filled with non-college-educated men and one filled with college-educated men. The hypothetical exercise takes 10 percent of the people in the first bowl (of non-college graduates) and puts them into the second one (for college-graduates). This has three effects: It changes earned income for the people in the first bowl (those without degrees) by reducing the supply of non-graduates, bidding up their earnings. It changes earned income for the people in the second bowl (graduates) by increasing the supply, pulling down their wages. And it changes earned income for the people who were moved from the first bowl to the second bowl (from non-graduates to graduates) by giving them access to the higher earnings received by graduates. (See Figure 1.) In each of the three cases, however, the effects assumed by Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers are likely overstated.

Figure 1

hamilton-sim-02

Appealing to a 2010 paper by Daron Acemoglu and David Autor, both economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers argue that shifting 10 percent of men from the first bowl to the second would reduce the wage gap between college and non-college workers by 18 percent, which Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers divide half-and-half between an increase in non-college earnings and a reduction in college earnings. The main basis for that 18 percent estimate is the experience of the 1970s, when the share of college-educated workers increased substantially as the Baby Boomers entered the workforce with far more education than their parents’ generation. This large increase in the supply of graduates arguably drove down the earnings of college graduates relative to the rest of the workforce. When the growth in the college-educated share of the workforce slowed in the 1980s, the college wage premium opened up again. That pattern is the principal motivation for the idea that inequality is primarily “the race between education and technology.”

The decision to divide the 18 percent into two equal parts, with a 9 percent increase in earnings increase for non-college-educated men, drives the reduction in inequality in the bottom of half of earners, one of the key findings that the authors highlight. But the labor market now is very different than it was in the period that Acemoglu and Autor analyze. Since around 2000, the labor market has been deteriorating, jobs are scarce, and the share of the adult population that works has declined. The modest expansion of the mid-2000s did not bring workers back to where they’d been in 2000, and the recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has not (yet) brought workers back to where they were in 2008. There is simply too much slack remaining in the labor market–for both non-college-and college-educated workers—for reassigning workers from one camp to another to make much difference.

That excess supply is fundamentally why reducing the number of non-college-educated workers (removing workers from the first bowl) is unlikely to increase their earnings by 9 percent. All the college-educated workers who can’t find jobs or are in positions for which they’re over-qualified need to find work or better work first. Only then will we see the emergence of a seller’s market for the non-college-educated, one in which employers have to out-bid each other to find workers. That competition among employers, which we last saw at the end of the 1990s, is what’s necessary to trigger rising wages among the supply of non-college-educated workers.

A second empirical problem with the analysis is that the workers who are assumed to receive an instant college degree are, contrary to a core assumption of the analysis, unlikely to command the kinds of earnings received by those who already have a college-degree. Instead, these hypothetical graduates would continue to compete for the same jobs as the non-college-educated, but the degree would give the graduates a leg up. That, in turn, would push some of the remaining non-college-educated workers out of the labor market entirely.

So, yes, a college degree would improve the individual circumstances of the new graduates relative to those who were not granted an instant degree, but an important part of the payoff would be the ability to out-compete non-college graduates for jobs that don’t actually require a college degree. That, more or less, is what a 2015 study titled “Dropouts, Taxes, and Risks: The Economic Return to College under Realistic Assumptions,” by Alan Benson and Frank Levy of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and independent economist Raimundo Esteva, finds. The economic benefit to obtaining a college degree for the population that is currently dropping out or otherwise on the cusp of getting one is quite modest. Our colleague Elisabeth Jacobs evocatively referred to this phenomenon as a “Cruel Game of Musical Chairs.” (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

hamilton-sim-03

It’s worthwhile to place this analysis within the context of a larger debate about the labor market and why it’s not delivering broad-based wage growth to the people who comprise it. Since 2000, median wages have stagnated and the labor market participation rate has fallen, as have the rates of job-to-job mobility and household and small business formation. Young workers are not climbing the job ladder to the middle class. The share of national income earned by workers declined. Over an even longer timeframe, wages have not kept pace with worker productivity.

All of these phenomena suggest that the labor market isn’t working for most employees—problems that aren’t confined to those without a college education—and that suggests the problem isn’t that too few people have college degrees. Rather than focus on education attainment as the solution to inequality, it’s time for policy-makers to move on from the race between education and technology and focus on our stagnant labor market. As Summers said, “the core problem is that there aren’t enough jobs.” The key to reducing inequality is more jobs and a higher demand for labor. In the absence of more jobs, heroic assumptions about educational improvement are likely to deliver only modest economic benefits.

 

—Marshall Steinbaum is a Research Economist and John Schmitt is the Research Director at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

How exactly do we measure U.S. economic well-being?

The Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business from time to time will release the results of a survey that poses statements to prominent academic economists and asks them to agree, disagree, or state their uncertainty. The results of the IGM Forum can often give us insight into how these economists think, and where their views diverge and converge. While most of the attention to these results zero in on a consensus or a lack thereof among economists, digging into why they agree or disagree can be quite instructive.

The most recent release from the forum is a great example. IGM presented the panelists with the following:

“The 9 percent cumulative increase in real U.S. median household income since 1980 substantially understates how much better off people in the median American household are now economically, compared with 35 years ago.”

70 percent of the panelists, on a confidence-weighted basis, agreed with the statement, 21 percent were uncertain, and 9 percent disagreed.

If you look at the responses of the economists who agreed with the statement, several mention problems with the U.S. Consumer Price Index, which is used to adjust for inflation in the measure of household income. Some economists argue the index overstates inflation, resulting in inflation-adjusted or real growth in household income being understated. And as Yale University finance and economics professor Judith Chevalier points out in her answer, if we want to look at household income as a measure of well-being then it’s more appropriate to look at disposable household income by taking account of government transfer programs such as unemployment insurance or government pensions

Of course, that assumes that looking at growth in household income– even after these considerations– is the best way to think about household economic prosperity. As Matt Yglesias points out at Vox, there are a host of issues that can arise when you looking purely at a snapshot of household income. Households with the same income may face quite different economic situations due to household size, net worth, and even their age.

There are even broader considerations that several of the economists bring up in their responses. First, there’s what we might call the “iPhone problem.” The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics tries to adjust the price of goods in its calculations of inflation to account for these goods’ increasing quality as well as for new products. But the invention of products such as smartphones or the broader Internet are advances whose benefits might not be captured in the BLS’s so-called “hedonic adjustments.” In economics speak, these technologies have created a large increase in consumer surplus (the gains in utility consumers get over the price they paid for an iPhone) that might not show up in income statistics.

Then there’s the question of how life expectancy fits into measurements of the U.S. standard of living. Several economists point out that life expectancy has increased quite a bit since 1980. This improvement, while quite unevenly distributed, is certainly an economic improvement but it won’t show up in annual income statistics. The same goes with declines in crime or improvements in air quality that other respondents cite. They’re quite important to the quality of life and living standards, but aren’t going to show up in income statistics.

This isn’t to say that the IGM question was framed incorrectly. Rather, by having the statement shift from an income statistic to economic well-being it provoked interesting responses that show how some economists think about income and its connection to well-being. While there has been quite a bit of thinking about measuring economic well-being, more thinking, debate, and arguing seems worthwhile.

Things to Read at Nighttime on May 13, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Choose Your Heterodoxy: Farmer vs. Krugman

Paul Krugman digs in in defense of old economic thinking: behavioral finance to explain bubbles, money illusion plus anchoring to explain wage and price inertia, and then the three-commodity–outside money, bonds, and currently-produced goods and services–temporary-equilibrium model of Hicks and Metzler to provide the backbone of a useful macroeconomics:

Paul Krugman: Choose Your Heterodoxy: “I’m pretty sure Roger Farmer is subtweeting me…

here when he says:

There are still a number of self-professed Keynesian bloggers out there who see the world through the lens of 1950s theory…

And it’s true!… Farmer wants us to think in terms of models with:

an infinite dimensional continuum of locally stable rational expectations equilibria…

or maybe:

a continuum of attracting points, each of which is an equilibrium…

But why, exactly? Saying that it’s ‘modern’ is no answer; so, for a while, was real business cycle theory, which proved to be a huge wrong turn. In part, I think, Farmer is trying to explain an empirical regularity he thinks he sees, but nobody else does — a complete absence of any tendency of the unemployment rate to come down when it’s historically high….

Farmer wants to preserve rational expectations and continuous equilibrium, while introducing multiple equilibria. That strikes me as a bizarre choice. Why not appeal to behavioral economics, behavioral finance in particular, to make sense of bubbles? Why not appeal to the clear evidence of price and wage stickiness — perhaps grounded in bounded rationality — to make sense of market disequilibrium?

The 1950s theory Farmer derides actually follows more or less that agenda…. Economists who knew their Hicks have actually done extremely well at predicting the effects of monetary and fiscal policy since the 2008 crisis, whereas those who sneered at this old-fashioned stuff have been wrong about almost everything. I’m all for new ideas, indeed for radical heterodoxy, if it solves some problem. Attacking ideas that seem to work pretty well simply because they’ve been around for a while, not so much.

I find myself genuinely split here. When I look at the size of the housing bubble that triggered the Lesser Depression from which we are still suffering, it looks at least an order of magnitude too small to be a key cause. Spending on housing construction rose by 1%-age point of GDP for about three years–that is $500 billion. In 2008-9 real GDP fell relative to trend by 8%–that is $1.2 trillion–and has stayed down by what will by the end of this year be seven years–that is $8.5 trillion. And that is in the U.S. alone. There was a mispricing in financial markets. It lead to the excess expenditure of $500 billion of real physical assets–houses–that were not worth their societal resource cost. And each $1 of investment spending misallocated during the bubble has–so far–caused the creation of $17 of lost Okun gap.

(You can say that bad loans were far in excess of $500 billion. But most of the bad loans were not bad ex ante but only became bad ex post when the financial crisis, the crash, and the Lesser Depression came. You can say that low interest rates and easy credit led a great many who owned already-existing houses to take out loans that were ex ante bad. But that is offset by the fact that the excess houses built had value, just not $500 billion of value. I think those two factors more or less wash each other out. You can say that it was not the financial crisis but the destruction of $8 trillion of wealth revealed to be fictitious as house prices normalized that caused the Lesser Depression. But the creation of that $8 trillion of fictitious wealth had not caused a previous boom of like magnitude.)

To put it bluntly: Paul is wrong because the magnitude of the financial accelerator in this episode cries out for a model of multiple–or a continuous set of–equilibria. And so Roger seems to me to be more-or-less on the right track.

When Paul says that standard Hicks-Metzler macro has done well, he means that, since the end of the 2008, given the magnitude of the leftward shift in the IS curve then experienced, Hicks-Metzler has given the right answer to four important questions:

  1. Will extraordinary expansion of the outside money base by the Federal Reserve have powerful effects boosting the economy even after short-term safe nominal interest rates hit zero? No, because such central banking operations are essentially swaps of assets that are nearly perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, and expectations of higher future inflation are not easily generated out of thin air but require facts on the ground that can be pointed to.

  2. Will expansionary fiscal policy be counterproductive because it will lead to a crisis of confidence and to a spiking of interest rates? No, not as long as the central bank can and does create the safe high-powered monetary asset that underpins the economy.

  3. Will expansionary monetary policy trigger stagflation–high unemployment and accelerating prices? No, because, once again, expectations of higher future inflation are not easily generated out of thin air but would require the facts on the ground of full recovery to trigger their appearance.

  4. Will the economy quickly recover back to its old normal? No, absent the working-out of bad debt and deleveraging of the economy needed to reverse the large leftward shift of the IS curve.

Giving the right answers ex ante to these four questions was a powerful victory for Hicks-Metzler macro. Judging that the housing price rise was a bubble, the popping of which would create risks, and that wage and price inertia would make recovery without truly extraordinary demand stimulation very painful are also powerful victories. Those who understood the behavioral finance of bubbles and the institutional psychology of wage-price inertia could see and think where others were blind or insane.

But it seems to me that Roger Farmer has empirical victories too. From today’s perspective, the things I used to teach before 2008 about how the American economy had a strong tendency to return to a full employment equilibrium with a 1/e time of two years seems simply wrong: rapid recovery in the past, looking back, seems to have depended on aggressive policy rather than on any natural equilibrating economic process. And I would have given very long odds that $500 billion of sectoral overinvestment, even overleveraged overinvestment, would not take down the U.S. and the world economy.

Must-Must-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Brookings Did a Symposium

Matthew Yglesias: “Brookings did a symposium on the 40th anniversary of Arthur Okun’s famous book…

Equality and Efficiency: The big tradeoff. There’s some interesting stuff in the transcript and also in Brad DeLong’s commentary, but… the big story… people on the liberal side of the divide are… hesitant to go truly guns blazing after how fundamentally misguided the political economy thinking behind this tradeoff talk is.

Oligarchy isn’t efficient: All societies have some inequality. At times, the people on the ‘winning’ side of that inequality are able to influence the political process to further enrich the already rich. When people are in a position to do that, do they normally go about doing so by enacting ‘efficient’ growth-friendly policies that maximize GDP? Of course not. Hedge fund managers get their income taxed at a preferential rate. Pharmaceutical companies hijack the global trade process to push for stronger patent rights. Medical doctors stifle competition from immigrants and nurse practitioners. Big companies seek rents, and when they do so successfully their shareholders and executives are duly rewarded…. There are some policies that both increase growth and increase inequality. But there’s no reason to believe that such policies are typical or that this is the big tradeoff that exists in practical political economy.

Dire poverty isn’t efficient: Conversely, there’s very little reason to think that a society with better living standards at the bottom will be less growth-friendly. Imagine if everyone in America managed to afford a house in a safe neighborhood that was close to a good school and that featured convenient commuting to job opportunities. That would be a much more egalitarian society. But it would also be much more growth-friendly…. What if no kids suffered from lead poisoning or the developmental problems associated with the cortisone surged induced by poverty-relayed stress? What if every pregnant woman had great prenatal and neonatal health care?…

Communism isn’t egalitarian: Last but by no means least… in the Soviet Union or North Korea… actual outcomes are not at all egalitarian…. It’s oligarchy under the red flag….

The real issue in all cases is… who, in practice, is the policy process accountable to. If it’s accountable to a narrow band of rich people that is worse than if it is accountable to the interests of average people. If it’s accountable to an even narrower band of elite party members, that’s even worse. But effective, accountable government is good for both equality and growth.

Must-Read: Lawrence Summers (2011): A Conversation on New Economic Thinking

Must-Read: Lawrence Summers (2011): A Conversation on New Economic Thinking: “We have a bunch of people who kind of assume that the regulators are smart…

…and that the private sector is greedy and that they’ll figure things out right.  And that we have a bunch of people who assume that the private – that the government always gets co-opted and the regulators always end up working for the regulated.  And we have sort of a dialog of the deaf  between them.

And the truth is the regulators haven’t done a terrific job.  The truth is we have a broad social problem that covers everything from finance, to deep sea drilling, to nuclear, and that in all kinds of areas that are technical and hugely  important  to society there’s roughly nobody who knows about them who doesn’t have some set of deep interest in them.  And that creates all kinds of questions of legitimacy and knowledge.  So we don’t really want legislation  by the co-opted. But we also don’t really want regulation by the ignorant.   And there’s hardly anybody who is both knowledgeable and un-co-opted.

And how we think about the design of regulatory institutions to address those structures – I think we economists have a tendency to spend too much time on whether the Basle system  should say 7% or 7.8%, and not enough time thinking about how over many years as accounting  conventions have to be set – as there are all kinds of interactions between the regulated and the regulator, how the system will adopt in terms of incentives of all the actors is important.

The public choice school has taken that very seriously, but they have driven it relentlessly towards nihilism in a way that isn’t actually helpful for those charged with designing regulatory institutions. But their recognition that regulators who are people that have incentives too is, I think, a very important one.  And so that would be an additional area that I would highlight to research…

Must-Read: Brad DeLong: Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in 1933

Must-Read: Andrew Jalil and Gisela Rua: Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in 1933): “By examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts…

…we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically [in the second quarter of 1933]. Second, using an event – studies approach, we identify the impact on financial markets of the key events that shifted inflation expectations. Third, we gather new evidence — both quantitative and narrative — that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery….

Must-Read: Marshall Steinbaum: What Explains Rising Wealth Inequality?

Must-Read: Marshall Steinbaum: What explains rising wealth inequality?: “At the University of Chicago… they sell a t-shirt that says…

…‘that’s all well and good in practice, but how does it work in theory?’ That… captures the state of knowledge about rising wealth inequality, both its causes and its consequences…. Mariacristina de Nardi of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago attempt[s] to match theory with reality…. People want to secure their children’s wellbeing through bequests…. Entrepreneurs need capital to finance otherwise-constrained new businesses…. Economists typically highlight individual or inter-generational mobility within the wealth distribution as both a reason not to care that the distribution itself is unequal and as an argument that having wealthy parents (or not) doesn’t matter that much for children’s outcomes…. But… there’s scant evidence that parents leave larger inheritances to stupid children. Nor is there much evidence that native ability is the major determinant of earnings…. Why are some people rich while others are poor? What economists are just finding out (while others have known for awhile now) is, essentially, ‘because their parents were.’