Must-Read: Willem Buiter: EU and China Ought to Use Helicopter Money

Must-Read: Willem Buiter: EU and China Ought to Use Helicopter Money:

Helicopter money is a coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus…

It is a fiscal stimulus funded permanently by the Central Bank. There are obvious win-win situations that we could have. Restructuring of debt if possible, haircuts if necessary, and then a well-targeted fiscal stimulus funded ultimately through the European Central Bank (ECB), people’s helicopter money….

The Central Bank itself provides a fiscal stimulus by sending checks to every man, woman, and child of the country…. In a country like Germany where infrastructure investment is needed, the government announces and implements a large-scale investment program and indirectly sells the debt to fund this program to the central bank, which monetizes it…. [China needs] fiscal stimulus targeted mainly at consumption, not at investment. Some capital expenditure like social housing, affordable housing, even some infrastructure. But organization supporting infrastructure, not high-speed trains in Tibet. It has to be funded by the central government, the only entity with deep pockets, and it has to be monetized by the People’s Bank of China…

Looking beyond GDP when measuring welfare

A new paper by Charles Jones and Peter Klenow puts forth a new model of a person’s welfare based on how much they consume and how much time they are able to take off.

Gross domestic product often gets confused for a measure of economic well-being. That’s understandable given how often GDP or GDP growth rates gets held up as the key measure of economic health. But should policymakers really care about how much an economy produces every year in and of itself? Economists (and many other people) would agree that increasing economic output is good in so much that it allows people to consume things, live longer, and have some leisure time. GDP, which is simply the value of all final goods and services produced in a country in one year, doesn’t fully capture those conditions. A new paper takes a stab at creating a measure of economic welfare.

The paper, by economists Charles Jones and Peter Klenow of Stanford University, was published in the latest issue of American Economic Review. The two economists try to move beyond GDP and build a measure of economic welfare that uses data on consumption, leisure, any inequality evident in those two variables, and life expectancy in a country. Why those data? In Jones and Klenow’s model, a person’s welfare is based on how much they can actually consume and how much time they can actually take off. If overall consumption is a small percent of income or worker hours are long, then economic welfare will be lower for a given level of economic output. The same goes for consumption or leisure inequality—if they are high (consumption and leisure are concentrated among a few people) or if life expectancy is low (a person might not be around long enough to enjoy consumption or leisure) then the average economic welfare will be lower than income alone would suggest.

Before digging into the specific results from the paper, let’s be clear that the measure of well-being developed by Jones and Klenow is dependent upon the assumptions of their model. The economists run the model with a number of other assumptions as a check on their results and they hold up. But the model-based nature of the results should be noted.

The results end up being quite interesting. While there is a very strong correlation between the two authors’ measure of welfare and GDP per person, comparisons between countries are different than if we used GDP per person. If policymakers were to compare the United States to France by average consumption, for instance, then France’s living standard is only 60 percent of the U.S. level. But using a measure that includes France’s lower inequality, lower mortality rate, and more leisure, France’s welfare-based living standard is about 92 percent of the U.S. level, with inequality, mortality, and leisure all boosting the relative standard equally.

All Western European countries in the data set developed by Jones and Klenow end up looking closer to the United States based on this measures. Lower-income countries, however, appear further away from the high-income countries due to much lower life expectancy and high rates of inequality.

Jones and Klenow’s measure also can be used to make comparisons over time. Their results show that standards of living measured by welfare have grown much quicker than standards based on income growth. The difference—3 percent per year versus 2 percent per year from the 1980s to the mid-2000s—might not seem large, but it’s the difference between standards of living doubling every 24 years instead of in 36 years.

The new paper by Jones and Klenow makes for very interesting reading, but it’s only the beginning of a new effort. The two economists point out that with more and better data they could loosen some of their assumptions in the model and that there are other applications of their model for building measure of welfare. Hopefully, they and others looking at how to better capture trends in living standards will continue to work hard on these questions. But maybe, for their welfare’s sake, not too hard.

Has Macro Policy Been Different since 2008?

3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Was macro policy different after 2008? I interpret that to be the question: “Did macro policy follow the same rule after 2008 that people had presumed before 2008 it would follow in a true tail event?” To answer that question requires determining just what policy rule people back before 2008 thought that the U.S. government was following. Let me propose four candidates for our (implicit) pre-2008 macroeconomic policy rule:

  1. Limit fiscal policy to automatic stabilizers, and follow a Taylor rule with John Taylor’s coefficients (Taylor).
  2. Follow Milton Friedman’s advice and target velocity-adjusted money: if nominal GDP is below trend, print more money and buy bonds; if that does not restore nominal GDP to either the trend level or the trend growth rate (depending on whether your favorite flavor has or does not have base-drift sprinkles), repeat (Friedman).
  3. Use open market operations to manipulate the short-term safe nominal interest rate to stabilize inflation and unemployment as long as you are not at the zero lower bound. At the zero lower bound credibly promise to be irresponsible in the future in order to raise inflation expectations by enough to push the real interest rate down to its negative Wicksellian neutral rate value, and so restore real macroeconomic balance (Krugman).
  4. Use open market operations to manipulate the short-term safe nominal interest rate to stabilize inflation and unemployment as long as you are not at the zero lower bound. At the zero lower bound resort to expansionary fiscal policy and do as much of it as needed, at least as long as interest rates on long-term government debt remain low (Blinder).

Were there any other live candidates for “the policy rule” back before 2008?

Must-Read:Takashi Negishi (1960): Welfare Economics and Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy

Must-Read: The market’s social welfare function: weight each individual’s utility by the inverse of their marginal utility of income, and weight by that. The desires of those who have the least need for goods and services therefore get the greatest weight:

Takashi Negishi (1960): Welfare Economics and Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy:

A competitive equilibrium is a maximum point of a social welfare function…

…which is a linear combination of the utility functions of consumers, with the weights in the combination in inverse proportion to the marginal utilities of income. Then the existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a maximum point of this special social welfare function. Therefore, we can prove the former by showing the latter…

Must-Read: Drew Altman: The ACA Marketplace Problems in Context (and Why They Don’t Mean Obamacare Is ‘Failing’)

Must-Read: Drew Altman: The ACA Marketplace Problems in Context (and Why They Don’t Mean Obamacare Is ‘Failing’):

There absolutely are problems in the marketplaces…

…Premiums will rise much more rapidly next year than they did this year…

…[19% of] marketplace enrollees may have a choice of only one plan next year…. The marketplaces are an important part of Obamacare. However, more uninsured people have been covered by Medicaid expansions than in the marketplaces, even though 19 states have not expanded Medicaid…. The law’s insurance reforms, including protections for people with pre-existing conditions, apply to people buying their own insurance outside the marketplaces as well…. A broad range of ACA reforms in Medicare payments to doctors and hospitals are moving ahead…. Many of these elements of the ACA are working imperfectly and can be strengthened, just like the marketplaces. But recent talk of “Obamacare failing” seems to conflate the marketplaces with the ACA overall….

The issues in the ACA marketplace are real problems that need to be addressed through greater enrollment and policy changes… [should] be treated much more like mundane implementation issues to be addressed by Congress than glaring headlines about failure.

Must-Read: Jonathan Portes and Simon Wren-Lewis: Issues in the Design of Fiscal Policy Rules

Must-Read: Jonathan Portes and Simon Wren-Lewis: Issues in the Design of Fiscal Policy Rules: “The potential conflict in designing rules between the need to mimic optimal policy…

…where debt is a shock absorber and is adjusted only very slowly, and the need to prevent deficit bias…. It may therefore make sense to make different recommendations depending on… the nature of governments…. [In] governments… not… subject to deficit bias… simple debt feedback rules come close to reproducing the optimal fiscal policy… [if] the exchange rate is floating and there is little risk of hitting the ZLB…. [G]overnment[s] behav[ing] in a non-benevolent manner… need… operational targets… fixed for the end of the natural term of the government… [to] provide strong incentives… for cyclically adjusted primary deficits…. These targets should be set in cooperation with a fiscal council, which would monitor progress… [and,] in exigent circumstances… suggest that the target be revised….

These rules should not apply if interest rates have hit the ZLB. In that case, fiscal policy should focus on demand stabilization… the suspension of the rule while the ZLB constraint applies, and not its modification. This ‘knockout’ should be an explicit part of the rule…

Must-Reads: August 31, 2016


Should Reads:

How often do Americans not pay federal taxes and receive government assistance?

During the last presidential election, a statistic from a distributional analysis of the U.S. tax code was the center of quite a bit of conversation. That statistic—47 percent—was the percent of tax units in 2009 that didn’t pay any federal income tax. The seeming prevalence of American tax payers who didn’t “pay into” the system had some participants in the conversation concerned that one portion of the U.S. population was permanently dependent upon the government for income. New research shows that concern is overblown.

A new working paper by economists Don Fullerton of the University of Illinois and Nirupama S. Rao of New York University looks at the question of the “47 percent,” but with an important difference. The original statistic was a snapshot in time, looking at how many households didn’t pay any federal income tax in 2009. What Fullerton and Rao look at instead is the persistence over time of households that did not not pay federal taxes and did not receive transfer income from the government in the form of government assistance. They use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which allows them to track households at different wage levels over time, with the PSID covering 40 years.

Fullerton and Rao end up finding quite a bit of movement among households, both in and out of non-taxpaying and receiving or not receiving transfers. According to their analysis, 77.9 percent of all households received some sort of government income transfers during the period they studied. But a large chunk of those households are older Americans who are receiving Social Security. We’d expect (and hope) that households receiving Social Security do so for many years.

About 42 percent of households never received a transfer that wasn’t Social Security. Of those that did receive income from one of those transfers, 30 percent did so for only one year and 76 percent for five years or less. A similar dynamic holds for paying federal income taxes, though there is much more persistence among non-tax payers. Only one-third of households owe income taxes during all of the sample years. Of those households that did not pay income taxes in every year, 52 percent do not pay for five or fewer years. And about 30 percent of households that do not pay income taxes don’t pay any income taxes at all for ten or more years.

So the data seem to show that the government income transfer system is working as an insurance system in which households seem to draw on the system temporarily before moving off the program. But for the income tax system, nonpayment seems to be more persistence. This could be due to programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, which significantly reduces tax liability for low-income households that would pay some federal income tax. The extent to which this is true might assuage concerns as the EITC is contingent upon the recipient working. We should also remember that many of the households that don’t pay federal income tax most likely do pay sales taxes and state and local income taxes.

This paper is a good reminder that snapshots of income, wealth, and other economic variables are important, but data that track them over time are even more useful.

Unpleasant Fiscal Dominance?

Sims highlights fiscal dominance at Jackson Hole Gavyn Davies

Paul Krugman appears confused:

Paul Krugman: Chris and the Ricardianoids:

Here’s [Chris] Sims on fiscal policy:

Fiscal expansion can replace ineffective monetary policy at the zero lower bound, but fiscal expansion is not the same thing as deficit finance. It requires deficits aimed at, and conditioned on, generating inflation. The deficits must be seen as financed by future inflation, not future taxes or spending cuts…

I think he’s saying that fiscal expansion works only if it leads to a rise in expected inflation…. [That] is certainly something I’ve heard from helicopter money types, who warn that something like Ricardian equivalence will undermine fiscal expansion unless it’s money-financed. But this is a misunderstanding of Ricardian equivalence, on two levels. First, as I’ve tried repeatedly to explain, a TEMPORARY increase in government purchases of goods and services will NOT be offset by expectations of future taxes even if full Ricardian equivalence holds. The kind of argument people like Robert Lucas made sounded Ricardian, but wasn’t–it was Ricardianoid. Second, less relevant to Sims but very relevant to other helicopter people, a deficit ultimately financed by inflation is just as much of a burden on households as one ultimately financed by ordinary taxes, because inflation is a kind of tax on money holders. From a Ricardian point of view, there’s no difference. So I’m trying to figure out exactly what Sims is saying…

As I understand where Sims and company are coming from, they are working in a model in which there are no government purchases. Or perhaps government purchases are useless, and so are not part of “true” real GDP. But in any event, either there is no difference between government purchases and tax cuts–hence no balanced-budget multiplier–or fiscal policy consists entirely of changes in taxes and transfers.

They are also working in a model in which total spending is given by something like:

C = C(r, W)

where W is the real wealth of the representative agent, and r is the real interest rate. The more wealth the more spending. The lower the real interest rate, the more spending.

The real interest rate is the difference between the nominal interest rate i and the inflation rate π:

r = i – π

And the economy is in a liquidity trap with i=0.

Now as I understand Sims, W is given by something like:

W = Y/r – T/(r + ρ)

where Y is the flow of income, T is the flow of taxes, and ρ is some sort of risk premium–that the finances of the government will become unstable and the government will not manage to collect its taxes.

Then the only ways fiscal policy can affect spending and output now are if:

  • deficits raise expectations of money-printing and so raise inflation π.
  • deficits raise expectations of future fiscal collapse and so increase current wealth by increasing the rate at which future tax liabilities are discounted.

And as I understand Sims, quantitative easing is counterproductive: it reduces the risk premium ρ, and so raises the present value of future tax liabilities and so reduces household wealth without doing anything to alter the real interest rate.

I think this is what is going on.

Is this a consistent model? I am not sure. Is this the model that Chris Sims has in mind that lies behind his talk? I am not sure. Is this the right model for the questions at hand? I am pretty sure it is not one of the first five models I would write does as most relevant.

Cf.: Gavyn Davies: Sims highlights fiscal dominance at Jackson Hole

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: Sims Highlights Fiscal Dominance at Jackson Hole

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: Sims Highlights Fiscal Dominance at Jackson Hole:

The most far reaching speech at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole meeting last week was…

…the contribution on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) by Professor Christopher Sims of Princeton University…. The subject is now moving centre stage…. It has important implications for the conduct of macro-economic policy, especially in Japan and the eurozone member states…. Government debt is an asset to the private sector. Prof Sims says that a reduction in future government deficits will make this debt a more attractive investment and this will induce the private sector to hold more of the debt, thus reducing demand for goods and services. This exerts a deflationary effect on the economy….

We are all familiar with… inflation if an irresponsible government (eg Brazil in the 1980s) persists in running excessive deficits…. Prof Sims reminds us that this can work in reverse, with all the signs changed. It is clear that this is directly relevant to the effectiveness of QE by the central bank…. Viewed in this light, the ineffectiveness of QE in offsetting a chronic shortage of private demand is not that surprising…. Prof Sims suggests that Japan can escape from its deflationary trap only by explicitly joining up fiscal and monetary policy, and making both subordinate to the inflation target…