Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: Why Hasn’t the Productivity Crisis Caused a Bear Market (Yet)?

Must-Read: This by the very sharp Gavyn Davies seems to me to be wrong. An ebbing of the current shortage of risk-bearing capacity would produce a further boom in equities. Central banks’ focus on a 2%/year inflation target makes it very difficult to envision any improvement in the economy leading to be a rapid increase in the wage share. Some unknown future negative shock to the economy could certainly produce a large bear market in equities. But a return to more normal risk attitudes in markets and a continuation of business-as-usual are very unlikely to do so:

Gavyn Davies: Why Hasn’t the Productivity Crisis Caused a Bear Market (Yet)?: “The 2016 calendar year may well see productivity growth in the US economy slumping to around 0.5 per cent, a catastrophic outcome…

…The productivity slowdown has often been called a ‘puzzle’, because it has coincided with a period of rapid technological change in the internet sector…. [But] many of the obvious benefits of the internet revolution appear to increase human welfare without leading to increases in market transactions and nominal GDP. Furthermore, there are several other plausible reasons for the productivity slowdown, including low business investment and a loss of economic dynamism since the financial crash. There is however a different puzzle connected to the productivity slowdown. Given that it has greatly reduced the level and expected growth rate in nominal GDP, why has it had so little apparent impact on equities, an asset class that depends on the level and expected future growth of corporate earnings?…

The conclusion is that the damaging impact of the productivity slump on the S&P 500 has so far been masked by other factors, but there are signs that this might be changing…. The drop in productivity growth has been accompanied by a decline in the yield on safe assets (government bonds), so the discount rate to be applied to future corporate earnings and dividends has declined…. There are however some other reasons…. The share of profits in the economy has risen to historic peak levels, and the dividend payout ratio has also increased…. So does this mean that investors can sit back and relax in the face of a productivity crisis that will clearly damage the outlook for the global economy very seriously? I doubt whether this aberration can last forever. The decline in the real bond yield may be reaching its limits…. And the sharp falls in the unemployment rate, especially in the US, could cause greater wage pressure and a decline in the profit share in GDP…

Must-Read: Maury Obstfeld: Evolution Not Revolution: Rethinking Policy at the IMF

Must-Read: Maurice Obstfeld: Evolution Not Revolution: Rethinking Policy at the IMF: “I would describe the process as evolution, not revolution…

…The Fund has long tried to build on its experiences in the field and on new research to improve its effectiveness in economic surveillance, technical assistance, and crisis response. It’s fair to say that the shock of the global financial crisis led to a broad rethink of macroeconomic and financial policy in the global academic and policy community. The Fund has been part of that, but, given the impacts of our decisions on member countries and the global economic system, we view it as especially important for us constantly to re-evaluate our thinking in light of new evidence. That process has not fundamentally changed the core of our approach, which is based on open and competitive markets, robust macro policy frameworks, financial stability, and strong institutions. But it has added important insights about how best to achieve those results in a sustainable way….

We are in favor of fiscal policies that support growth and equity over the long term. What those policies will be can differ from country to country and from situation to situation. Governments simply have to live within their means on a long-term basis, or face some form of debt default, which normally is quite costly for citizens, and especially the poorest. This is a fact, not an ideological position. Our job is to advise how governments can best manage their fiscal policies so as to avoid bad outcomes. Sometimes, this requires us to recognize situations in which excessive budget cutting can be counterproductive to growth, equity, and even fiscal sustainability goals….

Countries need credible medium-term fiscal frameworks that leave markets confident the public debt can be repaid without very high inflation. Countries with such frameworks will typically have room to soften economic slumps through fiscal means, including automatic stabilizers…. There are limits to the pain economies can or should sustain, so in especially difficult cases we recommend debt re-profiling or debt reduction, which require creditors to bear part of the cost of adjustment. That is the approach we are currently recommending for Greece…

Must-Read: Michael Hiltzik: Mergers in the Healthcare Sector: Why You’ll Pay More

Must-Read: Because people must purchase health insurance under ObamaCare, the demand curve has a steeper slope–and thus oligopoly and monopoly are even more dangerous and destructive than they typically are:

Michael Hiltzik: Mergers in the Healthcare Sector: Why You’ll Pay More: “Aetna is seeking to merge with Humana in one of the two proposed health insurance mega-mergers facing state and federal scrutiny…

…the other deal would combine Anthem and Cigna. Lower prices. More efficient healthcare. More innovation. Better customer service. That’s what hospital and insurance companies say, anyway.  But here’s what the data say: Hospital and insurance mergers almost always lead to higher costs, lower efficiencies and less innovation. The reason is simple: Mergers reduce competition–and it’s competition that drives down prices and encourages more efficiency and innovation. Some healthcare mergers have been outright disasters for consumers; studies of mergers that took place in the 1990s and early 2000s showed price increases of as much as 40% in communities that lost competition. These findings are important because we are deep into a new era of healthcare consolidation. In 2015, 112 hospital mergers were announced nationwide; that’s 18% more than a year earlier, and a 70% increase over 2010…

Must-Reads: June 12, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: Innovation Is Not Enough

Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: Innovation Is Not Enough: “Who can seriously doubt that innovation is progressing rapidly?…

…Technological diffusion can be constrained on both the demand and supply sides of the economy…. In rich economies, consumers spend the bulk of their income on services such as health, education, transportation, housing, and retail goods [where] technological innovation has had comparatively little impact to date…. The two sectors in the United States that have experienced the most rapid productivity growth since 2005 are the ICT… and media… with a combined GDP share of less than 10%…. Techno-optimists… look at such numbers as an opportunity: There remain vast productivity gains to be had from the adoption of new technologies in the lagging sectors. The pessimists, on the other hand, think that such gaps may be a structural, lasting feature of today’s economies…. On the supply side… when the technology requires high skills… its adoption and diffusion will tend to widen the gap between the earnings of low- and high-skill workers. Economic growth will be accompanied by rising inequality, as it was in the 1990s.

The supply-side problem faced by developing countries is more debilitating. The labor force is predominantly low-skilled. Historically, this has not been a handicap for late industrializers, so long as manufacturing consisted of labor-intensive assembly operations such as garments and automobiles. Peasants could be transformed into factory workers virtually overnight, implying significant productivity gains for the economy. Manufacturing was traditionally a rapid escalator to higher income levels. But once manufacturing operations become robotized and require high skills, the supply-side constraints begin to bite. Effectively, developing countries lose their comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rich countries. We see the consequences in the ‘premature deindustrialization’ of the developing world today. In a world of premature deindustrialization, achieving economy-wide productivity growth becomes that much harder for low-income countries. It is not clear whether there are effective substitutes for industrialization…

Must-Read: Ben Eisen: Newest Inflation Expectations Likely to Trouble the Fed

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Must-Read: Ben Eisen: Newest Inflation Expectations Likely to Trouble the Fed: “The Federal Reserve probably won’t like the latest data out of the University of Michigan on Friday…

…inflation expectations over the next five to ten years dropping to 2.3% in June, a record low…. That’s on top of market-based inflation expectations that have also fallen over the past month…. When Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen spoke on Monday, she drew attention to inflation expectations as a key input in actual inflation. She said:

It is unclear whether these indicators point to a true decline in those inflation expectations that are relevant for price setting; for example, the financial market measures may reflect changing attitudes toward inflation risk more than actual inflation expectations. But the indicators have moved enough to get my close attention. If inflation expectations really are moving lower, that could call into question whether inflation will move back to 2 percent as quickly as I expect….

The market is taking note as well. Benchmark 10-year Treasury note yields dropped to their lowest of the day after the data and recently traded at 1.63%, a new low for the year on a closing basis…

Inflation Becomes Key as Investors See Economic Weakness MoneyBeat WSJ

Macroeconomics, Fantasy, Reality, and Intellectual Utility…

A very nice overview piece this morning from smart young whippersnapper Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Economics Struggles to Cope With Reality: “Four different activities… go by the name of macroeconomics. But they actually have relatively little to do with each other….

  1. ‘coffee-house macro,’ and it’s what you hear in a lot of casual discussions. It often revolves around the ideas of dead sages–Friedrich Hayek, Hyman Minsky and John Maynard Keynes. It doesn’t involve formal models, but it does usually contain a hefty dose of political ideology.

  2. Finance macro. This consists of private-sector economists and consultants who try to read the tea leaves on interest rates, unemployment, inflation and other indicators in order to predict the future of asset prices (usually bond prices). It mostly uses simple math, though advanced forecasting models are sometimes employed. It always includes a hefty dose of personal guesswork.

  3. Academic macro. This traditionally involves professors making toy models of the economy–since the early ’80s, these have almost exclusively been DSGE models (if you must ask, DSGE stands for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium). Though academics soberly insist that the models describe the deep structure of the economy, based on the behavior of individual consumers and businesses, most people outside the discipline who take one look at these models immediately think they’re kind of a joke. They contain so many unrealistic assumptions that they probably have little chance of capturing reality. Their forecasting performance is abysmal. Some of their core elements are clearly broken. Any rigorous statistical tests tend to reject these models instantly, because they always include a hefty dose of fantasy….

  4. Fed macro. The Federal Reserve uses an eclectic approach, involving both data and models. Sometimes the models are of the DSGE type, sometimes not. Fed macro involves taking data from many different sources, instead of the few familiar numbers like unemployment and inflation, and analyzing the information in a bunch of different ways. And it inevitably contains a hefty dose of judgment, because the Fed is responsible for making policy.

However, I think he has picked the wrong four.

Let’s start with Noah’s second: finance macro. It needs to be divided: One of its pieces–call that the second of our four components of macro–is grifter-finance macro: essentially affinity fraud to terrify rich people and get them to let you overcharge them to manage your money or simply to sell some snake oil you have to offer. I think it should come first:

  1. Grifter macro

The other piece of Noah’s second–call that the useful finance-forecasting macro–is really the same thing as Fed-technocratic macro: the flow of ideas and people is large, and convergence not to a consensus model or approach but to a near-consensus distribution of models and approaches is relatively rapid. But let’s postpone that.

Instead, turn to Noah’s third, academic macro. It too needs to be divided: One of its pieces–DSGE macro–has indeed proven a degenerating research program and a catastrophic failure: thirty years of work have produced no tools for useful forecasting or policy analysis. As Noah puts it:

Academic macro has basically failed the other three…. Because academic macro is so useless for forecasting–including predicting the results of policy changes–the financial industry can’t use it for practical purposes. I’ve talked to dozens of people in finance about why they don’t use DSGE models, and some have indeed tried to use them–but they always dropped the models after poor performance.

Hence Noah’s first two need to be:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro

The other piece of Noah’s third is composed of that part of the academic community that is in dialogue with both finance-forecasting and Fed-technocratic macro. Noah says:

My view is that academic macro has basically failed the other three…. The Fed has had to go it alone when studying how the macroeconomy really works. Regional Fed banks and the Federal Reserve Board function as macroeconomic think tanks, hiring top-level researchers to do the grubby data work and broad thinking that academia has decided is beneath it. But that leaves many of the field’s brightest minds locked in the ivory tower, playing with their toys…

I think this is wrong. Academics are not locked in the ivory tower. Rather, some academics–unfortunately, many academics–lock themselves in their own ivory tower. And I question Noah’s description of the people as “brightest”. If you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring a single consumption Euler equation (rather than, say, risk-averse rich 70-somethings with short horizons; myopic middle-class 40-somethings, and the liquidity constrained); if you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring that firms engage in Calvo pricing; If you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring rational expectations (rather than anchored, adaptive, extrapolative, perfect-foresight, and Panglossian)–well, then you really aren’t very bright at all, are you?

In fact, there is a dialogue between Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting, and what we might call useful-academic. This dialogue is strong enough that they are pretty much the same thing: the flow of ideas and people is large, and convergence not to a consensus model or approach but to a near-consensus distribution of models and approaches is relatively rapid. Thus Noah’s first three should be:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro

And then there is Noah’s first, coffee-house macro:

Because academic macro models are so out of touch with reality, people in causal coffee-house discussions can’t refer to academic research to help make their points. Instead, they have to turn back to the old masters, who if vague and wordy were at least describing a world that had some passing resemblance to the economy we observe in our daily lives…

What this leaves out, I think, is that there is substantial idea-flow from coffee-house macro into useful Fed and forecasting macro. The useful macro community has spent the last decade realizing that there is a lot more to be learned from Keynes and Minsky than it had thought, and has been busily revising how and what it thinks under pressure of events. In some sense this was or ought to have been obvious. As Larry Summers said to me back in 1983: “There ought to be an awful lot of excellent careers to be made in macro by mathing-up more pieces of Keynes”. (There is also, alas!, substantial idea-flow from coffee-house macro into grifter macro–Hayek, von Mises, etc.)

Thus if I were to write down a quadriad, I would modify Noah’s into:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro
  4. Coffee-house macro

I would say that (2) is in dialogue with nobody and nothing. I would say that (1) is in dialogue with the wing nuttier parts of (4). And I would say that (3) and (4) are in useful dialogue–albeit one-way dialogue, so far at least, as useful macro is a recipient of big ideas from coffee-house macro rather than a generator of new and different big ideas for coffee-house macro.

And I would add a fifth:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro
  4. Coffee-house macro
  5. Policy macro

Policy macro is the intellectual framework that underpins the policies that the North Atlantic has followed since the start off 2010.

It is not in close dialogue with any of the others.

It has been, on the fiscal side, a complete disaster. It has been, on the regulatory side, a mixed bag. And it has been, on the monetary side, a very partial success.

Noah concludes with optimism:

Justin Wolfers… a conference celebrating the career of MIT economist Olivier Blanchard…. Wolfers suggested abandoning DSGE models, saying that they ‘haven’t worked’… suggests that the new macroeconomics will focus on empirics and falsification… fertilized by other disciplines… will incorporate elements of behavioral economics….

I think the new macroeconomics… will redefine what ‘macroeconomics’ even means…. ‘Macro-focused micro’–studies of businesses, competition, markets and individual behavior that have relevance for macro… business dynamism, price adjustment, financial bubbles and differences between workers. Let’s hope more and more macroeconomists focus on these things, instead of trying to make big, grandiose, but ultimately vacuous models of booms and recessions. When we understand the pieces of the economy better, we’ll have a much better chance of grasping the whole…

I am not sure. Macroeconomics needs, desperately, better and real behavioral microfoundations at the sector and the market level. But it also needs much better approaches to aggregation–to understanding how macroeconomic phenomena emerge out of real microfoundations.

Weekend reading: “elusive employment effects” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Why have students of for-profit colleges, who tend to have less debt that traditional students, seen their student loan default rates rise so much? Perhaps because the average for-profit student sees their earnings decline after attendance.

The relatively weak growth in business investment since the Great Recession has some economists puzzled. Maybe low interest rates have contributed to investment’s slow growth due to retirees’ investment decision-making? Given the assumptions about retirees this hypothesis requires, it seems unlikely.

Equitable Growth published our batch of working papers for June. This month’s papers include research on the effect of credit on job finding and output, a review of a new text book on immigration economics, and a paper trying to understand why a negative employment effect of the minimum wage is so hard to find.

Ben Zipperer writes about the new paper on the employment effects of the minimum wage, detailing the possible reasons why this negative effect hasn’t shown up in empirical work. The possibilities range from the effects on consumer demand to the idea that the perfectly competitive model of the labor market could be wrong.

Debates about the corporate income tax in the United States usually focus just on the marginal tax rate. While the rate is very important (it determines how much of an additional dollar is taxed), we can’t forget the importance of the tax base (how much of income is actually taxed).

Rents, you have heard, are too high in many coastal U.S. cities. Yet the trend may get worse over the next decade if trends continue. Nisha Chikhale points out important trends for rental demand and offers some possible policy solutions.

With the U.S. Department of Labor finalizing its new rule on overtime regulations, reminding ourselves of the state of overwork in the United States seems like a worthwhile endeavor. Heather Boushey and Bridget Ansel highlight three key charts from their recent report.

Links from around the web

One of the many open questions about the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policies to rebound from the Great Recession is how much it affected inequality. As the responses to this IGM Forum question from a panel of economists show, we really don’t know the answer. [igm]

Negative nominal interest rates used to be unthinkable. But now moderately negative interest rates are part of central banks’ policy toolbox. Narayana Kocherlakota discusses how communications policy will be a key part of using negative rates in the future. [bloomberg view]

Public education in the United States is very segregated by race. The implications of this segregation and the resulting inequality in access to education are huge. Nikole Hannah-Jones details the segregation in New York’s public schools and efforts to change it. [nyt magazine]

In 2011, venture capitalist Marc Andreessen argued that software was “eating the world.” Five years later, Conor Sen argues that housing, after a post-crisis lull, is about to eat the U.S. economy. [csen]

Speaking of housing, Josh Lehner proposes a “housing trilemma” for U.S. cities. A city may want to have a strong economy, a high quality of life, and housing affordability. But seemingly they can only get two of those three options at once. [oregon economic analysis]

Friday figure

Figure from “Equitable Growth’s Jobs Day Graphs: May 2016 Report Edition

Must-Read: Marco Arment: Avoiding Blackberry’s Fate

Must-Read: Marco Arment: Avoiding BlackBerry’s Fate: “Before the iPhone, RIM’s BlackBerry was the king of smartphones…

…When the iPhone came out, the BlackBerry continued to do well for a little while. But the iPhone had completely changed the game…. The BlackBerry’s success came to an end not because RIM started releasing worse smartphones, but because the new job of the smartphone shifted almost entirely outside of their capabilities, and it was too late to catch up…. No new initiative, management change, or acquisition in 2007 could’ve saved the BlackBerry. It was too late, and the gulf was too wide.

Today, Amazon, Facebook, and Google are placing large bets on advanced AI, ubiquitous assistants, and voice interfaces…. If they’re right — and that’s a big ‘if’ — I’m worried for Apple…. [in] big-data services and AI…. Apple can do rudimentary versions of all of those, but their competitors — again, especially Google — are far ahead of them, and the gap is only widening. And Apple is showing worryingly few signs of meaningful improvement or investment in these areas….

If Google is wrong, and computing continues to be defined by a tightly controlled grid of siloed apps that you poke a thousand times a day on a smooth rectangle of manufacturing excellence, Apple is fine…. But if Google is right, that’s a big problem for Apple.