Must-Reads: August 31, 2016


Should Reads:

How often do Americans not pay federal taxes and receive government assistance?

During the last presidential election, a statistic from a distributional analysis of the U.S. tax code was the center of quite a bit of conversation. That statistic—47 percent—was the percent of tax units in 2009 that didn’t pay any federal income tax. The seeming prevalence of American tax payers who didn’t “pay into” the system had some participants in the conversation concerned that one portion of the U.S. population was permanently dependent upon the government for income. New research shows that concern is overblown.

A new working paper by economists Don Fullerton of the University of Illinois and Nirupama S. Rao of New York University looks at the question of the “47 percent,” but with an important difference. The original statistic was a snapshot in time, looking at how many households didn’t pay any federal income tax in 2009. What Fullerton and Rao look at instead is the persistence over time of households that did not not pay federal taxes and did not receive transfer income from the government in the form of government assistance. They use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which allows them to track households at different wage levels over time, with the PSID covering 40 years.

Fullerton and Rao end up finding quite a bit of movement among households, both in and out of non-taxpaying and receiving or not receiving transfers. According to their analysis, 77.9 percent of all households received some sort of government income transfers during the period they studied. But a large chunk of those households are older Americans who are receiving Social Security. We’d expect (and hope) that households receiving Social Security do so for many years.

About 42 percent of households never received a transfer that wasn’t Social Security. Of those that did receive income from one of those transfers, 30 percent did so for only one year and 76 percent for five years or less. A similar dynamic holds for paying federal income taxes, though there is much more persistence among non-tax payers. Only one-third of households owe income taxes during all of the sample years. Of those households that did not pay income taxes in every year, 52 percent do not pay for five or fewer years. And about 30 percent of households that do not pay income taxes don’t pay any income taxes at all for ten or more years.

So the data seem to show that the government income transfer system is working as an insurance system in which households seem to draw on the system temporarily before moving off the program. But for the income tax system, nonpayment seems to be more persistence. This could be due to programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, which significantly reduces tax liability for low-income households that would pay some federal income tax. The extent to which this is true might assuage concerns as the EITC is contingent upon the recipient working. We should also remember that many of the households that don’t pay federal income tax most likely do pay sales taxes and state and local income taxes.

This paper is a good reminder that snapshots of income, wealth, and other economic variables are important, but data that track them over time are even more useful.

Unpleasant Fiscal Dominance?

Sims highlights fiscal dominance at Jackson Hole Gavyn Davies

Paul Krugman appears confused:

Paul Krugman: Chris and the Ricardianoids:

Here’s [Chris] Sims on fiscal policy:

Fiscal expansion can replace ineffective monetary policy at the zero lower bound, but fiscal expansion is not the same thing as deficit finance. It requires deficits aimed at, and conditioned on, generating inflation. The deficits must be seen as financed by future inflation, not future taxes or spending cuts…

I think he’s saying that fiscal expansion works only if it leads to a rise in expected inflation…. [That] is certainly something I’ve heard from helicopter money types, who warn that something like Ricardian equivalence will undermine fiscal expansion unless it’s money-financed. But this is a misunderstanding of Ricardian equivalence, on two levels. First, as I’ve tried repeatedly to explain, a TEMPORARY increase in government purchases of goods and services will NOT be offset by expectations of future taxes even if full Ricardian equivalence holds. The kind of argument people like Robert Lucas made sounded Ricardian, but wasn’t–it was Ricardianoid. Second, less relevant to Sims but very relevant to other helicopter people, a deficit ultimately financed by inflation is just as much of a burden on households as one ultimately financed by ordinary taxes, because inflation is a kind of tax on money holders. From a Ricardian point of view, there’s no difference. So I’m trying to figure out exactly what Sims is saying…

As I understand where Sims and company are coming from, they are working in a model in which there are no government purchases. Or perhaps government purchases are useless, and so are not part of “true” real GDP. But in any event, either there is no difference between government purchases and tax cuts–hence no balanced-budget multiplier–or fiscal policy consists entirely of changes in taxes and transfers.

They are also working in a model in which total spending is given by something like:

C = C(r, W)

where W is the real wealth of the representative agent, and r is the real interest rate. The more wealth the more spending. The lower the real interest rate, the more spending.

The real interest rate is the difference between the nominal interest rate i and the inflation rate π:

r = i – π

And the economy is in a liquidity trap with i=0.

Now as I understand Sims, W is given by something like:

W = Y/r – T/(r + ρ)

where Y is the flow of income, T is the flow of taxes, and ρ is some sort of risk premium–that the finances of the government will become unstable and the government will not manage to collect its taxes.

Then the only ways fiscal policy can affect spending and output now are if:

  • deficits raise expectations of money-printing and so raise inflation π.
  • deficits raise expectations of future fiscal collapse and so increase current wealth by increasing the rate at which future tax liabilities are discounted.

And as I understand Sims, quantitative easing is counterproductive: it reduces the risk premium ρ, and so raises the present value of future tax liabilities and so reduces household wealth without doing anything to alter the real interest rate.

I think this is what is going on.

Is this a consistent model? I am not sure. Is this the model that Chris Sims has in mind that lies behind his talk? I am not sure. Is this the right model for the questions at hand? I am pretty sure it is not one of the first five models I would write does as most relevant.

Cf.: Gavyn Davies: Sims highlights fiscal dominance at Jackson Hole

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: Sims Highlights Fiscal Dominance at Jackson Hole

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: Sims Highlights Fiscal Dominance at Jackson Hole:

The most far reaching speech at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole meeting last week was…

…the contribution on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) by Professor Christopher Sims of Princeton University…. The subject is now moving centre stage…. It has important implications for the conduct of macro-economic policy, especially in Japan and the eurozone member states…. Government debt is an asset to the private sector. Prof Sims says that a reduction in future government deficits will make this debt a more attractive investment and this will induce the private sector to hold more of the debt, thus reducing demand for goods and services. This exerts a deflationary effect on the economy….

We are all familiar with… inflation if an irresponsible government (eg Brazil in the 1980s) persists in running excessive deficits…. Prof Sims reminds us that this can work in reverse, with all the signs changed. It is clear that this is directly relevant to the effectiveness of QE by the central bank…. Viewed in this light, the ineffectiveness of QE in offsetting a chronic shortage of private demand is not that surprising…. Prof Sims suggests that Japan can escape from its deflationary trap only by explicitly joining up fiscal and monetary policy, and making both subordinate to the inflation target…

Must-Read: Charlie Stross: Two Thoughts

Must-Read: As I always say, the key to making it an an economy–pretty much any economy–is to find something (a) that you can do, that is also (b) scarce and hard to copy, and (c) for which rich people have a Jones. It doesn’t matter how useful the stuff you do or make is. You have a place in the economy only if you satisfy (a), (b), and (c) or control resources that satisfy (a), (b), and (c). It’s what the seventeenth-century proto-economists called the diamonds-and-water paradox: how can carrying the most useful stuff on earth to where it is needed be so poorly paid, while selling useless flashy gewgaws is so richly paid? Scarcity and a rich people’s Jones–or, as we say now as if it were an obvious and inescapable law of nature: supply and demand.

And as I have started saying more recently:

  1. Human thighs and backs as sources of value started going out in the fourth millennium BC with the horse, and then in the eighteenth century with the steam engine.

  2. Human hands and fingers as sources of value started going out in the eighteenth century with automatic machinery.

  3. But human brains as cybernetic control mechanisms for sources of power and manipulation retained their value–nay, increased their value, as every domesticated animal and machine required a human-level controller. (Although very few of the jobs that added value actually required a Turing-class cybernetic control mechanism.)

    • But now, increasingly, we have robots–and the demand for human brains as cybernetic control mechanisms for sources of power and manipulation is dropping fast.
  4. And human brains as information assembly and transmission mechanisms–cashiers, accountants, form-fillers, form-approvers, gatekeepers, database-enterers and so forth–gained enormously in value. (Although very few of the jobs that added value actually required a Turing-class cybernetic control mechanism.)
    • But now, increasingly, we have ‘bots–and the demand for human brains as information assembly and transmission mechanisms is dropping fast.
  5. That leaves smiles–direct personal services, plus human eyes, mouths, and voices as sources of motivation and persuasion.

  6. That leaves genuine creative thought, which is, you know, rather difficult…

Charlie Stross: Two Thoughts:

The effects [of] universal functional telepathy (lies and all)… on how we handle business…

The internet disintermediates supply chains, but… you have to be able to find your customers, or your root supplier…. Currently we’re seeing a land-rush by new middle-men trying to stake out their position as the Sultans of Search: Amazon… eBay… Uber… AirBNB…. To identify a new Silicon Valley start-up opportunity you just have to figure out what your mom no longer does for you now you’ve moved out of her basement and productize it.

But that’s not going to last forever…. It’s a race to the bottom and it ends when search becomes free at the point of delivery…. Ultimately most of those middle-men are doomed: they simply can’t add enough value to stay viable as information arbitrage brokers in a telepathic world. So where do we go from there?

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Capitalism and Democracy: The Strain Is Showing

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Capitalism and Democracy: The Strain Is Showing:

Confidence in an enduring marriage between liberal democracy and global capitalism seems unwarranted….

So what might take its place? One possibility[:]… a global plutocracy and so in effect the end of national democracies. As in the Roman empire, the forms of republics might endure but the reality would be gone.

An opposite alternative would be the rise of illiberal democracies or outright plebiscitary dictatorships… [like] Russia and Turkey. Controlled national capitalism would then replace global capitalism. Something rather like that happened in the 1930s. It is not hard to identify western politicians who would love to go in exactly this direction.

Meanwhile, those of us who wish to preserve both liberal democracy and global capitalism must confront serious questions. One is whether it makes sense to promote further international agreements that tightly constrain national regulatory discretion in the interests of existing corporations…. Above all… economic policy must be orientated towards promoting the interests of the many not the few; in the first place would be the citizenry, to whom the politicians are accountable. If we fail to do this, the basis of our political order seems likely to founder. That would be good for no one. The marriage of liberal democracy with capitalism needs some nurturing. It must not be taken for granted.

Only a hint of new thinking at Jackson Hole

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, center, Stanley Fischer, left, vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Bill Dudley, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, talk and view the Grand Tetons before Yellen’s speech to the conference of central bankers from around the world, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, at Jackson Lake Lodge in Grand Teton National Park, north of Jackson Hole, Wyo., Friday, Aug 26, 2016.

This past weekend, economists and central bankers gathered in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for an annual conference hosted by the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank. The conference is a combination of an academic forum with authors presenting papers and a place where the Federal Reserve chair can lay out thinking behind U.S. monetary policy. This year, the symposium was surrounded by a bit of hype. Its title, “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future,” along with a recent paper by San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank President John Williams on rethinking monetary policy in a world of low interest rates, had some observers believing that the discussion in Wyoming might be the very beginning in a rethink of monetary policy.

That did not happen as envisioned. Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen’s speech on Friday morning instead pointed toward a view within the Federal Reserve that the current monetary policy path is adequate to prepare for the next recession. With the federal funds rate still only at 0.25 percent, many observers fear that the central bank won’t have enough room to cut interest rates the next time the economy hits a downturn. Yellen, however, argues that the key interest rate is on pace to get to 3 percentage points, enough space to cut rates before the next time the central bank has to cut rates.

But getting to 3 percent might not be so easy. As a chart from Yellen’s presentation shows, the future path of short-term interest rates, based on the projections of Federal Open Market Committee participants, is incredibly uncertain. Given the uncertainty of the world, short-term rates might be at about 4.5 percent by the end of 2018, but they could still be sitting at 0.25 percent or somewhere in between those two levels.

Secondly, as Jared Bernstein points out, the financial markets don’t seem to believe the Federal Open Market Committee-implied path of interest rates. The markets are signaling that they think that rates will end up being much lower that 3 percent. Given that the FOMC has, as Larry Summers notes, consistently pushed down its estimates of the level of interest rates, the markets might be forgiven for thinking the federal funds rate won’t get to 3 percent.

Finally, it’s not clear that 3 percent is the correct resting place for the Fed’s benchmark rate. Several estimates of the natural rate of interest put it lower than 3 percent, with some people saying it’s at zero percent. If long-run inflation is 2 percent, this means the Federal Reserve should try to get nominal interest rates to 2 percent. So if those estimates are correct, the Fed can’t get to 3 percent without pushing the economy into a recession. But even if the Fed can’t cut from 3 percent, it still has quantitative easing—a program of purchasing longer-term assets—in its back pocket.

How many long-term assets would the Federal Reserve need to buy in the market in order to stimulate the economy with interest rates starting lower than they were in late 2007 at beginning of the Great Recession? Perhaps, as Yellen notes, the central bank could expand the kind of assets it purchases to include corporate bonds, stocks, real estate investment trusts or foreign currency as other central banks have. She also remarked that “some observers” have contemplated a higher inflation target or targeting the price level or the level of income growth. While it seems unlikely anytime soon, some observers hope Yellen and others are at the Federal Reserve will join in that contemplation.

Must-Read: Anna Aizer et al.: Do Low Levels of Blood Lead Reduce Children’s Future Test Scores?

Must-Read: Anna Aizer et al.: Do Low Levels of Blood Lead Reduce Children’s Future Test Scores?:

Linking preschool blood lead levels with third grade test scores for eight birth cohorts of Rhode Island children born between 1997 and 2005…

…we show that reductions of lead from even historically low levels have significant positive effects on children’s reading test scores in third grade. Our preferred estimates use the introduction of a lead remediation program as an instrument in order to control for the possibility of confounding and for considerable error in measured lead exposures. The estimates suggest that a one unit decrease in average blood lead levels reduces the probability of being substantially below proficient in reading by 3.1 percentage points (on a baseline of 12 percent). Moreover, as we show, poor and minority children are more likely to be exposed to lead, suggesting that lead poisoning may be one of the causes of continuing gaps in test scores between disadvantaged and other children.

No. There Is Not One Chance in Seven the 2018Q4 Fed Funds Rate Will Be 4.75% or Higher

WTF?! A 15% chance that the Fed Funds Rate will be 4.75% or higher in 27 months? Only a 15% chance that the Fed Funds rate will be effectively zero in 27 months?

Janet Yellen: Figure 1:

Yellen figure1 20160826 png 735×610 pixels

I confess I do not understand how such a graph could be estimated and drawn.

Business cycle asymmetry is a thing. It is an important thing.

The note under the graph says:

Confidence interval equals the median of the end-of-year funds rate paths projected by individual FOMC members (interpolated quarterly), plus or minus the average root mean square prediction error for 0 to 9 quarters ahead made by private and government forecasters over the past 20 years, subject to an effective lower bound of 12.5 basis points.

Eyeballing, I get a 9-quarter-ahead standard error of the forecast of a symmetric 2.2%-points. Look at the data over the past 20 years:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

There are no episodes in which private and government forecasters underestimated the 9-quarter-ahead funds rate by 2.2%-points. Even in March 2004 observers were expecting more than 2%-points of tightening over the next 9 quarters. By contrast, there have been two episodes in which private and government forecasters’ 9-quarter-ahead funds rate forecasts were more than 4%-points high:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

If the Federal Reserve is truly failing to take account of business cycle asymmetry here–taking some of the risk that the economy will greatly weaken rapidly and using it to raise its estimated probability of a sudden upside breakout on inflation–then I will be flummoxed. But if that is not what they are doing, why draw this graph?

Indeed, if we look back over the past 40 years, we see only two episodes of an unanticipated tightening of more than 2.2%-points: the late 1970s Volcker disinflation itself, and Greenspan’s late 1980s tightening overshoot. I see no way of ascribing any probability greater than 1 in 20 to a late-2018 fed funds rate of 4.75% or more.

Pyrrhus at Jackson Hole: A Monetary Policy “Victory” That Leaves the Central Bank in a Very Weak Position Blogging

Real Potential Gross Domestic Product FRED St Louis Fed

Larry Summers says that he is disappointed along three dimensions at what came out of the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Conference. I think Summers is right to be disappointed. Indeed, from my perspective, it was disturbing that there was not more connection between the academic papers on how the monetary policy toolkit might be expanded and the policy discussion.

Summers’s view is that the policy discussion is seriously awry: “near-term policy signals… on the tightening side… will end up hurting both the Fed’s credibility and the economy…. The longer-term discussion revealed… dangerous complacency about the… existing tool box…. [And] failure to seriously consider major changes in the current monetary policy framework…” I think that gets it right:

  • The Fed appears to me to be dangerously complacent,
  • Both with respect to the short-term macroeconomic situation,
  • And with respect to its ability to stabilize the economy over the longer term;
  • Hence its current policies appear to me to be dangerously blind to current realities,
  • And it is not seriously engaged in setting the stage so that the successors of current policymakers can have a chance at a quiet life.

So if these issues were not, in my view, properly discussed at Jackson Hole, where should people go to learn about them?

First, Summers. This morning Summers argues about the near-term policy and economic outlook:

Larry Summers: Disappointed by What Came Out of Jackson Hole:

I had high hopes… billed as a forum that would look at new approaches to the conduct of monetary policy…. The Federal Reserve system and its Chair are to be applauded for welcoming challengers and critics… meet[ing] with the “Fed Up” group…. The fact that the Fed has now recognized that the decline in the neutral rate is something that is much more than a temporary reflection of the financial crisis is a very positive sign. On balance though, I am disappointed….

The near-term policy signals were on the tightening side which I think will end up hurting both the Fed’s credibility and the economy…. The Fed has not earned the right to be intellectually complacent or to expect that others will have faith in its current policy framework…. The Fed has been too serene about the economic outlook…. When the Fed predicted last December that it would raise rates four times in 2016, market participants saw a disconnect from reality. It has been that way for a long time….

Disappointed by what came out of Jackson Hole Larry Summers

Disappointed by what came out of Jackson Hole Larry Summers 

Chair Yellen… basically repeated the existing Fed position that rates would be raised at some point when the data were clear that the economy was strong and inflation reaching two percent. Markets took the remarks as mildly dovish until Vice Chair Fischer was seen on CNBC as interpreting the Chair as implying that two rates increases by the end of the year were possible…. I [had] hoped that the Fed would make clear that it would tighten only when there appeared a real risk of inflation expectations rising above two percent. At a time when market forecasts of inflation on Fed’s preferred price index are in the range of 1.2 percent, this is very likely some time off. Some are skeptical of market measures of inflation expectations. Note that survey measures of long term inflation expectations for both professionals and consumers are near historical lows and if anything have declined over the last year…

Second, people should go read Paul Krugman. Basically, since at least 1998 Paul has been way ahead of the curve on many issues, one of which is the return of “depression economics” and the need for abandoning the belief that stabilization policy can successfully be conducted by independent central banks with a narrow monetary policy operations toolkit:

Paul Krugman: On Twitter:

Paul is citing himself from four years ago:

Paul Krugman (2012): Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy, Revisited:

One recurring complaint… is that [people] can’t figure out where I stand on monetary versus fiscal policy as a response to a deeply depressed economy…. Mike Woodford’s latest paper, especially taken in tandem with his paper last year at the Cambridge Keynes conference, actually explains it all…. Current monetary policy is indeed ineffective in a liquidity trap… there is still scope for central bank action in… credible commitments to keep monetary policy easy in the future…. The trouble is how to make those credible commitments… to convince the central bank itself that it’s a good idea… to convince the private sector that the central bank will not, in fact, just revert to type once the crisis is past. My judgment back in late 2008/early 2009 was that it would take a long time to get through those two stages….

What about fiscal policy? As Mike pointed out in his earlier paper, fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap doesn’t require that you convince the market that you’re going to behave differently once the crisis is past. It doesn’t depend on expectations at all; the government just goes out and creates jobs. So it made a lot of sense to argue for stimulus as the main immediate response to the slump. But isn’t fiscal stimulus also a hard sell politically? Yes, indeed….

So what should well-meaning economists do now, with both fiscal and monetary policy falling short? The answer is, campaign on both fronts, trying to convince influential players both that austerity is wrong and that the Fed needs to start signaling its willingness to see more inflation before it raises rates. And that’s more or less where I am.

That was true back in the fall of 2012. And that is still true. The Federal Reserve can, if it wants declare victory by pretending that the economy is at full employment (it might be; but it probably is not) and that inflation is effectively at its 2%/year core PCE target (yes, Stan Fischer, we are looking at you: there is a very small chance that it might be; but the odds are overwhelmingly that it is not), but it cannot pretend that it has set up the game board properly for today’s policymakers and their successors to deal with the next business cycle when it comes. For this, you need to read Jared Bernstein:

Jared Bernstein: Will the Federal Reserve Really Have What It Takes to Fight Off the Next Recession?:

No one knows when the next recession is going to hit… we just can’t accurately call these things…. There is, of course, a recession out there somewhere. The problem isn’t that we don’t know where; it’s that we’re not ready for it…. You simply cannot trust our Congress to act quickly and forcefully on countercyclical, discretionary fiscal policy (“discretionary” meaning the stuff aside from the automatic stabilizers)…. The Federal Reserve… likely [has a] limited-firepower problem…. The federal funds rate (FFR)… is sitting at less than half-a-percent, which gives them very little room to cut….Reifschneider… argues that this concern may be overblown, at least under certain conditions. His reasoning is threefold:

  1. If the recovery keeps going the Fed may have time to get rates back up to a needed perch.
  2. For reasons I’ve discussed in other posts, that perch is lower than it used to be.
  3. The FFR is not their only tool. There’s also quantitative easing (buying longer-term bonds to lower longer-term rates) and forward guidance (resetting people’s expectations by telling us that they’re going to keep rates low for a long time)….

I am not much comforted. There are a lot of “ifs” in Reifschneider’s story (all of which he is totally straight up about)…. Sure, I hope Reifschneider’s optimistic scenarios are correct. But I fear they’re not and we’d be crazy not to have a Plan B.

And Paul Krugman again:

Paul Krugman: On Fed Complacency:

Is the Fed really repeating its big mistake of the pre-crisis era, dismissing concerns about its ability to respond to recession? Jared Bernstein thinks so, and so do I…. The current state of thinking seems to be… Reifschneider, which argues… that by the time the next recession arrives, the Fed funds rate will have returned to a level that still leaves sufficient room to cut….

I can’t help but recall a 1999 paper by Reifschneider and John Williams about inflation targets and the risk of hitting the zero lower bound. They concluded that a 2 percent target should be enough to make this a minor concern… binding only 5 percent of the time, and ZLB episodes would last on average only 4 quarters…. We have just gone through an 8-year–32 quarter–ZLB episode, which accounts for more a quarter of the time that has passed since the beginning of the Great Moderation. Basically, that optimistic take was off by an order of magnitude. Shouldn’t that miss give the Fed pause now?

And you should also read Steve Matthews’s report on the conference, with reports of some policymakers understanding how dire the situation is:

Steve Matthews: Central Bankers Spurn Call for Radical Approach at Jackson Hole:

Yellen and three regional Fed bank presidents — Robert Kaplan of Dallas, Eric Rosengren of Boston and Loretta Mester of Cleveland — all urged fiscal policy makers to step up. “Central bankers, we are increasingly talking about this, about the need for fiscal policy and other economic tools beyond monetary policy,” Kaplan said during a luncheon Friday, although he cautioned it could be “many years” for there to be action…. “You can’t expect us to do the whole job,” Christopher Sims, Nobel Prize-winning economist from Princeton University, told Fed leaders on Friday. “So long as the legislature has no clue of its role in these problems, nothing is going to get done. Of course, convincing them that they have a role and there is something they should be doing, especially in the U.S., may be a major task”…

But they were not willing to call for institutional and policy reforms that will be needed in the highly-likely eventuality that fiscal policymakers do not recover their sanity:

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and her peers… re-affirmed their belief in power of monetary policy to stop economies from slipping into deflation. They were less keen on academic proposals that included the abolition of cash, raising their inflation targets, or keeping permanently large balance sheets…. Yellen, in her keynote address at the Kansas City Fed’s annual mountain retreat, said that additional tools remain “subjects for research” and were not being actively considered. Policy makers from Europe and Japan echoed her caution…. In stressing that monetary policy is adequate, Yellen and three other Fed officials at Jackson Hole urged structural reforms or a greater reliance on fiscal action…

Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda and Benoit Coeure, European Central Bank Executive Board member, both rejected the idea of a higher inflation target. Kuroda promised “ample space for additional easing” as needed, while Coeure said “we may need to dive deeper into our operational framework”…