Must-Read: Tim Duy: The Federal Reserve Turns Hawkish

Must-Read: I do not get this: it was 21 years ago that I learned–from an early draft of Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997)–that nobody had any business thinking or acting on any belief that they had the correct estimate of the natural rate. The natural rate shifts. And because the natural rate shifts there is no way to estimate it precisely, even in retrospect, let along in prospect:

Tim Duy: Fed Turns Hawkish: “The FOMC raised the… federal funds rate by 25bp today, as expected…

…But the tone of the press conference and the summary of economic projections were more hawkish than I anticipated…. Rather than showing up in a declining estimate of the natural rate, the unemployment drop showed up as a rise in the rate forecast. This is important. It is almost as if the Fed is drawing a line in the sand with an increased confidence that they have the correct natural rate estimate. Their tolerance for further declines below that line is wearing thin…. You should anticipate that further declines in unemployment will be met with a more aggressive Fed in 2017….

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen exuded confidence in the economic outlook during the press conference…. She repeatedly argued that her run a “high-pressure” economy comments from October were misinterpreted. She was recommending a research program, not a policy path. If you were expecting otherwise, time to get over it. She did not dismiss the possibility of staying on as a board member after her term as Chair ends…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Will Fiscal Policy Really Be Expansionary?

Must Read: In fact, it is looking less and less likely that the Trump deficits will be the kind of fiscal stimulus reality-based economists interested in economic recovery have been pleading for ever since the financial crisis:

Paul Krugman: Will Fiscal Policy Really Be Expansionary: “It’s now generally accepted that Trumpism will finally involve the kind of fiscal stimulus progressive economists have been pleading for…

…Republicans are deeply worried about budget deficits when a Democrat is in the White House, but suddenly become fiscal doves when in control. And there really is no question that the deficit will go up. But will this actually amount to fiscal stimulus?… Given the extent to which things are in flux, I can’t put numbers on what’s likely to happen. But I was able to find matching analyses by the good folks at CBPP of tax and spending cuts in Paul Ryan’s 2014 budget, which may be a useful model of things to come. If you leave out the magic asterisks… that budget was a deficit-hiker: $5.7 trillion in tax cuts over 10 years, versus $5 trillion in spending cuts. The spending cuts involved cuts in discretionary spending plus huge cuts in programs that serve the poor and middle class; the tax cuts were, of course, very targeted on high incomes…. That old Ryan plan would almost surely have been contractionary, not expansionary.

Will Trumponomics be any different? It would matter if there really were a large infrastructure push, but that’s becoming ever less plausible….

Posted in Uncategorized

Must- and Should-Reads: December 18, 2016


Interesting Reads:

(Early) Monday DeLong Smackdown Watch: Has Macroeconomics Gone Right?

U.S. Real GDP since 2009

After three years, how is this working out?…

Paul Krugman (2013): The Neopaleo-Keynesian Counter-counter-Counterrevolution: “OK, I can’t resist this one — and I think it’s actually important…

…Brad DeLong reacts to Binyamin Appelbaum’s piece on Young Frankenstein Stan Fischer by quoting from his own 2000 piece on New Keynesian ideas in macroeconomics, a piece in which he argued that New Keynesian thought was, in important respects, a descendant of old-fashioned monetarism. There’s a lot to that view. But I’m surprised that Brad stopped there, for two reasons. One is that it’s worth remembering that Fischer staked out that position at a time when freshwater macro was turning sharply to the right, abandoning all that was pragmatic in Milton Friedman’s ideas. The other is that the world of macroeconomics now looks quite different from the world in 2000.

Specifically, when Brad lists five key propositions of New Keynesian macro and declares that prominent Keynesians in the 60s and early 70s by and large didn’t agree with these propositions, he should now note that prominent Keynesians–by which I mean people like Oliver Blanchard, Larry Summers, and Janet Yellen–in late 2013 don’t agree with these propositions either.

In important ways our understanding of macro has altered in ways that amount to a counter-counter-counterrevolution (I think I have the right number of counters), giving new legitimacy to what we might call Paleo-Keynesian concerns. Or to put it another way, James Tobin is looking pretty good right now. (Incidentally, this was the point made by Bloomberg almost five years ago, inducing John Cochrane to demonstrate his ignorance of what had been going on macroeconomics outside his circle.)

Consider Brad’s five points:

  1. Price stickiness causes business cycle fluctuations: You clearly need price stickiness to make sense of the data. However, there is now widespread acceptance of the point that making prices more flexible can actually worsen a slump, a favorite point of Tobin’s.

  2. Monetary policy > fiscal policy: Not when you face the zero lower bound — and that’s no longer an abstract or remote consideration, it’s the world we’ve been living in for five years. And Tobin, who defended the relevance of fiscal policy, is vindicated.

  3. Business cycles are fluctuations around a trend, not declines below some level of potential output: This view comes out of the natural rate hypothesis, and the notion of a vertical long-run Phillips curve. At this point, however, there is wide acceptance of the idea that for a variety of reasons, but especially downward nominal wage rigidity, the Phillips curve is not vertical at low inflation. Again, a very Tobinesque notion, as Daly and Hobijn explain.

  4. Policy rules: Not so easy when once in a while you face Great Depression-sized shocks.

  5. ‘Low multipliers associated with fiscal policy’: Ahem. Not when you’re in a liquidity trap.

I do think this is important. Among economists who are actually looking at recent events, not doing a see-no-Keynes, hear-no-Keynes, speak-no-Keynes act, there has been a strong revival of some old ideas in macroeconomics. It’s not just new classical macroeconomics that’s in retreat; we’re also seeing, within the Keynesian camp, a distinct if polite rise of Neopaleo-Keynesianism.

I must say I find myself distinctly less optimistic than Paul here. After three years:

  • We seem to me to have had no influence on policy: IS-LM says that if the Federal Reserve wants to be able to respond to the next adverse macroeconomic shock we need a looser fiscal policy in order to normalize interest rates during this expansion. The Federal Reserve is ignoring IS-LM.

  • While it is true you no longer hear people outside of what I call “Chicago” talking about how DSGE is a progressive research program, you do hear nearly everybody still talking about it as if it were a harmless fetish and a useful neutral ground to frame the discussion.

  • As far as actual serious work as to what emergent properties we can expect from what characteristics of our really-existing structure of markets? We have made no progress…

Should-Read: Douglas O. Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson: How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?

Should-Read: The answer is: not precise at all. Nobody should imagine that they know what the NAIRU is right now, or make policy that does not take account of the fact that there is great uncertainty about what the NAIRU is right now:

Douglas O. Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson (1997): How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?: “Uncertainty arising from not knowing the parameters of the model at hand…

…A second source of uncertainty…. [It is] plausible… that the NAIRU switches stochastically among several regimes… the additional uncertainty of not knowing the current regime…. A third source of uncertainty arises from the choice of specification…. None of the confidence intervals presented in this paper formally incorporate this uncertainty…. Informally incorporating this additional source further increases the uncertainty surrounding the actual value of the NAIRU.

A central conclusion… is that a wide range of values of the NAIRU are consistent with the empirical evidence. However, the unemployment rate and changes in the unemployment rate are useful predictors of future changes in inflation…. The value of unemployment corresponding to a stable rate of inflation is imprecisely measured, even though an increase in unemployment will on average be associated with a decline in future rates of inflation.

Regional Policy and Distributional Policy in a World Where People Want to Ignore the Value and Contribution of Knowledge- and Network-Based Increasing Returns

Pascal Lamy: “When the wise man points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger…”

Perhaps in the end the problem is that people want to pretend that they are filling a valuable role in the societal division of labor, and are receiving no more than they earn–than they contribute.

But that is not the case. The value–the societal dividend–is in the accumulated knowledge of humanity and in the painfully constructed networks that make up our value chains.

A “contribution” theory of what a proper distribution of income might be can only be made coherent if there are constant returns to scale in the scarce, priced, owned factors of production. Only then can you divide the pile of resources by giving to each the marginal societal product of their work and of the resources that they own.

That, however, is not the world we live in.

In a world–like the one we live in–of mammoth increasing returns to unowned knowledge and to networks, no individual and no community is especially valuable. Those who receive good livings are those who are lucky–as Carrier’s workers in Indiana have been lucky in living near Carrier’s initial location. It’s not that their contribution to society is large or that their luck is replicable: if it were, they would not care (much) about the departure of Carrier because there would be another productive network that they could fit into a slot in.

All of this “what you deserve” language is tied up with some vague idea that you deserve what you contribute–that what your work adds to the pool of society’s resources is what you deserve.

This illusion is punctured by any recognition that there is a large societal dividend to be distributed, and that the government can distribute it by supplementing (inadequate) market wages determined by your (low) societal marginal product, or by explicitly providing income support or services unconnected with work via social insurance. Instead, the government is supposed to, somehow, via clever redistribution, rearrange the pattern of market power in the economy so that the increasing-returns knowledge- and network-based societal dividend is predistributed in a relatively egalitarian way so that everybody can pretend that their income is just “to each according to his work”, and that they are not heirs and heiresses coupon clipping off of the societal capital of our predecessors’ accumulated knowledge and networks.

On top of this we add: Polanyian disruption of patterns of life–local communities, income levels, industrial specialization–that you believed you had a right to obtain or maintain, and a right to believe that you deserve. But in a market capitalist society, nobody has a right to the preservation of their local communities, to their income levels, or to an occupation in their industrial specialization. In a market capitalist society, those survive only if they pass a market profitability test. And so the only rights that matter are those property rights that at the moment carry with them market power–the combination of the (almost inevitably low) marginal societal products of your skills and the resources you own, plus the (sometimes high) market power that those resources grant to you.

This wish to believe that you are not a moocher is what keeps people from seeing issues of distribution and allocation clearly–and generates hostility to social insurance and to wage supplement policies, for they rip the veil off of the idea that you deserve to be highly paid because you are worth it. You aren’t.

And this ties itself up with regional issues: regional decline can come very quickly whenever a region finds that its key industries have, for whatever reason, lost the market power that diverted its previously substantial share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend into the coffers of its firms. The resources cannot be simply redeployed in other industries unless those two have market power to control the direction of a share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend. And so communities decline and die. And the social contract–which was supposed to have given you a right to a healthy community–is broken.

As I have said before, humans are, at a very deep and basic level, gift-exchange animals. We create and reinforce our social bonds by establishing patterns of “owing” other people and by “being owed”. We want to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships. We create and reinforce social bonds by giving each other presents. We like to give. We like to receive. We like neither to feel like cheaters nor to feel cheated. We like, instead, to feel embedded in networks of mutual reciprocal obligation. We don’t like being too much on the downside of the gift exchange: to have received much more than we have given in return makes us feel very small. We don’t like being too much on the upside of the gift exchange either: to give and give and give and never receive makes us feel like suckers.

We want to be neither cheaters nor saps.

It is, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being takers: that we are consuming more than we are contributing, and are in some way dependent on and recipients of the charity of others. It is also, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being saps: that others are laughing at us as they toil not yet consume what we have produced.

And it is on top of this evopsych propensity to be gift-exchange animals–what Adam Smith called our “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”–we have built our complex economic division of labor. We construct property and market exchange–what Adam Smith called our natural propensity “to truck, barter, and exchange” to set and regulate expectations of what the fair, non-cheater non-sap terms of gift-exchange over time are.

We devise money as an institution as a substitute for the trust needed in a gift-exchange relationship, and we thus construct a largely-peaceful global 7.4B-strong highly-productive societal division of labor, built on:

  • assigning things to owners—who thus have both the responsibility for stewardship and the incentive to be good stewards…
  • very large-scale webs of win-win exchange…
    mediated and regulated by market prices…

There are enormous benefits to arranging things this way. As soon as we enter into a gift-exchange relationship with someone or something we will see again–perhaps often–it will automatically shade over into the friend zone. This is just who we are. And as soon as we think about entering into a gift-exchange relationship with someone, we think better of them. Thus a large and extended division of labor mediated by the market version of gift-exchange is a ver powerful creator of social harmony.

This is what the wise Albert Hirschman called the doux commerce thesis. People, as economists conceive them, are not “Hobbesians” focusing on their narrow personal self-interest, but rather “Lockeians”: believers in live-and-let live, respecting others and their spheres of autonomy, and eager to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships—both one-offs mediated by cash alone and longer-run ones as well.

In an economist’s imagination, people do not enter a butcher’s shop only when armed cap-a-pie and only with armed guards. They do not fear that the butcher will knock him unconscious, take his money, slaughter him, smoke him, and sell him as long pig.

Rather, there is a presumed underlying order of property and ownership that is largely self-enforcing, that requires only a “night watchman” to keep it stable and secure.

Yet to keep the fiction that we are all fairly playing the reciprocal game of gift exchange in a 7.4 billion-strong social network–that we are neither cheaters nor saps–we need to ignore that we are coupon clippers living off of our societal inheritance.

And to do this, we need to do more than (a) set up a framework for the production of stuff, (b) set up a framework for the distribution of stuff, and so (c) create a very dense reciprocal network of interdependencies to create and reinforce our belief that we are all one society.

We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as saps–people who are systematically and persistently taken advantage of by others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as, and are not moochers–people who systematically persistently take advantage of others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do this in the presence of a vast increasing-returns in the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend and in spite of the low societal marginal product of any one of us.

Thus we need to do this via clever redistribution rather than via explicit wage supplements or basic incomes or social insurance that robs people of the illusion that what they receive is what they have earned and what they are worth through their work.

Now I think it is an open question whether it is harder to do the job via predistribution, or to do the job via changing human perceptions to get everybody to understand that:

  • no, none of us is worth what we are paid.
  • we are all living, to various extents, off of the dividends from our societal capital
  • those of us who are doing especially well are those of us who have managed to luck into situations in which we have market power–in which the resources we control are (a) scarce, (b) hard to replicate quickly, and (c) help produce things that rich people have a serious jones for right now.

All of the above is in some sense a prolegomon to a thoughtful, intelligent, and practical piece by Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Four Ways to Help the Midwest: “When… Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ohio voted for Donald Trump, they… roll[ed] the economic dice…

It’s not clear yet whether President-elect Trump will or can follow through on his promises to revamp U.S. trade policy…

Note: given his hires, it is pretty clear that he has chosen not to. But let me let Noah go on:

It’s even more dubious whether that will have any kind of positive effect on the Midwest…

Let me say that it is clear that they won’t: a stronger dollar from higher interest rates and more elite consumption from tax cuts for the rich are likely to produce another chorus of the song we heard in the 1980s under Reagan, which was a disaster for the midwest and for the Reagan Democrats of Macomb County. But let me let Noah go on…

His promises resonated…. The Midwest needs help…. “The largest declines [in economic mobility have been] concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest states such as Michigan and Illinois.”… [The] Democrats[‘]… targeted tax credits and minimum-wage hikes is nothing more than a Band-Aid [because]it ignores the importance of jobs, for dignity and respect, for mobility and independence, and for a feeling of personal value and freedom. Handouts ease the pain of poverty, but in the end, Midwesterners–like most people–want jobs, and they went with the candidate who promised them.

Nor should we simply encourage Midwesterners to move to more vibrant regions. As economist and writer Adam Ozimek has noted, many people can’t easily abandon the place where they grew up, where their friends and family are, and where they often own homes….

Conor Sen has a big idea that I like–a bailout of public-employee pension obligations in the Rust Belt…. But that’s just a first step. I propose four new pillars….

  1. Infrastructure: Sick economies and shrinking population have left Rust Belt states and cities unable to pay for infrastructure improvements. As a result, many cities look like disaster areas. The federal government should allocate funds to repair and improve the Midwest’s roads, bridges and trains, and to upgrade its broadband….

  2. Universities:…. The Midwest has a number of good schools (I went to one of them for my Ph.D.), but more could be built, and existing universities could be expanded. Perhaps even more importantly, local and state governments in the Midwest could work with universities and local companies to create more academic-private partnerships and to boost knowledge industries in places like Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Columbus, Ohio. As things stand, Midwesterners tend to move away as soon as they graduate from college….

  3. Business Development: Some cities in Colorado have embraced a development policy it calls economic gardening. The program helps provide resources for locals to start their own businesses. It furnishes them with market research and connects them with needed resources….

  4. Urbanism: Tech hubs like San Francisco and Austin, Texas, are using development restrictions to keep their population densities in check. That gives Midwestern cities an opening to attract refugees from the high-rent metropolises of the two coasts. Cities like Detroit and Cleveland can work on creating neighborhoods that are attractive to the creative class, while allowing housing development to keep rents cheap. College towns like Ann Arbor can reduce their own development restrictions and allow themselves to become industrial hubs….

Governments — federal, state and local — can revitalize the long-suffering Rust Belt. Some locations have already begun this transformation — Pittsburgh, which is rebuilding a knowledge economy based around Carnegie Mellon University and undertaking various urban renewal projects, provides a great blueprint. Targeted regional development policy can prepare cities in the Midwest for the industries of the future, whatever those may turn out to be. And it can reassure the people living in these areas that their government hasn’t forgotten them.


Cf.: Musings on “Just Deserts” and the Opening of Plato’s Republic | Monday Smackdown: The Ongoing Flourishing of Behavioral Economics Makes My Position Here Look Considerably Better, No? | Inequality: Brown University Janus Forum | Noah Smith Eats Greg Mankiw’s Just Desserts

Should-Read: Robbie Whelan and Esther Fung: China’s Factories Count on Robots as Workforce Shrinks

Should-Read: Robbie Whelan and Esther Fung: China’s Factories Count on Robots as Workforce Shrinks: “Suzhou Victory Precision Manufacture Co.’s chairman, Yugen Gao, said the days when the company drew its strength from China’s cheap and hardworking employees are gone.//

…“We’ve been losing that edge in the past three years,” said Mr. Gao in his office, overlooking rows of buildings where a battalion of robots was cranking out computer keyboards. “It’s one of the effects of the one-child policy.” China’s appetite for European-made industrial robots is rapidly growing, as rising wages, a shrinking workforce and cultural changes drive more Chinese businesses to automation. The types of robots favored by Chinese manufacturers are also changing, as automation spreads from heavy industries such as auto manufacturing to those that require more precise, flexible robots capable of handling and assembling smaller products, including consumer electronics and apparel. At stake is whether China can retain its dominance in manufacturing. “China is saying, ‘we have to roboticize our industry in order to keep it,’” said Stefan Lampa, chairman of the robotics division of Kuka AG, a German automation firm and a supplier to Suzhou Victory…

Has Academic Thinking About Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Changed?

Has academic thinking about countercyclical fiscal policy changed recently? I would not say that thinking has changed. I would say that there is a good chance that thinking is changing–that academia is swinging back to a recognition that monetary policy cannot do the stabilization policy by itself, at least not under current circumstances. But it may not be.

If things are swinging back, it is as a result of a whole bunch of extraordinary surprises.

Back in 2007 we thought we understood the macroeconomic world, at least in its broad outlines and essentials. It has become very clear to us since 2007 that that is not the case. Right now we have a large number of competing diagnoses about where we were most wrong. We clearly were very wrong about the abilities of major money center banks to manage their derivatives books, or even to understand to understand what their derivatives books were. We clearly did not fully understand how those markets should be properly regulated.

Right now, however:

  • We have people who think the key flaw in the world economy today is an extraordinary shortage of safe assets. Nobody trusts private sector enterprises to do the risk transformation properly. Probably people will not again trust private sector enterprises for at least a generation.

  • We have those who think the problem is an excessive debt load where–I think we should distinguish between debt for which there is nothing safer, the debt of sovereigns that possess exorbitant privilege, and all other debts.

  • We have those who think we are undergoing a necessary deleveraging.

  • We have those who look for causes in the demography.

  • And then there is Larry Summers, as the third coming of British turn-of-the 20th century economist John Hobson. (The second coming was Alvin Hansen in the 1930s.) And the question: just what is Larry talking about?

    • Is Larry talking about the inevitable consequences of the coming of the demographic transition and of the end of Robert Gordon’s long second Industrial Revolution of extremely rapid economic growth?

    • Or is he talking a collapse of the ability of financial markets to do the risk transformation–to actually shrink the equity risk premium from its current absurd level down to something more normal?

If you look at asset prices now, you confront the minus two percent real return on the debt of sovereigns that possess exorbitant privilege with what Justin Lahart of the Wall Street Journal tells me is now a 5.5% real earnings yield on the U.S. stock market as a whole. That 7.5% per year equity premium is a major derangement of asset prices. It makes it very difficult for us to use our standard tools to think about what good policy would be…

Fiscal Policy in the New Normal: IMF Panel

Weekend reading: “Disaggregating data” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Research released last week documents the decline in economic mobility in the United States since the 1940s. Equitable Growth released a factsheet summarizing the report here.

By one metric racial economic inequality in the United States is back at levels last experienced in the 1950s. Bridget Ansel writes on a new study looking at trends in the black-white male wage gap.

Business investment growth in the United States has been weak compared to the level of profits recorded over the past 15 years. A new study finds evidence that a lack of competition and short-termism in financial markets is to blame.

Another paper looks at how business investment is faring in the United States, this one focusing on how financing is flowing to companies based on investment opportunities. The results should make us concerned about the functioning of the stock market.

Some of the fastest growing occupations in the United States are dominated by women while men seem unwilling to enter these jobs. Bridget Ansel looks into why that seems to be the case.

The aggregation of economic data on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders hides significant variation of socioeconomic conditions among those Americans. Kavya Vaghul and Christian Edlagan dive into the numbers to show why disaggregation matters.

Links from around the web

Can potential long-term economic growth be affected by short-run factors? J.W. Mason continues an investigation into how set potential growth rates. [the slack wire]

Speaking of the long-run effects of short-term programs, Max Ehrenfreund looks at how the creation of Medicaid helped improve the lives of poor children later in life. [wonkblog]

“If you spend more on education, will students do better?” ask Kevin Carey and Elizabeth Harris. Looking at new research on the effects of education spending pushes them to consider that the answer is yes. [the upshot]

Imagine a tax that not only would target the wealthy, but would also be efficient. This tax would help reduce wealth inequality while not harming economic growth. Adam Ozimek writes up such a tax: a tax on luxury homes. [moody’s]

The Federal Reserve raises interest rates this week for the first time this year. The expectation is that the central bank will hike several times in 2017. Ryan Avent argues the global economy will be better off if that doesn’t happen. [free exchange]

Friday figure

Figure from “Many of the fastest growing jobs in the United States are missing men” by Bridget Ansel

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Trump is going to be mad when he hears what his appointees think about the TPP

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Trump is going to be mad when he hears what his appointees think about the TPP: “His top economic and foreign policy advisers love it (as do his other advisers)…

…Trump said that while NAFTA was “the worst trade deal in the history of the country,” the TPP was even worse, posing “the greatest danger yet” to American jobs and prosperity. “It’s a rape of our country,” he said at an Ohio rally. “It’s a harsh word, but that’s what it is — rape of our country.”… Given his strong feelings about the matter, one can only imagine how furious the president-elect is going to be when he finds out what some of the members of his Cabinet have said…. Secretary of defense… James Mattis… sign[ed] a letter to Congress endorsing the TPP…. Energy secretary Rick Perry, is also a TPP fan. “Perry has always supported free trade and its positive impact on economic growth and job creation,” spokesperson Travis Considine told Breitbart’s Alex Swoyer. “He believes America can achieve robust economic growth and job creation, similar to what has occurred in Texas, with trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership.”… Trump’s choice to lead the National Economic Council… Gary Cohn…. Ambassador to China… Terry Branstad…. Interior secretary… Ryan Zinke… HHS Secretary Tom Price… HUD Secretary Ben Carson… Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao… [Secretary of State] Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson….

The main takeaway here is not that Trump is going to secretly turn around and get the TPP ratified… [but] that… there is no revisionist populist economic policy…. Some of Trump’s picks seem unqualified for the specific job… or for any… job… but all share a fairly conventional conservative governing philosophy. The deeper issue is that Trump’s grab bag of policy stances makes for an awkward combination with this philosophy…. The world is a complicated place and navigating that complexity is a difficult task. Trump has proven that a total lack of demonstrated understanding of the policy issues facing the United States of America is less of a bar to winning votes than one might have thought. But the presidency is still a big job with enormous consequences, and the various contradictions and lurking time bombs in what we see of Trump’s governing agenda suggest that it won’t be done very well.