Weekend reading: “Rich spatial controls” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

The U.S. economy might need an injection of more inflation. But many economists point to models that show higher inflation would have significant costs. A new paper comes to a different conclusion, examining how those costs might not change much with the rate of inflation.

Cutting the U.S. corporate income tax to help boost wages sounds like a counterintuitive idea. But if we think the incidence of the tax falls mostly on labor, it makes sense. Yet it seems unlikely that labor bears most, if any, of the tax burden, which mainly falls on capital.

Does raising the minimum wage in the United States reduce teen employment? A new paper in this debate argues that studies finding a negative impact do not account for pre-existing labor market trends in states before minimum wage hikes. Ben Zipperer, a co-author of the paper, provides a nontechnical explanation of the paper.

The last few years have seen significant increases in subprime auto lending across the country. For anyone who remembers the last big uptick in subprime lending, this might cause some concern about sparking a new recession. Those concerns are overblown.

Despite trends toward increasing gender equity in the workplace, occupational segregation by gender is still pervasive in the U.S. labor market. Will McGrew shows how this segregation is a problem for the wages and economic growth.

Links from around the web

Earlier this week, John Williams, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, released a new paper on rethinking monetary policy in an era of low interest rates. Larry Summers reacts to the paper and suggests some more policy reforms. [wonkblog]

Part of the Federal Reserve’s mandate is to promote “maximum employment” with its conduct of monetary policy. But there are clear differences in how changes in unemployment affect different racial groups in the United States, particularly African Americans. Narayana Kocherlakota points out that positive trend of Fed policymakers starting to acknowledge this fact. [bloomberg view]

Is there any connection between the decline in the labor share of income and measured productivity growth? Dietz Vollrath explains (with a baking analogy) how a change in the distribution of income can impact productivity growth. [growth econ]

The causes of rising “inter-firm inequality” is a big open question in economics. Looking into this question, Claudia Sahm digs into a big paper on the role of firms in the rise of income inequality. [macromom]

Due to the recent exit of certain insurers from the new U.S. insurance exchange markets, concerns about competition are becoming more prominent. With those concerns in mind, Yale University’s Jacob Hacker brings back his proposal for a public option—an insurance plan rule by the federal government – for the exchanges. [vox]

Friday figure

Figure from “Credible research designs for minimum wage studies” by Ben Zipperer.

Must-Read: Michael D. Carr and Emily E. Wiemers: The decline in lifetime earnings mobility in the U.S.: Evidence from survey-linked administrative data

Must-Read: What is driving this? Fewer progressive “careers” by which one rises from account-management drone to senior manager as one’s company grows and thrives? Much more seems to be riding on initial education and one’s choice of industry, perhaps… It’s complicated!

Michael D. Carr and Emily E. Wiemers: The decline in lifetime earnings mobility in the U.S.: Evidence from survey-linked administrative data:

Abstract: There is a sizable literature that examines whether intergenerational mobility has declined as inequality has increased….

This literature is motivated by a desire to understand whether increasing inequality has made it more difficult to rise from humble origins. An equally important component of economic mobility is the ability to move across the earnings distribution during one’s own working years.

We use survey-linked administrative data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to examine trends in lifetime earnings mobility since 1981. These unique data allow us to produce the first estimates of lifetime earnings mobility from administrative earnings across gender and education subgroups. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we find that lifetime earnings mobility has declined since the early 1980s as inequality has increased. Declines in lifetime earnings mobility are largest for college-educated workers though mobility has declined for men and women and across the distribution of educational attainment.

One striking feature is the decline in upward mobility among middle-class workers, even those with a college degree. Across the distribution of educational attainment, the likelihood of moving to the top deciles of the earnings distribution for workers who start their career in the middle of the earnings distribution has declined by approximately 20% since the early 1980s.

Must-Read: Michael Spence: Growth in a Time of Disruption

Must-Read: But what does “developing countries must accept the inevitability of changes to their growth models caused by digital technologies. Instead of viewing these changes as a threat, and trying to resist them, developing economies should be getting ahead of them…” mean, concretely, on the ground? Take advantage of digital technologies and platforms (eBay, cellphones, Amazon, FedEx) that provide channels of information capture and dissemination on the one hand and distribution on the other: those are clear complements to what developing economies can do. But how is one to find a niche for one’s workers’ brains-as-cybernetic-controllers that will make the diamonds-water paradox their friend in the enormously productive digital global economy of the future?

Michael Spence: Growth in a Time of Disruption:

Developing countries are facing major obstacles…

…headwinds generated by slow advanced-economy growth and abnormal post-crisis monetary and financial conditions… disruptive impacts of digital technology… set to erode developing economies’ comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing activities…. Adaptation is the only option. Robotics has already made significant inroads in electronics assembly… sewing trades, traditionally many countries’ first entry point to the global trading system, likely to come next…. Supply chains based on the location of relatively immobile and cost-effective labor will wane, with production moving closer to the final market….

Developing countries need to act now to adapt their growth strategies…. The problems in advanced countries–from slow economic growth to political uncertainty–are likely to persist…. Investment, both public and private, remains a powerful growth engine…. It is critical to manage the capital account in a way that protects and enhances the real economy’s growth potential…. A realistic approach to the digital revolution is needed…. Developing countries must accept the inevitability of changes to their growth models caused by digital technologies. Instead of viewing these changes as a threat, and trying to resist them, developing economies should be getting ahead of them….

The distribution of gains from economic growth cannot be ignored…. It is important to establish sustainable growth patterns early on…. Entrepreneurial activity is vital to translate economic potential into reality. Policies that support such activity, such as by removing obstacles to new business creation and enhancing financing opportunities, cannot be left out…

Must-Reads: August 19, 2016


Should Reads:

The “Confidence Fairy” and the Ideology of Economic Theory and Policy: Alas! Still Preliminary Little More than Notes…

I promised more on this in August.

Last August.

August 20125.

I am, clearly, very late:

Paul Krugman: Fairy Tales:

Mike Konczal, channeling Kalecki, pointed out…

…arguments rejecting Keynes and declaring that only business confidence can achieve full employment serve [the] very useful political purpose… [of] empower[ing] plutocrats and big business…. And this speaks to the wider point of the politicization of macroeconomics. Why did freshwater macroeconomists refuse to learn from the lessons of the Volcker recession and recovery, which clearly refuted their approach and supported some kind of Keynesian view on monetary policy? Why has the overwhelming recent evidence for a Keynesian view of fiscal policy been ignored? You might think that business, at least, would welcome policies that boost sales; but the ideology of confidence must be defended.

At the level of academic economics it is a huge puzzle–after all, Ed Prescott and Bob Lucas decide that downturns are driven not by monetary but by real factors just at the very moment when Paul Volcker hits the economy with a brick, and demonstrates not just that contractionary policy has contractionary effects on the real economy, but that doing everything he could to make his contractionary policy anticipated and credible did not materially lessen those real effects. A bigger example of “who are you going to believe, me and Ed or your lying eyes?” would be hard to imagine.

The best excuse I have found takes off from Marion Fourcade et al.‘s analysis of the American economics profession, especially their observations on the rise of business schools and business economics in shaping what economists think about and how they think it. That they are predisposed by their social location into believing that bankers (and the businessmen) are key value-adders in the economy creates an elective affinity with the macroeconomic doctrine that the bankers and businessmen have got us by the plums, and so the only durable way to create a strong and healthy economy is to keep them confident and enthusiastic about investing in new capital equipment now–which means keeping them very confident and very secure in their expectations of future profits.

My current (very imperfect) thoughts about this are contained right now in: The Confidence Fairy in Historical Perspective.

I was going to revise it into a proper paper before letting it out of the gate into the public. But that has not yet happened. So let me at least put the slides below the “fold”, if “fold” has any meaning anymore. Or, rather, below the next “fold”:

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Must-Read: Barry Ritholtz: How Fast is CEO Compensation Rising?

Must-Read: The floodgates opened in the late 1990s, with Clinton’s second term and the stock market boom. Why did the floodgates open, and open then, and open so much? The timing suggests the flood of insurance and commercial banking money into investment banking, and the ability of investment bankers to collect rents off of it, spilled over to CEOs who, by virtue of their ability to take their companies private and so join the Private Equity world, had effectively become investment bankers and paid like investment bankers in the late 1980s. But that is just a WAG (a Wild-A—–Guess)…

Barry Ritholtz: How Fast is CEO Compensation Rising?: “CEO compensation is growing faster than the wages of the top 0.1 percent…

…and the stock market. This is a rather amazing chart:

Banners and Alerts and How Fast is CEO Compensation Rising The Big Picture

Must-Read: Fred Bateman et al.: Did New Deal and World War II Public Capital Investments Facilitate a “Big Push” in the American South?

Must-Read: I am really glad that Fred and company have done this–helps explain why Big Defense is the only part of Big Government that America’s southern and western conservatives will admit to liking…

Fred Bateman et al.: Did New Deal and World War II Public Capital Investments Facilitate a “Big Push” in the American South?:

Abstract: The “big push” theory claims that publicly coordinated investment can break the cycle of poverty…

…by helping developing economies overcome deficiencies in private incentives that prevent firms from adopting modern production techniques and achieving scale economies. Despite a flurry of research, however, scholars have offered scarce few real-world episodes that seem to fit the theoretical model.We argue that the postwar performance of the American South, which followed large public capital investments during the Great Depression and World War II, is such an application. Both econometric analysis and a contemporary survey of firms strongly support the notion that big-push dynamics were at work.

Communism and Really Existing Socialism: A Reading List for Post-Millennials

Manchester 1844 Google Search

What should someone coming of age in 2020 or so–someone post-millennial, who has no memories of all of any part of the twentieth century–learn about communism, and really existing socialism?

It is, I think, very clear by now to everyone except the most demented of the herbal teabaggers, and should be clear to all, that communism was not one of the brightest lights on humanity’s tree of ideas. Nobody convinced by the writings of Marx and his peers that a “communist” society was in some sense an ideal who then achieved enough political power to try to make that vision a reality has built a society that turned out well. All, measured by the yardsticks of their time and geographical situation, were either moderately bad, worse, disastrous, or candidates for the worst-régime-every prize. None attained the status of:

a prayse and glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, “the Lord make it like that of New England.” For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill…

Moreover, those who took Marx most seriously and fell under his intellectual spell either did first-class work only after they had liberated themselves and attached themselves to some other’s perspective (as Perry Anderson did to Weber via “modes of domination” and as Joan Robinson did to Keynes). Too close and uncritical a study of Marx is a mode of self-programming that introduces disastrous bugs into your wetware. The thinkers useful for the twenty-first century are much more likely to be along the lines of Tocqueville, Keynes, Polanyi, de Beauvoir, Lincoln, and (albeit in his intellectual rather than his political or personal practice) Jefferson than Marx. (And Foucault? Maybe Foucault–nah, that is too likely to introduce a different set of dangerous bugs to your wetware…)

Yet the ideas and the arguments for “communism” were (and are?) powerful. And they were very convincing to millions if not billions of people for fully a century and a half. How should post-millennials understand this? How much about this ought they to learn? And how best to present the subject so that they gain the fullest and most accurate understanding, in the short time that is all that they can afford to spend on it?

Here’s my first second take on readings, in the order in which I would put them a course:


More Scattered Things I Have Written: on and About the Subject:

Gender segregation at work: “separate but equal” or “inefficient and unfair”

PepsiCo Inc. chairman and chief executive Indra K. Nooyi, left, and Jill Beraud, PepsiCo president of sparkling brands, meet with Barclays Capital investor relations representative Carmen Barone, right, at the post that trades Pepsi on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange Monday, Feb. 1, 2010. (AP Photo/Richard Drew)

Fifty years after the arrival of the contemporary women’s movement on the national stage, the U.S. workforce and the U.S. economy are the beneficiaries of the enormous strides in gender equality. Women are working in nearly all occupations that once were exclusively the domain of men, and many are in prominent leadership roles in business and government. Yet sex segregation in the workplace remains a problem as social norms continue to restrict occupational choices by women and men, thereby distorting labor markets, depressing wages, and hurting business innovation and productivity.

Despite the early gains of women in professional and service jobs that require a college education, many such occupations remain disproportionately male, particularly at the highest levels. Furthermore, most technical and manual blue-collar jobs have undergone little to no integration since the 1970s. Economists Francine Blau at Cornell University, Peter Brummund at the University of Alabama, and Albert Yung-Hsu Liu at Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., examined trends in occupational segregation between 1970 and 2009 and found that the process of desegregation has slowed significantly in recent decades, regardless of the education level necessary for a job. (See Figure 1.)

Why does occupational segregation by gender persist

Traditional economic theory explained occupational segregation by gender as an inevitable consequence of “natural differences” in skills between women and men, but contemporary economists have refocused the blame on gender discrimination by employers, coworkers, and other actors. According to the standard model, levels of segregation should be constant over time as they are determined by occupations’ supposed compatibility with “male” and “female” labor market preferences. Contradicting this prediction, economist Jessica Pan at the National University of Singapore finds that men abandoned formerly all-male professions in droves after women’s participation reaches “tipping points,” fearing the social stigma and wage penalties associated with belonging to “feminine” occupations.

Contemporary economic research has sought to better understand the causes of this male aversion to working with female colleagues. On one hand, the discrimination in hiring and promotion that reinforces segregation is based on stereotypes about women’s skills. As Harvard University economist Claudia Goldin argues in her “pollution theory of discrimination,” men often underestimate women’s skills based on their current underrepresentation in certain occupations and thus discriminate against women in these occupations on the false assumption that increasing their representation would lower overall productivity.

On the other hand, economists George Akerlof at Georgetown University and Rachel Kranton at Duke University argue that discrimination in male-dominated professions is caused by social pressures, interpreting women’s inclusion as a threat to the professions’ masculinity. By this account, men don’t discriminate against women because they view women as less qualified but rather because they are trying to protect the social power men hold through membership in the “boys’ club.” In a similar model of “stratification economics,” economists Sandy Darity of Duke, Darrick Hamilton of the New School for Social Research, and James Stewart of Pennsylvania State University detail how socially dominant groups create and reinforce prejudices against other groups in order to protect their economic, political, and social advantages.

Despite a decline in explicit sexism, researchers argue that gender discrimination today, whether in the form of stereotypes or social pressures, is perpetuated by a new, “egalitarian” form of gender essentialism—the belief that women and men’s social, economic, and familial roles are and should be fundamentally different. While most people now support women’s access to all economic opportunities, they simultaneously expect men and women to pursue traditionally “male” and “female” jobs and regard parenting as the primary responsibility of mothers. Sociologist Paula England at New York University and other researchers note that the resurgence in differential expectations is responsible for the recent stagnation in occupational desegregation and in other indicators of women’s economic inclusion.

Assuming different roles for men and women at work and at home, male-dominated occupations remain mostly structured to meet the needs of a stereotypical male who is expected to have a spouse at home, a work-schedule issue that not only fails to accommodate women but also often actively pushes women out. The idea that women are freely “opting out” of workforce opportunities because they have different career aspirations than men has been thoroughly debunked. Instead, women usually leave their jobs because of negative experiences in the workforce, especially in male-dominated fields. In particular, jobs in these fields often demand a culture of long hours, which does not accommodate flexibility for caregiving, forces many mothers to quit, and likewise discourages fathers from helping out at home.

To make matters worse, male-dominated workplaces are often hostile work environments for women, featuring the highest rates of sexual and gender-based harassment. Overt forms of sexual harassment remain part of the “culture” of many male-dominated jobs, particularly given the limited of application of anti-discrimination laws in many blue-collar occupations, as the late Barbara Bergmann, a pioneering feminist economist, once observed. Subtler forms of gender-based harassment in which men exclusively hire, socialize with, and promote each other are even more common in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) professions, in finance, and in other professional environments and have been demonstrated to limit women’s prospects for advancement, decrease female labor force attachment, and reinforce segregation.

How occupational segregation drives down wages and slows economic growth

At the microeconomic level, occupational segregation by gender substantially depresses female wages and contributes to the gender wage gap. Most of the U.S. economy’s highest paying occupations are predominantly male while most of the lowest paying occupations are predominantly female. (See Figure 2.)

By pushing women into lower-paying occupations, occupational segregation depresses female wages and hurts family economic security. A recent empirical review on trends in the gender wage gap since 1980 by economists Blau and her colleague at Cornell, Lawrence Kahn, attributes half of the present gap to women working in different occupations and industries than men. In addition to keeping women out of the highest-paying occupations, a report by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research authored by Heidi Hartmann, Barbara Gault, Ariane Hegewisch, and Marc Bendick details how segregation also excludes women from the best-paying middle-skills jobs in information technology, logistics, and advanced manufacturing, even though these jobs require similar skills as predominantly female jobs with worse pay. Other researchers clearly demonstrate that this “wage penalty” for occupational feminization is a product of discrimination against women’s labor as opposed to productivity differences between predominantly male and female jobs.

As AFL-CIO chief economist William Spriggs and Case Western University historian Rhonda Williams argue, these trends also are highly racialized: women of color at all education levels are segregated into jobs with lower wages than their white female peers of similar skill level. Conversely, occupational integration produces huge wage increases for women and people of color: econometric analysis by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Erik Hurst at the University of Chicago and Charles Jones and Peter Klenow at Stanford University shows that occupational integration since 1960 was responsible for 60 percent of real wage growth for Black women, 40 percent for white women, and 45 percent for Black men (after accounting for inflation). These patterns indicate that the persistence of segregation today results in a significant loss of income for working women and their families, which should be disconcerting to policymakers given the ameliorative effects of lifting women’s wages on poverty, unemployment, and inequality.

Beyond its effect on individual workers, occupational segregation limits optimal matching of workers with jobs where they can best leverage their skills and fulfill their ambitions. If men and women are pushed into careers based on societal definitions of “masculinity” and “femininity” then they aren’t able to choose the labor market opportunities that best match their skills and ambitions. Most of this issue brief is focused on how segregation limits women’s ability to contribute to traditionally male occupations, but it also limits men’s ability to contribute to traditionally female occupations—a significant policy issue as globalization and technology continue to decrease the availability of many predominantly male blue-collar jobs in the United States.

Indeed, a growing body of evidence demonstrates that occupational integration helps both sexes contribute their human capital to enhancing the productivity of firms. A variety of studies show that establishing a “critical mass” of at least 30-percent women in corporate leadership enhances firm innovation and overall performance. This is consistent with behavioral research that gender integration improves teams’ “collective intelligence.” In the financial sector in particular, occupational integration decreases systemic risk driven by masculine-stereotyped behaviors encouraged in sex-segregated environments, argues economist Julie Nelson at the University of Massachusetts-Boston.

These individual- and firm-level gains can have a massive impact on overall productivity and growth. Research by economists Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow demonstrates that occupational integration was responsible for driving 15 percent to 20 percent of the increase in aggregate output per worker since 1960.

Where policymakers can jumpstart integration

To counteract gender discrimination, firms should set explicit targets for increasing female representation at all levels. Because children’s labor market preferences are largely shaped by the representation of women in leadership roles, increasing women’s representation in private- and public-sector institutions can decrease stereotypes and expand opportunity for women at all levels. According to research by economists Marianne Bertrand at the University of Chicago, Sandra Black at the University of Texas-Austin, Sissel Jensen at the Norwegian School of Economics, and Adriana Lleras-Muney at the University of California-Los Angeles, Norway’s 40 percent minimum requirement for women on corporate boards increased female representation, attracted female board members with greater qualifications, and reduced gender wage gaps on boards. While it may take time for these effects to trickle-down to entry-level workers, a study by Lori Beaman at Northwestern University, Esther Duflo at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rohini Pande at Harvard University, and Petia Topalova at the International Monetary Fund, shows that a law mandating increased representation for women on municipal councils in India dramatically decreased bias against women in the population as a whole while expanding girls’ educational opportunities and career aspirations.

In addition to interventions at the top, researchers, including Harvard’s Rosabeth Moss Kanter, argue that by establishing a critical mass of women in all work environments employers can dramatically reduce the prevalence of discriminatory behaviors and force their workplaces to adapt to their female employees’ needs and demands. As Yale Law professor Vicki Schultz argues, anti-discrimination law and policy should thus emphasize increasing women’s numerical strength across occupations and dismantle the workplace structures discussed above that create sex differences in labor market choices—as opposed to simply reflecting them. Sociologists Sheryl Skaggs of the University of Texas-Dallas, Kevin Stainback of Purdue University, and Phyllis Duncan of Our Lady of the Lake University find significant “bottom-up” effects of increasing women’s general representation on their representation in managerial positions, complementing the “top-down” effects of increasing their numbers on corporate boards.

While work-life reforms benefiting both fathers and mothers are essential to developing an inclusive workplace, setting explicit targets for women at all levels would help reverse discrimination against women in promotion decisions based on their greater probability of taking leave, as Cornell economist Mallika Thomas documents. Furthermore, while male-dominated occupations can and must change to include women, it is equally important to elevate and integrate female-dominated occupations by mandating equal pay for jobs of equal value or “comparable worth,” as noted by, among others, economist and IWPR president Heidi Hartmann as well as economist and former Bennett College President Julianne Malveaux.

Beyond reforms within labor markets, ending occupational sex segregation will require a comprehensive strategy to prevent the formation of gender stereotypes at a young age that later “spillover” into the workplace. Cultivating inclusion must start early in order to have a lasting impact on children’s beliefs and experiences. Research demonstrates, for example, that unnecessarily segregating boys and girls in educational or social activities creates arbitrary categories of “us” and “them,” sending a message that children’s opportunities should be determined by their gender. Efforts to counteract gender stereotypes can also help women later on in their careers. Indeed, the IWPR report by Hartmann, Gault, Hegewisch, and Bendick argues for public-private partnerships to train and match women from “on-ramp occupations” to higher paying traditionally male jobs that require similar skills.

Achieving successful integration at all levels will take work. However, social scientists including legal scholar Joan Williams at the University of California’s Hastings School of Law and behavioral economist Iris Bohnet at Harvard are proposing a variety of strategies for decreasing bias, overcoming difference, and advancing women throughout their educational and professional careers. As Goldin and Princeton University economist Cecilia Rouse argue in their seminal study on the gender equity benefits of blind auditions for symphony orchestras, these strategies should focus on results-based approaches that decrease the influence of social networks and gender biases in evaluation, hiring, and promotion of women.

Leveraging these behavioral changes to promote gender equity and inclusion in all institutions boasts enormous potential to raise wages, boost productivity, drive innovation, and expand opportunity for women and men across the economy.

Will McGrew is an intern at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth and a Dahl Research Scholar at the Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies. He is studying Economics and Political Science at Yale University.

Subprime auto loans are not the second coming of the U.S. mortgage crisis

This past week on his show Last Week Tonight, the comedian John Oliver highlighted the rise of subprime automobile lending in the United States over the past couple of years. The lending practices that Oliver’s segment highlights—many of them deceptive—are clearly something policymakers should investigate. This subprime lending trend has been going on for several years now, with implications for how we think about the U.S. financial system. Oliver, though, carried his observations to an unfortunately familiar place—the subprime mortgage boom of 2002-2006—an analogy that’s seems telling at first glance but which is not really apt given the smaller effects of subprime auto lending on the overall economy.

First, the sheer size of home mortgages compared to auto loans should give us pause. According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, there were $1.1 trillion worth of auto loans in the second quarter of 2016, an almost 50 percent increase since the end of the Great Recession in the second quarter of 2009. The amount of mortgage debt is much larger ($8.84 trillion in the second quarter of 2016), and its growth during the housing bubble was much faster (almost doubling from 2001 to 2007).  Oliver recognizes this size discrepancy in his segment but not the speed discrepancy.

Oliver’s analogy has other problems as well. The reason why the collapse of the housing bubble was so vicious was because the inflation of the bubble increased consumer spending quite a bit. Many households used appreciating homes as a way to finance more consumption. But it’s well known that cars are a depreciating asset. They lose value over time. It’s highly unlikely that anyone is using their car as an ATM to finance spending. More households with auto debt will reduce consumption as money is funneled to service the debt on their cars.

The role of auto loans in the financial sector is also quite different than mortgages. Oliver notes that subprime auto loans are being securitized and sold to institutional investors just as subprime mortgages were before the housing crash and the onset of the Great Recession. Yet mortgage-backed securities weren’t just incredibly popular securities bought and sold by banks. They also became an integral part of the financial system, with banks using triple-A rated securities as risk-free collateral in inter-bank lending. These bonds were, in effect, privately created money used in the shadow banking system. There is no evidence that the securities based on auto loans are serving such a function right now.

But let’s not miss the broader point. The subprime auto-loan practices highlighted by Oliver seem to be very predatory. What’s more, loans made by auto dealers, known as dealer-originated loans, are not under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the federal agency that would naturally look into these issues. Policymakers concerned by these trends may want to look into this exemption. More broadly, the continuing ability of some actors in the U.S. financial system to target low-income and low-credit workers with financial products is something policymakers need to keep in mind as they consider the role of the financial sector in creating strong and sustained economic growth.