Should-Read: Gideon Rachman: Truth, Lies and the Trump Administration

Should-Read: Gideon Rachman: Truth, Lies and the Trump Administration: “Having a liar [like Donald Trump] in the White House is a disaster…

…not just for global security but also for the cause of democracy all over the world. Until now, dissidents in Russia, China or other authoritarian regimes could wage a lonely and dangerous fight for the truth, and point to the west to show that a better way existed. They could argue that lies are not the norm and that “the truth will set us free”. But the word freedom barely figured in Mr Trump’s inaugural address. And the US president is clearly indifferent to the truth…. Where else can the world turn? The German government, led by Angela Merkel, cannot do it alone. The British may be too desperate to do a trade deal with the US to take any chances with its relationship with Mr Trump….

The European democracies could still set an example, by demonstrating that most western countries do not practise the debased discourse of Trumpism. But the biggest role in protecting the truth—and therefore democracy itself—will fall to Americans. The press will need to be robust and courageous…. American institutions from the media to Congress and the courts have demonstrated their independence from the White House in the past. They are about to be tested as never before…

NAFTA and Other Trade Deals Have Not Gutted American Manufacturing—Period: Live at Vox.com

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Live at Vox.com: NAFTA and Other Trade Deals Have Not Gutted American Manufacturing—Period: Politically speaking, there was no debate on United States international trade agreements in 2016: All politicians seeking to win a national election, or even to create a party-spanning political coalition, agree that our trade agreements are bad things…. From the left… Bernie Sanders…. From the right—I do not think it’s wrong but it’s not quite correct to call it “right,” at least not as Americans have hitherto understood what “right” is—but from somewhere… now-President Donald Trump…. From the center establishment… popular vote–winning (but Electoral College–losing)… Hillary Rodham Clinton…. “I will stop any trade deal that kills jobs or holds down wages, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership. I oppose it now, I’ll oppose it after the election, and I’ll oppose it as president.…” The rhetoric of all three candidates resonates with the criticism of trade agreements that we heard way back when NAFTA was on the table as a proposal—not, as today, something to blame all our current economic woes on… Read MOAR at http://vox.com


This piece actually does only a third of what I wanted to do:

  1. Lay out how our trade agreements have not decimated manufacturing.
  2. Lay out what a properly-nurturing macroeconomic and industrial policy to increase the health of our important and valuable communities of engineering practice would be–but stress that such policies would not bring back mass manufacturing jobs.
  3. Account for the political mishegas.

But I only got through (1). And it is 8000 words. And I had to drop the extended notes and digressions that will go into the bibliographic essay…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Attacking Economics is a Diversionary Tactic

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Attacking Economics is a Diversionary Tactic: “The financial crisis in the UK was the result of losses by banks on overseas assets, originating from the collapse in the US subprime market…

…UK macroeconomists failed to pick up the impending crisis [because] they did [not] routinely monitor… bank leverage. Macroeconomists generally acknowledge that they were at fault in ignoring the crucial role that financial sector leverage can play…. Admati and Hellweg have written persuasively that we need a huge increase in bank capital requirements to bring the ‘too big to fail’ problem to an end and avoid a future banking crisis, and the work of David Miles in the UK has a similar message. I have not come across an academic economist who seriously dissents from this analysis, but it has no impact on policy at all. The power of the banking lobby is just too strong.

So the response of economists to the financial crisis has been as it should be…. Economists have come up with clear proposals about how to avoid the crisis happening again. And these proposals have been pretty well ignored. In terms of conventional monetary and fiscal policy, academic economists got the response to the crisis right, and policymakers got it very wrong….

So given all this, why do some continue to attack economists? On the left there are heterodox economists who want nothing less than… the overthrow of mainstream economics…. The right on the other hand is uncomfortable when evidence based economics conflicts with their politics. Their response is to attack economists. This is not a new phenomenon, as I showed in connection with the famous letter from 364 economists…. The media did the rest of the job for them by hardly ever talking about the majority of economists who did not support austerity….

Attacking economists over Brexit is designed to discredit those who point out awkward and uncomfortable truths. Continuing to attack economists over not predicting the financial crisis, but failing to ignore their successes, has the effect of distracting people from the group who actually caused this crisis, and the fact that very little has been done to prevent a similar crisis happening in the future.

Should-Read: Lars Svensson: Leaning against the wind: Re-evaluating the evidence

Should-Read: Lars Svensson: Leaning against the wind: Re-evaluating the evidence: “‘Leaning against the wind’ refers to conducting, for financial-stability purposes…

…a tighter monetary policy (i.e. setting a higher policy interest rate) than would be justified by standard flexible inflation targeting if policymakers disregarded the possibility of a financial crisis. It has been promoted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2014). Regarding the costs and benefits of leaning against the wind, an IMF Staff Report concluded that, “based on current knowledge, the case for leaning against the wind is limited, as in most circumstances costs outweigh benefits” (IMF 2015)…

Will Competition in Health Insurance Survive? The Odds Are Better After Yesterday

Guest Post from Michael DeLong: Will Competition in Health Insurance Survive? The Odds Are Better After Yesterday

Will competition in health insurance survive?

The answer after yesterday is “perhaps”.

The federal courts, at their lowest district court level, have just weighed in on the side of more competition and fewer behemoth health insurance companies; on the side of more competition and fewer monopolies and near monopolies. This matters for consumers: monopolies are bad news, and monopolies where what is being sold is a very expensive necessity—which health insurance coverage is—very bad news for consumers, and so for societal well-being. If we are to retain a market-based health insurance system, people need effective options. A market in which there is only one insurance company, or two companies that collude to match each other’s prices, has all the bureaucratic drawbacks of a single-payer system plus all the drawbacks of a monopoly.

The federal courts have weighed in because two health insurance companies, Aetna and Humana, decided to attempt a merger to form a behemoth company. President Obama’s Department of Justice decided to challenge the merger. The case went to trial. Last December 21st the Department of Justice wrapped up its case against the $37 billion Aetna-Humana health insurance merger, arguing that it should be blocked. Why? Harm to consumers: the merger would be anticompetitive in that it would harm consumers by making them pay higher premiums and offering them fewer choices. George W. Bush-appointed federal Judge John Bates pondered how to decide this case for a month.

This case and decision is very important for the health, the well being, and the pocketbooks of all Americans who participate or will participate in Medicare. It is most immediately important for the seventeen million senior Americans who have chosen Medicare Advantage plans, which are offered by private companies and in which Medicare pays these companies to cover their benefits. The merger would create Medicare Advantage monopolies in 70 counties and harm competition in 364 counties, where Medicare Advantage serves about 1.6 million seniors, of which almost 980,000 are enrolled with Aetna or Humana. In these areas the resulting MA market would have too few insurance companies for there to be any credible curb to prices by competition.

The merger would also eliminate competition between Aetna and Humana on the public exchanges in at least Florida, Georgia, and Missouri, which would greatly reduce choice for over 700,000 people. This reduction of choice would severely impact people with low or moderate incomes, who make up a disproportionate share of the exchanges.

Judges Bates decided to block the Aetna-Humana merger. He wrote that “the Court is unpersuaded that the efficiencies generated by the merger will be sufficient to mitigate the transaction’s anticompetitive effects for consumers.” In short, he agreed with the Department of Justice’s argument that if Aetna were to acquire Humana, competition in Medicare Advantage would be greatly harmed. The Department successfully argued that people choose Medicare Advantage because it offers them (given their particular circumstances) a much better deal than traditional Medicare. Medicare Advantage plans, like normal Medicare, cover doctor and hospital visits. But they sweeten the deal by offering things like dental, vision, and hearing benefits in exchange for limiting the network of doctors and hospitals patients can go to. For those who don’t place a high value on choice-of-doctor—or those who positively do not want the hassle but want to be steered—this is not much of a sacrifice. And if you have bad teeth, the dental coverage is worth a great deal. The Justice Department lawyers pointed out that even when Medicare Advantage prices spike, 85% of seniors that change their plans switch to other Medicare Advantage plans, and very few of them switch out into traditional Medicare. Thus they had substantial evidence for their claim that the merger will hurt competition and consumers.

An important part of the background to this case is that Aetna dropped out of the Affordable Care Act’s health exchange in eleven states after the government sued to block the merger. Aetna claimed this was an independent business decision, but the Justice Department said otherwise. It implied that Aetna was attempting to pressure the Obama administration into dropping its opposition to a harmful merger by threatening to weaken Barack Obama’s signature initiative. Lawyers during the case showed exchanges where Aetna CEO Mark Bertolini referred to Obama administration’s decision to block the merger and said that the administration had “a short memory, no loyalty, and very thin skin.” The Justice Department concluded by posing the question: can Aetna evade antitrust scrutiny by just withdrawing temporarily from markets?

Aetna and Humana argued that there would still be effective competition after the merger because they would sell 290,000 Medicare Advantage accounts to Molina—a health insurance company that primarily focuses on Medicaid. Molina has tried in the past to branch out and gain a share of the Medicare Advantage market. It has twice failed, and currently has only 424 Medicare Advantage members! In internal documents produced during the trial, Molina admitted “we do not have the same level of administrative expertise…we are woefully unresourced to take this [divestitures] on.” And 290,000 is a very small share of the 3.1 million Medicare Advantage patients currently covered by Humana. Odds are those 290,000 would soon flow back out of Molina’s coverage.

Past divestitures, most notably in the 2012 Humana-Arcadian merger, have failed to preserve competition. For Aetna-Humana’s claims about preserving competition to be credible, it would have had to propose divestitures orders of magnitude greater—millions of insurance policies—and made them to another insurance company with successful experience in running Medicare Advantage. The Department of Justice’s complaint proposed divesting insurance plans in a total of 364 counties in 21 states to meet antitrust requirements for preserving competition.

The trial could have gone the other way.

Aetna and Humana strenuously argued at the trial that Medicare Advantage and standard Medicare are really very close to each other. They claimed that Aetna-Humana’s market power to raise prices would be sharply curbed by the ability of patients to vote with their feet for traditional Medicare in response. And they claimed that Aetna’s withdrawal from the exchanges—no matter whether it was an independent business decision or a threat—was simply not relevant to the case.

If it had gone the other way, it would have been a substantial defeat for consumers. Past evidence is overwhelmingly clear that health insurance mergers lead to higher premiums. Little if any savings are ever passed on to consumers. Aetna-Humana would have become one of the nation’s largest insurance companies, able to wield substantial market power. The Aetna-Humana behemoth would have been dominant in Medicare Advantage in 364 counties across 21 states with 1.6 million seniors being served. In some counties the merged company would have wielded incredible power—in Polk County, Iowa, Aetna-Humana would have 79% of the Medicare Advantage market; in Shawnee County, Kansas, 100%. That would have been bad news for consumers. But it would have been very good news for investors in and executives of health insurance companies. Aetna-Humana’s profits would have likely jumped way up.

Moreover, a decision the other way would have been a starting gun for a new wave of additional health insurance mergers to further decimate competition.

Therefore Judge Bates’s disapproval of the Aetna-Humana merger is a substantial victory for consumers, for affordable health care, and for the continued survival of a market-based health insurance system. The health insurance merger frenzy over the past decade is likely stopped. Competition in Medicare Advantage going forward will be much stronger than had the merger gone through.

In addition, this outcome to the trial means that the ACA exchanges will also be stronger going forward. Fewer of them will likely fail due to insufficient competition. The danger for the exchanges is that health insurance companies raise prices, and then find that only the expensive-to-treat sign up for policies. Competition that forces health insurance companies to earn profits through efficiency rather than price increases makes the ACA exchanges healthier as well. Some of the exchanges do have their problems. But the solution should be to promote competition between insurers to benefit consumers, not to consolidate health insurance markets into one gargantuan entity. And the more options on the federal and state exchanges, the better the deals available to consumers.

Aetna has withdrawn from several state exchanges. But it has kept its options open so it can return and compete on the markets again if it seems profitable. In some exchanges Aetna lost money. In others it made substantial profits, most notably in Florida: $36 million in 2016.

Our health care and health insurance systems here in America are drastically underperforming: we spend more than twice as much money and resources on doctors, nurses, hospitals, and pharmaceuticals as the typical rich North Atlantic country, and yet on average our health is worse. Unless we want to accept our current broken system, our options are either to disrupt the entire health sector and move to a single-payer system or find ways to make health insurance markets competitive and functional. The ACA was one attempt to do that. The encouragement of competition for Medicare patients via offering government subsidies to insurance companies that would enter the Medicare Advantage market was another. The success of each of these still hangs in the balance. But things look a little brighter now than the looked last falls.


Michael M. DeLong is a community organizer, and was Director of the Coalition to Protect Patient Choice http://www.thecppc.com. Read the CPPC’s coverage of the Aetna-Humana trial at http://www.thecppc.com/cppc-blog/date/2016-12

Should-Read: Pro-Growth Liberal: EconoSpeak: Paul Ryan’s Two-Faced Comments on Auerbach’s Tax

Should-Read: Pro-Growth Liberal: Paul Ryan’s Two-Faced Comments on Auerbach’s Tax: “Page 15 of the tax portion of A Better Way…

…This Blueprint does not include a value-added tax (VAT), a sales tax, or any other tax as an addition to the fundamental reforms of the current income tax system….

A few lines later….

The focus on business cash flow… is a move toward a consumption-based approach to taxation….

So is the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax an income tax or a consumption tax? And why is Speaker Ryan contradicting himself within the same page?… Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing… wondered why Speaker Ryan does not simply call this a consumption tax with a labor subsidy. The answer might be simply politics—Speaker Ryan has always wanted to get rid of the corporate profits tax replacing it with a consumption tax. But of course Speaker Ryan does not have the political courage to just say so. No wonder President Trump finds this too confusing. The tax’s main political proponent has never been exactly honest about what his agenda is…

Demographics, robots, and global economic growth

The world’s population is getting older. The share of the global population that is more than 50 years old is becoming larger and larger, presenting several economic challenges, the most troubling being the possibility of much slower economic growth. Several economists have raised the alarm that an older population will slow growth due to lower productivity, less labor force participation, and less investment growth. If this hypothesis is true, then the global economy could be in store for a sustainable period of weak growth. But are these fears about the future overblown?

In a new working paper, economists Daron Acemoglu of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Pascual Restrepo of Boston University look at the relationship between an aging population and aggregate economic growth. After running several regression analyses that account for initial GDP levels, they find that there isn’t a negative relationship between an older population and GDP growth. In fact, some of the results indicate a positive relationship between aging and economic growth, though this relationship is weaker when they look at only high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Given the expectations that an aging population should stifle growth, what could explain this lack of a negative relationship? The answer that Acemoglu and Restrepo offer is technology. The economists hypothesize that as populations age businesses are more likely to adopt technology that helps boost productivity. They show preliminary results from upcoming work that shows a relationship between aging and the adoption of robots.

In other words, they believe there is an endogenous response to aging as the economy reacts to these demographic changes. They argue that as the population ages, the number of working-age people declines relative to demand, which in turn increases wages. Higher wages then give firms an incentive to invest in technologies that make labor more productive. This boost in productivity offsets the reduction in economic growth from an older population or might overwhelm it and increase overall economic growth.

The key factor here is that the two economists find that aging and the reduction in the supply of prime-age workers will necessarily lead to an increase in wages. Demographics may be very important for understanding economic trends, but they are not destiny. Higher wages might be an important and necessary trend for a boosting growth in a future where workers are increasingly older, but we should be skeptical that such a change will happen on its own. Policy might have to contribute as well.

What have we learned about geographic cross-sectional fiscal multipliers?

The limits of monetary policy during the Great Recession pushed fiscal policy back to the forefront of macroeconomic policy discussions in the United States. Yet empirical estimates of the effects of fiscal policy vary. Two main challenges dominate economic thinking. First, fiscal policy can respond to a changing economic trajectory, as when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 increased spending precisely because unemployment was already rising. Second, changes in spending often coincide with changes in taxes or other policies. Both challenges mean that the naïve relationship between government spending and subsequent outcomes may not measure the true causal impact.

The past several years delivered up a wave of new research using geographic variation in spending to better understand the employment and output effects of fiscal policy. By definition, a geographic cross-sectional fiscal multiplier uses variation in fiscal policy across distinct geographic areas within a single period of time to measure the effect of an increase in spending in one region in a monetary union. This cross-sectional approach has the advantage of identifying much greater variation in policy across space than over time, and variation more plausibly exogenous with respect to the no-intervention paths of outcome variables.

In a new review paper, I assess what we have learned from this research wave. I conclude the cross-sectional evidence implies a national multiplier of about 1.7 or above when monetary policy is constrained. This magnitude falls at the upper end of the range suggested by earlier studies using time series variation only, and suggests that fiscal policy can play an important role in the management of business cycles when monetary policy has reached its limits. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

An example based on three papers studying the effects of the Recovery and Reinvestment Act makes clear the meaning of a cross-sectional multiplier. These papers exploit variation in the non-discretionary, formulaic component of the distribution of ARRA funds, due to factors such as pre-recession Medicaid spending or the number of lane miles of federal highway. I combine the spending variation in the three studies and use updated employment data and new state output data to estimate cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions of the cumulative increase in employment and output during 2009 and 2010 as a function of ARRA spending in a state. I find a cross-sectional “cost per job” of roughly $50,000 and output multiplier of roughly 1.75.

A review of the recent empirical literature broadly confirms the lessons from this example. One strand of this literature examines various components of the Recovery Act. The cost-per-job across these studies ranges from roughly $25,000 to $125,000, with around $50,000 emerging as a preferred number. Using a production-function approach, this magnitude translates loosely into an output multiplier of about 2. Another set of recent papers uses variation from historical episodes or other countries, many quite creatively. The diversity of outcome variables and policy experiments makes reaching a synthesized conclusion across these studies harder. Nonetheless, those papers that estimate a cost-per-job find numbers of around $30,000, and (with one or two notable exceptions) those which estimate income or output multipliers find numbers in the range of 1.0 to 2.5.

Research into the mapping between cross-sectional multipliers and national multipliers also has advanced. Three main differences can arise, depending on who pays for the spending, what monetary policy does, and the different openness of regions and the country as a whole.

Starting with the first, in many cross-sectional multiplier studies the spending does not affect the present value of local tax burdens, for example, because the spending is paid for by the federal government. Standard economic theory, however, suggests that such outside financing can have a small effect on local output. Fully rational, forward-looking, liquidity unconstrained households (sometimes denoted as so called “Ricardian agents”) will increase their private spending by only the annuity value of the outside transfer, which for transitory spending implies a small increase relative to the direct change in government purchases, while spending by fully “rule-of-thumb” or “liquidity-constrained” agents does not depend at all on the present value of the tax burden. In either case, the fact that the financing of the spending comes from outside the region adds little to the local private-spending response.

Monetary tightening in response to higher spending may reduce the output impact. Therefore, cross-sectional multipliers best help to characterize national multipliers when monetary policy is constrained, for example, by a zero lower bound on interest rates. Finally, expenditure switching and import leakage exert a downward influence on regional multipliers relative to the aggregate multiplier.

Combining these three arguments, the cross-sectional multiplier offers a rough lower bound for a national multiplier as long as the spending is relatively transient and monetary policy is constrained. These conditions appear likely to hold in many empirical settings, including during the implementation of the Recovery Act.

Combining the empirical evidence and the recent theory, the cross-sectional studies suggest a closed economy, constrained monetary policy, deficit-financed multiplier of about 1.7 or above.  This magnitude falls at the upper end of the range suggested by earlier studies using time series variation only.

The cross-sectional literature and my review essay have focused their attention most on understanding what cross-sectional multipliers imply about national multipliers. Other lessons also emerge. Foremost, many of the cross-sectional studies test for and find evidence of higher multipliers or less crowd-out in regions and periods with more unused resources. These results suggest multipliers may be larger during downturns and for reasons beyond constraints on monetary policy.

I conclude this summary with a comment on research practices. In the wake of the Great Recession of 2007-09, many have criticized the economics profession and macroeconomists in particular. The foray into cross-sectional multipliers offers a positive example of economists directing their research toward understanding newly relevant policy levers. Necessarily, the effort involved both empirical and theoretical advances. As a result, I believe we have a better grasp of the efficacy of fiscal policy than we did before the Great Recession started.

— Gabriel Chodorow-Reich is an assistant professor of economics at Harvard University. His research focuses on macroeconomics, finance, and labor markets. His working paper upon which this column is drawn can be found here.

hould-Read: Walt Mossberg: Lousy ads are ruining the online experience

Should-Read: Walt Mossberg: Lousy ads are ruining the online experience: “I left the Journal in 2013 and co-founded Recode…

…About a week after our launch, I was seated at a dinner next to a major advertising executive. He complimented me on our new site’s quality and on that of a predecessor site we had created and run, AllThingsD.com. I asked him if that meant he’d be placing ads on our fledgling site. He said yes, he’d do that for a little while. And then, after the cookies he placed on Recode helped him to track our desirable audience around the web, his agency would begin removing the ads and placing them on cheaper sites our readers also happened to visit. In other words, our quality journalism was, to him, nothing more than a lead generator for target-rich readers, and would ultimately benefit sites that might care less about quality…