Should-Read: Brad Setser: China’s Dual Equilibria

Should-Read: Brad Setser: China’s Dual Equilibria: “Not just multiple possible exchange rate equilibria… at least two different possible macroeconomic equilibria…

…In the “strong” yuan equilibrium, outflows are kept at a level that China can support out of its current goods trade surplus…. A larger “on-budget” central government fiscal deficit—together with an expansion of social insurance—keep demand up, even as investment falls. In the “weak” yuan equilibrium, China lets the market drive its currency lower—and a weaker currency increases the trade and current account surplus. Such surpluses would finance sustained capital outflows in excess of half a trillion dollars a year without the need to dip further into China’s reserves. The resulting surpluses would be shockingly large…. A larger trade surplus would also provide support for the economy. As investment slows, China would in effect pivot back to exports–and it wouldn’t need to use the central government’s fiscal space to support demand. Both are plausible…

The modern way to maintain an undervalued currency isn’t to intervene to weaken your currency. It is to step back and allow the market to drive your currency down–-And then intervene to resist subsequent pressure to appreciate (and rebuild reserves) when the market turns…

Must-Reads: November 29, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Is the cost of childcare driving women out of the U.S. workforce?

In this May 6, 2015, file photo Saryah Mitchell, sits with her mother, Teisa, Gay, left, a rally calling for increased child care subsidies at the Capitol in Sacramento, Calif. In much of the U.S., families spend more on child care for two kids than on housing. And if you’re a woman, it’s likely you earn less than your male colleagues even though one in four households with kids relies on mom as the sole or primary breadwinner.

The U.S. unemployment rate now stands at 4.9 percent, a seemingly healthy level last experienced prior to the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Yet what is not reflected in this statistic is the growing number of Americans who have dropped out of the labor force altogether. Economists are still puzzled by this decline in the so called “labor force participation rate”—meaning the percentage of Americans that either have a job or are actively looking—especially among Americans between the ages of 25 to 54, who are supposed to be at the peak of their working life.

Scholars and policymakers interested in this trend mostly focus on the U.S. labor force’s “guy problem,” but the number of women in the labor force is amid a two-decade-long decline that began just as the cost of childcare began to rise. Are the two trends related? And if so, how big an effect does higher childcare costs have on women’s employment?

A recently released job market paper by So Kubota, a Ph.D. candidate in economics at Princeton University, attempts to tackle these questions. Kubota looks at women’s employment from 1985 to 2011. At the beginning of this period, women were entering the workforce in droves, and by the early 1990s the United States had one of the highest female labor force participation rates in the world. Today, however, many of our peer countries, economically speaking, have far surpassed the United States in this realm. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

What happened? Research by economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn at Cornell University finds that the United States’ lack of family friendly policies to support women in their prime childbearing and career years explains one-third of the decrease in women’s labor force participation. The U.S. political landscape contrasts with many European countries, which have enacted and expanded policies such as paid parental leave, childcare subsidies, and part-time work entitlements to encourage women’s employment.

Kubota’s work complements Blau and Kahn’s work, and finds that large increases in the costs of childcare in the United States also play a role. Between 1990 and 2010—a period in which wages stagnated for many workers—the hourly cost of childcare rose 32 percent. (Childcare workers did not experience a corresponding rise in wages and today make about 40 percent less than the national median wage.) There are many theories about why costs rose as much as they did, but Kubota suggests that it was largely driven by a series of state and federal policy changes over the same period.

Kubota finds that rising childcare expenditures by families resulted in an estimated five percent decline in total employment of women and a 13 percent decline in the employment of working mothers with children under the age of five. In many ways, these results are unsurprising. Childcare is the single biggest monthly expense for some families (it exceeds the average cost of in-state college tuition in more than half of the states) while one third of parents who use childcare say that it has caused a financial problem for their household.

As prices rose, many parents began to rely less on fee-based childcare, instead seeking out other informal arrangements such as grandparents or other family member. But these kinds of arrangements are less reliable. And when they fall through, women are more likely than men to be the one to pick up the slack.

Kubota points out that his paper examines the effects of rising childcare costs on female labor supply, but adds that “it also has a significant factor on total labor supply.” Among today’s families, work-family conflict is no longer just a “women’s issue.” Women are breadwinners in 40 percent of families, and men are taking on more housework and childcare than ever before (although still significantly less than women). In fact, 60 percent of fathers in dual-earner couples reported work-family conflict.

The drop in the U.S. labor force participation rate among men and women should concern policymakers for several reasons. First of all, it has a considerable impact on U.S. economic performance and growth. And, considering most families now rely on two incomes to stay afloat, more women leaving the workforce threatens family economic security. Women’s long-term earnings and financial well-being also are at risk, reducing their accumulation of long-term savings and the ability to be financially viable in the case of divorce or a partner’s death.

Addressing the growing childcare crisis in the United States as well as helping parents by enacting other work-family supports are critical to helping more women stay in the labor force, bolstering family economic security and ensuring more robust and sustained economic growth.

How Schizo Is Ms. Market These Days?

BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Effective Yield© FRED St Louis Fed

I’m confused because it does not seem to me that there is a single Ms. Market out there…

I used to strongly believe that bond and equity markets were tightly coupled by well-defined assessments of risk and a well-specified risk tolerance: take the risk-free rate, and to that the riskiness of a security times the premium per unit of risk, and you got the rate for that security. And as the risk-free rate moved up and down the whole configuration would move up and down, with some widening of spreads as the risk-free rate moved up and contraction as the risk-free rate moved down, but all in a predictable, stable configuration.

Thus safe bond and risky bond and stock prices would move in opposite directions in response to shocks to productivity and profits, and would move together in response to shocks to monetary policy and financial conditions.

Yet that does not seem to be true anymore. Since 2008 the ability of markets to actually make the risk transformation in sufficient volume that is needed for it to make sense to say “the market has a well-specified risk tolerance” seems to have broken down.

Safe bonds to their thing.

Risky bonds do their thing.

Short bonds do their thing.

Long bonds do their thing.

Equities do their thing.

And the spreads between them look like residuals more than relationships. Rather than trade ironing out the market into a single aggregate view, there seem to be three often inconsistent views here…

Should-Read: Ian Dunt: Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now?: Everything You Need to Know about Britain’s Divorce from Europe

Should-Read: Ian Dunt: Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now?: Everything You Need to Know about Britain’s Divorce from Europe: “Britain’s departure from the European Union is filled with propaganda, myth, and half- truth–but the risks are very real…

…Mishandling Brexit could lower our global status, diminish our quality of life, and throw our legal system into turmoil…. Ian Dunt… explains • why leaving the EU is set to make us permanently poorer • how cutting immigration will affect wages and taxes • why leading industries like farming, pharmaceuticals and finance will struggle to function • whether the biggest constitutional change in post-war history will break up the UK
This is the first full public exploration of Brexit, shorn of the wishful thinking of its supporters in Parliament and the media… a portrait of a country about to undergo a period of self-inflicted isolation.

Must-Read: Nancy Folbre: Does the One Percent Deserve What It Gets?

Must-Read: If people’s utility is proportional to the log of their lifetime incomes, then a perfectly competitive market without increasing returns, non-rival or non-excludible goods, or externalities “solves” the social welfare problem of maximizing a weighted sum of individual utility levels in which each individual’s utility is weighted by the value of his or her comprehensive lifetime endowment. What determines your lifetime endowment? The environment in which you are raised and your genetic inheritance that determines your skills, the property you inherit, luck; plus whether your particular environment-genetic-property-luck combination is scarce by nature, the luck of the draw, or by rent-seeking policy; and whether rich people have a strong jones for the things that your comprehensive lifetime endowment gives you a comparative advantage in making.

And if people are more risk averse than log utility–and it really looks like they are–the social welfare problem the market “solves” weights the ex post rich even more highly.

And we haven’t even gotten to the point that virtually nobody well-off is paid their marginal product–subtract them from society and let the market reach a new equilibrium, and in all but the most exceptional cases the drop in output would be only a small fraction of their “compensation”. (The poor, by contrast, are paid their marginal product–or less.)

The answer to the question, “is it sensible for society to maximize a social welfare function in which everybody’s utility is weighted by the ex post value of their comprehensive lifetime endowment?” is “no”.

Where does the idea that it is sensible come from. I think it comes from the opposite of rational thought. It is, psychologically, very important for human happiness for people to convince themselves that they “deserve” what they get–people are very unhappy if they think that they are among the moochers, and very very unhappy if they think that they are among the moochers. Finding a way to believe that this is true–that what is is one’s just karma–is important to many people. Thus it is a form of theology, not social science…

Nancy Folbre: Does the One Percent Deserve What It Gets?: “Years of schooling in neoclassical economic theories predispose [economists] to the view that perfectly competitive markets yield equitable as well as efficient outcomes…

…As a result, they often assess “rent seeking,” or efforts to get rich at someone else’s expense, by comparison with hypothetical market outcomes. Rent seeking becomes just another name for interference with the magic meritocracy of the marketplace. From this perspective, efforts to increase the minimum wage can be considered just as unfair as efforts to challenge compensation practices for corporate chief executives and other well-heeled top managers…

Must-Reads: November 28, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Must-Read: Pseudoerasmus: To Explain Myself on Twitter: My View of Chile

Must-Read: Pseudoerasmus: To Explain Myself on Twitter: My View of Chile: “Chile before Allende had already been a middle-income country… since the 19th century….

But… much like Argentina, Chile had been in relative decline since the early 20th century. Allende was a complete disaster https://pseudoerasmus.com/2015/05/21/the-invisible-blockade-against-allendes-chile/… both a ‘short-term’ disaster of fiscal and monetary management; and a long-term structural disaster of increasingly ‘socialising’ the economy. Allende to some extent was unlucky… but his mismanagement was extreme, Venezuela-like, in the face of the external shock.

Pinochet’s first austerity programme (1973–5) was absolutely necessary in the sense that Chile’s 30% of GDP budget deficit and hyperinflation had to be reversed…. Pinochet was indeed lucky to see rising copper prices during his part of the 1970s…. However, Pinochet also liberalised the capital account, letting in ‘hot money’ capital flows, much of which went into a real estate bubble in the late 1970s. Because of this, Chile faced the debt crisis in the early 1980s just as much as any other Latin American country…. The financial austerity in the face of the debt crisis erased the economic recovery of 1973–82. This was purely Pinochet’s mismanagement and incompetence. He was no better than Mexican presidents, in this regard.

But that’s different from his structural reforms. Those largely survived him, albeit with more redistribution under democratic governments, more ‘light’ industrial policy, as well as capital account controls, which were actually implemented by Pinochet after 1982. Clearly, Chile is much closer to the neoliberal paradigm, albeit with anomalies, than Chile was in 1969 or 1973. Denying that is tantamount to denying that the rest of Latin America is also closer to the neoliberal paradigm today than it was in 1975 or 1980. But there is nothing special about Chile today….

Had an Allende-like regime persisted, Chile would probably be much poorer today. But the actually existing Chile is no closer to convergence with the rich countries than it was in 1930. Moreover, Chile’s GDP/capita is about the same as Argentina’s, but Chile’s median household income is lower, and Chileans work longer hours per year than Argentinians.

Must-Read: Noah Smith (2013): “Just Deserts”

Must-Read: Noah Smith (2013): “Just Deserts”: “‘I get what you get in ten years, in two days.’–Chris Brown…

…Mankiw wants… a value system based on “just deserts”… “people should receive compensation congruent with their contributions”…. I think it’s worthwhile to think through the implications….

Brad CEO… makes $30 million a year…. Mike Clerk, who works at Wal-Mart… $25,000 a year…. So Mike works and works and works, for three years…. Suppose Brad randomly sees Mike’s new Civic in a parking lot and decides that he wants the same car…. Brad will have to work a little less than 5 hours…. Go to a couple meetings, send some emails, and the Civic is his.

Now suppose Mike goes to Greg Mankiw and asks: “Dr. Mankiw, why is it right and just that it took me 4% of my entire lifespan to buy this car, with all my heroic efforts and harsh self-denial, when it took that Brad CEO guy less than a day? I put in every bit as much effort as he does, day after day. Why does he deserve to get things with so much less effort than I put in?” Dr. Mankiw responds:

I am more persuaded by the thesis advanced by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) in their book The Race between Education and Technology. Goldin and Katz argue that skillbiased technological change continually increases the demand for skilled labor. By itself, this force tends to increase the earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers, thereby increasing inequality….
“OK,” Mike says. “But why, then, is Brad CEO so much more productive than I am? Where does his $30 million productivity come from?”

Dr. Mankiw responds:

[T]he intergenerational transmission of income has many causes beyond unequal opportunity. In particular, parents and children share genes…. IQ… has a large degree of heritability… IQ is only one dimension of talent, but it is easy to believe that other dimensions, such as self-control, ability to focus, and interpersonal skills, have a degree of genetic heritability as well.

“So let me get this straight,” Mike says. “Brad deserves to be so much richer than me because of ability he was born with?…”

Mike falls off of a ladder…. In the old days, before Mankiw’s “just deserts” theory gained widespread acceptance, Mike would have been able to collect Social Security disability; now, however, the government tells him that he does not deserve disability payments–they constitute an unfair transfer of income from the productive to the unproductive…. Mike cannot go to physical therapy because he cannot afford health insurance, and Medicaid was canceled because Medicaid payments do not constitute… “just deserts”….

Hopefully by now I’ve made my point. It’s easy to say that people deserve to get whatever they can manage to get in a “free” market. But when you start to actually think… you realize that it probably doesn’t fit very closely with most people’s concept of… “just deserts”…. Moral values are just statements of opinion, and Greg Mankiw is certainly entitled to his own. But I somehow doubt that his opinion of “just deserts” will be able to win over a majority of Americans, even among the intellectual classes.