Must-read: Thomas Piketty: “A New Deal for Europe”

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: A New Deal for Europe: “Only a genuine social and democratic refounding of the eurozone…

…designed to encourage growth and employment, arrayed around a small core of countries willing to lead by example and develop their own new political institutions, will be sufficient to counter the hateful nationalistic impulses that now threaten all Europe. Last summer, in the aftermath of the Greek fiasco, French President François Hollande had begun to revive on his own initiative the idea of a new parliament for the eurozone. Now France must present a specific proposal for such a parliament to its leading partners and reach a compromise. Otherwise the agenda is going to be monopolized by the countries that have opted for national isolationism—the United Kingdom and Poland among them…

Must-read: David Glasner (2015): “Neo-Fisherism and All That”

Must-Read: David Glasner (2015): Neo-Fisherism and All That: “John Cochrane and Stephen Williamson [believe]… if the central bank wants 2% inflation… [and] if the Fisherian real rate is 2%…

…the central bank should set its interest-rate instrument (Fed Funds rate) at 4%, because, in equilibrium–and, under rational expectations, that is the only policy-relevant solution of the model–inflation expectations must satisfy the Fisher equation. The Neo-Fisherians believe… they have overturned at least two centuries of standard monetary theory… back… to Henry Thornton…. The way to reduce inflation is for the monetary authority to reduce the setting on its interest-rate instrument and the way to counter deflation is to raise the setting on the instrument…. Unwilling to junk more than 200 years of received doctrine on the basis, not of a behavioral relationship, but a reduced-form equilibrium condition containing no information about the direction of causality, few monetary economists and no policy makers have become devotees of the Neo-Fisherian Revolution….

Let Cochrane read Nick Rowe…. If he did, he might realize that if you do no more than compare alternative steady-state equilibria, ignoring the path leading from one equilibrium to the other, you miss just about everything that makes macroeconomics worth studying…. The very notion that you don’t have to worry about the path by which you get from one equilibrium to another is so bizarre that it would be merely laughable if it were not so dangerous…

Must-read: Tim Duy: “Lacker, Kaplan, Fischer”

Must-Read: The list of features of the current macroeconomic situation that the Federal Reserve’s communications strategy suggests that it does not grasp keeps growing. In the past we had:

  • The asymmetry of the loss function for undershooting vis-a-vis overshooting nominal GDP growth.
  • The weakness of monetary policy tools as stimulus in and near the liquidity trap vis-a-vis the strength of monetary policy tools to cool off the economy always.
  • The extraordinarily low precision of estimates of the Phillips Curve.

And now we have also:

  • The degree to which the slope of the Phillips Curve now is smaller than it was in the 1970s.
  • The degree to which the gearing between increases in inflation now and increases in future expected inflation has decreased since the 1970s.
  • The fact that lack of strong association between financial jitters and subsequent reduced growth is a reduced form that factors in a stimulative monetary response in response to such jitters.
  • The strong links between credit-channel disruptions and reduced spending growth.

And, above all, the fact that in the Greenspan and Volcker eras a lack of concern for downside risks was excusable because demand could always be swiftly and substantially boosted in an afternoon via large interest-rate reductions. Not so in the Bernanke-Yellen era.

It thus seems more and more to me as though the Federal Reserve is making macroeconomic policy in a world that simply does not exist. Tim Duy has comments:

Tim Duy: Lacker, Kaplan, Fischer: “Today Richmond Federal Reserve President Jeffrey Lacker argued that the case for rate hikes remains intact…

…On the opposite side of the table sits Dallas Federal Reserve President Robert Kaplan… very dovish…. Pure wait-and-see, risk management mode…. Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer remains less-moved by recent developments. Instead, low unemployment rates capture his attention…. Fischer sounds very uncomfortable with the prospect of the unemployment rate falling much below 4.7%. He is getting an itchy trigger finger.

I remain unmoved by this logic….

We have seen similar periods of volatility in recent years–including in the second half of 2011–that have left little visible imprint on the economy…. As Chair Yellen said in her testimony to the Congress two weeks ago, while ‘global financial developments could produce a slowing in the economy, I think we want to be careful not to jump to a premature conclusion about what is in store for the U.S. economy.’

This echoes the comments of… John Williams, and again misses the Fed’s response to financial turmoil. In 2011, it was Operation Twist…. I really do not understand how Fed officials can continue to dismiss market turmoil using comparisons to past episodes when those episodes triggered a monetary policy response. They don’t quite seem to understand the endogeneity in the system.

My sense is that there remains a nontrivial contingent within the Fed that really, truly believes they need to hike sooner than later for fear that overshooting the employment mandate will result in overshooting the inflation target. This contingent is attempting to look at the financial system as separate from the ‘real’ economy. That will not work. No matter how good the underlying fundamentals, if you let the financial system implode, it will take the economy down with it. I don’t know that the Fed needs to cut rates, or that they needed to cut rates as deeply as they did during the Asian Financial crisis, but I do know this: The monetary authority should not tighten into financial turmoil. Wait until you are out of the woods. That’s Central Banking 101…

Carbon inequities, climate change, and complementary solutions

Exhaust rises from smokestacks in front of piles of coal at NRG Energy’s W.A. Parish Electric Generating Station in Thompsons, Texas. (AP Photo/David J. Phillip)

Today, the earth’s atmosphere holds more than 400 parts per million of carbon dioxide. That’s roughly 40 percent more than carbon dioxide levels at the start of the Industrial Revolution, and it’s primarily due to our unruly combustion of fossil fuels. Considering that carbon dioxide emissions increase greenhouse gas levels and consequently exacerbate climate change, environmentalists in the United States have long been proposing a Pigovian tax on the carbon contents of goods and services.

But how does any of this relate to equity? Let’s backtrack.

It begins with the fact that the rich are one of the biggest agents of climate change. In a study released in 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau found that high-income households (those earning more than $75,000 a year) consume double the energy of the poorest households (those earning less than $10,000 a year) in the United States. As a result, the rich significantly contribute to carbon dioxide emissions, too. A recent report from Oxfam concluded that people in the top tenth of the world’s income distribution are to blame for 50 percent of global emissions, while those in the bottom half of the distribution account for only 10 percent of emissions.

What makes carbon inequality worse is that minorities and low-income communities are disproportionately harmed by climate change’s pernicious effects. The White House’s National Climate Assessment report found that these vulnerable groups in the United States are disparately buffeted by the onset of heat waves, worsening air quality, and extreme weather events, which has ramifications for physical and mental health and financial well-being.

By nature, the causes and consequences of climate change have distributional components. And so does a tax-based solution—well, in part.

In principle, a carbon tax is a fee that is placed on the carbon contents of different types of fossil fuels based on the amount of carbon dioxide each type of fuel emits when it is used, factoring in the long-term social costs of emissions as well. Coal—in comparison to oil and natural gas, for example—emits the most carbon dioxide per unit of energy, so it would likely have the highest tax rate. There are also several questions about how the tax would be implemented and who should be taxed: Should the energy producers (upstream), distributors and retailers (midstream), or the consumers (downstream) be the point of taxation? Regardless of who in the chain pays, the tax is the most efficient way to discourage high-carbon consumption behavior to ultimately reduce emissions.

The problem, however, is that a carbon tax may also increase the price of products like gasoline, utilities, and even food, which is what makes it regressive. Statistics show that poor families generally spend a higher portion of their incomes on these basic necessities compared to middle-class and rich households. So, if the prices on products increase, poor families will be hit the hardest. In fact, a 2009 study by environmental economists Corbett Grainger of the University of Wisconsin and Charles Kolstad of Stanford University documents the distributional effects of a hypothetical $15-per-ton tax. They find that the burden of a carbon tax on households at the bottom fifth of the income distribution would be at least 1.4 times to 4 times higher than for households at the top fifth. What’s more, Grainger and Kolstad note that if a tax is also applied to other types of greenhouse gases, this disproportionate burden would only increase.

Of course, there are a couple ways to soften a carbon tax’s potential impact on low-income families. One extremely efficient idea is to recycle the revenues from a carbon tax to cut another tax. This “tax swap” could work by providing tax credits to reduce the regressive burden of corporate income tax (capital recycling) or payroll income tax (payroll recycling). The second idea is to redistribute the revenues from a carbon tax through lump-sum rebates. Economist Chad Stone at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argues that these rebates could theoretically reach low-income households through refundable tax credits, a supplement to direct federal payments to eligible groups, or the electronic benefit transfer (EBT) system.

It’s easy to imagine that Congress might disagree on how to make a carbon tax more progressive or what to do with the revenues, which could prolong passing new or existing proposals. And, as it stands, carbon taxes might not fix resource inequalities at their root. The fact that low-income families spend a disproportionate amount of their income on carbon-rich essentials and don’t nearly contribute as much to emissions as the rich is still a signal that we must also think about other innovative ways to reduce energy costs for families while keeping carbon emissions down.

Given congressional gridlock, cities have been exploring ways to promote carbon equity. Improving the transit infrastructure and walkability of metro regions is certainly one option, especially because transportation and gasoline costs comprise the second-largest investment for low-income families and passenger cars account for more than 30 percent of transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions. In practice, these improvements could include planning strategies such as mixed-income transit-oriented development with mixed-use neighborhood design. Simply, this could help contain sprawl and reduce motor vehicle reliance, consequently reducing fuel consumption and carbon emissions for families across the income distribution.

Another community-based strategy is to adopt district energy systems. District energy is a highly efficient heating and cooling system that uses a central plant in typically a village- or neighborhood-sized part of a city to distribute energy to and from buildings within the district. Because the system is localized, it is able to balance energy demand between properties on the grid. Having a central plant also allows for integration of other renewable energy sources such as geothermal loops and solar cells. It is a significant investment upfront, but it boasts impressively lower carbon dioxide emissions than traditional systems while trimming home energy bills.

All this said, there are still several questions about the feasibility, costs, implementation timelines, and even carbon emissions abatement of these city-centric programs, especially in comparison to the efficiency of a carbon tax. That’s why, in the meantime, pursuing multiple, complementary solutions simultaneously can be the most effective approach to slowing climate change and dealing with its repercussions.

Whether we approach carbon use and emissions and climate change from the federal, state, or local levels, though, one thing is clear: Conversations about our environment, just like conversations about our economy, must include a vision to augment equity.

What explains the rise in income inequality at the top of the income distribution?

Skill-biased technological change is a prominent explanation for the rise in income inequality over the past few decades, but it is not clear how this theory can explain the differential rise in very top incomes across countries. The theory, argued by Harvard’s Lawrence Katz and the University of Chicago’s Kevin Murphy and recently overhauled by MIT’s Daron Acemoglu and David Autor, states that changes in technology drive increased demand for workers whose skills best complement new production processes. But as Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon explain, “it is difficult to think of what particular skill set would account for the meteoric rise of incomes in the top 1 and 0.1 percentiles.”

A purely technological explanation cannot explain all of the variance in the change in top incomes across rich countries. Figure 1 shows the share of national income accruing to the top 1 percent of earners (excluding capital gains) over time for a selection of highly developed countries, from Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.

Figure 1

 

The chart provides a history lesson in its own right. You can see the sky-high inequality of the early 1900s, the remarkable collapse in top incomes following World War II, and the long moderation of income inequality during a period of high growth in the succeeding three decades. After that, we can see the recent explosion in top-end inequality starting during the mid-1980s.

Notably, the pace of growth in that inequality is strikingly different among developed countries. Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, saw their rich run away from the rest of their populations. In the United States, the top 1 percent of earners went from claiming 8 percent of national income in 1980 to nearly 18 percent of national income in 2010. The United Kingdom saw a similar increase over the same time period (from 6 percent to 15 percent), as did Canada (from 8 percent to 12 percent).

These gains contrast sharply with much more modest changes in other countries over that time period:

  • France: 8 percent to 9 percent
  • Germany: 10 percent to 11 percent
  • Spain: 8 percent to 9 percent
  • Italy: 7 percent to 9 percent
  • Sweden: 4 percent to 7 percent

Given this new understanding of top-end incomes, can we point to some additional explanations? While some countries do have some technological advantages over others, all advanced Western economies are broadly on the same level in terms of development. Modern information technology is pervasive in all major sectors of the economy, and they all have high-performing education systems. So why is similar tech driving dissimilar returns to skill across the developed world? Are the United States and the United Kingdom exceptional in how talented their high performers are? Or is it a matter of institutional disparities between countries—that is, the degrees to which collective bargaining, high marginal income tax rates, and intellectual property regimes rein in the bargaining power of the top 1 percent?

These are still open questions, and it’s beyond the scope of this blog post to give a full answer. Suffice it to say, although inequality is increasing in many rich countries, the severity to which it’s increasing varies dramatically depending on where you look.

Puzzled by Gerry Friedman…

A question about the estimable Gerry Friedman:

How can an increase in government spending of $1.4 trillion/year generate a $14 trillion increase in spending in the year 2026? But it really looks to me like he has both:

  • the very dubious assumption that all 10%-points of the shortfall from the trend as of 2007 can be made up relatively easily’, and
  • a multiplier of not the 3-in-and-near-a-liquidity trap I carry around in the back of my head, but 10.

But Friedman’s text claims his multiplier is not even 3, but less than 2, and averaging roughly 1…

In short: In his runs Friedman has government spending higher in 2026 by $1.4 trillion than in baseline. He has real GDP higher in 2026 by $14 trillion. What other components of real spending are higher by how much in order to make that real GDP number in the year 2016 higher than baseline by $14 trillion? And what mechanisms are making those components higher?

It’s fine to propose aspirational policies based on a hope that the world is such that things will break your way. It’s not so good to put the world breaking your way forward as a central-case forecast of what your policies will do. And it’s distressing that I cannot figure out how to make Friedman’s analysis hold together quantitatively even if I do allow the assumption that the entire output relative to the pre-2007 potential-output trend can be closed easily…

Must-reads: February 22, 2016


Weekend reading: H.G. Wells: On Becoming a Socialist

H.G. Wells (1908): Becoming a Socialist: from “New Worlds for Old” (London: Macmillan), pp. 16-19: “A walk I had a little while ago with a friend along the Thames Embankment…

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…from Blackfriars Bridge to Westminster. We had dined together and we went there because we thought that with a fitful moon and clouds adrift, on a night when the air was a crystal air that gladdened and brightened, that crescent of great buildings and steely, soft-hurrying water must needs be altogether beautiful.

And indeed it was beautiful: the mysteries and mounting masses of the buildings to the right of us, the blurs of this coloured light or that, blue-white, green-white, amber or warmer orange, the rich black archings of Waterloo Bridge, the rippled lights upon the silent flowing river, the lattice of girders, and the shifting trains of Charing Cross Bridge–their funnels pouring a sort of hot-edged moonlight by way of smoke–and then the sweeping line of lamps, the accelerated run and diminuendo of the Embankment lamps as one came into sight of Westminster.

The big hotels were very fine, huge swelling shapes of dun dark-gray and brown, huge shapes seamed and bursting and fenestrated with illumination, tattered at a thousand windows with light and the indistinct glowing suggestions of feasting and pleasure. And dim and faint above it all and very remote was the moon’s dead wan face veiled and then displayed.

But we were dashed by an unanticipated refrain to this succession of magnificent things, and we did not cry, as we had meant to cry:

How good it was to be alive!

Along the embankment, you see, there are iron seats at regular intervals, seats you cannot lie upon because iron arm-rests prevent that, and each seat, one saw by the lamplight, was filled with crouching and drooping figures. Not a vacant place remained, not one vacant place.

These were the homeless, and they had come to sleep here. Now one noted a poor old woman with a shameful battered straw hat awry over her drowsing face, now a young clerk staring before him at despair; now a filthy tramp, and now a bearded, frock-coated, collarless respectability; I remember particularly one ghastly long white neck and white face that lopped backward, choked in some nightmare, awakened, clutched with a bony hand at the bony throat, and sat up and stared angrily as we passed. The wind had a keen edge that night, even for us who had dined and were well-clad. One crumpled figure coughed and went on coughing–damnably.

‘It’s fine,’ said I, trying to keep hold of the effects to which this line of poor wretches was but the selvage; ‘it’s fine! But I can’t stand this.’

‘It changes all that we expected,’ admitted my friend, after a silence.

‘Must we go on–past them all?’

‘Yes. I think we ought to do that. It’s a lesson perhaps–for trying to get too much beauty out of life as it is, and forgetting. Don’t shirk it!’

‘Great God!’ cried I. ‘But must life always be like this? I could die, indeed, I would willingly jump into this cold and muddy river now, if by so doing I could stick a stiff dead hand through all these things in the future,–a dead commanding hand insisting with a silent irresistible gesture that this waste and failure of life should cease, and cease forever.’

‘But it does cease! Each year in its proportions it is a little less.’

I walked in silence, and my companion talked by my side.

‘We go on. Here is a good thing done, and there is a good thing done. The Good Will in man–‘

‘Not fast enough. It goes so slowly–and in a little while we too must die.’

‘It can be done,’ said my companion.

‘It could be avoided,’ say I.

‘It shall be in the days to come. There is food enough for all, shelter for all, wealth enough for all. Men need only know it and will it. And yet we have this!’

‘And so much like this!’ said I.

So we talked and were tormented.

And I remember how later we found ourselves on Westminster Bridge, looking back upon the long sweep of wrinkled black water that reflected lights and palaces and the flitting glow of steamboats, and by that time we had talked ourselves past our despair. We perceived that what w

Ed Luce says some very nice things about Steve Cohen’s and my forthcoming “Concrete Economics”

It is very nice to get a favorable view that indicates that the book we wrote is–at least in some respects–the book we thought we had written and tried to write. So Steve and I find ourselves especially grateful this weekend to the very-sharp Ed Luce:

Ed Luce: Is robust American Growth a Thing of the Past?: “My hunch is that [Robert] Gordon is a little too adamant…

…Perhaps we will come up with a cure to Alzheimer’s disease… androids will take… all the low-paying jobs. But even if he is right, there are things we can do…. The embittered US presidential primary battle offers a case study of what happens to politics when people’s economic hopes are dashed…. For an antidote to Gordon’s fatalism, turn to Concrete Economics.

This short book, by the economists Stephen Cohen and Bradford DeLong, is light on data and high on readability. What it shares with Gordon is the view that today’s economy is not serving most Americans well. Growth has slowed and inequality has risen.

Unlike Gordon, however, Cohen and DeLong believe that Americans have the power to do something about it. The key lies in better understanding their history.

If you ask Americans to identify the elixir of their country’s success, most would say something about freedom and entrepreneurship. Government would not feature. Their answer, in other words, would be ideological. A more accurate response, in the authors’ view, would be to draw on America’s creed of pragmatism. Franklin Roosevelt called it ‘bold, persistent experimentation’. Alexander Hamilton — perhaps the most modern of the founding fathers, and the only one who has a rap musical about him running on Broadway — developed the ‘American system’. Cohen and DeLong make a plea for Americans to abandon the ‘ideological incantations and abstract obfuscations’ that have held since the late 1970s in favour of ‘whatever works’ economics.

They make a persuasive case. From Hamilton’s infant industries to Abraham Lincoln’s Homestead Act, the federal government played a guiding role in the American success:

The invisible hand was repeatedly lifted at the elbow by the government and replaced in a new position where it could go on to perform its magic,

they write. If Lincoln had auctioned off land in the west to the highest bidders rather than parceled it out to families, the US would have developed along Latin American-style lines. Government was behind many of the technological leaps that Gordon writes about. Even in the ideological era, government has prodded the market to go where it decrees. But it has taken wrong turns. Huge chunks of the US economy are devoted to financial trading, healthcare claims processing, real estate transaction and other ‘busy but useless’ activity.

It is within America’s scope to reclaim its pragmatism, say the authors. Theirs is a lyrical manifesto. It is a million miles from Gordon’s techno-determinism and a different universe to Trump’s vision. It is also a corrective. Read Gordon and weep. Then perk yourself up with Concrete Economics. Some things are beyond our power to foresee. Others are within the realm of the possible.

Figure 5% of GDP wasted in excess health-care administration, 5% wasted in excess earnings paid to finance, another 15% wasted–from the perspective of America’s societal well-being–in incentivizing the rich and the super-rich in ways that are either ineffective or counterproductive, and another 5% subtracted from GDP by an ideological refusal to do win-win policies (cough infrastructure; cough aggregate demand; plus others) easily within our graph–and we have an America that could be 30% richer, not in the sense that measured real GDP would by 30% higher but in the sense that we would be delivering 30% more useful goods and services to those for whom it really counts. That would hold off Gordon’s stagnation for nearly a generation. And we could do that. Relatively easily. With our ideological blinders off. And with our political will on.

The melting-away of North Atlantic social democracy

This has been available in full exclusively at the magnificent and well worth subscribing-to Talking Points Memo.

SEND TPM MONEY!!!!

But now let me let it out into the wild here–and promise to imminently (well, maybe in a month…) write about the whole symposium of which it is a part:

The Melting Away of North Atlantic Social Democracy: Hotshot French economist Thomas Piketty, of the Paris School of Economics, looked at the major democracies with North Atlantic coastlines over the past couple of centuries. He saw five striking facts:

  • First, ownership of private wealth—with its power to command resources, dictate where and how people would work, and shape politics—was always highly concentrated.
  • Second, 150 years—six generations—ago, the ratio of a country’s total private wealth to its total annual income was about six.
  • Third, 50 years—two generations—ago, that capital-income ratio was about three.
  • Fourth, over the past two generations that capital-income ratio has been rising rapidly.
  • Fifth, the flow of income to the owner of the dollar capital did not rise when capital was relatively scarce, but plodded along at a typical net rate of profit of about 5% per year generation after generation.

He wondered what these facts predicted for the shape of the major North Atlantic economies in the 21st century. And so he wrote a big book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that was published last year.

It has been a surprise bestseller. Thomas Piketty’s English-language translator, Art Goldhammer, reports that there are now 2.2 million copies in print and e-book form in 30 different languages scattered around the globe.

Piketty’s big surprise best-selling book has one central claim: Two generations ago the major North Atlantic economies were all four stable social democracies—relatively egalitarian places when viewed in historical perspective (for native-born white guys, at least), with political voice widely distributed throughout the population, the claims of wealth to drive political directions and shape economic structures not neutralized but kept within bounds. That was the North Atlantic economy that we lived in and had grown used to as recently as one generation ago. That, Piketty argues, was an unstable historical anomaly. It is now passing away.

Piketty believes that the rising inequality trends we have seen over the past generation and see now are simply returning us to what is the pattern of unequal income distribution and dominant plutocracy that is normal for an industrialized market economy in which productivity growth is not unusually fast. We had thought otherwise, and grown used to the social-democratic structure of two generations ago only because it came at the end of an era in which productivity growth had been unusually fast; the various political, depression, and revolutionary shocks to overturn established and inherited wealth had been atypically large.

The social democratic economy model the major North Atlantic economies followed as recently as a single generation ago had five salient features:

  1. For one, that labor was important relative to ownership of wealth as a source of income.
  2. Next, enterprise and savings were important relative to inheritance as a source of accumulated wealth.
  3. Opportunity, while constrained by race and gender, was not that constrained by class—there was upward mobility.
  4. Economic growth—both numbers of workers and the productivity of the average worker—was relatively rapid, with each generation clearly larger and more productive than its predecessor.
  5. And, finally, politics were relatively democratic, in that while the rich spoke with a louder voice, their concerns did not drown out the economic interests of others.

And Thomas Piketty’s central claim is that all five of these once-salient features of our social democracy are vanishing. We are, he believes, on a long-run historical trajectory to return us to a situation more like the nineteenth century, in which ownership of capital is more important relative to labor as a source of income; inheritance dominates enterprise and savings as a source of wealth; opportunity is tightly constrained by class of birth; economic growth is slow (both because of declining technological invention and birth rates on the one hand, and because established wealth, which is hostile to the creative destruction that drives economic growth, possesses a bigger voice in shaping the political economy); and politics is dominated by plutocrats.

Capital in the Twenty-First Century has struck a chord—hence its 2.2 million copies. And it has excited a fierce debate, with more and more people finding it worth arguing about both for the reasons that it struck a chord and because of the fact that it has struck a chord.

The first question is: Do we care?

Some—perhaps many—say that we do not care. There is one often-made thread of argument that we simply should not care about inequality, which is good as an engine of faster economic growth and not a problem for an economy, a society, or a country at all. What is a problem, this thread maintains, is poverty. And because we are now much richer than our predecessors of six generations ago, the amount of inequality that back then caused poverty and so was a problem does not cause poverty and so is not a problem today.

I think this is wrong. I think we do care.

  • First, anyone who has looked at the distribution of medical care in the United States and our abysmal health outcome statistics relative to other rich countries cannot help but see that inequality is a factor that leads enormous investments of resources to deliver little of ultimate value in the sense of human well-being and human satisfaction. The point generalizes beyond the health sector: an unequal economy is one that is lousy at turning productive potential into societal well-being. We could be doing better—and with a more equal income and wealth distribution would be.

  • Second, as noted above, established wealth, especially inherited wealth, is by its nature hostile to the creative destruction that accompanies rapid economic growth, for it is established wealth that is creatively destroyed. Plutocrats and their ideologues like to claim that too equal an income distribution destroys incentives to work and turns us into a ‘nation of takers.’ But a return to the inequality levels of the 1960s would not turn us into Maoist China. In the relevant range of levels of inequality, it is much more likely that higher inequality will slow growth by depriving the non-rich of the resources to invest in themselves, their children, and their enterprises; It will further slow growth by focusing effort on helping the rich keep what they have at the cost of squelching the development of the new.

  • Third, a society in which plutocrats deploy their resources to have not just a loud but an overwhelming voice will be a society in which government sets about to solve problems of concern the plutocrats and not the people. And that is unlikely to be a good society.

So: Yes, we care.

The second, relevant, question is then: Is he right?

The only possible answer is ‘perhaps’.

Everything hinges on what ‘on our current political-economic trajectory’ means. So what might we take that phrase to mean? And under which interpretations of that phrase is Piketty right, and under which is he wrong?


Our Current Trajectory: Piketty’s View

Piketty’s view is that our current trajectory has five elements:

  1. For one thing, we now have a demographic pattern determined by literate women’s preference to have two or fewer children. Thus we have slow—or zero—population growth.
  2. For another, the pace of technological progress may well be slowing from its 20th-century white-heat intensity. Thus slower population and slower productivity growth combine to produce slower overall growth, and so wealth accumulated in the past when the economy was smaller looms larger in the present than it would were the economy expanding more rapidly.
  3. In addition, ever since—even before—the start of the Industrial Revolution, we have seen the system of property rights continually tweaked, via a politics in which money talks loudly, in order to keep the rate of profit on wealth roughly at 5% per year. The British economist John Maynard Keynes was one of many who thought that a world of more wealth accumulation would also be one of a more equal income distribution. As capital accumulated, he thought, that capital would have to bid for the services of workers to operate it. It would do that by offering to accept a lower rate of profit in order to pay higher wages and salaries. The profit rate would, he thought, fall more rapidly than the stock of capital would grow, and we would have what he called the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’: even though the rich might be very rich indeed in terms of assets, their relative share of income would, over time, fall. But, Piketty documents, this seems to be wrong: The overall profit rate did not rise when economies went from the wealth-to-annual income ratio of six that it was six generations ago to the one of three that it was two generations ago. The overall profit rate has not fallen as wealth-to-annual-income ratios have risen.
  4. Yet another factor is the concentration of savings among the rich, for—contrary to economists’ standard life-cycle theories—the proportion of income saved does not decline with increasing wealth. And so a higher stock of wealth does not induce forces that tend to spread it around, but rather induces forces that concentrate it.
  5. And, last, Piketty sees money as talking even louder in politics than it used to and thus preventing, with increasing strength over time, the implementation of policies that might redistribute wealth and so keep the social-democratic political-economic order alive.

In Piketty’s view, we are now more than a full generation into this process of the passing away of North Atlantic social democracy.

This process, however, has not yet come to an end. It will, he thinks, take another two generations or more for the logic he sees driving us on our current trajectory to work itself through to its completion. We haven’t, in Piketty’s view, seen anything yet, at least support as far as plutocracy is concerned.


The Demand for Bad Critiques of Piketty

A substantial number of critics have offered differing strongly negative views of Piketty’s theories.

There is, for example, Greg Mankiw from Harvard and his (2015) ‘Yes, r > g. So What?’:

There is… good reason to doubt… the ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’ that concerns Piketty…. The worrisome ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’… [requires] the return on capital r to exceed the economy’s growth g by at least 7 percentage points per year…. There is no ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’…’

I presume Mankiw picked up the phrase ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’ from Piketty’s introduction, where the phrase is not a prediction of the necessary consequences that follow from r > g. It is, instead, a description of what the data Piketty has compiled and analyzed tells us about the pre-WWI Belle Époque:

1870–1914 is at best a stabilization of inequality at an extremely high level, and in certain respects an endless inegalitarian spiral…

Mankiw’s critique was pre-butted not just in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, but also in Piketty’s (2015) ‘Putting Distribution Back at the Center of Economics’ in which he explicitly refers critics to Stanford economist Charles Jones and to Piketty’s online appendix. An economy with a larger gap between the rate of profit r and the rate of economic growth g will indeed be an economy with more concentrated wealth. Mankiw’s implicit claim that we should remain unconcerned with wealth inequality and concentration unless and until it is growing without bound toward infinity—even among a brazen goalpost-moving exercises, that is a remarkably brazen one.

There is also, for example, a paper from Daron Acemoglu of MIT and James Robinson of Chicago (2015), ‘The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism’. It claims that the theoretical mechanisms stressed by Piketty cannot be seen in the real world. To this Piketty responds by arguing that they are looking at changes over much too short a time period to see what is and will in the future be going on:

The process of intergenerational accumulation and distribution of wealth is very long-run process, so looking at cross-sectional regressions between inequality and r − g may not be very meaningful…

There is Stanford’s Allan Meltzer, and his 2014 ‘The United States of Envy’:

The Obama administration has drawn the political discussion away from its unpopular and flawed… Obamacare… income redistribution… based heavily on research by two French economists named Thomas Piketty and Emanuel Saez. The two worked together… at MIT, where the current research director of the IMF, Olivier Blanchard, was a professor…. He is also French. France has, for many years, implemented destructive policies…

There is Clive Crook’s 2014 ‘The Most Important Book Ever Is Wrong’, which I will leave to the Economist’s Ryan Avent:

You don’t even have to read hundreds of pages to get the qualification Mr. Crook wants; you can start with the page on which r>g is first mentioned…. I suppose if you only read the book’s conclusion you could miss these details, but who would do that?’

If there is a worst critique of Piketty from a technical economics standpoint, it is made by Per Krusell of Gothenberg and Anthony A. Smith of Yale in their 2015 ‘Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?’. They assume—without presenting evidence or data—that their key parameter is 10% per year when Piketty documents that it appears to be less than 2% per year. When challenged, they write only:

DeLong’s main point is that the rate we are using is too high (we use 10% in one place and 8% in another place…. (We conducted a quick survey among macroeconomists at the London School of Economics, where Tony and I happen to be right now, and the average answer was 7% [per year]…

This response seems to me to be remarkably weak. This response seems to me to indicate only that the macroeconomists they talk to have neither carried out aggregate growth-accounting calculations nor reflected on what share of society’s productive assets are machines that depreciate at 7% per year, as opposed to land, buildings, and infrastructure that depreciate much more slowly.

When I look at these—and other—critiques of Piketty and assess their quality, I find myself quite surprised. And I find myself strongly tempted to agree with what Piketty said at the January 2015 American Economic Association meeting about billionaires:

We know something about billionaire consumption, but it is hard to measure some of it. Some billionaires are consuming politicians, others consume reporters, and some consume academics…

The Demand for Piketty

I do find it disappointing that so many critiques, indeed what appear to me to be the standard critiques, of Piketty, do not look much like academic analyses. Instead, they look more like things designed to reassure standard billionaires hoping to establish a dynasty. If Piketty is wrong, it is important to figure out why. For his book has definitely struck an immense nerve: people want answers to questions, and they hope Piketty will provide them.

So let me turn to Capital in the Twenty-First Century as a sociological-intellectual phenomenon.

I did not expect Capital in the Twenty-First Century to go, in a sense, viral.

I expected the book to sell ten copies to libraries and professors here at Berkeley, and a couple hundred copies to students here—10,000 copies worldwide.

Art Goldhammer quotes William Sisler, head of Piketty’s English-language publisher, Harvard University Press, as being more optimistic and expecting total sales in the 10-20,000 copy range ‘if we were lucky’.

Capital in the Twenty-First Century does indeed have many excellences. Its logic is clear and powerful. It is comprehensively documented by very skillful extraction and presentation of the data. It deals with very big and important questions. It takes a broad historical and moral-philosophical view.

But I thought it would be a book for a narrow audience: myself and a few others.

You had to like mathematical economic growth theory, economic history, going deep into the weeds of data construction, plus have read Balzac and Jane Austen to be comfortable in the intellectual world of the book. It seemed to me that there were very few people whose interests were as broad as Thomas Piketty’s. Given that the book makes few concessions to and demands much of its audience, I expected that audience to be small—not large.


Better Critiques of Piketty

So it is in a way fortunate that there are some better critiques of Piketty’s argument out there. An MIT graduate student has mounted the best sustained critique: Matthew Rognlie points to a set of considerations that John Maynard Keynes called the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’:

  • As capital accumulation proceeds, more and richer people seek to entrust their larger and larger wealth to entrepreneurs to buy machines relative to the number of workers who seek to be hired by entrepreneurs to work the machines.
  • Thus by simple supply-and-demand the rate of profit declines.
  • Thus increasing wealth accumulation enriches workers-their productivity at the margin rises and entrepreneurs are willing to bid more for their services.
  • And increasing wealth accumulation does not impoverish the wealthy, but it does make their wealth less salient as a source of income.

Thomas Piketty’s response to this is, roughly: Rognlie’s argument sounds very good in neoclassical economic theory, but fails in historical practice. Supply-and-demand tells us that when the economy’s wealth-to-annual income ratio varies, the rate of profit should vary in the opposite direction. But history tells us that the rate of profit sticks at 5% per year, across eras with very different wealth-to-annual-income ratios.

Piketty, however, does not tell us why.

Perhaps this is because at a technological level capital does not empower and complement but rather competes with and thus substitutes for labor. Perhaps this is because of successful rent-seeking by the rich who control the government and get it to award them monopoly rents. Perhaps it is because of a social structure that leaves wealth holders believing that a 5% per year is the ‘fair’ rate of profit and are unwilling to underbid each other. Piketty is agnostic here.

This makes his argument both difficult to criticize, and less than fully satisfactory. For, Rognlie points out, the big news so far in the accumulation of wealth and the surge in income received by wealth holders comes from housing, which has risen from 3% of total income to 8% of total income here in the U.S. since World War II. Similar forces are at work in England and France: simply look at rents these days in central London or central Paris. And the collapse of the wealth of European Belle Époque elites after 1900—though not of American Gilded Age elites—owed a lot to the falling value of their broad-acre agricultural-land estates as globalization and rapid improvements in farm productivity enriched the economy as a whole but left agriculture relatively impoverished. In Rognlie’s view, the connection between wealth inequality and income inequality is largely a reflection of the dynamics of housing prices—and, I would add, in Europe agricultural land values. And, in Rognlie’s and Piketty’s view, the rise in U.S. income inequality at the top up until now is only tangentially related to the concentration of wealth. Rather, it is the superincomes of corporate executives, anesthesiologists and allied specialties, and financiers that we have seen so far—and they have not had to have much wealth of their own to grasp these prizes. (Although, of course, their children will then start out with a great deal of wealth.)

There are additional complaints that I regard as serious:

  • First, as James K. Galbraith has most aggressively noted, Piketty tacks back-and-forth between a market value—the capitalized current value of all claims on income that are not brow-sweat—and a physical quantity conception of capital in a way that cannot be completely legitimate.
  • Second, I would be much more comfortable with a framework in which, instead of talking about ‘tendencies’ that can be counteracted by ‘special factors,’ Piketty included the ‘special factors’ in the model and then forecast the economy’s destiny.
  • And, third and most important of all, Piketty badly needs a political-economic theory of the constancy of the rate of profit that he finds in his data. He does not have one.

I think these critiques have force, all of them: from the ‘euthanization of the rentier’ as a possibility that needs to be considered, to the need to understand housing and agriculture separately rather than lumping them into ‘wealth,’ the need to be clear about the units—dollars on the one hand or acres and machines on the other—of measurement, my economist’s preference for predictions of equilibrium points rather than identification of tendencies, and the need for a political economy-based theory of how government capture by the rich means that wealth accumulated is not spent invested in projects that make us richer, but rather in better ways of raising the share of a constant-sized pie that is carved up for the rich.


Assessment

When I try to evaluate the state of the debate over Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century two years after its first (French) publication, I find myself driven to three conclusions. The factors that Piketty identifies as leading to the melting-away of the social-democratic North Atlantic economy are operating, but so far their effects on income and wealth inequality have been smaller than other largely-unrelated factors that have been operating in the past generation and generating the rise of housing as a source of wealth and the rise of the super-incomes. Piketty’s factors have been supercharged by other forces over the past generation, but that does not mean that they are not at work—and, in fact, reinforces the chances that Piketty’s inequality-driving factors will be of decisive importance over the next seventy years. The question of whether our road leads to Piketty (2014)—a new Belle Époque plutocracy—or Keynes (1936)—a euthanization of the rentier in which the wealth of the rich is outlandish but their incomes are not due to low rates of profit—hinges on our politics. And our politics is something we can control.

We as a civilization could decide that we are not willing to let money talk so loudly in politics. We could keep our politics from being one of establishing monopoly after monopoly and rent-extraction chokepoint after rent-extraction chokepoint. If we manage that, then the forecasts of Keynes (1936) and Rognlie (2015 will come true, and a rise in wealth accumulation will carry with it a fall in the rate of profit, and a highly-productive not-too-unequal society.

But right now money talks very loudly indeed. And I leave the Piketty debate more depressed about our ability to keep it from talking so loudly. What makes me more depressed? The Piketty debate itself does: The eagerness of so-many economists to aggressively make so many shoddy arguments that Piketty does not know what he is talking about–that makes me think that Piketty does indeed know what he is talking about.