Should-Read: Eric Holthaus: @EricHolthaus: “We’ve never seen anything like what’s happening in the Arctic and Antarctic right now. This is a new era.” https://t.co/PUibEUN0t8
Should We Use Expansionary Fiscal Policy Now Even If the Economy Is at Full Employment? Yes!
When should you use fiscal policy to expand demand even if the economy is at full employment?
First, when you can see the next recession coming: that would be a moment to try to see if you could push the next recession further off.
Second, if it would help you prepare you to better fight the next recession whenever it comes.
The second applies now whether we are near full employment or not. Under any sensible interpretation of where we are now, using some of our fiscal space would put upward pressure on interest rates and so open up enormous amounts of potential monetary space to fight the next recession. It would do so whether or not it raised output and employment today as long as it succeeded in raising the neutral interest rate–and if a large enough fiscal expansion does not raise the neutral interest rate, we do not understand the macroeconomy and should simply go home.
Note to Self: Regulatory Uncertainty and Housing Finance
The U.S. Treasury seized Fannie and Freddie in 2008, and said that housing finance would be differently organized in the future.
It is now more than eight years later. There is still no plan for how housing finance is going to be different. Would you make a thirty-year fixed nominal rate loan to anyone in such an environment?
I think it is a miracle that Wells Fargo is willing to make mortgage loans.
I think that U.S. residential investment is one place where regulatory uncertainty may genuinely be having massive effects. We now have had nine years of seriously depressed residential construction–nine years’ worth of household formation of pent up demand. And yet U.S. residential construction continues to be substantially subnormal. Housing prices have recovered to 2004 mid-boom levels. Yet construction has not.
Must-Reads: November 20, 2016
- Duncan Black: Everybody Wants You: “I do think the upper class twits that rule Britain really do believe that the continent needs them (or thinks they do, effectively the same thing). They don’t…
- Simon Wren-Lewis: The Folly of Triggering Article 50: “Immediately after the Brexit vote, all the analysis I saw argued that Article 50 would not be triggered for some time…
- Andreas Fagereng et al.: Heterogeneity and Persistence in Returns to Wealth: “Twenty years of population data from Norway’s administrative tax records [show]…
- Paul Krugman: Infrastructure Build or Privatization Scam?: “Trumpists are touting the idea of a big infrastructure build…. But remember who you’re dealing with…
- Austin Frakt: Senator Lamar Alexander and Endless Can-Kicking Repeal: Senator Lamar Alexander understand how hard crafting health policy is… (Tu)
Interesting Reads:
- Either central banks must be given the tools to stabilize the economy, or responsibility for stabilization policy needs to be shifted back so that fiscal authorities share it–in which case fiscal authorities need to step up their technocratic game: Stefan Gerlach: Sky-High Monetary Policy
- Michael Santoli: @michaelsantoli: “Non-financial stocks are up less than 1% since election [& financials up 10.6%]. But be sure to tell us again how ‘everything’s changed.'” https://twitter.com/hsilverb/status/799366135439388672
- Richard Baldwin: The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization http://amzn.to/2g4GIpQ
- Susan Dynarski: @dynarski: Stock price of U Phoenix at 52-wk high. Investors expect profits to rise at for-profits.
- Fiscal Policy in the New Normal: IMF Panel
- Weekend Reading: Diane Coyle: On Richard Baldwin’s “The Great Convergence”
- Weekend Reading: Alexander Hamilton: Protecting the Choice of President from Sinister Foreign Interference
- Any Hopes for Inclusive Growth in the Age of Trump?
- Note to Self: For the second day in a row, Sherman Robinson says that I must read Richard Baldwin’s new book immediately…
- Comment of the Day: Robert Waldmann: Some Questions About Low Investment, to Some of Which I Have Half-Adequate Answers…: “Ah, yes! Basically just the very primitive accelerator without even a real interest term…
- Some Questions About Low Investment, to Some of Which I Have Half-Adequate Answers…
- Neville Morley: Political Economy and Classical Antiquity
- Mohamed A. El-Erian: @elerianm: ICYMI, it didn’t take long for the Bank of #Japan to react to higher yields – unlimited #bonds buying at fixed rates
Should-Read: Austin Frakt: Senator Lamar Alexander and Endless Can-Kicking Repeal
Should-Read: Reading the thinking of the Republican legislative caucus is always difficult, because they:
- are terrified of getting turfed out at the next election (more terrified of the primary than the general, but still);
- are not focused on the idea that policies need to work to be politically popular in the long run;
- have a circle of advisers largely limited to those who have told them what they wanted to hear and what was politically convenient for them to hear in the past.
Thus standard technocratic reality-based habits of thought often do not apply. Here, however, Austin Frakt finds Lamar Alexander getting it.
I would add that a great many Republican governors who have the Medicaid expansion money would like to keep it, and a great many Republican governors who do not have the Medicaid expansion money would like it block-granted to them:
Austin Frakt: Senator Lamar Alexander and Endless Can-Kicking Repeal: Senator Lamar Alexander understand how hard crafting health policy is…
…said replacing Obamacare could take longer than the education bill he worked to pass last year, which took six years:
That was hard, but this is even more difficult because we spent six years as the Hatfields and the McCoys adopting our positions and shooting at each other. So building consensus in an environment like that is hard to do. But if we keep in mind that we’re trying to help people who are hurting and trying to keep people from being hurt, then that will encourage consensus.
More than six years! Making predictions in this environment is a fool’s errand, but I’ll do it anyway. I expect repeal with delay will happen by reconciliation. But the delay will be two years…. Then… there will be no GOP replace plan in time. What then? Either Congress will kick the can and delay repeal further or key parts of the ACA will expire. This process will repeat itself indefinitely…. If the GOP cannot craft a plan in two or so years, they will never do so. Never. Each election cycle will be too disruptive. A health care bill is much harder than an education bill. If you haven’t noticed, health care is a third rail onto which primary and general election opponents attempt to push one another. Endless, can-kicking repeal will be the best, achievable alternative.
But the uncertainty is terrible for insurers, as well as hospitals and state legislators trying to manage Medicaid programs. Repeated delayed repeal will probably lead to states with no marketplace insurers, a cessation if not retrenchment of Medicaid expansion, and will threaten the movement toward value-based payment. Senator Alexander may get this, but I’m not sure the rest of his caucus does.
Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Infrastructure Build or Privatization Scam?
Should-Read: There is, as of yet, no Trump fiscal policy plan. There is only a plan to have a plan to have a plan.
On the tax side, getting good policy looks hopeless: another big tax cut for the super-rich and the rich, sold to outsiders as something that will induce a tidal wave of entrepreneurial activity and sold on the inside as simply allowing you to keep your money that would otherwise flow to the losers and the cheaters and the moochers.
On the spending side… at the moment it does indeed look like money for nothing: have the government pay for projects most of which would have been built by privates anyway, and then entrench monopoly pricing of what ought to be free public-good infrastructure for a generation: a zero on the short-term Keynesian boost to employment and production, a zero on the medium-term Wicksellian rebalancing to allow the normalization of interest rates, and a zero on boosting America’s long-term potential by filling some of the infrastructure gap.
As I have said, however, there is a potential key at hand here: it is not in Donald Trump’s interest for his infrastructure plan to be a failure. It is in his interest for it to build many, many large things. The debate can be moved here.
Paul Krugman: Infrastructure Build or Privatization Scam?: “Trumpists are touting the idea of a big infrastructure build…. But remember who you’re dealing with…
…you are at great risk of being scammed…. It’s not a plan to borrow $1 trillion and spend it on much-needed projects…. Private investors do the work both of raising money and building the projects–with the aid of a huge tax credit that gives them back 82 percent of the equity they put in…. You should immediately ask three questions….
First, why involve private investors at all? It’s not as if the federal government is having any trouble raising money…. One answer might be that this way you avoid incurring additional public debt. But that’s just accounting confusion…. Second, how is this kind of scheme supposed to finance investment that doesn’t produce a revenue stream? Toll roads are not the main thing we need right now…. Third, how much of the investment thus financed would actually be investment that wouldn’t have taken place anyway? That is, how much “additionality” is there?… All of these questions could be avoided by doing things the straightforward way: if you think we should build more infrastructure, then build more infrastructure, and never mind the complicated private equity/tax credits stuff.
You could try to come up with some justification for the complexity of the scheme, but one simple answer would be that it’s not about investment, it’s about ripping off taxpayers. Is that implausible, given who we’re talking about?
Must-Read: Andreas Fagereng et al.: Heterogeneity and Persistence in Returns to Wealth
Must-Read: Andreas Fagereng et al.: Heterogeneity and Persistence in Returns to Wealth: “Twenty years of population data from Norway’s administrative tax records [show]…
…in a given cross-section, individuals earn markedly different returns on their assets, with a difference of 500 basis points between the 10th and the 90th percentile…. Heterogeneity in returns does not arise merely from differences in the allocation of wealth between safe and risky assets: returns are heterogeneous even within asset classes…. Returns are positively correlated with wealth… have an individual permanent component that accounts for 60% of the explained variation….
For wealth below the 95th percentile, the individual permanent component accounts for the bulk of the correlation between returns and wealth; the correlation at the top reflects both compensation for risk and the correlation of wealth with the individual permanent component. Finally, the permanent component of the return to wealth is also (mildly) correlated across generations.
Should-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: The Folly of Triggering Article 50
Should-Read: As I have said, democracy is not an especially good way of choosing effective technocratic leaders. And our current democracy appears to be rather worse than usual. Cf. Thoukydides, [Mytilene Debate][], [Sikilian Expedition][], Melian Dialogue:
Simon Wren-Lewis: The Folly of Triggering Article 50: “Immediately after the Brexit vote, all the analysis I saw argued that Article 50 would not be triggered for some time…
…They were thinking rationally….
Triggering Article 50 without any kind of idea about what any agreement would look like puts the UK in a very weak negotiating position. This is why the EU were pressing for Article 50 to be triggered as soon as possible…. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say it allows the EU to dictate terms. Triggering Article 50 was our best card, yet it is a card that Theresa May is determined to throw away…. Anyone who actually wants a good deal from the EU when we leave should realise that the UK’s negotiating position becomes instantly weaker once Article 50 is triggered. I do not know whether those who have successfully pushed for triggering Article 50 so soon simply live in a deluded state… or whether they are desperately afraid that if it is not done soon people will go off the whole idea of leaving. But whichever… it is an act of folly….
As for Labour’s position, I’m afraid all I can say is you were warned…. But I do not want to get distracted by that….
So if MPs, pro or anti leaving, had any sense at all, and any independence at all, they would vote against…. But if have the interests of the British people as your priority rather than your short term popularity that is what you will do. You could even get voters on your side if you explain why you are doing it…
Should-Read: Duncan Black: Everybody Wants You
Should Read: Duncan Black: Everybody Wants You: “I do think the upper class twits that rule Britain really do believe that the continent needs them (or thinks they do, effectively the same thing). They don’t…
…And even if Italy is desperate to sell you Prosecco, good luck trying a similar pitch on every other EU country.
Boris Johnson’s approach to Brexit has been ridiculed by European ministers after he told Italy it would have to offer tariff-free trade in order to sell its prosecco in the UK. Carlo Calenda, an Italian economics minister, said it was insulting that Johnson had told him during a recent meeting that Italy would grant Britain access to the EU’s single market “because you don’t want to lose prosecco exports”. “He basically said: ‘I don’t want free movement of people but I want the single market,’” he told Bloomberg. “I said: ‘No way.’ He said: ‘You’ll sell less prosecco.’ I said: ‘OK, you’ll sell less fish and chips, but I’ll sell less prosecco to one country and you’ll sell less to 27 countries.’ Putting things on this level is a bit insulting.”
I’ve heard enough similar statements from the twits to think they really buy their own bullshit. Soon nobody else will!
Some Questions About Low Investment, to Some of Which I Have Half-Adequate Answers…
I think the big part of the story is that the investment accelerator is a big thing, even though our models say it should not. Businesses do wait to invest until they are running flat out to invest. It’s a puzzle why they do this–they ought to act like the foresighted agents in our models, shouldn’t they?
I think a large part of the rest of the story of depressed investment is the growth of radical uncertainty. We used to see one 40% real collapse in the value of an important asset class every generation.
Now we have seen three in a decade.
Call it radical uncertainty, call it the collapse of risk tolerance, call it moral hazard in the credit channel’s ability to do the risk transformation as nobody will believe that investment banks produce AAA assets rather than sell you unhedged puts–the failure to satisfactorily mobilize the collective risk bearing capacity of the world to support risky investment is one of the biggest financial stories of the past decade. You look at the bonds of exorbitant privilege possessing reserve currency sovereigns and at the U.S. equity yield hanging up there at 5% real, and we have an equity return premium of the magnitude of the immediate post-WWII years and not seen since.
For residential investment, of course, we have to add regulatory uncertainty. Would you sell thirty-year fixed-rate nominal callable loans when there was no plan for how the mortgage finance GSEs will operate in a decade?
Questions to which I do not have any good answers:
Why is it that capital is so very expensive for risky businesses and so cheap for the exorbitant privilege possessing reserve currency sovereigns? How much do we dare ask those sovereigns to take over the business of boosting investment globally via infrastructure for the next decade or so?