Where are U.S. data on the gig economy?

There’s an old joke about the economist who loses his car keys one night and only looks for them directly under a lamppost. Why would he look where there wasn’t enough light? The joke is often bandied about after hearing economists say they haven’t dug into an issue because the data aren’t good enough or don’t even exist. Today, this refrain is often heard when the so-called gig economy is mentioned. So in an era of Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and Handy do we need to update our labor market data?

Take a look at the current labor market statistics and you won’t find much evidence of a dramatic emergence of an “Uberfied” work force. Adam Ozimek, an economist at Moody’s Analytics looks at a number of labor market data sets from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and finds no evidence of a “nation of freelancers.” The share of workers who are self-employed actually looks to be on the decline in recent years and workers aren’t more likely to hold multiple jobs. Josh Zumbrun at the Wall Street Journal finds very similar results when he also digs into the data.

But as Justin Fox writes at Bloomberg View—commenting on Ozimek’s post—the labor market “fringes are where interesting stuff usually begins.” With that in mind, it’s heartening to see the recent letter to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), who asks a number of questions about the agency’s capabilities to measure the gig economy now and in the future.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics produces high quality data on a number of issues, but no data set is ever perfect. Economists Larry Katz of Harvard University and Alan Krueger at Princeton University are looking into the gig economy and find evidence that the BLS surveys are missing out on some developments. Case in point: they find some evidence of a larger gig economy in tax data.

Furthermore, there’s room within the agency’s current statistics to get more information about the labor force. Consider independent contractors. Sociologist Annette Bernhardt at the University of California-Berkeley points out that a wide variety of workers are included in this group—from “management consultants, lawyers, doctors, farm managers, and architects” to “street vendors, barbers, auto mechanics, landscapers, cab drivers, caregivers, and truck drivers.” So while perhaps the aggregate labor market might not be full of freelancers, it’s important to understand which industries and occupations could be considered a part of this new and emerging gig economy.

It’s far too soon to say that we live and work in a gig economy today, but it’s important to consider how we can improve our understanding of how these trends might be shifting today and in the future so that other aspects of the labor market, such as worker benefits and non-wage compensation, can be examined in a new light.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Bubblewashing

Must-Read: I gotta agree with Paul Krugman here: Ylan Q. Mui is smart and hard-working. But she is not doing the job that a WonkBlog reporter should be doing. She is, instead, doing the standard Len Downie-culture Washington Post job of pleasing her sources and confusing her readers–nearly the exact opposite of what I took to be the task that Ezra Klein originally set the reporters of WonkBlog.

As I have said and will say again: The (surprisingly few) good journalists working for the Washington Post would land on their feet if it stopped publishing tomorrow. The rest shouldn’t be in the industry. And the quality of the information stream would be improved:

Paul Krugman: Bubblewashing: “Almost 15 years have passed since I warned about media ‘balance’…

…that involved systematically abdicating the journalistic duty of informing readers about simple matters of fact…. Have things improved? In some ways, they may have gotten even worse. These days, media balance often seems to involve retroactively rewriting history to avoid telling readers that one side of a policy debate got things completely wrong. In particular, when you see reports on monetary disputes, you often see characterizations of what the Fed’s right-wing critics have been saying that go something like this, in the WaPo:

Among the criticisms: The Fed was keeping interest rates artificially low and fueling speculative bubbles. The helicopter-drop of money known as quantitative easing did little more than inflate stock markets and fund Washington’s deficit spending. The bailout of big banks left them bigger than ever.

Um, no. The people who gathered at the anti-Jackson-Hole event weren’t warning about bubbles and too-big-to-fail. They warned, in apocalyptic terms, that runaway inflation was just around the corner. Here’s Ron Paul; here’s Peter Schiff.

Why would a reporter credit the Fed’s critics with warnings they didn’t give, and fail to mention what they actually said?

The answer, pretty obviously, is that if you were to say ‘Ron Paul has been predicting runaway inflation ever since the Fed began its expansionary policies’, that would make it clear that he has been completely wrong. And conveying that truth–even as a matter of simple factual reporting–is apparently viewed as taking sides. So what we get instead is a whitewashing of the intellectual history, in which Fed critics are portrayed as making arguments that haven’t been shown to be ridiculous. It’s a pretty sorry spectacle.

Things to Read at Nighttime on September 2, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

More Here at Equitable Growth:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: The Triumph of Backward-Looking Economics

Must-Read: When I have to teach my students policy-oriented macro, I look for cases of moderate inflation in which expectations relevant to the Phillips curve and the inflation-unemployment “tradeoff” turn out to be neither anchored nor adaptive but rational. The only historical example I have found in a major North Atlantic country that even partly fits the bill is the accession of Francois Mitterand to the French presidency in the early 1980s–and even there the expectations that look rational are not workers’ or bosses’ but rather foreign-exchange traders…

Mark Thoma: The Triumph of Backward-Looking Economics: “In response to Paul Krugman’s recent post, “The Triumph of Backward-Looking Economics”…

…let me offer this from Blanchard and Johnson’s intermediate macroeconomics text….

Fighting inflation implied tightening monetary policy, decreasing output growth, and thus accepting higher unemployment for some time. The question arose of how much unemployment, and for how long, would likely be needed to achieve a lower level of inflation, say 4%–which is the rate Volcker wanted to achieve. Some economists argued that such a disinflation would likely be very costly…. [But] Lucas argued: Why shouldn’t wage setters take policy changes directly into account? If wage setters believed that the Fed was committed to lower inflation, they might well expect inflation to be lower in the future than in the past…. The essential ingredient of successful disinflation, he argued, was credibility…. Furthermore, [Sargent] argued, a clear and quick disinflation program was more likely to be credible than a protracted one….

[Starting] September 1979… from 9%… the three-month Treasury bill rate was increased to 15% in August 1981…. There was no credibility miracle: Disinflation was associated with a sharp recession…. Does this settle the issue of how much credibility matters? Not really. Those who argued before the fact that credibility would help argued after the fact that Volcker had not been fully credible…

If Volcker’s disinflation was not a “fully credible” attempt to curb a moderate inflation, then nothing short of a replacement of a currency will ever be credible. And the question of how to stop a moderate inflation via credible policies is simply without interest.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Base versus Base

Must-Read: As time passes, there seems to be less and less technocrat rationale for the policy of cutting back the social insurance state in order to keep the taxes on the rich low. Yet that does not appear to do anything to weaken pressures putting for politicians to endorse such policies–even at a very cost in terms of being in synch with their electoral base:

Paul Krugman: Base Versus Base: “‘This is an impressive crowd…

…the haves and the have-mores. Some people call you the elites; I call you my base.” — George W. Bush

Ezra Klein… on [how] The Donald… representat[‘s]… the GOP base … dovetails with my piece about Social Security…. The Republican establishment [now is] a small group of very wealthy donors… a sort of different base… [with] a stark conflict between the two bases. The Bush base… has anted up well over $100 million… to anoint Jeb!… If Jeb! really believed he could achieve 4 percent growth, there would be no need for Social Security cuts…. But slashing the welfare state is, of course, not about the money–it’s about the pain.)… Bro! was… pretty good at convincing the voter base that he was one of them…. But that fell apart… during his attempt to privatize Social Security. And Jeb! has no talent at all for that kind of salesmanship…. Everyone still says that DT can’t win this thing, and they may be right. But who, exactly, is supposed to come out on top and how?

Paul Krugman: Republicans Against Retirement: “Social Security… is, of course, both extremely popular…

and a long-term target of conservatives, who want to kill it…. Stephen Moore (now chief economist of the Heritage Foundation) once declared, Social Security is ‘the soft underbelly of the welfare state’; ‘jab your spear through that’ and you can undermine the whole thing…. Republicans… have been declaring… the retirement age… should go up… Jeb Bush… ‘68 or 70’. Scott Walker has echoed…. Marco Rubio… raise the retirement age and… cut benefits for higher-income seniors. Rand Paul… 70 and means-test benefits. Ted Cruz wants to revive the Bush privatization plan…. What’s puzzling… is that it looks like bad politics as well as bad policy….

It’s all about the big money. Wealthy individuals have long played a disproportionate role in politics, but we’ve never seen anything like what’s happening now: domination of campaign finance, especially on the Republican side, by a tiny group of immensely wealthy donors. Indeed, more than half the funds raised by Republican candidates through June came from just 130 families. And while most Americans love Social Security, the wealthy don’t…

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Real Business Cycle Theory as Gaslighting

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Real Business Cycle Theory as Gaslighting: “The basic 1982 Nobel-winning RBC model…

…a complete-markets, representative-agent theory of business cycles where productivity shocks, leisure preference shocks, and/or government policy distortions drive business cycles–has never been very good at matching the data…. Simple patches… didn’t really improve the fit…. The model isn’t very robust to small frictions, either. And one of the main data techniques used… the Hodrick-Prescott filter… [is] very dodgy. Furthermore… Chris Sims showed that the main policy implication of RBC–that monetary policy can’t be used to stabilize the real economy–doesn’t hold up…. [But] RBC fans maintain that RBC is the basic workhorse business cycle model….

Ed Prescott and Ellen McGrattan released a paper claiming that if you just patch basic RBC up with one additional type of capital, it fits the data just fine. As if this were the only empirical problem with RBC, and as if this new type of capital has empirical support!… Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert… refers to RBC as “the standard business-cycle model”. As if anyone actually uses it as such!… Valerie Ramey says: “Of course, [the] view [that monetary policy is not an important factor in business cycles] was significantly strengthened by Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) seminal demonstration that business cycles could be explained with technology shocks.” As if any such thing was actually demonstrated!…

This strikes me as a form of gaslighting–RBC fans just blithely repeat, again and again, that the 1982 RBC model was a great empirical success…. Why do RBC fans keep on blithely repeating that RBC was a huge success, needs only minor patches, and is now the standard model?… If RBC was refuted [by 1980-84]… it means that the Lucas/Prescott/Sargent revolution looks just a little bit more like a wrong turn…. Or maybe RBC represents a form of wish fulfillment. If RBC is right, stabilization policy–which, if you believe Hayek, just might be the thin edge of a socialist wedge–is just a “rain dance”…. It could also be a sort of high-level debating tactic…. Anyway, whatever the reason, it’s kind of entertaining to watch…

No, the Federal Reserve Is Not a Market Manipulator

Let me pile on to something Paul Krugman published last week, and make fun of William Cohan for writing and the New York Times for publishing hopelessly confused austerity pseudonomics:

**Paul Krugman**: [Artificial Unintelligence](http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/krugman/2015/08/29/artificial-unintelligence/?referrer=): “In the early stages of the Lesser Depression…

>everywhere you looked, people who imagined themselves sophisticated and possessed of deep understanding were resurrecting 75-year-old fallacies and presenting them as deep insights…. [Now] I feel an even deeper sense of despair–because people are still rolling out those same fallacies… So here’s William Cohan in the Times, declaring that the Fed should ‘show some spine’ and raise rates….

>>Like any commodity, the price of borrowing money–interest rates–should be determined by supply and demand, not by manipulation by a market behemoth. Essentially, the clever Q.E. program caused a widespread mispricing of risk, deluding investors into underestimating the risk of various financial assets they were buying.

>Oh dear.

>Cohan’s theory of interest rates is basically the old notion of loanable funds…. As Keynes and Hicks explained three generations ago, this is… inadequate… misses the reality that the level of income isn’t fixed, and changes in income affect the supply and demand for funds…. There are arguments that the Fed should be willing to abandon its inflation target so as to discourage bubbles… but… they have nothing to do with the notion that current rates are somehow artificial, that we should let rates be determined by ‘supply and demand’. The worrying thing is that, as I’ve suggested, crude misunderstandings along these lines are widespread even among people who imagine themselves well-informed and sophisticated. Eighty years of hard economic thinking, and seven years of overwhelming confirmation of that hard thinking, have made no dent in their worldview. Awesome.

Let us suppose that instead of a Federal Reserve Board we have a Federal Potato Board. And let us suppose that the Federal Potato Board wants to peg the price of Idaho potatoes above its market-clearing value–just like, William Cohan claims, the Federal Reserve Board is now pegging the price of bonds above its market-clearing value. Suppose the FPB decides to set the price of potatoes at $12/50 lb. rather than the market clearing $8/50 lb.

What happens in the potato market?

Well, 14 billion pounds of Idaho potatoes are produced each year. And 14 billion pounds are eaten. At a price 50% higher than the market-clearing price, something like 20 billion pounds would be produced. And something like 10 billion pounds would be eaten. The FPB would have to buy the excess 10 billion pounds each year–at a cost of $2.4 billion/year. But it could not then sell them, because that would increase market supply and so drive down the price. It would have to destroy them. That would be a waste: $2.4 billion/year of hard work and sweat rotted away, literally.

What happens in the bond market?

Suppose, as Cohan seems to think, that the equilibrium market price of 5-year-duration bonds ought to be 1000 at a 3%/year interest rate, but the Federal Reserve artificially pushes the price up to 1150 and pushes the interest rate on them down to zero by printing money and buying bonds. Bond producers see that bond production is now highly profitable and they start producing more bonds…

How do you produce a bond, anyway?

Well, one way to do it is that you build an extra factory, and you then commit the profits from that extra factory to amortizing the bond. It was not profitable to undertake this when you could only sell the bond for 1000, but now that you can sell the bond for 1150.

One way to think is then this: You sell the bond for 1150 to the Federal Reserve–if it doesn’t buy it then the supply of bonds is greater than demand and the price of bond would fall. But the Federal Reserve cannot then sell the bond because that, too, would increase the supply of bonds. The Fed has to destroy the bond… No it doesn’t… The Fed can simply hold the bond to maturity, and then roll it over… But the FPB had to tax people to raise the $2.4 billion, and so the FRB would have to… No, it doesn’t: it, after all, simply prints the money… As SF Fed VP Glenn Rudebusch told an audience once: “We print money. We use it to buy bonds, We then clip the coupons. It’s a very good business model…” But just as all the time and energy that went into growing the excess 10 billion lb/year of potatoes was a waste of hard work and sweat because in the end nothing useful was produced… Oops… We know have a useful factory. And all the previously-unemployed people who got to work building the factory had jobs while it was being built. They liked that… And now the factory can employ more people, boosting wages…

If the economy had been at full employment when the FRB lowered interest rates, there would indeed have been a waste: The building of the factory would have pulled people out of jobs where their societal value was greater than their value as factory-builders. And we would have seen this waste reflected in inflation: The lowering of interest rates would have increased total spending in dollars without increasing the total amount of useful goods and services produced, and the result would have been previously-unexpected inflation.

But no unexpected inflation, no waste. As long as we are below full employment, the lowering of interest rates causes production to expand in accord with total spending and demand. It is simply a win.

(Better-prepared students will by now have noticed that the FRB, unlike the FPB, does not have to keep buying more and more bonds each year in order to keep the price at 1150. The extra workers employed building the factory have higher incomes. And they spend and save those higher incomes. And employment rises in other industries as well. And the people put to work in those industries spend and save their incomes. And with their savings they buy the bonds issued to finance the construction of next year’s factory. So all the FRB has to do–unlike the NPB–is get the ball rolling. Thereafter there is no disequilibrium between the supply of and the demand for bonds that requires the FRB to step in.)

But suppose that the FRB decides in the future to lower the price of bonds back down from 1150 to 1000. Doesn’t it then lose 150? Doesn’t it then have to raise taxes to make up for that loss? Aren’t those extra taxes a waste? Somehow?…

The fact is that the costs and waste of pushing interest rates “too low”, when they exist, show up as unexpected inflation. No unexpected inflation, no costs. Those who claim that expansionary monetary policy that lowers interest rates causes people to make bad economic decisions–to think that they are creating more real wealth than they are–are saying that when people go to market they will find that aggregate demand is higher than aggregate supply, and that there is as a result unexpected inflation. Planned investment in excess of desired savings–Cohan’s “widespread mispricing of risk, deluding investors…”–shows up, by the metaphysical necessity of the case, in aggregate demand greater than aggregate supply times the anticipated price level and thus in unexpected inflation.

Cohan’s argument is thus, at bottom, the inflationista argument: that expansionary monetary policy has somehow stored up a lot of inflation that is or is about to reveal itself in a rising-price tsunami. Thus my view: Cohan should join the inflationistas where they wait on their mountain top down-valley in Jackson Hole for their inflationocalypse, and stop bothering the rest of us.

The cruel game of musical chairs in the U.S. labor market

Musical chairs by Paolo, flickr, cc

Last year, our colleague Elisabeth Jacobs referred to the fate of young people in today’s slack labor market as “a cruel game of musical chairs” because there aren’t enough jobs to employ everyone at their full earning potential. Workers with college degrees tend to win out in the competition for the few jobs that are available, but many must settle for lower-paying jobs than similarly credentialed workers entering the workforce in previous decades. Those without college degrees, in turn, are driven into even lower paying work or pushed out of the labor market entirely. Economists refer to this phenomenon as “filtering-down,” with the best-educated workers increasingly filling jobs lower and lower on the job ladder.

The dire experience of these workers with college degrees displacing workers with less formal education stands in strong contrast to the widelyheld view in economic and policymaking circles that the main problem facing the U.S. economy is a shortage of highly-educated workers. If college-educated workers were in short supply, then we would expect their wages to rise as employers attempted to lure them away from their competitors. Yet the inflation-adjusted value of the wages of college-educated workers has barely increased in the 21st century.

What’s more, between 2000 and 2014 (the last year for which complete data are available), the employment of college-educated workers has increased much more rapidly in low-earning industries than in high-earnings ones. If there weren’t enough college graduates to go around, then the opposite should be happening because high-earnings industries would presumably be outcompeting low-earnings industries to hire college-educated workers. Our new analysis of the data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators strongly suggests that college-educated workers are more likely to “filter down” the job ladder than to climb it.

The QWI dataset is a comprehensive administrative source for information on flows in and out of employment, collecting information on total employment, hires, “separations” (workers either quitting their jobs, getting laid off, or fired for cause), and earnings. The data are disaggregated along many dimensions, including workers’ education level and the industries where they work. We can, for example, look at the share of employees in restaurants and bars that have a Bachelor’s degree or more, or the share of workers on Wall Street who have less than a high school degree.

Our analysis examines the average earnings of workers in the 91 industry groups—identified by their 3-digit coding in the North American Industrial Classification System–which together account for nearly all employment in the United States, alongside the share of workers in each industry with a college degree or more. While not definitive, the most striking finding is that the industries with the lowest earnings for all employees are experiencing the largest increases in the share of workers with a college education or higher. Our analysis, for example, finds that 16.3 percent of all workers who work in restaurants and bars in the United States have attained a Bachelor’s degree or more, compared to 14.2 percent in 2000. In contrast, high-paying industries such as the financial sector saw their share of college-educated workers decrease, from 65.2 percent in 2000 to 56.1 percent in 2014 (See Figure 1).

Figure 1

08XX15-filtering-down-01-3

This “filtering down” trend in the employment of college-educated workers is even more acute when we look at recent hires rather than overall employment. The trend line over 2000-2014 is even more steeply downward sloping for hires than for all employees, highlighting the cruel game of musical chairs. In short, a college degree is becoming increasingly less predictive of employment in a high-earnings industry. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

If instead of plotting the change in employment of college-educated workers or the change in recent hires of college-educated workers on the vertical axis—as we have done in Figures 1 and 2—we had alternatively plotted the share of college-educated workers in total employment, or the share of college-educated workers in recent hires, then we would see that industries with higher average earnings tend to employ more credentialed workers. In other words, the trend line we would see in the alternative charts would slope up, not down. Findings of that kind, which depict the higher average earnings of college-educated workers, are typically trumpeted as evidence that the only thing preventing young, under-employed workers from finding a good job is their lack of a Bachelor’s degree. But what our analysis demonstrates is that this relationship has gotten less positive since 2000. (See the data appendix below for a complete description of the data and our methodology.)

This means that the changing share of workers with a college degree or more across industries is unlikely to be due to “skill-biased technical change” in low-earnings industries, since by and large workers in those industries are less prone to technological substitution. Think bartenders and busboys. Those workers perform what economists call “non-routine, manual” tasks that can’t easily be performed by pre-programmable machines. Nor does the rise in the share of college-educated workers in lower-paying industries merely reflect that there were fewer such workers in these industries prior to 2000, because the same trend is true among recent hires as among employees overall.

Finally, the increased hiring of workers with college degrees has not boosted the relative pay in those low-paying industries. The patterns are quite similar whether we calculate industry average earnings in 2000 or in 2014 because average earnings across industries haven’t changed very much. What’s changed is the education mix of workers.

The implication of all of these findings is that the U.S. labor market doesn’t lack for college-educated workers. Workers who have degrees are already taking jobs further and further down the job ladder. Encouraging or subsidizing higher education attainment will not solve the fundamental problem facing workers in the current job market: There are not enough jobs.

Data appendix

The U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators is a comprehensive administrative dataset of employment “matches,” meaning labor market relationships between employers and employees. The existence of a match (employment), the beginning of a match (hires), and the end of a match (separations) are observed in a given quarter, along with average earnings of workers in each group of hired workers, employed workers, and separated workers. The QWI is disaggregated by geography, industry, and many demographic characteristics, including, for our purposes, education attainment (discussed more completely below).

There are two predominant underlying sources of the QWI data: U.S. Census data and state unemployment insurance filings by businesses. QWI is the publically available version of a dataset called Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, or LEHD, which follows individual workers from job to job over the course of their careers. QWI, however, does not track individual workers over time. Instead, quarter-by-quarter, it counts up all the flows described in the previous paragraph, for each detailed sub-population and employer category.

Because state-provided data from the unemployment-insurance system are critical to constructing LEHD and hence the QWI, and because states only began to participate in the LEHD at different points in time, the data are available as an unbalanced geographic panel. Every state except Massachusetts is currently providing data to the program, but the start dates vary by state. Enough states have joined by about 2000 that the literature has labeled QWI nationally representative from that point forward, which covers all the data reported in this exercise. We aggregate the data across states to create our industry-education disaggregation.

LEHD does not actually observe the education levels of most workers. For those it does not observe, education is imputed from other worker characteristics using Census Bureau microdata (mostly from the 2000 Decennial Census). That is the most likely reason why the QWI-reported share of college-educated workers has decreased by slightly more than one percentage point overall, and by substantially more in some industries. The imputation procedure works best around the date when its source data was collected (2000), and increasingly less well as we get further away from that date. The Current Population Survey, a representative sample of the population collected continuously, reports that the overall share of college-educated workers in the economy increased by approximately five percentage points between 2003 and 2012, and has only declined by a small amount in a very few industries.

The education imputation in QWI complicates the inference from exercises such as the one we present here, because the whole point of our interpretation is that educational attainment has become less predictive of workers’ experience in the labor market, and in particular, of their earnings, as better-educated workers are forced to take worse jobs. The effect of the data imputation, however, is most likely to mute the phenomena we highlight: if credentialed workers are taking jobs further down the labor market hierarchy, then workers who take jobs further down the hierarchy than they did in the past would be more likely to be misidentified as lacking educational qualifications. For that reason, we believe the imputation of education data means that our results understate the effect of filtering-down.

Tentative confirmation for this can be found in a regression of the change in the share of young workers on industry average earnings, which yields an even-more-sharply negative slope than Figures 1 and 2. In other words, young workers are filtering down the labor market even more starkly than BA-educated ones, according to QWI. Since young workers are more likely to have college degrees than retirees, the education-based regressions we present here probably understate the cruelty of the cruel game of musical chairs.

In order to construct Figures 1 and 2, we use a NAICS 3-digit Industrial Sector disaggregation of the QWI’s 2015Q3 Sex by Education files with all firm size and age categories for all available states and the District of Columbia. The data are smoothed using a four-quarter moving average, and nominal earnings are adjusted for inflation (to 2014 dollars) using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers, or CPI-U. We use the “stable jobs” concept, meaning only “full-quarter employment” is counted. A worker is “full-quarter employed” at a given match if and only if that worker has positive earnings from that match in the quarter itself and (at least) the ones preceding and subsequent. (Similarly, a “full-quarter hire” is one in which positive earnings are observed in the preceding, current, and subsequent quarters but not two-quarters-ago.)

The dependent variables in the regression are calculated from either EmpS or HiraS (for employment and hires respectively), and the dependent variables are correspondingly EarnS or EarnHiraS. We use the education category corresponding to a “BA or more” to calculate college-educated shares of employment and hires, and we exclude workers aged 24 or under since QWI does not report education attainment for that age group. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

The raw data and the Python script we used to clean and reshape the raw data are available at Equitable Growth’s GitHub.

Martin Wolf and I See the Odds on the Different Future Chinas Somewhat Differently

Martin Wolf calls himself a long-run China optimist–that China is more likely than not following the Korean road, is now where Korea was in the early 1980s, and:

South Korea’s real GDP per head has since nearly quadrupled in real terms, to reach almost 70 per cent of US levels. If China became as rich as Korea, its economy would be bigger than those of the US and Europe combined…

Last week for the Huffington Post I gave my case for China pessimism: that what Japan, Korea, Spain–even Singapore–demonstrate is that escaping the middle-income trap requires institutional convergence to the North Atlantic to generate education and flexibility and to greatly reduce the burdens of corruption and of one-party ossification as nobody dares tell those at the top what a further round of economic growth requires.

The point for Martin’s relative optimism is that I have now been wrong about China’s future for a quarter of a century straight. It has, indeed, astonished the world.

Nevertheless, I cannot help but think that Brazil or Chile–or in the best case Greece–is the image of China’s future. And that is, relative to where China was in 1975, a very, very bright future indeed. It is just not the future that makes the second half of the twenty-first century the Chinese future. And it is not the future the people of China are worthy of:

Martin Wolf: China risks an economic discontinuity: “The important economic fact about China is its past achievements…

…Gross domestic product… from 3 per cent of US levels to some 25 per cent…. This transformation is no statistical artefact. It is visible on the ground. The only ‘large’(bigger than city state) economies, without valuable natural resources, to achieve something like this since the second world war are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. Yet, relative to US levels, China’s GDP per head is where South Korea’s was in the mid-1980s. South Korea’s real GDP per head has since nearly quadrupled in real terms, to reach almost 70 per cent of US levels…. This is a case for long-run optimism. Against it is the caveat that ‘past performance is no guarantee of future performance’. Growth rates usually revert to the global mean. If China continued fast catch-up growth over the next generation it would be an extreme outlier….

‘Discontinuities’… as in Brazil in the 1980s or Japan in the 1990s?… The core argument for a discontinuity is that it is hard to move smoothly from an unsustainable path. The risk is that the economy slows much faster than almost anybody now expects…. The best approach would be to continue with reforms, while trying to put more spending power into the hands of consumers and investing more in public consumption and environmental improvements…. Moreover, the challenge is not only, or even mainly, technical. A big question is whether a market-driven economy is compatible with the growing concentration of political power. The next stage for China’s economy is a conundrum. Its resolution will shape the world.

Schedules that work for families and the U.S. economy

Anyone who has a job knows that the key feature of work is giving someone else control of your time. For some of us, this is a straightforward process. The boss says our hours are nine-to-five, five days a week—end of story. But for millions of workers, selling their time to employers isn’t so simple. Many people have unpredictable schedules, both in terms of when they work and for how long.

About four in ten young workers ages 26 to 32 know their schedule a week or less in advance, according to data from the University of Chicago’s psychology professor Susan J. Lambert, sociologist Peter J. Fugiel, and psychologist Julia R. Henly. For many workers, it’s not just not knowing their schedule, but also being available on short notice—and, if not, then quite possibly having no job at all.

This used to be the case uniformly at the giant clothing retailer The Gap, Inc. Last week, however, the company announced it is changing the way it schedules its employees in stores for all five of their brands: Athleta, Banana Republic, Gap, Intermix, and Old Navy. Employees will no longer have to be available for last-minute shifts. Instead, employees will get their schedule at least 10 days—and in some cases, 14 days—in advance of their shifts.

The Gap made its decision to eliminate on-call scheduling and to give a 10- to 14-day notice of schedules based on a number of factors. But one telling reason was this—The Gap has been working with two of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s 2014 grantees, Joan Williams at the Center for WorkLife Law and UC Hastings College of The Law and The University of Chicago’s Lambert. The two scholars are leading the Stable Schedules for Hourly Workers Pilot at The Gap, which began with a Preliminary Pilot that tested out two weeks’ advance notice, elimination of on calls, and several other changes to existing scheduling practices in three GAP stores in the San Francisco area.

Equitable Growth provided funding for this expanded pilot work in our 2015 grantgiving cycle. Over the next 18 months Williams and Lambert will conduct a full pilot study in roughly 30 Gap stores, implementing additional scheduling changes designed to provide more schedule stability for workers while meeting business goals of the company.

The Gap, like many retailers, had been using “just-in-time” scheduling because they thought it was saving them money. Today’s advanced computer technology allows firms to craft sophisticated software algorithms that monitor store traffic. A decade or two ago, store managers had little more than basic insights into customer traffic—whether it’s snowing outside or whether it’s the 4th of July—but now they can program in much wider array of factors. This means store managers can schedule employees to be at work only when they have sufficient customers—or so the theory goes.

There are two problems with this theory. First, just-in-time schedules create havoc in the lives of employees and their families. And second, there’s emerging evidence that it doesn’t even boost the bottom line of businesses.

First the workers and their families. Lack of notice limits the rest of life. Too many workers never know their schedules and cannot afford to turn down work when offered to them. It’s not just that they cannot live without the income from that shift; their bosses may not give them shifts, or possibly even fire them if they complain.

But it seems that just-in-time scheduling isn’t good for firms, either. We won’t know for a while the results of the study by Williams and Lambert, but The Gap apparently finds the early evidence compelling. And we know that other firms are taking a second look at their scheduling practices as well. To take just one example: In 2007, Wal-Mart was one of the first retailers to implement just-in-time scheduling. But, in February 2015, they announced a change in policy. Come 2016, employees will know their schedule two-and-a-half weeks in advance, and they will be able to have some input on when they work. Some employees will even get a fixed schedule.

Maybe the days of just-in-time scheduling are numbered. There’s lots of evidence that schedules that work for employees can be very good for firms—and for the economy more generally—and maybe this is something U.S. businesses are finally seeing for themselves.