Is Tax Increment Financing the pathway to rebuilding blighted U.S. infrastructure?

Urban blight in Baltimore, Maryland.

It’s no secret that the infrastructure in the United States is underfunded, under-maintained, and, consequently, crumbling in many communities across the country, as it has been over the course of the past five decades. In fact, our infrastructure, which includes everything from transit and roads to energy and drinking water, has deteriorated so much that the American Society of Civil Engineering recently awarded a D+ rating to describe its overall health.

The good news is that we already know that investments in infrastructure can go a long way toward not only improving the condition of infrastructure across the country but also bolstering the broader economy. In the near term, infrastructure projects can spur local economic activity, and increase employment. And in the long run, according to Josh Bivens of the Economic Policy Institute, different levels of investment—be it stopping scheduled funding cuts, focusing on green strategies, or closing the “infrastructure deficit”—will provide better paying jobs for those will less education and help improve overall U.S. economic growth and productivity.

Yet how exactly do policymakers jumpstart these efforts? Over the years, as federal funds and grants have decreased, most of the responsibilities for urban renewal and infrastructure development now fall upon local governments. Municipalities or local development authorities are then left to figure out how to raise the money to make it happen. Although there are many innovative methods of financing local development, more often than not municipalities today rely on a tool called Tax Increment Financing, or TIF—a highly efficient closed-loop funding mechanism that functions a bit like a credit card, enabling local governments to borrow from future tax revenue to pay for improvements now.

To best explain how it works, let’s say there are a several dilapidated buildings and roads across a few blocks within a city. In its current state, developers are apprehensive about investing in real estate there. So, the property is stuck in limbo, with great potential but still blighted. In this case, a municipality or its local development authority may propose making it a TIF district in order to finance its renewal and attract development.

Once an ordinance is passed, the TIF authority will draw a boundary around the site and declare it a TIF district for a certain time period, say 10 years. At the start of this designation, the TIF authority will calculate the site’s initial assessed value—essentially the estimate of a property’s dollar worth, from which property taxes can be calculated. They will hold this “base value” constant throughout the lifetime of the TIF. Then, in order to start treating or improving the structures and streets, the TIF authority will sell bonds secured against the TIF district or reach some other agreement with the vendor or developer handling the clean-up efforts.

As the site’s quality improves, the assessed value of the district increases over the 10-year span.

The TIF mechanism allows the TIF authority to earmark the project’s new property tax revenue (minus the property revenue they calculated earlier based on the initial assessed value) to finance the development, such as paying off the bonds. Basically, all of the newly generated property tax revenue during the lifespan of the TIF district goes back to the TIF authority while only the base-value revenues are distributed among the usual taxing bodies within the TIF district.

In other words, over 10 years, if a TIF district has other overlapping jurisdictions, such as counties, school districts, or park districts, these entities will only receive the property tax revenues based on the initial assessed value. At the end of the 10 years, the site is officially improved, and the TIF district is closed. At this point, all of the property tax revenues, expected to be much higher than before since the assessed value of the area has increased, are funneled to the original taxing bodies.

Tax Increment Financing is not necessarily a new tool. The idea for it began percolating in the 1950s, when California used it to secure matching funds from the federal government for redevelopment projects. But widespread uptake of this financing tool did not begin until the 1970s, when federal funding for urban renewal shrank, compelling cities to take matters into their own hands. Since then, 49 states and the District of Columbia have adopted appropriations for TIF districts, with the only holdout being Arizona. Chicago, for example, is famous for their use of Tax Increment Financing: The city opened its first TIF district in 1984, and they now have more than 160 TIF districts covering 30 percent of the city’s land area. Today, it is probably the most widely used development method in the urban planning toolbox.

On paper, Tax Increment Financing sounds like the miraculous (and popular) pathway to improving infrastructure, especially considering that it doesn’t add new taxes or alter existing tax rates. Basically, it’s self-sustaining. But in practice, it has some serious implications, one of which is gentrification. In recent years, urban planners have increasingly misused Tax Increment Financing for economic development instead of urban renewal. If city policymakers want to incentivize retail businesses to set up shop in a new area, for example, they can establish a TIF district to help assist developers and private businesses with development. While publicly subsidized private development may increase tax revenues and even boost downtown economic growth, these practices can hasten the process of gentrification and the consequent displacement of vulnerable groups.

A report by the Front Range Economic Strategy Center finds that in Denver’s downtown, areas that historically are home to low-income, minority residents, TIF districts are associated with rising property values, shrinking affordable housing stock, and an increasing share of white residents. To make matters worse, TIF investments often already occur in rapidly-gentrifying places, as seen in Chicago, because they offer the greatest yield of property tax revenues. But this means that places that can benefit from urban renewal don’t necessarily receive the equitable attention or TIF money they deserve.

All this is not to say that Tax Increment Financing cannot be a viable way for local policymakers to improve infrastructure and neighborhoods while simultaneously increasing local economic growth. Whether this means using alternate tax revenue other than property taxes to pay back bonds or mandating more affordable housing units in a TIF district, policymakers need to pay attention to the equitable deployment of Tax Increment Financing.

Correct Predictions and the Status of Economists: Hoisted from the Archives from Three Years Ago

Bradford delong com Grasping Reality with the Invisible Hand

Brad DeLong (2013): Correct Predictions and the Status of Economists:

Paul Krugman is certainly right that history has judged… for James Tobin over Milton Friedman. There is not even a smudge left where Friedman’s approach to a monetary theory of nominal income determination once stood….

Robert Waldmann points out, repeatedly and correctly, that there is nothing theoretically in Friedman (1967) that is not in Samuelson and Solow (1960)–that inflation above expectations might deanchor future inflation was not something Friedman (or Phelps) thought up, and that neither Friedman (nor Phelps) was thinking that high unemployment might deanchor the NAIRU. And Paul Krugman points out that the vertical long-run Phillips Curve of Friedman (and Phelps) is simply wrong at low rates of inflation, and so not helpful as a fundamental tool.

There is, however, one big thing Friedman got right: to stand up on his hind legs and say: ‘Expectations of inflation are becoming deanchored right now. The accelerationist mechanism is the mechanism that is going to dominate business cycle dynamics in both the short-term and the medium-term.’ That was right. And that was a powerful source of manna.

Similarly, or perhaps not, I would argue that there is one big thing (along with a large number of medium things and small things) that Paul Krugman got right: his prediction back in 1998 of The Return of Depression of Economics. Yet somehow Uncle Paul has not gained a similar amount of manna to what Uncle Milton gained in the late 1960s…


UPDATED 2016: And I note that Larry Summers has a similar extremely large important macroeconomic empirical hit with his predictions half a decade ago that not just “depression economics” but secular stagnation was something that we need to take very seriously indeed. I’m watching to see what the community makes of this…

Must-Read: Steven J. Davis and Till M. von Wachter: Recessions and the Cost of Job Loss

Must-Read: When the unemployment rare is low, economic disruption has a substantial but not overwhelming cost to workers who lose their jobs. Steve Davis and Till von Wachter peg it at 1.5 years’ worth of pre-displacement earnings for workers caught up in a mass layoff when the unemployment rate is below 6%. That cost doubles when the unemployment rate is above 8%.

Thus structural change and creative destruction are very costly things indeed–unless the Federal Reserve and other policy authorities can maintain a high-pressure economy. But we have not had a high-pressure economy since 2000…

Steven J. Davis and Till M. von Wachter: Recessions and the Cost of Job Loss:

Drawing on longitudinal Social Security records for U.S. workers from 1974 to 2008… men lose an average of 1.4 years of pre-displacement earnings if displaced in mass-layoff events that occur when the national unemployment rate is below 6 percent…

They lose a staggering 2.8 years of pre-displacement earnings if displaced when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent… discounting at a 5% annual rate over 20 years after displacement. We also document large cyclical movements in the incidence of job loss and job displacement and present evidence on how worker anxieties about job loss, wage cuts and job opportunities respond to contemporaneous economic conditions. Finally, we confront leading models of unemployment fluctuations with evidence on the present value earnings losses associated with job displacement. The model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) extended to include search on the job generates present value losses only one-fourth as large as observed losses. Moreover, present value losses in the model vary little with aggregate conditions at the time of displacement, unlike the pattern in the data.

Must-Read: Janet Gornick and Branko Milanovic: Income Inequality in the United States in Cross-National Perspective: Redistribution Revisited

Must-Read: Janet Gornick and Branko Milanovic (2015): Income Inequality in the United States in Cross-National Perspective: Redistribution Revisited:

Figure 1… [says that] inequality of market income is high in the US (.52) but – in cross-national terms – it is not off the charts….

Nine countries – about half of this group – report market income inequality at the level of .50 or higher…. The US has high market income inequality but it is not especially exceptional among the rich countries of the world…. [But] market income inequality for the working age population in the US is… higher than we would conclude from Figure 1 alone…. Relative to other high-income countries, the US has an exceptionally large low-wage labor market… a large share of top earners, many of whom also have high levels of capital income. The results seen in Figure 2 – which pertain to those households most reliant on market income – are consistent with these features of the American market income distribution. When we consider the US in cross-national perspective, the conclusions that flow from the results for working-age households should prompt us to shift more attention to policy and institutional factors that influence market income distributions.

Www gc cuny edu CUNY GC media CUNY Graduate Center PDF Centers LIS LIS Center Research Brief 1 2015 pdf ext pdf

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: A Divided Nation

Must-Read: Why did England ex-London vote so overwhelmingly for Brexit? I cannot say that I understand it. Simon Wren-Lewis tries to strategize for a way forward:

Simon Wren-Lewis: A Divided Nation:

Economists and others who voted Remain are quite right to say “I told you so” as the economic hit they expected comes to pass….

The Brexit Bust needs to be labelled clearly, given the power the Leave side has over the means of communication. (Those behind that campaign are already talking utter nonsense in order to pretend it had nothing to do with them.) But those who voted Remain also need to understand why they lost….

Education and age are key determinates: if you are less educated or older you tend to vote Leave. Both matter independently…. Once you take these into account, income is not a significant factor.

Geography matters in key ways. One of those is that people in Scotland and Northern Ireland were much less likely to want to leave (controlling for other factors). The other I will come to…. Areas with a recent large increase in immigration are more likely to vote leave, [but] more work needs to be done on whether its actual level matters. However, even if it matters, it does not matter that much…. The Leave vote increases in areas where there is a lot of poverty and local inequality….

There is no reason why we need to choose between the economic and the social types of explanation…. Antagonism to the idea (rather than the actuality) of migration [could be] the way an underlying grievance got translated into a dislike of the EU…. Economic arguments were important for Remain voters. The economic message did get through to many…. The NHS was important to Leave voters, so the point economists also made that ending free movement would harm the NHS was either not believed or did not get through…. Whether [leavers] did not know about the overwhelming consensus among economists who thought [Brexit would be bad], or chose to ignore it, we cannot tell…. Leave voters are far more pessimistic about the future, and also tend to believe that life today is much worse than life 30 years ago…. Those who thought the following were a source of ill rather than good–multiculturalism, social liberalism, feminism, globalisation, the internet, the green movement and immigration–tended by large majorities to vote Leave…. Leave voters were those left behind in modern society in either an economic or social way (or perhaps both)…

Must-Read: David Kamin: Taxing Capital: Paths to a Fairer and Broader U.S. Tax System

Must-Read: The Golden Mantra of public finance is: it is very expensive to tax things that are elastically supplied, so load your taxes onto things that are inelastically supplied. Old capital and the profits received by it are inelastically supplied. But how about savings? It is, I think, still largely an open question–and a question to which I would expect the answer to vary across countries and eras…

David Kamin: Taxing Capital: Paths to a Fairer and Broader U.S. Tax System:

Taxing capital is a key way to maintain and increase progressivity in the U.S. tax system and raise revenue….

Why turn to capital as a source of government revenue? Taxing capital is a highly progressive form of taxation that research suggests does not seriously affect the rate of savings among high-income Americans—an important consideration in terms of encouraging future economic growth—and is a key part of optimal taxation in the United States. Yet the federal tax rate paid on capital income is, on average, relatively low, due to a combination of factors including low existing rates, special tax breaks, and the gaming of the system to avoid paying taxes on capital.

Must-Reads: August 13, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Jonathan A. Parker et al.: Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008

Must-Read: Jonathan A. Parker et al. (2011): Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008:

Oon average, households spent about 12-30%… of their stimulus payments on nondurable expenditures during the three-month period in which the payments were received…..

There was also a substantial and significant increase in spending on durable goods, in particular vehicles, bringing the average total spending response to about 50-90% of the payments. Relative to research on the 2001 tax rebates, these spending responses are estimated with greater precision using the randomized timing variation. The estimated responses are substantial and significant for older, lower-income, and home-owning households. We find little evidence that the propensity to spend varies with the method of disbursement (paper check versus electronic transfer).

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Airing the IMF’s Dirty Laundry

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Airing the IMF’s Dirty Laundry:

The IMF established an Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) to undertake arm’s-length assessments of its policies and programs…

Self-serving claims were in the interest of European officials, but why was the IMF prepared to accept them? One answer is that European governments are large shareholders in the Fund. Another is that the IMF is a predominantly European institution, with a European managing director, a heavily European staff, and a European culture. The report… criticize[s] the Fund for acquiescing to European resistance to debt restructuring by Greece in 2010. It criticizes the IMF for setting ambitious targets for fiscal consolidation… but underestimating austerity’s damaging economic effects…. The report rejects claims that the IMF was effectively a junior member of the Troika, insisting that all decisions were made by consensus. But that is difficult to square with everything we know about the fateful decision not to restructure Greece’s debt. IMF staff favored restructuring, but the European Commission and the ECB, which put up two-thirds of the money, ultimately had their way. He who has the largest wallet speaks with the loudest voice. In other words, there are different roads to “consensus.” The Fund encountered the same problem in 2008, when it insisted on currency devaluation as part of an IMF-EU program for Latvia….

The implication is that the IMF should not participate in a program to which it contributes only a minority share of the finance. But expecting the IMF to provide majority funding implies the need to expand its financial resources…. And was the ECB even on the right side of the table in these European debt discussions? When negotiating with a country, the IMF ordinarily demands conditions of its government and central bank. In its programs with Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, however, the IMF and the central bank demanded conditions of the government. This struck more than a few people as bizarre.
It would have been better if, in 2010, the IMF had demanded of the ECB a pledge “to do whatever it takes” and a program of “outright monetary transactions,” like those ECB President Mario Draghi eventually offered two years later…. Nothing prevents the IMF from demanding policy commitments from regional bodies when lending to their member governments…

Must-Reads: August 12, 2016


Should Reads: