WorldPost: China’s Market Crash Means Chinese Supergrowth Could Have Only 5 More Years to Run….

Over at WorldPost: China’s Market Crash Means Chinese Supergrowth Could Have Only 5 More Years to Run: Ever since I became an adult in 1980, I have been a stopped clock with respect to the Chinese economy. I have said — always — that at most, Chinese supergrowth likely has five more years to run.

Then there will come a crash…. After the crash, China will revert to the standard pattern of an emerging market economy without successful institutions that duplicate or somehow mimic those of the North Atlantic… convergence to the North Atlantic growth-path norm will be slow… and political risks… [cause] the most likely surprises. I have been wrong for 25 years straight — and the jury is still out on the period since 2005. Thus, I’m very hesitant to count out China and its supergrowth miracle. But now ‘a’ crash — even if, perhaps, not ‘the’ crash I was predicting — is at hand. [READ MOAR]

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: China’s Policy Failings Challenge the Fed

Must-Read: I cannot help but note strong divergence between the near-consensus views of Fed Chair Janet’s and Fed Vice-Chair Stan’s still-academic colleagues and students that tightening now is grossly premature, financial markets’ agreement with the hippies as evidenced by the ten-year breakeven, commercial-banker and wingnut demands for immediate tightening, the extraordinarily awful performance since 2007 of not all but the average regional Fed president as revealed in the transcripts, and the Federal Reserve’s strong predisposition to an interest-rate liftoff soon. That divergence plus the apparent focus of what is a global hegemon on its domestic situation make me think that this is not a well-functioning institution we have here:

Gavyn Davies: China’s Policy Failings Challenge the Fed: “There is something… important… doubts about the competence and credibility of Chinese economic policy…

…and the appropriateness of the US Federal Reserve’s monetary strategy…. While overall Chinese activity was not disastrous, the sectors of the economy that were most important for commodities–real estate, construction and manufacturing–were clearly weaker than the expanding services sectors. China pessimists… claimed that the “inevitable” Chinese hard landing was at hand…. Martin Wolf and David Pilling have rightly suggested in the FT that China’s economic problems are deep seated, stemming from an unbalanced economy that is far too dependent on investment, and on inherent contradictions between the need to introduce market forces in the long term, and the need to retain state control to deflate the leverage bubble in the short term. Perhaps the regime of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang needed to be super-human to navigate all this. But the policy errors of mid 2015 suggested instead that they were split, indecisive and confused….

Shorn of any reassurance from a credible economic framework in China, western investors have turned their attention to their ultimate security blanket, the Federal Reserve. But the Fed seemed to have embarked on a pre-determined course to raise US interest rates before year end…. But as Lawrence Summers argued this week:

A reasonable assessment of current conditions suggests that raising rates in the near future would be a serious error that would threaten all three of… price stability, full employment and financial stability….

Financial markets… act… as if they are experiencing an adverse monetary policy shock from the Fed… rather similar to… 2013…. Markets have refused to believe that the Fed would raise interest rates as early, or as fast, as the Federal Open Market Committee has shown in its “dots”…. [recently] increased their belief that a rise in US rates would be inappropriate this year. Yet… the Fed has shown little sign of wobble…. Some investors are beginning to agree with Mr Summers that another dose of quantitative easing may be necessary…. The Fed’s… path for tighter policy is no longer consistent with stable financial markets. Something will have to give.

Things to Read at Lunchtime on August 27, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Kris James Mitchener and Marc D. Weidenmier: Was the Classical Gold Standard Credible on the Periphery? Evidence from Currency Risk

Must-Read: Kris James Mitchener and Marc D. Weidenmier: Was the Classical Gold Standard Credible on the Periphery? Evidence from Currency Risk: “We use a standard metric from international finance…

…the currency risk premium, to assess the credibility of fixed exchange rates during the classical gold standard era. Theory suggests that a completely credible and permanent commitment to join the gold standard would have zero currency risk or no expectation of devaluation. We find that, even five years after a typical emerging-market country joined the gold standard, the currency risk premium averaged at least 220 basis points. Fixed-effects, panel-regression estimates that control for a variety of borrower-specific factors also show large and positive currency risk premia. In contrast to core gold standard countries, such as France and Germany, the persistence of large premia, long after gold standard adoption, suggest that financial markets did not view the pegs in emerging markets as credible and expected that they devaluation.

Must-Read: Miles Kimball: Larry Summers: The Fed Looks Set to Make a Mistake

Live from Jackson Hole 2015 Weblogging: Must-Read: I think Miles Kimball is dead-on here: unless the advocates of interest-rate smoothing can come up with an argument for interest rate smoothing better than any they have so far, the right level of the Federal Reserve’s short-term federal funds control rate is (if it is away from its zero lower bound) the level at which the Fed is uncertain whether its move at the next meeting will be up, down, or zero:

Miles Kimball: Larry Summers: The Fed Looks Set to Make a Mistake: “Let me address one myth…

…that Mike Woodford has shown that interest-rate smoothing makes sense. I would be glad to be corrected, but I think this myth arises because Mike talked about the Fed carrying about affecting… expectations of future rates. Just as backward-looking state variables have forward-looking costate variables, bond market expectations are like a forward-looking state variable for the Fed; those bond market expectations have a corresponding backward-looking costate variable…. Such backward-looking costate variables giving guidance about doing the right thing in relation to bond-market expectations contribute additional drift terms to the optimal policy rate, but it still seems to me that over a six-week span of time between FOMC meetings, the variance of news is sufficient that the effect of news should typically be substantially larger than the sum of all drift terms on the policy rate. Hence the metaphor of a muddy random walk.  

Things to Read at Lunchtime on August 26, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Rich Gilbert: E-Books: A Tale of Digital Disruption

**Must-Read: Rich Gilbert**: [E-Books: A Tale of Digital Disruption](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.29.3.165): “E-book sales surged after Amazon introduced the Kindle e-reader at the end of 2007…

>…and accounted for about one quarter of all trade book sales by the end of 2013. Amazon’s aggressive (low) pricing of e-books led to allegations that e-books were bankrupting brick and mortar book booksellers. Amazon’s commanding position as a bookseller also raises concerns about monopoly power, and publishers are concerned about Amazon’s power to displace them in the book value chain. I find little evidence that e-books are primarily responsible for the decline of independent booksellers. I also conclude that entry barriers are not sufficient to allow Amazon to set monopoly prices. Publishers are at risk from Amazon’s monopsony (buyer) power and so sought ‘agency’ pricing in an effort to raise the price of ebooks, promote retail competition, and reduce Amazon’s influence as an e-retailer. (In the agency pricing model, the publisher specifies the retail price with a commission for the retailer. In a traditional, ‘wholesale’ pricing model, publishers sell a book to retailers at a wholesale price and retailers set the retail price.) Although agency pricing was challenged by the Department of Justice, it may yet prevail in some form as an equilibrium pricing model for e-book sales.

Must-Read: Robert Lucas (2001): Bald Peak

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Must-Read: Jackson Hole 2015 Weblogging: As best as I can see, Robert Lucas is here saying that at the very same moment that Paul Volcker managed to push the U.S. unemployment rate up to 10% via monetary policy, he–Robert Lucas–was convinced by Ed Prescott’s “new style of comparing theory to evidence” that “monetary shocks were just not pulling their weight” in providing a potential explanation of short-run movements in production and employment.

No, Paul Romer, I will not let you blame this style of thought on the fact that Bob Solow was mean to Robert Lucas at Bald Peak. The reason that Bob Solow was mean to Robert Lucas at Bald Peak was that this episode was and is characteristic of how Bob Lucas does business:

Robert Lucas (2001): Bald Peak: “In October, 1978—leaf season—the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored a conference at the Bald Peak Colony Club in New Hampshire…

…Though I did not see it at the time, the Bald Peak conference also marked the beginning of the end for my attempts to account for the business cycle in terms of monetary shocks…. Ed Prescott presented a model… that was a kind of mixture of Brock and Mirman’s model of growth subject to stochastic technology shocks and my model of monetary shocks…. As they gained more experience through numerical simulations of their Bald Peak model, Kydland and Prescott found that the monetary shocks were just not pulling their weight: By removing all monetary aspects of the theory, they obtained a far simpler and more comprehensible structure that fit postwar U.S. time series data just as well as the original version.

Besides introducing an important substantive refocusing of business cycle research, Kydland and Prescott introduced a new style of comparing theory to evidence that has had an enormous, beneficial effect on empirical work in the field…

Whose Recovery? Possible Slides for Jackson Lake Lodge/Grand Teton Teach-In

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Note to Self: Several points to try to hit this week in Jackson Hole:

  • The Federal Reserve was supposed to be a people’s central bank. The desire to make it a people’s central bank was behind the pre-World War I democratic progressive rejection of the Aldrich plan–written by John D. Rockefeller II’s father-in-law Sen. Nelson Aldrich (R-RI). Instead of being run by bankers for bankers, the Federal Reserve was to be run by wise technocrats–the Board in Washington, with presidentially-appointed members with very long terms–to be distributed around the country in 12 reserve banks only one of which would be in New York, and the directors the bank presidents served would have a solid majority representing their region’s public and the Board, not representing bankers.

  • It hasn’t really worked–although at least some officials of the Federal Reserve will occasionally say that the Federal Reserve is the North Atlantic central bank that is least close to the banking sector it regulates, and might hint that that is one of the reasons why the Federal Reserve has done better than other North Atlantic central banks since 2007.

  • Not only did Congress give the Federal Reserve a structure that is flawed, but Congress gave the Federal Reserve a mandate that is flawed: it places too high a weight on price-level stability rather than price-level predictability.

  • Not only did Congress give the Federal Reserve a flawed structure and a flawed mandate, but the target the Federal Reserve has adopted is flawed: even with the weight given to price stability, a 2%/year average inflation rate is too low a target to aim for for economic health.

  • Not only did Congress give the Fed a flawed structure and a flawed mandate, and not only is the Fed’s 2%/year inflation target (rather than, say, a 4%/year inflation target or a 6%/year NGDP growth target) flawed, but the Federal Reserve’s decisions are not a successful implementation of that target. Right now Wall Street is betting that the Federal Reserve will undershoot its target by a cumulative total of 5% over the next decade.

https://www.icloud.com/keynote/AwBUCAESEAAUD2PCz4iTr9JO8k4Tn08aKQE_mZALGX2aq0JZdX8fvKiMcHTJblc9m6acPd4yOsW9Cqzp4LPaPE2iMCUCAQEEIO7aG-oyXDuP0R2LjtdS2a5Y5-8UqD1BSieFGo_alXpD#2015-08-25_DeLong_Possible_Jackson_Hole_Slides.key

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Liberal Activism!: Federal Reserve Jackson Hole Edition

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Kevin Cirillo shows up in my inbox:

Kevin Cirilli: Activists Confront Fed Leaders to Warn Against Rate Hike

And my first reaction: Is he talking about former Treasury Secretary and Harvard President Lawrence H. Summers? Is he one of the “activists” in question?

Lawrence Summers: The Fed Looks Set to Make a Dangerous Mistake: “the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice by adopting…

…a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this–a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy…. Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels… increase the value of the dollar, making US producers less competitive…. This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality…. There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago…. That debate is now moot…. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping some part of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.

Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates were now 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from a sense that the economy has substantially normalised… and so the extraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn…. Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach the seventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think of economic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds…

No, I do not believe that LHS is on a plane to Jackson Hole tomorrow. But I am going. This is perhaps the first time I have been described as a “liberal activist”:

Liberal activists are descending upon a global economic conference in Jackson Hole, Wyo., to criticize Federal Reserve officials… The liberal Center for Popular Democracy has launched a ‘Fed Up’ campaign to urge the central bank’s chairwoman, Janet Yellen, and her team of policymakers against raising interest rates…. ‘The economy remains far too weak to slow it down. We shouldn’t mince words — when the Fed raises interest rates, it’s doing that to slow the economy down,’ said Ady Barkan, Fed Up campaign director, on a conference call with reporters. He called the prospect of the Fed raising interest rates ‘an insane perspective to take and an insane policy to take at the moment.’

The group is sending about 50 activists to the annual Economic Policy Symposium, which includes members of the Federal Reserve, global bankers and top economists. The activists will hold ‘Teach Ins’ that coincide with the annual summit. Among the planned events is one titled, ‘Do Black Lives Matter to the Fed?’ — a nod to the national movement to highlight policies that disproportionately hurt the African-American community….

And:

AP: Fed Up Group Plans Counter Jackson Hole Conference: “Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen may be skipping this year’s annual gathering of central bank policymakers in Wyoming…

…but a group of demonstrators will be making their second appearance at the elite gathering. And this year they will be conducting their own teach-in…. The Fed Up coalition, made up of community activist groups, has rented a conference room in the same hotel where the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank will be holding its annual Jackson Hole conference starting Thursday… will bring in low-wage workers from around the country who are struggling to make ends meet to emphasize the need for the Fed to do more to attack income inequality….

Ady Barkan with the Center for Popular Democracy and campaign director for Fed Up said that before Fed officials ‘can have a real discussion of raising interest rates and slowing the economy, they should understand firsthand who it would effect.’… In addition to arguing that raising rates now would be premature, the group will hold discussions on ways to reform the Fed’s current selection process for the presidents of the Fed’s 12 regional banks….

While the Fed announced in May that Yellen would not be attending this year’s conference, Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer is scheduled to deliver comments on inflation during a panel discussion at Jackson Hole on Saturday. Financial markets will be closely examining those comments for any hints about whether the Fed is still likely to boost interest rates at its Sept. 16-17 meeting despite a huge sell-off in recent days in stocks that saw the Dow Jones industrial average fall another 588.47 points or 3.6 percent on Monday.

Back when the Federal Reserve was founded, it was subject to harsh criticism from the banking lobby for giving non-bankers too much influence over the new organization–that it was not enough under the thumb of the bankers:

Roger T. Johnson: Historical Beginnings: The Federal Reserve: “On June 23, 1913, President Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress and presented his program…

…pleaded for a banking system that would provide for an elastic currency and that would vest control in the government:

so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters, of business and of individual enterprise and initiative.

Most bankers did not like what they heard. Particularly vigorous—and often very bitter—in their opposition were the big-city bankers, especially from New York. Conservatives also lambasted the bill as a radical break in… laissez-faire…. The bankers… favored… a central bank under banker control, disliked the framework of government regulation, dominated by political appointees… disliked the fact that the new Federal Reserve banks would be the sole holders of reserves… disliked compulsory membership… criticized the bill’s assault on “private rights”… termed the bill a Democratic party measure… dominated by [the Democratic Party’s] southern, western, and “anti-business” elements. The New York Times referred derisively to the “Oklahoma idea, the Nebraska idea,” clearly pointing to Senator Owen and Secretary of State Bryan who, as we have seen, played a major role in writing the bill and adding the government control through the Federal Reserve Board….

The Times said [that the plan]:

reflects the rooted dislike and distrust of banks and bankers that has been for many years a great moving force in the Democratic party, notably in the Western and Far Western States… goes to the very extreme in establishing absolute political control over the business of banking.

The New York Sun… the spokesman for Wall Street at that time, called the bill:

this preposterous offspring of ignorance and unreason… covered all over with the slime of [soft-money] Bryanism….

The vast majority of the nation’s bankers—country and city—still strongly opposed the bill, often with the bitterest hostility; a San Antonio banker, for example, called the bill a “communistic idea.”… Meeting in Chicago in late August with a commission of the American Bankers Association, the presidents of 47 state banking associations and 191 clearinghouse associations raised many objections to the Administration’s banking reform. They made it clear that they wanted the Aldrich plan, with one central bank generally controlled by bankers and generally independent of government regulation.

According to Wilson’s major biographer, Professor Arthur S. Link, the Chicago conference decisively altered the controversy over the banking issue, making the Administration more
hostile to the bankers publicly opposing the Federal Reserve bill. Until this time Wilson and his major advisers had believed that the bankers, despite their rhetoric, would in the final analysis work responsibly for the Administration plan. The Chicago manifesto appeared to kill that hope and sharply etched the broad differences between the majority of the banking community and the Wilson Administration. From then until final passage of the Federal Reserve bill in December, the Wilson Administration tended to regard banker opposition as essentially irreversible…

The bankers’ fear was that the new Federal Reserve system would be a hostile regulator, tightly constraining their businesses and curbing their profits. And the bankers’ fear was that the new Federal Reserve would be excessively attached to inflationary soft-money monetary policies–after all, the leader of the soft-money wing of the Democratic Party, then Secretary-of-State William Jennings Bryan, endorsed it. Political appointees making up the Board of Governors, regional banks directors dominated by public and Board-appointed members, the banker “representatives” on regional bank boards a solid minority–how could this regulatory agency do its job of providing a comfortable life for the banking industry it was set to regulate?

Good questions all. Yet–with the singular notable exception of the 1965-1979 later Martin-Burns-Miller period–nobody who is not a wingnut goldbug argues that the Federal Reserve has been unduly attached to inflation. And the perennial problem has been that the Federal Reserve–even with an entire Board appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, even with regional bank boards dominated by the public Class B and the Board-appointed Class C directors–has been too attached to the interests of the financial system when those are at odds with the interest of the public.

Paul Krugman has taken the latest whack at why this has turned out to be so:

Paul Krugman: Rate Hike Fever: “Larry Summers argues that a Fed rate hike would be a big mistake…

…I completely agree. Yet he also suggests that the Fed ‘seems set’ to do this foolish thing. Why?… [This] is not like debating monetary policy with the seventeen stooges conservatives whose doctrine tells them that fiat money will turn us into Zimbabwe any day now, and are impervious to evidence. The Fed chair is Janet Yellen; the vice chair is Stan Fischer… salt-water economists whose underlying macro worldview is surely very much like Larry’s, or mine, not least because we studied under Stan himself. So why the difference on policy?… Something about being on the inside is making the Fedsters more rate-hike prone…. Pressure from the usual suspects–the constant sniping against easy money–may play a role. But I also suspect that a lot has to do with the urge to resume a conventional central-banker role. The whole culture of central banks involves saying no to stuff people want, taking away the punch bowl as the party gets going, having the courage to do unpopular things; everyone wants to be Paul Volcker. The Fed is really, really eager to return to that position–and is, I fear, engaging in wishful thinking, believing much too readily that a return to normalcy is appropriate. It’s not.

And:

Paul Krugman: Insiders, Outsiders, and U.S. Monetary Policy: “I ran into Olivier Blanchard… [another] of the people who either make monetary policy or comment on it…

…from fairly influential perches [and] are members of what you might call the 1970s Cambridge mafia. Olivier, Ben Bernanke, Ken Rogoff, Mario Draghi, and yours truly all overlapped at MIT… Larry Summers was at Harvard at the same time… just about everyone was Stan Fischer’s student…. Unusually, Olivier and I do have a significant disagreement right now, over US monetary policy…. I’m very worried that the Fed may be gearing up to raise rates too soon; he’s sanguine…. Our disagreement over coffee is part of a wider split. Among the Cambridge mafia… there’s a surprisingly sharp divide… [that] seems to depend on one thing: whether the economist in question is currently in a policy position…. We don’t have access to different facts; we don’t… have different economic models. It’s an uncertain world, but why do those in office come down on one side of that uncertainty, while those outside come down on the other? Well, even smart, flexible people can fall prey to incestuous amplification. And I worry that this is what is happening to the insiders. On the whole, it seems less likely for the outsiders, although it’s true that the Keynesian econoblogs form what amounts to a tight ongoing discussion group that could be doing some amplification of its own…. But if you ask me, there’s a worrying complacency among the insiders right now, and I would urge them to consider the potential consequences if they’re wrong.

I am not at all confident he has it right. But this is a serious problem. And we are showing up in Jackson Hole to remind the people in the conference rooms upstair from us that they need to worry about whether their view of the world is a little bit too accommodating to the interests–or I would argue the irrational prejudices–of those whom they are supposed to be regulating in the public interest.