Must- and Should-Reads: November 18, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Duncan Weldon: Negative Yields, the Euthanasia of the Rentier, and Political Economy

Should-Read: I wrestle with this political economy puzzle unsuccessfully myself. I am equally flummoxed:

Duncan Weldon: Negative Yields, the Euthanasia of the Rentier, and Political Economy: “I understand the mechanics of engine that took us here but not what the driver was thinking…

…Since approximately mid 2010 (I’d date it to the Toronto G-20) an incomplete economic recovery in the developed economies has been increasingly reliant on monetary policy to accelerate it with fiscal policy acting as brake… especially in the Europe and to a lesser extent in the US…. Years of tight fiscal policy and monetary loosening have taken us to where we are…. I am really struggling with is the political economy that drove it….

The death of the rentier was supposed to be a side effect of an economy operating at full employment. Instead, across much of Europe the rentier is being gradually euthanised whilst workers continue to suffer from weak real income growth and high unemployment….

A bund or gilt today is a very different proposition from what it was a decade ago… the income is non-existent and there is an increasing risk of a (large) capital loss. In effect, the monetary policy aim of pushing people into riskier assets has made “safe” assets more dangerous. And this is why I don’t understand the political economy that has brought us tight fiscal and easy money–it simply isn’t creating enough winners to be sustainable….

Of course the voting public don’t seem particularly keen on deficits…. It may be that… this is the best argument for helicopter money. If fiscal policy makers won’t do what is required, then perhaps monetary policymakers can…

Should-Read: Aaron Carroll: Will “Repeal and Delay” Be the Next “Doc Fix”?

Should-Read: Aaron Carroll: Will “Repeal and Delay” Be the Next “Doc Fix”?: “I’m seeing a lot of chatter on how one thing Republicans can do in January is ‘Repeal and Delay’…

…It’s going to be a long, hard slog to create a “replace” plan. In spite of repeated claims that it’s right around the corner, they really haven’t done it in the last 6 years. It seems silly to think they’ll get to one fast. Many won’t want to wait for that to finally claim victory in “getting rid of the hated Obamacare”. This allows them to pass a law, claim victory, and punt the actual change to after the midterms (which will avoid a debacle like we saw in 2010 for the Democrats). Plus, some think this will put the Democrats over a barrel. If they don’t come to the table and reach an agreement, then the whole thing will blow up, and Republicans can blame it on them.

I don’t know if I agree with that. I don’t see Democrats suddenly caving any more than the Republicans caved in 2009 and 2010. I think they’ll be able to spin that the Republicans broke the system, and they own it. At the very least, I think we’ll see a standoff. In fact, I think it’s very possible that we’ll get our new “doc fix”. Every six months to a year, everyone will panic that they health care system is about to blow up, right up to the last second there will be news stories predicting armageddon, and then Congress will agree to “kick the can” down the road another six months. The difference here is that instead of just doctor reimbursement being the thing held ransom, the health insurance and health care of more than 20 million people will be, as well as all the industries that depend on stability for financial success. So basically all of them.

Inclusive Growth?: PIIE Conference

NewImage

http://tinyurl.com/dl20161117a

NewImage NewImage NewImage NewImage NewImage NewImage NewImage NewImage

PIIE: Conference on Income Inequality and Inclusive Growth: “Keynote Speaker: Paul Krugman (Graduate Center, City University of New York)

November 17, 2016 8:30 AM to 2:00 PMADD TO

The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) and the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) will cohost a conference on income inequality and inclusive growth on November 17, 2016. Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate and Distinguished Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, will conclude the conference with a keynote address, titled “After the Elephant Diagram,” at 12:15 pm.

The conference morning will consist of two panel discussions. The first panel (8:45–10:15 am) will focus on global inequality and begin with a presentation by MGI partner Anu Madgavkar on MGI’s new report, Poorer than their parents: A new perspective on income inequality. (link is external) Sandra Black, member of the US Council of Economic Advisers, will offer her remarks drawing on the CEA’s recent research on the topic. Paolo Mauro, assistant director of the African department at the International Monetary Fund, will share his insights from his PIIE Working Paper, The Future of Worldwide Income Distribution.

The second panel (10:30 am–12:00 pm) will focus on inclusive growth policy ideas for the next US administration. The panelists include Brad DeLong, professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley; William Spriggs, chief economist at the AFL-CIO; Jonathan Woetzel, McKinsey & Company senior partner and MGI director; and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, senior fellow at PIIE since September and previously director-general for economic policy at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Must-Reads: November 16, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: Donald Trump’s False Promises

Must-Read: Anything wrong with this analysis? I cannot see anything:

Martin Wolf: Donald Trump’s False Promises: “Fiscal loosening with monetary tightening would mean a stronger dollar and a rising current account deficit…

…would, as in the early 1980s, increase protectionist pressures–Ronald Reagan’s administration was quite protectionist in its first term…. But protection against imports would raise the currency’s value further, shifting the adjustment on to unprotected sectors–above all, on to competitive exporters…. A strong dollar must weaken the manufacturing Mr Trump seeks to help…. The president-elect has also promised to eliminate Obamacare and most environmental and financial regulations. It is hard to believe any of this would succour the prospects of the working class… worse health cover, a dirtier environment, more predatory behaviour by financial institutions and, at worst, even another financial crisis. Protectionism, too, will fail to help… his supporters… [who] depend on cheap imported goods….

A burst of infrastructure spending, regressive tax cuts, protectionism, cuts in federal spending and radical deregulation. A big rise in infrastructure spending would indeed help construction workers. But little else in these plans would help the working class…. The longer-term consequences are likely to be grim, not least for his angry, but fooled, supporters. Next time, they might be even angrier. Where that might lead is terrifying.

Note to Self: I Still Fail to Understand Ken Rogoff’s Medium-Long Term Macroeconomic Optimism…

Ken Rogoff: “In nine years, nobody will be talking about ‘secular stagnation’. I’ve been debating Larry on this for a year, and I started saying ‘in ten years…, and so for consistency I now say ‘in nine years…”.

10 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate FRED St Louis Fed

This is a wager that the full-employment long-run in which money and its associates are a veil that does not affect or disturb the Say’s Law operation of the economy will come not more than 18 years after the shock of 2017–or at least that whatever remnants of the effects of that shock on the business cycle come 2025 will be dwarfed the effects of other business cycle shocks subsequent to now.

I do know from experience that one disagrees with Ken Rogoff at one’s grave intellectual peril. But is he correct here? I really cannot follow him to the conclusion he wants me to reach…

Things to reread and chew over:

  • Paul Krugman (2015): The Inflationista Puzzle: “Traditional IS-LM analysis said that the Fed’s [expansionary QE] policies would have little effect on inflation; so did the translation of that analysis into a stripped-down New Keynesian framework that I did back in 1998, starting the modern liquidity-trap literature. We even had solid recent empirical evidence: Japan’s attempt at quantitative easing in the naughties…. I’m still not sure why relatively moderate conservatives like Feldstein didn’t find all this convincing back in 2009…”

  • J. Bradford DeLong (2015): New Economic Thinking, Hicks-Hansen-Wicksell Macro, and Blocking the Back Propagation Induction-Unraveling from the Long Run Omega Point

  • Paul Krugman (2015): Backward Induction and Brad DeLong: “Brad DeLong is, unusually, unhappy with my analysis in a discussion of the inflationista puzzle–the mystery of why so many economists failed to grasp the implications of a liquidity trap, and still fail to grasp those implications despite 6 years of being wrong. Brad sorta-kinda defends the inflationistas on the basis of backward induction; I find myself somewhat baffled by that defense…”

  • Paul Krugman (2015): Rethinking Japan: “Secular stagnation and self-fulfilling prophecies: Back in 1998… I used a strategic simplification… [assumed] the Wicksellian natural rate… would return to a normal, positive level at some future date. This… provided a neat way to deal with the intuition that increasing the money supply must eventually raise prices by the same proportional amount; it was easy to show that this proposition applied only if the money increase was perceived as permanent, so that the liquidity trap became an expectations problem… [so] that if the central bank could “credibly promise to be irresponsible,” it could gain traction even in a liquidity trap. But what is this future period of Wicksellian normality of which we speak?… Japan looks like a country in which a negative Wicksellian rate is a more or less permanent condition. If that’s the reality, even a credible promise to be irresponsible might do nothing…. The only way to be at all sure of raising inflation is to accompany a changed monetary regime with a burst of fiscal stimulus…. While the goal of raising inflation is, in large part, to make space for fiscal consolidation, the first part of that strategy needs to involve fiscal expansion. This isn’t at all a paradox, but it’s unconventional enough that one despairs of turning the argument into policy…”

  • Paul Krugman (2015): St. Augustine and Secular Stagnation: “The assumption here is that the neutral rate will eventually rise so that monetary policy can take over the job of achieving full employment. What if we have doubts about whether that will ever happen? Well, that’s the secular stagnation question… a situation in which the neutral interest rate is normally, persistently below zero. And this raises a puzzle: If we worry about secular stagnation, should we then say that St. Augustine no longer applies, because better days are never coming? No. The way to deal with secular stagnation, if we believe in our models, is to raise the long-run neutral interest rate…. If we can do this via structural reform and/or self-financing infrastructure investment, fine. If not, raise the inflation target. And how do we get to the higher target inflation rate, when monetary policy is having trouble getting traction? Fiscal policy! If you’re really worried about secular stagnation, you should advocate a combination of a raised inflation target and a burst of fiscal stimulus to help the central bank get there. So the St. Augustine approach is right either way, with secular stagnation suggesting the need to be even less chaste in the short run.”

  • J. Bradford DeLong (2015): Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Rethinking Japan: “Paul Krugman’s original argument assumed that the economy would eventually head towards a long-run equilibrium in which flexible wages and prices would make Say’s Law hold… [with] the price level would be proportional to the money stock. That now looks up for grabs. It is the fact that that is up for grabs that currently disturbs Paul. Without a full-employment Say’s Law equilibrium out there in the transversality condition to which the present day is anchored by intertemporal financial-market and intertemporal consumer-utility arbitrage, all the neat little mathematical tricks that Paul and Olivier Blanchard built up at the end of the 1970s to solve for the current equilibrium break in their hands…. There is… more. Paul Krugman’s original argument also assumed back-propagation into the present via financial-market… and consumer-satisfaction intertemporal… arbitrage of the effects of that future well-behaved full-employment equilibrium. The equilibrium has to be there. And the intertemporal arbitrage mechanisms have to work. Both have to do their thing…”

  • J. Bradford DeLong (2015): The Scary Debate Over Secular Stagnation: Hiccup… or Endgame?

  • Paul Krugman (2015): On Being Against Secular Stagnation Before You Were for It

  • Duncan Weldon (2016): Negative Yields, the Euthanasia of the Rentier, and Political Economy: “I understand the mechanics of engine that took us here but not what the driver was thinking…”

  • J. Bradford DeLong (2015): Just What Are the Risks That Alarm Ken Rogoff?: “This part of Ken Rogoff’s piece appears to me to be very much on the wrong track: ‘Ken Rogoff: Debt Supercycle, Not Secular Stagnation: Robert Barro… has shown that in canonical equilibrium macroeconomic models small changes in the market perception of tail risks can lead both to significantly lower real risk-free interest rates and a higher equity premium…. Obstfeld (2013) has argued cogently that governments in countries with large financial sectors need to have an ample cushion, as otherwise government borrowing might become very expensive in precisely the states of nature where the private sector has problems…’ We need to be clear about what the relevant tail-risk states that Ken Rogoff is talking about are…. [They are that] even though it was sold at a high price and carries a low interest rate, the issuing of government debt is very expensive to the government [because] when the time comes in the bad state of the world for it to raise the money to amortize the debt, it finds that it really would very much rather not do so. It is clear if you are Argentina or Greece what the risk is: it is of a large national-level terms-of-trade or political shock, something that you can insure against by investing in the ultimate reserves of the global monetary system. If you are the United States or Germany or Japan or Britain, what is the risk? What is the risk that cannot be handled at low real resource cost by a not-injudicious amount of inflation, or of financial repression?”

  • J. Bradford DeLong (2015): Watching a Discussion: The Omega Point

Must-Read: Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg: Preparing for the Next Recession: Lessons from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

Must-Read: I dissent from one of Jared and Ben’s points here: it is not at all clear to me that a lower national debt is always and everywhere a better thing. At current interest rates–and until interest rates “normalize”, if they ever do–there are major plusses from a higher debt, and no minuses I can see. And if a high debt stops being optimal because interest rates normalize? Then we can (and should) pay it down.

The argument that we should not have a higher debt now is an argument about political disfunction when it comes time that it is appropriate to pay it down, not an argument about the economics:

Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg: Preparing for the Next Recession: Lessons from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: “Moving forward… a stronger set of automatic stabilizers would help…

…we recommend that policymakers:

  • Make UI’s EB program more responsive to economic conditions….
  • Have temporarily higher SNAP benefits (and perhaps higher SNAP administrative funds for states) take effect automatically when a trigger… reaches certain thresholds;
  • Make state fiscal relief, in the form of higher federal payments to help states cover their Medicaid costs, take effect automatically… and
  • Prepare for additional discretionary steps during downturns by establishing a dedicated fund for subsidized jobs and job creation programs and considering one-time housing vouchers….

Some policymakers… may hesitate to enact them due to concerns that such measures would increase our debt as a share of GDP…. All else being equal, we agree that a lower debt-to-GDP ratio is better for the economy over the long run.  All else is not equal, however, especially during recessions. The benefits of more effective fiscal stimulus measures to fight recessions outweigh the potential drawbacks of higher debt…