Must-Read: Charles Bean: Causes and Consequences of Persistently Low Interest Rates

Must-Read: So what is the argument against shifting the monetary-policy target to 4%/year PCE inflation or 6%/year nominal GDP growth again? I mean, Larry Summers and I wrote 23 years ago that the danger of hitting the zero lower bound made it potentially unwise to aim to push inflation much below 5%/year–and that was when we expected both a small equity risk premium–hence Treasury rates not far below the return on physical investment–and not a global savings glut but rather a global savings shortfall:

Charles Bean: Causes and Consequences of Persistently Low Interest Rates: “Demographic developments… the partial integration of China…

…and the associated capital outflows…. a lower propensity to invest… as a result of heightened risk aversion…. Rates should eventually return to more normal levels…. But… the time scale… is highly uncertain and will be influenced by longer-term fiscal and structural policy choices…. With current inflation targets of around 2%, episodes where policy rates are constrained by their lower bound are likely to become more frequent and prolonged… how easy it is in such circumstances to slip into a deflationary trap–and how difficult it can be to escape it….

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Lunch with the FT: Ben Bernanke

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Lunch with the FT: Ben Bernanke: “‘The notion that the Fed has somehow enriched the rich…

…through increasing asset prices doesn’t really hold up…. The Fed basically has returned asset prices… to trend… [and] stock prices are high… because returns are low…. The same people who criticise the Fed for helping the rich also criticise the Fed for hurting savers…. Those two… are inconsistent….

‘Should the Fed not try to support a recovery?… If people are unhappy with the effects of low interest rates, they should pressure Congress… and so have a less unbalanced monetary-fiscal policy mix. This is the fourth or fifth argument against quantitative easing after all the other ones have been proven to be wrong….’ Other critics argue, I note, that the Fed’s intervention prevented the cathartic effects of a proper depression. He… respond[s]… that I have a remarkable ability to keep a straight face while recounting… crazy opinions…. ‘We were quite confident from the beginning there would be no inflation problem…. As for… the Andrew Mellon [US Treasury secretary] argument from the 1930s… certainly among mainstream economists, it has no credibility. A Great Depression is not going to promote innovation, growth and prosperity.’ I cannot disagree, since I also consider such arguments mad….

Does… blame… lie in pre-crisis monetary policy… interest rates… too low… in the early 2000s?… ‘Serious studies that look at it don’t find that to be the case…. Shiller… has a lot of credibility…. The Fed had some complicity… in not constraining the bad mortgage lending… [and] the structural vulnerabilities in the funding markets….’ Thus, lax regulation…. Has the problem been fixed?… ‘It’s an ongoing project…. You can’t hope to identify all the vulnerabilities in advance. And so anything you can do to make the system more resilient is going to be helpful.’… I push a little harder on the costs of financial liberalisation. He agrees that, in light of the economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘I don’t think you could rule out the possibility that a more repressed financial system would give you a better trade-off of safety and dynamism.’ What about the idea that if the central banks are going to expand their balance sheets so much, it would be more effective just to hand the money directly over to the people rather than operate via asset markets?… A combination of tax cuts and quantitative easing is very close to being the same thing.’ This is theoretically correct, provided the QE is deemed permanent…

Must-Read: Kevin Drum: Red States Spent $2 Billion in 2015 to S—- the Poor

Must-Read: Nobody is saying anymore that states’ rejecting Medicaid expansion is a way of raising the chances of repealing-and-replacing ObamaCare with something better. Only true dead-enders–cough, Michael F. Cannon–are claiming that Medicaid is ineffective. And more and more evidence piles up that Medicaid expansion lowers rather than raising state-level health spending even in the short run. The remarkable thing is that the anti-Medicaid expansion zombies just keep on going–and it’s not just the poor, it’s the disabled, it’s the elderly whom Medicare copays have made poor, and its the hospitals and doctors and nurses who treat the poor:

Kevin Drum: Red States Spent $2 Billion in 2015 to S—- the Poor: “In 2015… spending by states that refused to expand Medicaid…

…grew by 6.9 percent. That’s pretty close to the historical average. However, spending by states that accepted Medicaid expansion grew by only 3.4 percent. Obamacare may have increased total Medicaid enrollment and spending, but the feds picked up most of the tab. At the state level, it actually reined in the rate of growth…. The states that have refused the expansion are… willing to shell out money just to demonstrate their implacable hatred of Obamacare. How much money? Well, the expansion-refusing states spent $61 billion of their own money on Medicaid in 2014. If that had grown at 3.4 percent instead of 6.9 percent, they would have saved about $2 billion this year… denying health care to the needy and paying about $2 billion for the privilege. Try to comprehend the kind of people who do this….

The residents of every state pay taxes to fund Obamacare, whether they like it or not. Residents of the states that refuse to expand Medicaid are paying… Obamacare taxes… about $20 billion of that is for Medicaid expansion…. So they’re willing to let $20 billion go down a black hole and pay $2 billion extra [a year] in order to prevent Obamacare from helping the needy. It’s hard to fathom, isn’t it?

Noted for Lunchtime on October 26, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Matt O’Brien: Europe Just Made It Harder for the Fed to Raise Rates

Matt O’Brien: Europe Just Made It Harder for the Fed to Raise Rates: “Europe is going to have zero interest rates for a lot longer…

…that is going to make it harder for the United States to stop having them…. The ECB seems set to do something at its December meeting to try to prevent the emerging market slowdown from spilling over into Europe and get inflation moving back up toward its 2 percent target. It that sounds familiar, that’s because it is. Those are the same problems the U.S. has now. But instead of thinking about new ways to stimulate the economy, the Federal Reserve is getting ready to do less. Why? Well, unemployment is half as high here as it is in Europe, so there should be more upward pressure on inflation. Look at that last sentence again, though. That’s a lot of faith to put in one of the most dangerous words in the English language–should–when the cost of being wrong is so high. Indeed, inflation isn’t increasing at all now even though unemployment is down to a pretty normal level….

Consider this: according to Goldman Sachs, just talking about raising rates has already tightened financial conditions as if the Fed had actually raised them around three times. And that was when the ECB was only buying 60 billion euros of bonds a month. It’d be even more of a problem if it was buying more…. If two monetary policies diverge even more in, well, not a wood, we might take the path every other country that has tried to raise rates from zero has traveled by–back to where we started.


Katie Martin: Dovish Mario Draghi sends bond yields to new lows: “Yields on two-year debt now stand below zero for almost every member of the eurozone…

…Investors have been piling into eurozone debt since a press conference on Thursday at which ECB president Mario Draghi suggested further cuts to the deposit rate could be on the way. The deposit rate already stands at minus 0.2 per cent…. The ECB has already been buying an average of €60bn a month since March, mostly in government bonds, and intends to continue that programme until at least September next year. But investors now think the programme could last longer, encompass more instruments or grow in size…. Economists think the euro weakness that would inevitably accompany a fresh bout of easing from the ECB will create headaches for other central banks in the region.
Swedish bank SEB wrote on Friday that the prospect of further easing is ‘a nightmare’ for the Riksbank, which already has interest rates at rock bottom to try and support inflation. Renewed strength in the krona, the flip side of weakness in the euro, would probably depress consumer prices still further.

How tax expenditures distort our understanding of the U.S. tax code

Photo of tax payment by GStudio Group, veer.com

There are certainly good reasons to subsidize the adoption of electric cars. And there are certainly a number of ways to effectively push consumers to move into the electric market. But using a tax break originally designed to encourage farmers to invest in large equipment to now encourage people to buy a Tesla Model X probably isn’t one of them. The benefit from this tax break will almost certainly go to the wealthy individuals who were already going to buy these cars in the first place. This story is just an exaggerated example of some of the many problems with the number of loopholes and deductions in the U.S. tax code.

A recent piece by Politico tax reporter Katy O’Donnell details one of the issues with tax deductions: They are a shadow budget because the spending doesn’t show up on the official U.S. budget. Deductions are often called “tax expenditures” because specific tax breaks act very much like government spending. Consider the mortgage interest tax deduction: In practice, the tax break acts like giving money to a taxpayer with a mortgage, with the amount of the payment depending on the mortgage’s size.

Despite acting like spending, tax expenditures aren’t registered on the U.S. federal budget like the rest of spending. So while the rest of the spending in the budget gets voted on every year, most tax expenditures roll on unaccounted for. If you want to see how much the federal government has spent since 1789, for example, that data is easily available and downloadable on the Office of Management and Budget website. Finding the amount of spending through the tax code for just the last two years, however, requires finding a PDF squirreled away on a separate page.

But the general public doesn’t seem to miss the number of loopholes and deductions. Around tax time, looking at the number of potential deductions you might qualify for can be daunting. Or, perhaps, it makes you wonder who exactly is taking advantage of these loopholes. In an opinion piece for Morning Consult, Vanessa Williamson of the Brookings Institution and Andrea Louise Campbell of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology note how a number of people they interviewed about the tax code believed that they were missing out on the benefits of deductions and credits while the rich were raking it in. Interestingly, this is why many of them supported a flat tax. They thought the elimination of loopholes would result in the rich paying a higher share of their income.

These people’s intuitions about the incidence of tax expenditures are correct—the benefits of spending through the tax code go disproportionately to high-income taxpayers. But the overall distributional effects of a flat tax would be overwhelmingly regressive. Tax reform that streamlines these breaks but keeps a progressive structure would end up meeting the criteria of the taxpayers that Williamson and Campbell interviewed.

So not only are tax expenditures inefficient and inequitable, but they are also opaque. They give a misleading picture of the actual amount of federal government spending, and they make taxpayers question the structure of the code itself. The case against tax expenditures only continues to get stronger.

Noted for the Afternoon of October 25, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Charles Bean: Causes and Consequences of Persistently Low Interest Rates

Must-Read: So: On the one hand, risk tolerance is disappointingly and inappropriately low–but should return to normal some day. On the other hand, investors are “reaching for yield” and taking inappropriate risks by crowding into bubbly assets. I cannot be the only person who wants a real model of how this is supposed to work, and real evidence that it is a factor at work, plus a real argument that higher interest rates would exert enough of a curb to pass some reasonable benefit-cost test. The very sharp Gabriel Chodorow-Reich looked for this and did not find it…

Charles Bean: Causes and Consequences of Persistently Low Interest Rates: “Demographic developments… the partial integration of China…

…and the associated capital outflows…. a lower propensity to invest… as a result of heightened risk aversion…. Rates should eventually return to more normal levels…. But… the time scale… is highly uncertain and will be influenced by longer-term fiscal and structural policy choices…. A world of persistently low interest rates may be more prone to generating a leveraged ‘reach for yield’ by investors and speculative asset-price boom-busts. While prudential policies should be the first line of defence against such financial stability risks, their efficacy is by no means assured. In that case, monetary policy may need to come into play as a last line of defence…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Scam They Am

Scam They Am The New York Times

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Scam They Am: “Eric Lipton and Jennifer Steinhauer… find that the…

[Tea Party] PACs… [of] the Freedom Fraud caucus are basically in it for the money… consultants’ fees… paid to the… people organizing the drives…. As Rick Perlstein pointed out several years ago, the modern conservative movement is in large part a ‘strategic alliance of snake-oil vendors and conservative true believers’ with ‘a cast of mind that makes it hard for either them or us to discern where the ideological con ended and the money con began.’… Goldbuggism, for example, is intimately tied to direct-marketing schemes for gold coins and gold certificates…. The American Seniors Association… bills itself as a conservative… AARP… [but] is a for-profit enterprise whose goal is to sell me insurance. And so on. This is surely a[n]… important part of our political story…. Obama- and Hillary-hatred… much of it is generated by scammers out to make a buck off the racism and misogyny of some–sad to say, fairly many–older white men.

The two classic readings on this are: Rick Perlstein**: [The Long Con](http://thebaffler.com/salvos/the-long-con); **David Frum**: [The Fox News Wink](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/08/fox-news-email-chains.html). It is an attempt to identify those Americans with the very-poorest reality testing and mobilize them politically–but only tertiarily to get them to vote. The primary objective is to scam them directly. The secondary objective is to terrify them, and so keep their eyeballs glued so that they can be sold to advertisers.

Central Banks Are Not Agricultural Marketing Boards: Depression Economics, Inflation Economics and the Unsustainability of Friedmanism

Central Banks Are Not Agricultural Marketing Boards: Depression Economics, Inflation Economics and the Unsustainability of Friedmanism

Insofar as there is any thought behind the claims of John Taylor and others that the Federal Reserve is engaged in “price controls” via its monetary policy actions.

Strike that.

There is no thought at all behind such claims at all.

Insofar as one did want to think, and so construct an argument that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy operations are destructive and in some ways analogous to “price controls”, the argument would go something like this:

The Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee’s operations are like those of an agriculture marketing board–a government agency that sets the price for, say, some agricultural product like butter or milk. Some of what is offered for sale at that price that is not taken up by the private market, and the rest is bought by the government to keep the price at its target. And the next month the government finds it must buy more. And more. And more.

Such policies produce excess supplies that then must be stored or destroyed: they produce butter mountains, and milk lakes.

The resources used to produce the butter mountains and milk lakes is wasted–it could be deployed elsewhere more productively. The taxes that must be raised to pay for the purchase of the butter and milk that makes up the mountains and the lakes discourages enterprise and employment elsewhere in the economy, and makes us poorer. Taxes are raised (at the cost of an excess burden on taxpayers) and then spent to take the products of the skill and energy of workers and… throw them away. Much better, the standard argument goes, to eliminate the marketing board, let the price find its free-market equilibrium value, provide incentives for people to move out of the production of dairy products into sectors where private demand for their work exists, and keep taxes low.

Now you can see that a central bank is exactly like an agricultural marketing board, except for the following little minor details:

  1. An agricultural marketing board must impose taxes to raise the money finance its purchases of butter and milk. A central bank simply prints–at zero cost–the money to finance its purchase of bonds.
  2. The butter mountains and milk lakes that the agricultural marketing board owns cannot be sold without pushing the price down below its free-market equilibrium and thus negating the purpose of the board. A central bank does not want to sell its bond mountains, but merely to collect interest and hold them to maturity, at which point they are simply money mountains.
  3. The butter mountains and milk lakes are useless for the agricultural marketing board: all it can do with them is simply watch them rot away. The bond mountain turns into a money mountain–seigniorage–which the central bank then gives to the government, which lowers taxes as a result.

So a central bank is exactly like an agricultural marketing board–NOT!!! They are identical–except that they are completely different.

But, somewhat smarter John Taylor and others might say, a central bank is like an agricultural marketing board. The extra money it puts into circulation when its bonds mature and it transfers profits to the government devalue and debauch the currency. It raises the real resources needed to finance its bond purchases by levying an “inflation tax” on money holders–by reducing the value of their cash just as an income tax reduces the (after-tax) value of incomes.

And I would agree, if the inflation comes. Under conditions of what I like to call Inflation Economics, money-printing and bond purchases do push the interest rate below the natural rate of interest–push bond prices above their natural price–as defined by Knut Wicksell. Money-printing and bond purchases then do indeed cause economic problems somewhat analogous to those of a marketing board that keeps the prices of butter and milk above their natural price.

But what if the inflation does not come? What if our economy’s phase is one of not Inflation Economics but Depression Economics, in which the central bank is not pushing the interest rate below its Wicksellian natural rate but is instead stuck trying to manage a situation in which the Wicksellian natural rate of interest is less than zero?

Then the analogies break down completely. Money-printing is then not an inflationary tax but instead a utility-increasing provision of utility services. Bond purchases do not create an overhang that cannot be sold without creating an opposite distortion from the optimal price but instead push the temporal slope of the price system toward what a benevolent central planner would want the temporal slope of the price level to be.

Milton Friedman was very clear that economies could either have too much money (Inflation Economics) or too little money (Depression Economics)–and that a central bank was needed to try to hit the sweet spot. He hoped that hitting the sweet spot could be made into a somewhat automatic rule-controlled process, but he was wrong.

So trying to construct a thinking argument that central banks are engaged in something analogous to “price controls” via their monetary policy actions leads even a substantially sub-Turing entity to the conclusion: Sometimes, under conditions of “Inflation Economics”, but not now.

And let me offer all kudos to those like David Beckworth, Scott Sumner, and Jim Pethokoukis who are trying to convince their political allies of these points that I regard as basic and Wicksellian–cutting-edge macro from 125 years ago. But I think that Paul Krugman is right when he believes that they are going to fail. Let me turn the mike over to Paul Krugman to explain why he thinks they are going to fail:

Paul Krugman: More Artificial Unintelligence: “David Beckworth pleads with fellow free-marketeers to stop claiming that…

…low interest rates are “artificial” and comparing them to price controls…. The Fed isn’t imposing a price ceiling… monetary policy… nothing at all like price controls…. What interest rates would be in the absence of distortions and rigidities [is] the Wicksellian natural rate…. The actual interest rate, at zero, is above the natural rate…. But… Beckworth should be asking… why almost nobody on the right is willing to think… not just… ignoramuses like Rand Paul and George Will. The “low interest rates = price controls” meme is bang-your-head-on-the-table stupid–but… John Taylor…. [It’s] a line of argument that people on the right really, really like….

Beckworth is… tak[ing] the… Friedman position… trusting markets… except… [for] the business cycle…. This is… [intellectually] problematic…. You need… market failure to give monetary policy large real effects, and… why… is the only important failure?…

Let me, as an aside, point out that it could indeed be the case that monetary policy joins police, courts, and defense as they only significant areas in which the costs of rent-seeking, regulatory-capture, and other government failures are less than the costs of the market failures that the government could successfully neutralize. It’s unlikely. But it’s possible. Indeed, Milton Friedman thought that that was the case. And he was not at all a dumb man. And laying down general rules sector-by-sector about the relative magnitudes of market and government failures is almost surely a mistake. As John Maynard Keynes wrote in his “The End of Laissez-Faire”:

We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail what Burke termed: “one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion…”

But let’s give the mike back to Krugman to make his major point:

More important… this position turns out to be politically unsustainable. “Government is always the problem, not the solution, except when it comes to monetary policy” just doesn’t cut it for modern conservatives. Nor did it cut it for traditional conservatives. Remember, during the 1930s people like Hayek were liquidationists, with Hayek specifically denouncing expansionary monetary policy during a slump as “the creation of artificial demand.” The era of Friedmanism, of free-market views paired with tolerance for monetary stimulus, was a temporary and unsustainable interlude, and no amount of sensible argumentation will bring it back.

But this doesn’t mean that Jim, Scott, David, and company should not try, no? It is not just the Milton Friedman was a galaxy-class expert at playing intellectual Three-Card Monte, no? It is true that at times my breath is still taken away at Friedman’s gall in claiming that a “neutral” and “non-interventionist” monetary policy was one which had the Federal Reserve Bank of New York buying and selling bonds every single day in a frantic attempt to make Say’s Law, false in theory, true in practice. But he wiped the floor with the Hayekians intellectually, culturally, academically, and politically for two generations.

Krugman’s line “claiming that laissez-faire is best for everything save monetary policy (and property rights, and courts, and police, and defense) is intellectually unstable and unsustainable in the long-run” may well be true. But as somebody-or-other once said:

This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again…


UPDATE: And I should add a link to Krugman’s original:

Paul Krugman: Artificial Unintelligence: “In the early stages of the Lesser Depression…

…those of us who knew a bit about the… 1930s… felt… despair…. People who imagined themselves sophisticated and possessed of deep understanding were resurrecting 75-year-old fallacies and presenting them as deep insights…. [Today] I feel an even deeper sense of despair–because people are still rolling out those same fallacies, even though in the interim those of us who remembered and understood Keynes/Hicks have been right about most things, and those lecturing us have been wrong about everything. So here’s William Cohan in the Times, declaring that the Fed should ‘show some spine’ and raise rates even though there is no sign of accelerating inflation. His reasoning….

The price of borrowing money–interest rates–should be determined by supply and demand, not by manipulation by a market behemoth….

[However,] the Fed sets interest rates, whether it wants to or not–even a supposed hands-off policy has to involve choosing the level of the monetary base somehow…. How would you know if the Fed is setting rates too low? Here’s where Hicks meets Wicksell: rates are too low if the economy is overheating and inflation is accelerating. Not exactly what we’ve seen in the era of zero rates and QE…. There are arguments that the Fed should be willing to abandon its inflation target so as to discourage bubbles. I think those arguments are wrong-but… they have nothing to do with the notion that current rates are somehow artificial, that we should let rates be determined by ‘supply and demand’. The worrying thing is that… crude misunderstandings… are widespread even among people who imagine themselves well-informed and sophisticated. Eighty years of hard economic thinking, and seven years of overwhelming confirmation of that hard thinking, have made no dent in their worldview. Awesome.