Fall 2015 BPEA Th 3:00 PM: Boldin and Wright: I still find myself confused as to the extent to which weather-induced adverse supply shocks are permanent losses, are super-losses in that they disrupt something called “momentum”, or are merely shifts as activity that would have been carried out during a snowstorm is shifted to later in the year. I clearly need more guidance as to how to think about this…
Must-Read: Larry Summers: “If there’s one thing that characterizes our politics now…
Must-Read: “If there’s one thing that characterizes our politics now, it is a sense amongst almost everyone in the middle class…
:…that there’s someone who speaks for everybody except for them. Traditionally in America, the people who spoke for the broad middle class were the union movement. And if they are able to speak with less force because they have fewer members, if they are pushed towards the margins, the damage done at each employment unit is the smaller part of the damage. The larger part of the damage is what it does to our broad political dialogue…
Fall 2015 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity Weblogging: Greece: Schumacher and Weder di Mauro
Fall 2015 BPEA Th 1:00 PM: Schumacher and Weder di Mauro’s paper, “Diagnosing Greek Debt Sustainability: Why Is It so Hard?”, confuses me. It is not at all clear to me what “sustainable” or “less than 20% chance of debt-distress” really mean–as, indeed, it has become a term a political art rather than one of economic analysis.
Moreover, the interest-rate configuration now is so weird that I do not see how debt sustainability benchmarks constructed for what we used to see as normal times can be useful.
The German ten-year bund rate has been below the eurozone’s inflation target for more than four years now. The U.S. thirty-year Treasury rate has been below projected U.S. nominal GDP growth for more than eight years now. It is usually the case that, as the late Michael Mussa used to say, debt sustainability analyses are of the nature of: “if… if… if… as they would say where I grew up: ‘if my grandmother had wheels, she would be a bus’.” That is overwhelmingly the case now.
So I think we need to go back to basics. Rather than picking up sustainability benchmarks built for a different global macroeconomic situation. I want to see what is assumed with respect to:
- what the yield premium over the German benchmark is.
- when the German benchmark is expected to normalize.
- what the German benchmark is expected to normalize to.
- how fast the real principal is expected to be paid down.
- what share of GDP can be expected to be devoted to debt service and amortization.
Fall 2015 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity Weblogging: Greece: Reinhart and Trebesch
Fall 2015 BPEA Th 1:00 PM: Reinhart and Trebesch: I note the statement that:
external creditors fared rather benignly in Greece, despite the many years of default. The real ex-post returns on the defaulted bonds were in the range of +1% to +5%, despite the losses due to haircuts and arrears… partly the result of the high yields… but also because partial debt service continued even in severe crisis years…
That seems to explain why people lend to Greece–that when the crisis comes, they have enough control to squeeze the lemon hard, whatever the excess burden of the taxes imposed and its cost for the Greeks.
Are the lessons: (a) a country should not borrow in a currency it cannot print, and (b) a country should not let its firms borrow in a currency it cannot print because private debt will be turned into public debt in a crisis?
It does make me wonder: what would have been the macroeconomic consequences for Texas in the early 1990s had the federal government insisted that Texas reimburse the RTC for payments made by the RTC to depositors in Texas S&Ls?
Fall 2015 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity Weblogging: Greece: Ioannides and Pissarides
Fall 2015 BPEA Th 4:30 PM: Ioannides and Pissarides seem to me to provide yet one more argument that the right policy in 2010 was Grexit so that external balance could be achieved via depreciation–that given structural impediments to productivity growth and the predictable consequences of austerity and internal deflation, nothing else had a chance of working.
So what was the plan and expectation back in 2010?
Fall 2015 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity Weblogging: House and Tesar on Greece
Fall 2015 BPEA 1:00 PM Th: I read House and Tesar. They say that attempting a 4%-point increase in government revenue as a share of GDP in Greece may well push you over the top of the Laffer curve:
We consider spending reductions or tax increases sufficient to generate an average flow increase in the primary balance of one percent of 2014 GDP… a quarter of the repayment required to fully meet the stream of debt payments…. We do not push the model to generate the full 4 percent increase in the primary balance as a share of 2014 GDP…. Policy shifts that satisfy (or attempt to satisfy) the full 4 percent increase could push capital and labor taxes into the downward sloping portions of the Laffer curve…
Does it not follow immediately that the excess burdens of a 1%-point increase are overwhelmingly large? It then follows that any tax increases at all are inadvisable. Thus the only policies that might possibly be advisable are those that cut spending.
Thus, if I were to set out to write House and Tesar’s paper, it would consist of that one paragraph–that Greece is near the top of the Laffer Curve, hence what it urgently does not need is any tax increases.
Then would come fifteen pages documenting this claim on which all else depends: that Greece is near the top of the Laffer Curve. Yet those fifteen pages are missing. Instead, we have fifteen pages confirming that when you are near the top of the Laffer Curve raising taxes for any purpose is a really bad idea.
Do we think Greece is near the top of the Laffer Curve? Why do we think that Greece is near the top of the Laffer Curve?
The intellectual history of the minimum wage and overtime
The rapid growth of the “Fight for $15” minimum wage movement and President Barack Obama’s changes to overtime regulations have sparked new rounds of debate over the economic consequences of an increased overtime pay threshold and a higher minimum wage. Advocates of overtime and wage hikes argue these policies protect workers from exploitation and improve job quality. Opponents insist these regulations will hurt workers in the long run, as they will inflict a burden on companies that will be forced to cut jobs. These concerns are nothing new—this debate dates back to the early 20th century, before the minimum wage even existed in the United States and when overtime pay was unheard of.
At the end of the 19th century, economists such as John Bates Clark preached that markets, if left to their own devices, would function at equilibrium levels with the best possible distribution of resources. Rapid industrialization created the Gilded Age of American wealth, and people credited the free market with their increased prosperity. But along with increasing growth, industrialization also sharpened economic inequalities and made certain groups particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Debates over hour and wage limits focused on which groups required labor protections and the best mechanisms for protecting these groups.
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Labor regulations began in the 1890s as state-level maximum hour and minimum wage protections, which the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly struck down. Federal standards were not created until four decades later, when president Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, guided the Federal Labor Standards Act into law. (See Figure 1). This issue brief details the arguments that shaped hour and wage limits in the early 20th century.
Figure 1
Women’s maximum hours
U.S. legal historians usually describe the beginning of the 20th century as the “Lochner Era,” a 32-year period characterized by the Supreme Court’s attempt to protect the free market through its constant repeal of labor laws. The Supreme Court actually was discriminatory in its protection of the free market—although it consistently blocked labor laws that applied to men, the high court allowed restrictions on women’s employment. The Supreme Court passed distinct rulings for men and women by emphasizing different doctrines for the two sexes. For men, the court consistently upheld freedom of contract; for women, the court privileged police powers.
The Supreme Court’s gender discrimination began with cases concerning maximum hour limits. In Lochner v New York (1905), the namesake of the Lochner Era, the court justified its decision to strike down the 1895 Bakeshop Act—which placed hour limits on New York bakers—with the freedom of contract doctrine. Freedom of contract comes from the due process clause of the Constitution, which says that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” At the time, justices interpreted due process to mean that individuals should be free from restraint except to guarantee the same freedoms to others, and that government could not restrict people’s ability to acquire future property. Limiting the hours that New York bakers worked, proponents argued, took away their liberty to choose the terms of their employment and limited the money they could earn, so maximum hour laws violated freedom of contract.
Just three years later, the Supreme Court set a different standard for women. In Muller v Oregon (1908), it upheld a 1903 Oregon law that prohibited women from working more than 10 hours a day. The court argued that women’s freedom to contract was superseded by the police powers doctrine, which allows government regulation for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morality, and the general welfare of the public. The court found that “as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical wellbeing of woman is an object of public interest.” In other words, protecting women’s reproductive health was more important than respecting their freedom to contract. Women were also seen as fragile, vulnerable, and lacking the skills necessary to effectively bargain for wages and working conditions, and therefore unable to exercise their freedom of contract. These sex-specific discussions about government-imposed hour limits set the stage for a new conversation: the passage of state minimum wages.
Women’s minimum wages
In 1912, Massachusetts became the first state to pass a minimum wage law that applied only to women and children. Thirteen more states (along with DC and Puerto Rico) followed in the next 11 years. These legislatures passed a patchwork of legislation with a range of wage limits and enforcement mechanisms. States such as Massachusetts created wage commissions to determine industry-specific minimum wages and enforced standards through public shaming, publishing the names of companies that did not comply with the regulations. In contrast, states such as Arkansas set two cross-industry minimum wages for women: experienced women were paid $1.25 a day while inexperienced women only got $1.
The police powers doctrine justified minimum wages for women, but said nothing about how they affected industries. To justify minimum wages on the industry side, academics used the parasitic industries argument. Originally developed by the British economists Beatrice and Sidney Webbs in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the parasitic industries argument says that businesses who focused on short-term profit maximization instead of long-term efficiency tend to pay workers unlivable wages. Workers receiving these sweatshop wages become a burden to society, since they have to rely on charity or other family members for subsistence. To fix the problem, companies have to either amend their practices to consider the long-term welfare of the company and the workers, or exit the market.
Women’s minimum wage laws grew out of gender norms supporting women’s protection, but at the same time, racial biases led to laws that neglected women of color. Because minimum wage legislation was usually industry-specific, industries such as domestic work, agriculture, retail, and laundry—all dominated by African American workers—were often excluded from regulation. One case in point: The Wage Board in the District of Columbia set a weekly rate for laundry workers that was $1 lower than the across-the-board minimum adequate weekly wage of $16 it has previously chosen. The board explained that since 90 percent of laundry workers were African American, “the lower rate was due to a crystallization by the conference of the popular belief that it cost colored people less to live than white.” By not extending equal minimum wage protections to African American women, minimum wage laws reinforced their lower economic status.
In the next decade, legal changes in women’s status, paired with the economic optimism of the Roaring Twenties, brought a big shift in minimum wage legislation. Ratified in 1920, the 19th Amendment granted Women’s Suffrage. Shortly after, in a victory for more equal gender standards but a loss for labor protections, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that struck down women’s minimum wage laws across the country. In Adkins v Children’s Hospital (1923), the court overturned the 1918 law that created D.C.’s Wage Board, which had set minimum wages for women employed in laundries and food-serving establishments. Reasoning that women were now politically empowered to advocate for themselves in the free market, the Court privileged freedom of contract over police powers and nullified minimum wage laws in the United States.
This optimism about the competitiveness of the free market did not last long. Once the Great Depression hit, people lost faith in the fairness of the U.S. economy. The failure of the banks cultivated distrust of large corporations. People were afraid that business concentration hurt competition and created unfair trusts. The new popular economic narrative of economists such as Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain said that imperfect and monopolistic competition dominated the market. This unfair competition gave businesses a huge advantage, which they used to exploit labor. Public opinion shifted toward seeing government intervention not as redistribution but rather as reestablishing a competitive market.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
In this rapidly shifting political and economic climate Franklin D. Roosevelt won the 1932 elections and appointed Frances Perkins as his Secretary of Labor. With decades of experience advocating for labor rights as a social worker and later as Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor when the future president was governor of New York, Perkins accepted the federal cabinet office on the condition that Roosevelt would commit to supporting her reform platform, which included hour limits and minimum wages for both women and men. Perkins’ platform originally appeared in the National Industrial Recovery Act, which tried to improve working conditions through voluntary industrial participation. Under the proposed law, industries would be able to form alliances, which previously violated anti-trust laws, if they complied with maximum hour and minimum wage standards. In return, participating companies could display a Blue Eagle emblem in their stores, brandishing their patriotism and commitment to post-Great Depression recovery. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States (1935), however, the Supreme Court struck down the law, drawing the ire of Roosevelt and forcing Perkins to find a new way to pass labor reform.
Out of growing frustration with the Supreme Court’s challenges to his policies, Roosevelt came up with a plan to pack the court. He set off a campaign to reform the Supreme Court so he could appoint additional members to the court who would vote in line with his New Deal reforms. Faced with this existential threat and greater public support for labor laws, in 1937 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Washington state’s minimum wage law for women in West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish. The court’s ruling de-emphasized the freedom of contract, reversing its 1923 decision and opening the door for future minimum wage legislation.
Following the Supreme Court decision, Perkins and Roosevelt sent a maximum hour and minimum wage bill to Congress. The original draft of the bill had called for industry-specific, regionally variant minimum wages to account for regional differences in prices and cost of living. As the bill made its way through Congress, two more opposition groups emerged: unions and northern industries. Unions feared that government-imposed wage and hour restrictions would undermine their influence in collective bargaining. Northern industries opposed regionally specific wages for fear that industries would follow the cheap labor south. To appease these two groups, Roosevelt and his Democratic allies in Congress tweaked the bill to make it more popular. Roosevelt appeased the unionists’ fears in his State of the Union address by emphasizing that more desirable wages should continue to be the responsibility of collective bargaining. Lawmakers suggested a national minimum wage to satisfy northerners, but set the wage low enough to appease southerners.
In its final form, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 mandated a 44-hour workweek, scheduled to decrease to 40 hours in three years, with time-and-a-half overtime wages. The new law also created a minimum wage of 25 cents an hour, set to increase by 5 cents a year to reach 40 cents an hour by 1945. The original law was not universal. It included exemptions for agricultural, domestic, and some union-covered industries—once again, mostly industries dominated by African Americans. Since the law lacked a mechanism for automatically increasing wages beyond 1945, it has been updated over the decades to increase wages and broaden industry (and racial) coverage. In the most recent revision to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 2009, the federal minimum wage was increased to $7.25 an hour.
Conclusion
The intellectual history of maximum hours and minimum wages is a story of debates over which groups should be protected from exploitation and what form this protection should take. Concerns over women’s health, ambivalence toward African American rights, and advocating for unorganized workers dominated the debate at different points. As social views changed, so did economic policies. Today, women account for two-thirds of minimum wage earners and people of color account for two-fifths. Studying the history of the minimum wage should compel policymakers to question how social priorities influence different groups, who is considered worthy of protection, and to what extent their welfare is considered. By implementing effective maximum hour and minimum wage regulations, policymakers can protect vulnerable workers’ standard of living to encourage productivity, push companies to increase their efficiency, and consequently cultivate long-term equitable growth.
-Oya Aktas is a Summer 2015 intern for the Washington Center for Equitable Growth
Pre-k national demo
A snapshot of the long-term impacts of universal prekindergarten
If the United States were to invest in a public, voluntary, high-quality universal prekindergarten program starting in 2016, what would its impacts be over time? Toggle between the buttons to visualize the different impacts of universal prekindergarten programs across the U.S. or click on a state to learn more about the program in that state.
This study looks to quantify the long-term benefits and costs of investing in a high-quality universal prekindergarten available to all three- and four-year olds across the United States. But before delving into the report, use the interactives below to explore how a universal prekindergarten would affect the nation or even your state. Currently, across the United States, only 17 percent of three- and four-year-olds (1,336,695 children) participate in state-sponsored prekindergarten, and another 38 percent attend Head Start or private preschool. Unfortunately, the quality of these programs varies significantly across and even within states, which means that preschoolers do not always experience the same benefits or long-term effects. If a universal program were enacted and fully phased in by 2017, 86 percent of three- and four-year-olds (6,960,916 children) would be enrolled in prekindergarten, benefiting from a high-quality early childhood education. Research has established that high-quality prekindergarten education can generate significant long-run benefits for program participants, their families, and even other non-participants. For example, longitudinal studies have shown that, aside from improved educational achievement, children who have attended a prekindergarten program have spent less time in special education and had lower grade retention rates. Program participants also experience less child maltreatment and reduced crime, smoking, and depression rates. In addition, both participants and their parents have higher projected earnings, which subsequently increases government tax revenue. If a universal prekindergarten program were to start in 2016, by 2050, there would be over $304 billion in total benefits for the U.S. In 2050, that amounts to savings of $748.51 per capita. How do these total benefits break down? $200.41 per person is attributed to savings to government, $281.81 per person comes from increased compensation, and $266.27 is accounted for by savings to each individual from better health and less crime. Currently, the U.S. spends an average of $45 per capita per year on preschool programs, special education services, and Head Start. In 2017, when a universal prekindergarten program is fully phased in, it would take an investment of $79 more per capita per year to maintain a high-quality prekindergarten program. There are three main costs associated with a high-quality universal prekindergarten program: the cost of the program, increased high school attendance, and increased college attendance. The program itself is based on Chicago’s comprehensive high-quality Child Parent Center half day program, and thus, the costs take into account the multitude of services that are provided at the Child Parent Center offset by the current spending on similar early childhood education programs as to not double count expenditures. Because studies have shown that students who attend prekindergarten have higher high school completion rates and are more likely to attend college, these usage costs are also factored into the total cost of a universal prekindergarten program. In 2050, these costs add up to $35 billion, or $84.54 per capita. $74.27 per capita is attributed to program costs, $2.35 comes from increased high school usage per person, and the remaining $7.92 per person is accounted for by increased college attendance. If a high-quality universal prekindergarten program were to start in 2016 and be fully phased in by the end of 2017, the program would require $26 billion in additional taxpayer dollars. Over time, the cost would eventually grow to include the cost of additional high school and college usage. But in just 8 years, by 2024, the benefits of the program would outstrip the costs. By 2050, there would be more than $304 billion in total benefits compared to merely $35 billion in total costs, yielding net benefits of $270 billion. By 2050, for every dollar invested in a universal program, there would be $8.9 in returns. Must-Read: The Divergence Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Pay: Why It Matters and Why It’s Real: ”Our work has been widely cited… …It has also attracted criticisms from those looking to deny the facts of inequality…. The data series and methods we use to construct our graph of the growing gap between productivity and typical worker pay best capture how income generated in an average hour of work in the U.S. economy has not trickled down to raise hourly pay for typical workers…. There are three important “wedges”… an overall shift in how much of the income in the economy is received by workers… the growing inequality [within] compensation… faster price growth of things workers buy relative to the price of what they produce…. Over the entire 1973 to 2014 period, over half (58.9 percent) of the growth of the productivity–median compensation gap was due to increased compensation inequality and about a tenth (11.5 percent) was due to a loss in labor’s income share. Less than a third (29.6 percent) of the gap was driven by price differences…. Gains to owners of capital and the improved bargaining position of capital owners are not adequately captured by this analysis of the wedges between productivity and median compensation… a wedge between pay and productivity caused by the improved bargaining position of capital owners… would likely be larger than the wedge made up of the loss of labor’s share of income in net domestic product… Must-Read: As I see it, John Maynard Keynes was right when he wrote that “good, or even competent, economists are the rarest of birds. An easy subject, at which very few excel!” The problem is that a good economist needs to be able to: Economists vs. Economics: “Navigating among economic models–choosing which one will work better… …is considerably more difficult than choosing the right map. Practitioners use a variety of formal and informal empirical methods with varying skill. And, in my forthcoming book Economics Rules, I criticize economics training for not properly equipping students for the empirical diagnostics that the discipline requires. But the profession’s internal critics are wrong to claim that the discipline has gone wrong because economists have yet to reach consensus on the ‘correct’ models (their preferred ones of course). Let us cherish economics in all its diversity–rational and behavioral, Keynesian and Classical, first-best and second-best, orthodox and heterodox–and devote our energy to becoming wiser at picking which framework to apply when.
Who would participate?
What are the benefits?
What are the costs?
How do the benefits compare to the costs?
How do the impacts compare across states?
Must-Read: Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel: The Divergence Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Pay: Why It Matters and Why It’s Real
Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: Economists vs. Economics