Must-read: NPC Newsmakers: “Feb. 11 Newsmaker Panel Asserts that the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership’s ISDS Provision Will Undermine U.S. Courts and Legislative Bodies”

Must-Read: As I understand it, all precedent suggests that ISDS provisions are not a problem for the United States. ISDS panels make their determinations, and as a result other countries gain or fail to gain the right to impose countervailing duties on U.S. exports–and then the negotiations begin, with the first move being the U.S. negotiators say: “Do you really think this company of yours now waving around an ISDS panel ruling has a strong enough case that you want to seriously risk pissing us off?” It is much easier all around for everyone if the ISDS panel rules for the United States–and the pattern of rulings in the ten years we have watched this instrumentality at work strongly suggest that that is how it works.

Of course: things could change. And ISDS panels do rule against other countries’ governments–that is, after all, why the U.S. has put ISDS into this agreement: to give its companies protection.

But the disturbing thing is that I do not understand these institutions very well–neither how they are formally supposed to work, how they work in practice, and why they work the way that they appear to do:

NPC Newsmaker: Feb. 11 Newsmaker Panel Asserts that the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership’s ISDS Provision Will Undermine U.S. Courts and Legislative Bodies: “What are the ramifications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership…

…and in particular will the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision of TPP take the enforcement of U.S. laws out of the hands of the nation’s courts and legislatures in favor of corporate-controlled tribunals? On Feb. 11, at 10 a.m., in the National Press Club’s Bloomberg Room, three experts on trade and investment law will address a National Press Club Newsmaker news conference…. Joseph Stiglitz… Lise Johnson… Ralph E. Gomory

Audio

Mid-February musings on the economics, sociology, and psychology of Obamacare implementation

ObamaCare: How Is It Doing?

There have been three very surprising things with respect to Obamacare implementation so far.

The first is the surge in enrollment in employer-sponsored insurance. The fear was that people and employers would find the coverage offered on the exchanges irresistible, and that there would be a great deal of disruptive churn as the exchanges started up. The penalty for large employers who did not offer health insurance was constructed to guard against this. Yet it seems to have been needless. The appearance of the exchange option appears to have led to more rather than fewer employers offering insurance.

Kevin Drum February 2016 Mother Jones

This is a problem for economists: alternatives are supposed to be at most irrelevant, and certainly their appearance is not supposed to lead to more people voting with their feet for something that was always there. This is a victory for psychologists and sociologists, who if they did not predict this consequence are at least unsurprised by it. The implementation of Obama care thanks health insurance more salient in workers’ minds, and so more highly valued. This shift in valuation induces more employers to offer it as they try to find their compensation sweet spot.

The second surprising thing is the failure of national health expenditures to rise as ObamaCare has been implemented more rapidly than was projected in the baseline. There was, everyone agreed, a great deal of pent-up demand for medical care from people who had been unable to get affordable insurance. When this wave hit, everybody expected, spending would surge–especially as, while ObamaCare did a great deal to expand demand for medical services, it did little to expand supply. The initial surge would, people thought, eventually ebb. But the ebb would leave national health spending on a higher trajectory: people who had not had access to affordable medical care would have it, and they would use it.

The hope of ObamaCare’s advocates was that a system with near-universal coverage would be a more rational and more cost-conscious system. Rather than treating patients and then scrambling for someone with deep pockets who could be made to pay not only their own but others’ bills, a rational calculus of treatment costs and benefits would become at least possible. And, down the road, this plus increased competition would bend the cost curve—and, if not, then whatever additional regulatory steps would turn out to be necessary would be taken.

But the cost curve bent itself.

The cost curve bent itself before Obamacare implementation even began.

And the bending of the cost curve continues. Some attributes the bending to the lesser depression and to a consequently poor society.

As a full explanation, this seems highly strained. Once again, it looks like a victory for the psychologists and the sociologists. The public debate around ObamaCare raised the salience of cost control, of avoiding overtreatment, and of being good stewards of what might be increasingly limited medical care resources in a context in which more people were able to draw on those resources.

All in all: a substantial surprise for us economists. Perhaps we should be cast down from our high seats in the Ttmple of policy analysis?

And there is, of course, the third surprising thing about ObamaCare implementation.

The unreliable rumor on the street is that when Chief Justice Roberts decided to rewrite the Affordable Care Act from the bench—lawlessly, in a technical sense: in a manner with no support in president, law, or the Constitution—Roberts and his clerks thought that they were throwing Americas right wing a bone, but a nothingburger bone. The money to finance Medicaid expansion was more than free to the states: everybody who could do the arithmetic knew that as the federal government paid for the Medicaid expansion, other ancillary draws on state treasuries would decline, leaving states in a better fiscal position. One-third of the Medicaid expansion money would provide more employment in healthcare, as people without affordable access to medical care gained it. One-third would beef up the shaky finances of those healthcare providers who do treat Americas poor. And one-third would flow into the medical industrial complex which would no longer be informally taxed to pay for services that the federal government was now willing to pay for.

How could you turn this down?

Unless, that is, you are a psychopath or a madman for whom treating the poor and paying those who do treat the poor is a minus, Medicaid expansion was and is a no-brainer.

And even if you are a madman and a psychopath, you are also a politician. You draw heavily upon the medical-industrial complex for your campaign contributions. Would you seek to anger the MIC over real money, for nothing except a symbolic declaration that all of the works of the hated Kenyan-Muslim-socialist were rotten? Particularly since those works had originally been the core social policy platform of your own 2012 presidential nominee?

The answer is: yes.

Mad men, and psychopaths, and totally unfazed by the idea of inciting the ire of the MIC. Ohio Governor John Kasich said, apropos of his acceptance of Medicaid expansion money:

You know how many people were yelling at me? I go to events where people are yelling at me. You know what I tell them? I mean, God bless them, I’m telling them a little bit better than this. But I said, there’s a book. It’s got a new part and an old part. They put it together. It’s a remarkable book. If you don’t have one, I’ll buy you one. And it talks about how we treat the poor…

And the response, from then Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and current South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, was this:

At a closed-door donor forum in Palm Springs hosted by the Koch brothers, Kasich was attacked by two fellow Republican governors, Nikki Haley and Bobby Jindal, for, in the words of a source who attended the event, “hiding behind Jesus to expand Medicaid.” The source added, “It got heated”…

So: contrary to what sources who may or may not be reliable concerning Chief Justice John Roberts’s assumptions about the ability of some of his party colleagues to do the math, not a nothingburger bone of a concession at all…

Once again: we economists are in trouble. Politicians turning down free money? Politicians alienating powerful lobbying groups that are in large part inside their coalition for no gain?

Now in the long run it may all work out for the economists. How long will the wave of cost control enthusiasm last? How long will the provision of health insurance remain salient and thus a cheap way for more employers to please their workers? How long will the Brownbacks and their flacks continue to claim, largely falsely, that Medicaid expansion props up inner city hospitals that ought to close because they treat Black people? How long will those who elect and reelect the Brownbacks continue to buy this, as rural hospitals that treat white people continue to call out for the life preserver that the Brownbacks? continue to refuse to throw?

But in all three of these cases the long run is certainly taking its own sweet time in arriving…

Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: The Hope of Health Care Cost Stabilization: “We knew that there was going to be a massive amount of catch-up [health] care…

…as people who either were uncovered, sporadically covered or had no usable insurance because the cost sharing was atrocious got coverage through either Medicaid expansion or the Exchanges. The big question was always how much catch up care was happening and if/when would it subside as crisis care converted into maitenance care. There is starting to be some evidence that the catch up care wave is subsiding…. This uncertainty about catch-up care was why there were the three R’s of risk adjustment, risk corridors and re-insurance. No one knew how many expensive surprises were out there.

https://www.balloon-juice.com/2016/02/03/the-hope-of-stabilization/

Why it’d be nice if the “job-hopping” Millennial story were true

One stereotype of Millennials is that they are constantly hopping from one job to another, unable to hold one down. Unfortunately for that narrative, the data don’t seem to back it up, and young workers today are less likely to switch jobs than in the past.

If Horace Greeley were alive today, his advice to young people would probably have less to do with physically moving as much as moving jobs. Moving from job to job early in a career is a positive sign for earnings and wage growth as young workers gain experience, find what career path they might enjoy, and climb the job ladder to higher-paying jobs. So while we should be focused on the total amount of quitting and job-to-job movement as a sign of the health of the labor market, we should keep a particular eye on these trends for young workers. And it’s worthwhile to dispel some myths about young workers and their propensity to switching jobs.

The entrance of the Millennial generation (those roughly 18 to 34 years old) into the U.S. workforce has caused a bit of consternation among older generations, even provoking deep study into the generation by some managers. One stereotype of the younger generation is that they are constantly hopping from one job to another, unable to hold one down. Unfortunately for that narrative, the data don’t seem to back it up. Both Jeff Guo of the Washington Post and Ben Casselman of FiveThirtyEight have written pieces citing data showing that young workers today are actually less likely to jump from job to job than in the past.

Yet the narrative endures. Last week, Natalie Kitroeff wrote a piece for Bloomberg Business in which she asks if these younger workers are less likely to stick to a job. Millennials, in her telling, “seem categorically opposed to spending their lives at one desk.” Because the quits rate data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey can’t be broken down by worker age, however, she says she can’t tell if young workers are quitting and switching jobs at a higher rate.

But data from the Job-to-Job Flows data set are broken down by age, so we actually can tell how job switching is changing across the age distribution. Like JOLTS, the Job-to-Job Flows data set goes back to 2000. Looking at the data, young workers are more likely to switch jobs than older workers today, but that’s been true for the entire time the data set covers.

Since 2000, the job-to-job transition rate for all U.S. workers has been on the decline. From the peak of the overall transition rate in the third quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2013, the rate for workers ages 25 to 34 declined by about 23 percent. Over that same period, the switching rate fell by 18 percent for workers ages 35 to 44, and by 16 percent for workers ages 45 to 54. The decline has been the largest the youngest workers.

The recovery in job switching has also been quite similar by age. From the second quarter of 2009—the end of the Great Recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research—to the third quarter of 2013, the transition rate for 24- to 34-year-olds increased by about 37 percent. The increase for 34- to 55-year-olds was 42 percent and 35 percent for 45- to 54-year-olds.

So not only are young workers less likely to switch jobs than in the past, but the increase in job switching has been strongest for older workers.

This decline is worrying. Young workers have been increasingly working in low-paid industries since 2000, which means they’re starting their career low on the job ladder. Combined with a declining transition rate, this means young workers are less likely to move up the ladder, resulting in weaker wage growth and lower upward mobility during a lifetime. A labor market where young workers were increasingly likely to move from job to job would be a quite good thing. Sadly, the data tell us something else.

Update: Penultimate paragraph edited for clarity.

Must-read: Ada Palmer (2014): “Sketches of a History of Skepticism, Part I: Classical Eudaimonia”

Must-Read: Ada Palmer (2014): Sketches of a History of Skepticism, Part I: Classical Eudaimonia: “Our youth, whom we shall now leave panicking on the riverbank along with Socrates…

…Descartes, Sartre and, hopefully, a comfortable picnic, has now received the full impact of why Zeno’s paradoxes of motion matter. They aren’t supposed to convince you there’s no motion, they’re supposed to convince you that logic says there is no motion, therefore we cannot trust logic. Their intended target is any philosopher cough Plato cough Aristotle cough who wants to make the claim that we one can achieve certainty by weaving logic chains together. Anyone whose tool is Logic. Meanwhile, the stick in water attacks any philosopher who wants to rely on sense perception cough Aristotle cough Epicurus cough and say that we know things with certainty through Evidence. When you put both side-by-side, and demand that Zeno shoot an arrow at the stick in water that looks bent, then it seems that both Logic and Evidence are unreliable, and therefore that… there can be no certainty! Don’t panic, be happy…

Must-reads: February 15, 2016


  • Richard Mayhew: “The cost curve is bending. If prices can grow at roughly the rate of inflation and not even nominal GDP quite a few long term federal financing problems go from dire to manageable…”

Must-read: Henry Farrell: “Facebook’s Algorithms Are Not Your Friend”

Must-Read: Ordinarily, buyers and sellers in a marketplace have a partial harmony of interests. All want to make a win-win deal. But all also want to, conditional on the deal being made, reduce the amount of surplus received by their counterparty by as much as they can. The interest vectors have a positive dot product. But they are not aligned.

However, when what is being sold is not the service to the user but rather the user’s eyeballs to an advertiser who may want to inform the user and may want to distort the user’s cognition and worsen his or her judgment, even the partial harmony of interest goes up for grabs. And now Henry Farrell is annoyed at Alex Tabarrok’s transfer of what was originally a valid intuition outside of its proper sphere:

Henry Farrell: Facebook’s Algorithms Are Not Your Friend: “Alex’s more fundamental claim–like very many of Alex’s claims…

…rests on the magic of markets and consumer sovereignty. Hence all of the stuff about billions of dollars ‘making its algorithm more and more attuned to our wants and needs’ and so on. But we know that the algorithm isn’t supposed to be attuned to our wants and needs. It’s supposed to be attuned to Facebook’s wants and needs, which are in fact rather different. Facebook’s profit model doesn’t involve selling commercial services to its consumers, but rather selling its consumers to commercial services. This surely gives it some incentive to make its website attractive (so that people come to it) and sticky (so that they keep on using it). But it also provides it with incentives to keep its actual customers happy–the businesses who use it to advertise…

Must-read: Donald Kohn and David Wessel: “Eight Ways to Improve the Fed’s Accountability”

Must-Reads: Perhaps the most frustrating thing about monetary policy making since the taper tantrum has been that we outsiders find that (a) asymmetric risks plus (b) uncertainty about the true state of the labor market and (c) uncertainty about the position and slope of the Phillips Curve are dispositive. They make the case for keeping the monetary-expansion pedal to the metal overwhelming. Yet the Federal Reserve has not felt compelled to engage with outsiders making these arguments in any sustained and deep technocratic way. And those doing oversight at congress have been incapable of doing the job–what we have seen has been either blathering or, worse, ravings about the gold standard.

The extremely-sharp Don Kohn and David Wessel have good suggestions for procedural reform:

Donald Kohn and David Wessel: Eight Ways to Improve the Fed’s Accountability: “1. The Fed should… have monetary policy hearings quarterly…

…2. The now semi-annual Monetary Policy Report… should become quarterly…. 3. The Fed should publicly release the Monetary Policy Report three days before the relevant hearing…. 4. The Monetary Policy Report should continue to include the Fed’s assessment of financial stability risks…. 5. Fed staff should continue to brief and field questions from the congressional staff…. 6. Congress should establish a process for obtaining and publishing the views of outside experts…. 7. Each quarterly hearing in the House should allow only half the committee members to question the chair…. 8. The Fed should hire outside experts to periodically evaluate the procedures used to generate… economic projections….

None of these suggestions would reduce the Fed’s independence. Rather, they would improve Congress’s oversight and the Fed’s accountability, at a time when our economic discourse would greatly benefit from better public understanding and increased confidence in the efficacy and appropriateness of the central bank’s actions.

Must-read: John Plender: ‘Lehman Brothers: A Crisis of Value’ by Oonagh McDonald

Must-Read: Either Lehman was a reasonable organization caught in a perfect storm–in which case its creditors should have been bailed out as part of its resolution–or Lehman should have been shut down and resolved while there was still enough notional equity value left in the portfolio to cover the inevitable surprises and the likely negative shock to risk tolerance. As I have come to read it, Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner were afraid to do their job in spring and summer of 2008, and also afraid to take responsibility to do what their forbearance with Lehman in the spring and summer had made prudent in the fall.

Perhaps Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner thought that although the way they handled Lehman was a small technocratic policy mistake, it was a political economy necessity. Perhaps they thought an uncontrolled Lehman bankruptcy that would deliver a painful shock to asset markets and economies would generate strong political benefits: constituents would feel that shock and then complain to congress, which would then give the Fed and the Treasury a free hand to keep it from happening again. Perhaps such considerations made it the right political-economy thing to do. Perhaps not.

But we have never had the debate over that. Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner have instead claimed that they did not have legal authority to resolve Lehman in the fall. Combining with their failure to resolve it in the summer to generate the conclusion that they did not understand what their jobs were:

John Plender: ‘Lehman Brothers: A Crisis of Value’ by Oonagh McDonald: “The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was… a spectacular curtain raiser…

…Oonagh McDonald, a British financial regulation expert and former MP, brings a regulatory perspective to the story, exploring the multitude of flaws in the patchwork of rules… examines how, one weekend in September, Lehman went from being valued by the stock market at $639bn to being worth nothing at all…. Lehman… was so highly leveraged that its assets had only to fall in value by 3.6 per cent for the bank to be wiped out. The tale of how the management reached this point under the leadership of Dick Fuld is compelling. The response… to the credit crunch that began in mid-2007 was pure hubris. Having survived episodes of financial turmoil when many expected the bank to fail, Mr Fuld and his colleagues decided to take on more risk. Meanwhile, they neglected to inform the board that they were exceeding their self-imposed risk limits and excluding more racy assets from internal stress tests…. Much of the decline in the value of Lehman’s assets came from direct exposure to property….

The conclusion is a broader, provocative exploration of the concept of market value, in which McDonald tilts at the efficient market hypothesis that underlay much of the thinking in finance ministries, central banks and regulatory bodies before the crisis…. The brickbats McDonald aims at regulatory behaviour before the crisis are amply justified. More questionable is her critique of crisis management by the US Treasury and the US Federal Reserve. She thinks Lehman could and should have been bailed out in the interests of systemic stability, but does not address the question of how the troubled asset relief programme would have found its way through a hostile Congress without the extreme shock of Lehman’s collapse…

Must-read: Paul Krugman sending us to Gavyn Davies, Lael Briainard from last October, and himself from a year ago

Must-Read: James Fallows will be upset as I buy into the myth of the boiling frog. The Federal Reserve’s decision to raise interest rates last December was, it thought, a marginal move that was running a small risk. But as evidence has piled in suggesting that the risks on the downside are larger and larger, the Federal Reserve has done… nothing…

Paul Krugman orders and inspects the arguments:

Paul Krugman sends us to Gavyn Davies, Lael Briainard from last October, and himself from a year ago:

  • Gavyn Davies today: The Fed and the Dollar Shock: “The dismal performance of asset prices continued…. The weakening US economy. This weakness seems to be in direct conflict with the continued determination of the Federal Reserve to tighten monetary policy. Janet Yellen’s… attitude was deemed by investors to be complacent about US growth. (See Tim Duy’s excellent analysis of her remarks here.) Why is the Federal Reserve apparently reluctant to respond to the mounting recessionary and deflationary risks faced by the US? It is human nature that they are reluctant to admit that their decision to raise rates in December was a mistake. Furthermore, they believe that markets are often volatile, and the squall could yet blow over. But I suspect that something deeper is going on. The FOMC may be underestimating the need to offset the major dollar shock that is currently hitting the economy…”

  • Lael Brainard: Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy–October 12, 2015: “The risks to the near-term outlook for inflation appear to be tilted to the downside…. Over the past year, a feedback loop has transmitted market expectations of policy divergence between the United States and our major trade partners into financial tightening in the U.S. through exchange rate and financial market channels…. The downside risks make a strong case for continuing to carefully nurture the U.S. recovery–and argue against prematurely taking away the support that has been so critical to its vitality…. These risks matter more than usual because the ability to provide additional accommodation if downside risks materialize is, in practice, more constrained than the ability to remove accommodation more rapidly if upside risks materialize…”

  • Paul Krugman: The Dollar and the Recovery: “Consider two pure cases of rising US demand…. #1, everyone sees the relative strength of US spending as temporary…. In that case the dollar doesn’t move, and the bulk of the demand surge stays in the US…. #2, everyone sees the strength of US spending relative to the rest of the world as more or less permanent. In that case the dollar rises sharply, effectively sharing the rise in US demand more or less evenly around the world. It’s important to note, by the way, that this is not just ordinary leakage via the import content of spending; it works via financial markets and the dollar, and happens even if the direct leakage through imports is fairly small. So, what’s actually happening? The dollar is rising a lot, which suggests that markets regard the relative rise in US demand as a fairly long-term phenomenon…. The strong dollar probably is going to be a major drag on recovery.”

Must-read: Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz: “How the Euro Crisis Was Successfully Resolved”

Must-Read: When people ask me if Barry Eichengreen is in, I sometimes say: No, he is in the 1920s. But he will be coming back via time machine and in his office this afternoon.

Now I learn that I was wrong: that he has been visiting Charles Wyplosz, whose home base is a parallel universe in which the Euro crisis was successfully resolved in 2010:

Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz: How the Euro Crisis Was Successfully Resolved: “When the newly elected Greek government of George Papandreou…

…revealed that its predecessor had doctored the books, financial markets reacted violently. This column discusses the steps implemented by policymakers following this episode, which were essential in resolving the Crisis. What is remarkable, in hindsight, is the combination of pragmatism and reasoning based on sound economic principles displayed by European leaders. Instead of finger pointing, they acknowledged that they were collectively responsible for the Crisis….

A miracle [was] made possible by a combination of steely resolve and economic common sense. In their historic 11 February 2010 statement, European heads of state and government acknowledged that the Greek government’s debt was unsustainable. Rather than ‘extend and pretend’, they faced reality…. Greece, European leaders insisted, had to restructure its debt as a condition of external assistance…. Trichet, rather than opposing debt restructuring, opposed the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, noting that the ECB’s mandate limited it to lending against good collateral. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, not happy that their banks had recklessly taken positions in Greek bonds, agreed that those banks should now bear the consequences. If banks failed, then the German and French governments would resolve them, bailing in stakeholders while preserving small depositors. Chancellor Merkel was adamant: asking Greek taxpayers to effectively bail out foreign banks was not only unjust but would aggravate moral hazard….

[The] IMF staff’s debt-sustainability analysis showed that Greece’s debt was already too high for [any] large loan to be paid back…. The managing director quickly concluded that the expedient path was to ally with European leaders and embrace the priority they attached to debt restructuring. At the landmark meeting of the IMF Executive Board on Sunday 10 May, European directors overrode the objections of the US Executive Director. The Board agreed on a programme assuming a 50% haircut on Greek public debt…. Fiscal consolidation was still required but for the moment would be limited to 5% of GDP, which was just possible for Greece’s new national union government to swallow. 

In return for this help, Greece was asked to prepare a programme of structural reforms, starting with product market reform… [which] lowered prices and increased households’ spending power, thereby not worsening the recession…. Programme documents gave the Greek authorities considerable leeway in the design of these measures and acknowledged the reality that they would take time to implement. The Greek government having been reassured of IMF support commenced negotiations with its creditors. A market-based debt exchange, in which investors were offered a menu of bonds with a present value of 50 cents on the euro, was completed by the end of the year…