Must-read: Brad Hershbein: “A College Degree Is Worth (Disproportionately) Less If You Are Raised Poor”

Must-Read: Brad Hershbein: A College Degree Is Worth (Disproportionately) Less If You Are Raised Poor: “Boosting college education is… seen by many—including me…

…as a way to lift people out of poverty, combat growing income inequality, and increase upward social mobility. But how much upward lift does a bachelor’s degree really give to earnings? The answer turns out to vary by family background…. It turns out that the proportional increase for those who grew up poor is much less than for those who did not. College graduates from families with an income below 185 percent of the federal poverty level (the eligibility threshold for the federal assisted lunch program) earn 91 percent more over their careers than high school graduates from the same income group. By comparison, college graduates from families with incomes above 185 percent of the FPL earned 162 percent more over their careers (between the ages of 25 and 62) than those with just a high school diploma…. This earnings gap between poor and non-poor college graduates also widens as time passes. Bachelor’s degree holders from low-income backgrounds start their careers earning about two-thirds as much as those from higher-income backgrounds, but this ratio declines to one-half by mid-career…

A college degree is worth less if you are raised poor Brookings Institution

Must-read: Nick Bunker: “Abundance and the Direction of Technological Growth”

Must-Read: Cf. the debate about North Atlantic technological development in the nineteenth century started by the most amazingly-named Sir Hrothgar John Habakkuk, or, indeed Robert Allen’s The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Most new technologies will not–at least not initially–involve movements of the PPF up and to the right, but rather the creation of new techniques that fall, relative to current ones, in quadrants II and IV. Whether those are profitable will turn very heavily on what current factor prices and factor availabilities are:

Nick Bunker: Abundance and the Direction of Technological Growth: “In a piece from two years ago, Ryan Avent of The Economist fleshes out a deeper argument…

…that in incentivizing work from low-wage workers, wages remain low and reduces the incentive to innovate. If these workers were able to live without earning wages from work, wages might rise and spark labor-saving innovation. Jared Bernstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities floats the idea that during periods of full employment, when the labor market and the economy as a whole use labor and capital to their capacity, productivity can be boosted as companies innovate in response to higher wages.

These arguments are similar to the idea of directed technical change…. The relative prices of the factors of production affect the kind of innovation and productivity growth in an economy…

Must-read: Noah Smith: “Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth”

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth: “After many decades of essentially ignoring the role of land…

…economists are starting to reconsider. Some are worried that landlords are hurting growth by making it too expensive to live in highly productive cities. Now, some are starting to think about how land figures in the rise in inequality. The basic idea is that landlords use their local political power to stack the deck…. That unpleasant narrative might now be playing out in the U.S. Jason Furman, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers…. According to Furman, some of the change may be due to more zoning. Since the late 1970s, land-use regulation has skyrocketed in the U.S….

The new spotlight on zoning is causing even traditional proponents of government intervention to call for regulatory reform. Paul Krugman… “[T]his is an issue on which you don’t have to be a conservative to believe that we have too much regulation. … New York City can’t do much if anything about soaring inequality of incomes, but it could do a lot to increase the supply of housing, and thereby ensure that the inward migration of the elite doesn’t drive out everyone else.”… [But] existing landlords have lots of power in local politics, while potential landlords and tenants, because they are still living elsewhere, have zero…

What to teach the undergraduates about business cycles

Let me promote this to “highlighted” status, and flag it: it is time I once again tried to think hard about just what the “macro” weeks of introductory economics are for:

Time to Start Teaching the Undergraduates About Business Cycles: How to begin? What is the vision I went them to take away and remember?

How about this:

For some reason–it can be any of a large number of reasons, this time it is the blowback from excessive leverage and irrational exuberance, but it can be for any of a large number of reasons–the people in the economy decide that they are spending too much on currently-produced goods and services. They decide that they want to spend less and so build up their holdings of financial assets. People cut back on their spending on currently-produced goods and services, planning to use the margin they will create between income and spending to build up their holdings of financial assets.

The problem is that one person’s spending is another person’s production, and that one person’s production is another person’s income. Businesses see demand for what they produce fall off. They see their inventories of unsold goods rise. Businesses thus lay workers off in order to avoid making even more stuff that they cannot sell: production falls.

And as production falls businesses stop paying the workers they have laid off: incomes fall.

People spend what they had planned on currently-produced goods and services. But they find that their incomes are less than they had thought they would be. Thus the margin they had hoped to create between their incomes and their spending does not exist. People find that they have not managed to carry out their plans to build up their holdings of financial assets. But they still want to. So people try to cut back on their spending on currently produce goods and services yet again to build up their holdings of financial assets. And the process repeats. Spending, production, and incomes fall again.

Why don’t spending and production and incomes and production fall to zero in this downward spiral?
Because at some point incomes drop so low that people give up on the idea of building up their stocks of financial assets.
They still would like to build up their stocks of financial assets–if their incomes were normal. But keeping their standard of living from falling too much becomes a higher priority.

The economy settles down at a spot where spending on currently-produced goods and services once again equals production and income. It finds itself at a short-run macroeconomic equilibrium where inventories are neither rising and causing businesses to fire more workers or falling and causing businesses to hire more workers. This equilibrium, however, has a lot of unemployment: a lot of unemployed workers looking for jobs, and few vacancies looking for workers.

How bad do things get as a result of this collective decision to try to build up stocks of financial assets?

For that we need to build an economic model. And we need to build different economic model then the production function base growth economic model we been dealing with over the past two weeks…

Must-read: Stumbling and Mumbling: “Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives”

Must-Read: Stumbling and Mumbling: Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives: “What happened in both cases is motivational crowding out…

…financial incentives can displace intrinsic ones. Small fines crowded out parents’ desire to help kindergarten staff by being punctual, just as a small prize pot crowded out O’Sullivan’s desire to play brilliantly. This is no mere curiosity. One reason for banks’ serial criminality… is that bonus culture has driven out any sense of professional ethics.Daniel Pink, author of Drive, has described this crowding out as ‘one of the most robust findings in social science’….

Tim Worstall is right to say that the core concept in economics is that incentives matter. However, they can matter in unpredictable ways. The point here is a simple one. Designing incentives – in companies, sport, public services or wherever – require careful thought. More thought, in fact, than is often given. I fear that, in the real world, ‘incentives’ in fact serves an ideological function described by George Carlin:

Conservatives say if you don’t give the rich more money, they will lose their incentive to invest. As for the poor, they tell us they’ve lost all incentive because we’ve given them too much money.

No: We can’t wave a magic demand wand now and get the recovery we threw away in 2009

The estimable Mike Konczal writes:

Mike Konczal: Dissecting the CEA Letter and Sanders’s Other Proposals: “I would have done Gerald Friedman’s paper backwards…

…He gives a giant headline number and then you have to work into the text and the footnotes to gather all the details. But a core assumption within the paper is that we are capable of getting back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand. We can get the recovery we should have gotten in 2009…

He is wrong.

We cannot get back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand alone.

For one thing, demand for investment spending has now been low for almost a decade. Since 2007, we have foregone relative to the then-trend:

  1. 16%-point-years of GDP of housing investment.
  2. 6%-point-years of GDP of equipment investment
  3. 5%-point-years of government purchases–of which roughly half have been investments.
  4. 4% of our labor force from their attachments to the labor market.
  5. A hard-to-quantify amount of development of business models and practices.
FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

These are principal causes of “hysteresis”. I do not believe that the output gap is the zero that the Federal Reserve currently thinks it is. But it is very unlikely to be anywhere near the 12% of GDP needed to support 4%/year real growth through demand along over the next two presidential terms.

We could bend the potential growth curve upward slowly and gradually through policies that boosted investment and boosted the rate of innovation. But it would be very difficult indeed to make up all the potential output-growth ground that we have failed to gain during the past decade of the years that the locust hath eaten

Must-reads: February 21, 2016


Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue”

Must-Read: Very nice. But why “Galilean”, Gavyn? I do note that in the end Gavyn’s “insider” argument boils down to “we must keep the hawks on the FOMC on board with policy”, which is a declaration that:

  1. The Obama administration has made truly serious mistakes in speed of action and in personnel in its Fed governor nominations;
  2. The Bernanke-Yellen Board of Governors has made truly serious mistakes in Fed Bank President selection; and
  3. The high priority given to keeping (nearly) the entire FOMC on board with the policy path should, perhaps, be revisited.

Also, “we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time” is simply incoherent: sunk costs do not matter for future actions.

The dialogue:

Gavyn Davies: Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue: “As Paul Krugman pointed out a year ago…

…a sharp difference of views about US monetary policy has developed between two camps of Keynesians who normally agree about almost everything. What makes this interesting is that, in this division of opinion, the fault line often seems to be determined by the professional location of the economists concerned. Those outside the Federal Reserve (eg Lawrence Summers, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong) tend to adopt a strongly dovish view, while those inside the central bank (eg Janet Yellen, Stanley Fischer, William Dudley, John Williams) have lately taken a more hawkish line about the need to ‘normalise’ the level of interest rates [1]. My colleague David Blake suggested that this blog should carry a Galilean ‘Dialogue’ between representatives of the two camps. Galileo is unavailable this week, but here goes”

Fed Insider: The US has now reached full employment and the labour market remains firm. The Phillips Curve still exists, so wage inflation is headed higher. Core inflation is not far below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. While the economy is therefore close to normal, interest rates are far below normal, so there should be a predisposition to tighten monetary conditions gradually from here. That would still leave monetary policy far more accommodative than normal for a long period of time.

Fed Outsider: I am not so sure about the Phillips Curve. It seems much flatter than it was in earlier decades. But in any case you do not seem to have noticed that the economy is slowing down. This is probably because of the increase in the dollar, which has tightened monetary conditions much more than the Fed intended. The Fed should not make this slowdown worse by raising domestic interest rates as well.

Insider: I concede that the economy has slowed, and I am worried about the tightening in financial conditions caused by the dollar. But I think that this will prove temporary. The dollar effect will not get much worse from here, and the economy has also been affected by inventory shedding and the drop in shale oil investment. As these effects subside, GDP growth will return to above 2 per cent. The pace of employment growth may slow, but remember that payrolls need to grow by under 100,000 per month to keep unemployment constant at the natural rate. Some slowdown is not only inevitable, it is desirable.

Outsider: I do not know how you can be so confident that growth will recover. All your forecasts for growth in recent years have proven far too optimistic. You should be worried that the economy is stuck in a secular stagnation trap. The equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the actual rate of interest. To emerge from secular stagnation, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising them.

Insider: The case for secular stagnation is a bit extreme. Economies tend to return to equilibrium after shocks. The US has been held back by a series of major headwinds since 2009, but these are now abating. Fiscal policy is easing, the euro shock is healing and deleveraging is ending. As these headwinds abate, the equilibrium real rate of interest will return to its normal level around 1.5 per cent, so the nominal Fed funds rate should be 3.5 per cent. It is right to warn people now that this is likely to happen.

Outsider: The hawkish forward guidance shown in your ‘dot plot’ will slow demand growth further. It is unnecessary – in fact, outright damaging. I am pleased that you are rethinking the presentation of the dots. But, more important, the economic recovery is already long in the tooth. There is a 60 percent chance of a recession within 2 years. In a normal recession, the Fed has to cut interest rates by 4 percentage points. Because of the zero lower bound, it will not be able to do so in the next recession, so it needs to avoid a recession at all costs.

Insider: Oh dear. Recoveries do not die of old age, as Glenn Rudebusch at the San Francisco Fed has just conclusively proved. Expansions, like Peter Pan, do not grow old. Provided that we avoid a build up of inflation pressures, or excessive risk taking in markets, there is no reason to believe that this recovery will spontaneously run out of steam. It is much more likely to persist.

Outsider: Maybe, but have you ever considered the possibility that you might be wrong? The future path of the equilibrium interest rate is subject to huge uncertainty, as your own estimations demonstrate. If you kill this recovery, it will subsequently be impossible to use monetary policy to get out of recession. If, on the other hand, you allow inflation to rise, you can easily bring it back under control, simply by raising interest rates. So the risks are not symmetrical.

Insider: Well, we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time. And anyway I do not agree with you about inflation risks. If we allow inflation to become embedded in the system, we will then have to raise interest rates abruptly. That is the most likely way that this recovery can end in a severe recession.

Outsider: Inflation cannot rise permanently unless inflation expectations rise as well. In case you have not noticed, inflation expectations have been falling and are now out of line with your 2 per cent inflation target. This is dangerous because real (inflation adjusted) interest rates are actually rising when they should be falling.

Insider: I used to worry a lot about the inflation expectations built into the bond market, but I now think that these are affected by market imperfections that should be downplayed. Inflation expectations in the household and corporate sectors are still broadly in line with the Fed target. And, anyway, I am increasingly concerned that inflation could rise because productivity growth is now so low. With the economy at full employment, inflation pressures could be building, even with GDP growth still very subdued.

Outsider: I am also very worried about the slowdown in productivity growth. But I think this could be happening because you have allowed the actual GDP growth rate to be so low for so long. Because of hysteresis, you may be making things progressively worse. You may have permanently shifted the equilibrium of the economy in a bad direction.

Insider: I am not so sure about this hysteresis stuff. I would not rule it out entirely. But you cannot rely on the Fed to solve all of our economic problems. At the moment, the Fed’s main priority is to return monetary policy to normal, and I am determined to continue this process unless something really bad happens to the economy.

Outsider: In that case, something bad is quite likely to happen. It seems that it will take a disaster to shake your orthodoxy. Do you really want to be responsible for making a historic economic mistake?

Insider: It is easy for you on the outside to make dramatic points like that. If you had been entrusted with the responsibility of office, you would be more circumspect. Although we went to the same graduate school, we are now in different positions. The hawks on the FOMC need to be kept on board with the majority. And I do not want to inflame the Fed’s Republican critics in Congress by appearing soft on inflation. That means I sometimes have to make difficult compromises that you do not have to make.

Outsider: The hawks are giving too much weight to the health of the banks. You should be worrying more about Main Street, and less about Wall Street.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “What Have We Learned since 2008?”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned since 2008?: “Some annoying propositions…

…”Complex” econometrics never convinces anyone. “Complex” includes multiple regression. Natural experiments rule. But so do “surprising” ex-ante predictions that come true…. “In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences.” — Frank Graham…. Demand side: The liquidity trap as a baseline…. Predictions: * Little or no effect of even very large increases in monetary base. * No crowding out from deficits * Large fiscal multipliers. These were controversial predictions!….

Very little effect of monetary expansion. Certainly no inflation. Did QE do anything?… Feel the [debt] crowding out!… Things we didn’t expect: crucial role of liquidity…. Things we didn’t expect: negative rates…. But there is still presumably a lower bound set by storage costs for currency….

The supply side: what was the baseline? Probably the accelerationist Phillips curve…. But what’s missing is the acceleration, not the unemployment => inflation causation…. Strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (courtesy Olivier Blanchard)…. Things we didn’t expect: Very strong hysteresis (maybe)….

What is the post-2008 experience trying to tell us? * Liquidity-trap economics passes with flying colors. * Fiscal policy effectiveness confirmed. * Monetary iffy at best. * Neo-paleo-Keynesian aggregate supply in short run. * Long run seems to reinforce, not diminish, that case.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Living with Monetary Impotence”

Must-Read: [And no sooner do I write:]

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now…

But Paul Krugman goes full (1) as well:

Paul Krugman: Living with Monetary Impotence: “Check our low, low rates…

… Fiscal policy has been effective but procyclical…. Monetary policy has been countercyclical but ineffective…. Lender of last resort matters…. Otherwise, not so much…. Open market vs. open mouth operations…. String theory is hard to explain…. Surprise implication: stagnation is contagious.