Economics as a Professional Vocation

Real GDP Growth Rate

Should-Read: The very sharp Binyamin Applebaum had an interesting rant yesterday: Binyamin Applebaum: @BCAppelbaum on Twitter: “I am not sure there is a defensible case for the discipline of macroeconomics if they can’t at least agree on the ground rules for evaluating tax policy…

…What does it mean to produce the signatures of 100 economists in favor of a given proposition when another 100 will sign their names to the opposite statement? How does Harvard, for example, justify granting tenure to people who purport to work in the same discipline and publicly condemn each other as charlatans? How are ordinary people, let alone members of Congress, supposed to figure out which tenured professors are the serious economists?…

I would say, first, that journalists (and others) are supposed to use their eyes and their brains. They can take a look at the Nine Unprofessional Republican Economists who placed their letter in the Wall Street Journal last Saturday containing:

A conventional approach to economic modeling suggests that such an increase in the capital stock would raise the level of GDP in the long run by just over 4%. If achieved over a decade, the associated increase in the annual rate of GDP growth would be about 0.4% per year…

And note that by Wednesday they were saying:

Our letter addresses the impact of corporate tax reform on GDP; we did not offer claims about the speed of adjustment to a long-run result…

That degree of—four days later—”who are you going to believe: us or your lying eyes?” is a definite tell.

Similarly, they can take a look at the Hundred Unprofessional Republican Economists who placed their letter in Business Insider containing:

The enactment of a comprehensive overhaul—complete with a lower corporate tax rate—will ignite our economy with levels of growth not seen in generations… produce a GDP boost ‘by between 3 and 5 percent’…. Sophisticated economic models show the macroeconomic feedback generated by the TCJA will… [be] more than enough to compensate for the static revenue loss…

They should then ask: would a boost to GDP of 3% over 10 years—0.3% per year—generate growth “not seen in generations”? No, it would not. That claim is simply false, as a glance at the GDP growth graph immediately reveals.

They should then ask: what are the “sophisticated economic models [that] show the macroeconomic feedback generated by the TCJA will… [be] more than enough to compensate for the static revenue loss…” And, when the response is “[crickets]”, understand that there are no such models.

These tells of unprofessional behavior will inform them who to trust.

And they should go to organizations that at least have a track record of surveying a consistent group of well-regarded economists, like the IGM Panel. When only one economist on the panel—Stanford’s Darrell Duffie—says that they agree with the statement that the tax bill will make “US GDP… substantially higher a decade from now than under the status quo…” you can conclude that economists claiming it letters that it will are far outside the professional consensus.

Now there is the question of where this unprofessional behavior by economists comes from, and what should be done about it.

Professional economists simply should not say on Saturday that the long run of their forecasts could come in as short a time as a decade (“if achieved over a decade, the associated increase in the annual rate of GDP growth would be about 0.4% per year…) and then the following Wednesday deny what they had said (“we did not offer claims about the speed of adjustment to a long-run result”). They should have not made the might-be-ten-years claim in the first place. Having made it, they should have withdrawn it—hell, they should still withdraw it: they could use the <strike>…</strike> html tag. Having made it, they should not deny that they made it.

Professional economists should not say that an 0.3%-point increase in economic growth would carry us to “levels of growth not seen in generations”. Professional economists should not say that “sophisticated economic models show the macroeconomic feedback generated by the TCJA will… [be] more than enough to compensate for the static revenue loss…” for their are no such models. They are, as one Twitter wit said and as I endorse, the equivalent of the girlfriend-who-lives-in-Canada.

In universities—and thinktanks—concern for one’s academic reputation and the good opinion of colleagues in the context of a community that places the highest value on truth-seeking, truth-telling, and high-quality debate is supposed to keep such unprofessional behavior to a minimum.

Just before he was canned from Berkeley during the Red Scare, medieval history professor Ernst Kantorowicz argued that the academic robe worn by scholars on formal occasions was a sign of this dedication to truth-seeking, truth-telling, and high-quality debate: academics had placed themselves under a geas to think hard and say what they believed to be true, and that in carrying out this geas they were responsible to “their conscience and their God”.

But what if we find that there are large numbers of university professors and thinktank fellows who fear neither God nor their consciences—and who value the support of donors and the approval of partisans more than their internal academic reputations? The process of socialization and acculturation was supposed to keep such people out of universities and thinktanks, and in law and lobbying firms where it was understood that people were simply offering arguments rather than claiming to be setting forth truths, and from which their arguments could be assessed with boatloads of salt. What if this process fails?

It is a serious problem.

I do not have an answer.

Calling out people who I judge behave unprofessionally and cross the line, so that I can no longer credit that they are trying as hard as they can to think and to tell the truth—that is one small thing I can do.

Must-Read: Robert J. Barro, Michael J. Boskin, John Cogan, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Glenn Hubbard, Lawrence B. Lindsey, Harvey S. Rosen, George P. Shultz and John. B. Taylor: Economists respond to Summers, Furman over Mnuchin letter

Must-Read: The Nine Unprofessional Republican Economists have become even more unprofessional. I would also note that such transparent self-contradiction is incompetent. Do they even read what they wrote four days before?: Robert J. Barro, Michael J. Boskin, John Cogan, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Glenn Hubbard, Lawrence B. Lindsey, Harvey S. Rosen, George P. Shultz and John. B. Taylor (Wednesday, November 29, 2017): Economists respond to Summers, Furman over Mnuchin letter: “First Point You Raised: Our letter addresses the impact of corporate tax reform on GDP; we did not offer claims about the speed of adjustment to a long-run result (though official revenue estimators will obviously need to do so for short-run analysis)…”

Robert J. Barro, Michael J. Boskin, John Cogan, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Glenn Hubbard, Lawrence B. Lindsey, Harvey S. Rosen, George P. Shultz and John. B. Taylor (Saturday, November 25, 2017): How Tax Reform Will Lift the Economy: “A conventional approach to economic modeling suggests that such an increase in the capital stock would **raise the level of GDP in the long run by just over 4%. If achieved over a decade, the associated increase in the annual rate of GDP growth would be about 0.4% per year…”

The “If” at the start of the second sentence in the second quote is an assertion that the long run could well be as short as a decade. That is a claim about the lower bound of the speed of adjustment to a long-run result if I have ever seen one.

They have reputations: blowing them up for the whole world—or even for Wales—would be one thing. This is another:

Should-Read: Charlie Stross: Unforeseen Consequences and that 1929

Should-Read: This is nuts! When’s the crash?

Charlie Stross: Unforeseen Consequences and that 1929: “The mining process in combination with the hard upper limit…

…Per this article, Bitcoin mining is now consuming 30.23 TWh of electricity per year, or rather more electricity than Ireland; it’s outrageously… energy-intensive…. BTC is a libertarian shibboleth…. I tweeted… that we need to ban Bitcoin because it’s fucking our carbon emissions. It’s up to 0.12% of global energy consumption and rising rapidly: the implication is that it has the potential to outstrip more useful and productive computational uses of energy (like, oh, kitten jpegs) and to rival other major power-hogging industries without providing anything we actually need. And boy did I get some interesting random replies!… What I wasn’t expecting was the alt-right/neo-Nazi connection. Bitcoin isn’t just popular among libertarians, it’s popular among folks with green frog/Kek user icons and anti-semitic views. (“Are you a Jew?” asked one egg.)

One possible explanation, which looks quite reasonable as a first approximation, is that the US libertarian fringe has been assimilated by the neo-Nazis…. Weaponized media (both social media and mass media owned by the oligarchs) is used to channel the sense of grievance felt by the immiserated population into acceptable directions, via slogans like “taking back control” or “make America Great again”. Directions such as resentment towards immigrants, get-rich-quick schemes such as cryptocurrency bubbles or goldbuggery, and ritualized abusive denunciation of anyone who questions these attempts to divert attention away from the real problem—the way we’re being conditioned for exploitation by our self-proclaimed masters. So I now have two follow-on questions about BTC….

If BTC delivers what its supporters promise, then how will the oligarchs react? A working distributed cryptocurrency model is inimical to the interests of billionaire monopolists who want to get rich by imposing rent-seeking practices on the immobilized peasantry (ahem: I mean us ordinary folks). They won’t go quietly, there will be a crack-down, and we may be seeing the first signs of the shape it will take in China (which is banning bitcoin exchanges). Distributed systems, contra received wisdom, can be banned: you just have to be sufficiently ruthless….

If, as I think, BTC doesn’t deliver, then the bubble will eventually burst…. We’re going to run out of new BTC to mine…. The incentive for mining (a process essential for reconciling the public ledgers) will disappear and the currency will… what? The people most heavily invested in it will do their best to patch it up and keep it going, because what BTC most resembles (to my eye, and that of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase) is a distributed Ponzi scheme. But when a Ponzi scheme blows out, it’s the people at the bottom who lose.

The longer BTC persists, the worse the eventual blowout—and the more angry people there are going to be. Angry people who are currently being recruited and radicalized by neo-Nazis.

Should-Read: Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles: Unfortunately, the tax plan currently under discussion…ignores nearly all the hard choices

Should-Read: Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles: Unfortunately, the tax plan currently under discussion… ignores nearly all the hard choices… incorporating only the ‘goodies’…

…It reads as if it were developed for a country whose debt problems have been solved, when in reality debt is the highest it has ever been other than around World War II. When this tax reform discussion started, House Speaker Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) called for revenue-neutral tax reform. While ultimately more revenue is needed, deficit neutrality is likely the best that can be expected in the current political environment. Yet Congress abandoned even this minimum standard of fiscal responsibility…

Simpson and Bowles

Should-Read: One Hundred Unprofessional Republican Economists: Trump tax reform opinion

Should-Read: Well, we have 100 more unprofessional Republican economists today…

We saw 4.5% real GDP growth in the second half of the 1990s and 5% in the half-decades before and after the 1979-1982 Volcker Disinflation Recession. “Levels of growth not seen in generations” is a high bar indeed. Appealing to Kevin “Dow 36000″ Hassett rather than doing any modeling is perhaps the most unprofessional thing I have ever seen, save for insisting that sophisticated economic models show… macroeconomic feedback… more than enough to compensate for the static revenue loss” without, somehow, naming the models, plural—let alone grappling with the fact that of us who have tried hard to look for an elastic supply response of domestic savings to the after-tax rate of return have failed to find anything:

I am, I have to admit it, greatly embarrassed by these clowns.

Most of them know they are lying. And it is not as though many of them think that a devil’s bargain is worth making they will thereby gain high federal office and be able to rein in crazy nut jobs. A little affinity fraud. A lot of partisanship. Zero commitment to telling it like it is:

One Hundred Unprofessional Republican Economists: Trump tax reform opinion: Why Congress should pass: “The enactment of a comprehensive overhaul—complete with a lower corporate tax rate—will ignite our economy with levels of growth not seen in generations…

…A twenty percent statutory rate on a permanent basis would, per the Council of Economic Advisers, help produce a GDP boost ‘by between 3 and 5 percent’. As the debate delves into deficit implications, it is critical to consider that $1 trillion in new revenue for the federal government can be generated by four-tenths of a percentage in GDP growth. Sophisticated economic models show the macroeconomic feedback generated by the TCJA will exceed that amount—more than enough to compensate for the static revenue loss…. Your vote throughout the weeks ahead will therefore put more money in the pockets of more workers. Supporting the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will ensure that those workers—those beneficiaries—are American…

Sincerely, James C. Miller III, Douglas Holtz-Eakin… Barry W. Poulson… Charles W. Calomiris… Donald Luskin… [and 95 others]

Should-Read: Kansas City Star: Jerry Moran: Don’t take failed Kansas tax plan nationwide

Should-Read: Since Sam Brownback planted his behind behind the Kansas governor’s desk at the end of 2012, Kansas has lost 6%-points of employment relative to the U.S. average. And there is nothing special about Kansas that would make such a huge swing happen in such a short period—nothing but the presence of a tax-cuts-for-the-rich nut in the governor’s chair and a complaisant legislature implementing his policies. I would not in a hundred years have dared speculate that Brownbackism in Brownbackistan could be so destructive. And yet I cannot think of any alternative explanation for what has gone on:

Republican Governance in Kansas

Kansas City Star: Jerry Moran: Don’t take failed Kansas tax plan nationwide: “Moran… could be the deciding vote…. He has already seen, first-hand, during a very painful five years, what will happen…

…At a forum Moran held at the Tasty Pastry in Clay Center last weekend, one of his constituents, Robynn Andracsek, of Olathe, neatly summed up the apparent thinking behind the bill: “Let’s cut taxes for millionaires and billionaires, and then let’s figure out how to pay for it.” Instead, she pleaded with him, “Let’s do a sensible tax cut. This is Kansas. We know the trickle-down experiment doesn’t work. All of our members of Congress from Kansas should know that.” Should but do not. Or if they do, betray no sign of it.

Every Kansan knows what happened after Gov. Sam Brownback’s 2012 cuts did away with the state income tax for some 330,000 business owners. The governor kept insisting—and in fact, still does—that robust growth and woohoo, jobs galore would result. When that didn’t happen, elected officials kept having to dip into funds set aside for highways and schools just to balance the budget. Finally, this year, lawmakers overrode a Brownback veto and at last repealed the LLC tax break and raised income tax rates.

That had to happen, as Andracsek reminded Moran, “because we decided we want schools and we want roads.” Knowing all that history, she asked him, “Why would you take this failed experiment nationwide? Our members of Congress should be the ones leading the way for tax reform that actually affects normal people, not just millionaires and billionaires.”… Moran assured voters in Clay Center that “I’m also cognizant of what people saw happen in Kansas.” And even if that weren’t the case, he said, “there is plenty of conversation about Kansas in Washington, D.C.”

Senator, we understand that you want to get something accomplished. But you don’t have the luxury of the ignorance that the president could plausibly claim when just days after his election he went around promising applauding, whistling patrons in one of New York’s best restaurants, “We’ll get your taxes down, don’t worry about it.” We want to believe you, Senator, when you say, “My goal is to find out which taxes you cut can actually help create more jobs, better jobs, higher-paying jobs … and which ones don’t do that. Not all of them do that.” “There are still a lot of conversations to be had,” you say. But please have the toughest one of all with that small-town banker who insists that his top priority is to stay connected to Kansans….

You know what’s wrong with this bill…. So all you have to do now is vote accordingly.

Should-Read: Economist: Jean Tirole: Standing up for economists

Should-Read: Economist: Jean Tirole: Standing up for economists: “Review of Economics for the Common Good. By Jean Tirole. Translated by Steven Rendall. Princeton University Press; 576 pages; $29.95 and £24.95…

…Economics is perfectly capable of incorporating questions of morality, says Mr Tirole. It simply imposes structure on debate where otherwise indignation would rule. It might make sense to ban some markets, like dwarf-tossing, he says: its existence diminishes the dignity of an entire group. But a market in organs or blood, for example, should not be rejected on the basis of instinctive moral repugnance alone. Policymakers should consider whether payment would raise the supply of donated blood or kidneys, improving or even saving lives. (It might not, if the motivation of money makes generous people afraid of looking greedy.) Whatever the answer, policymakers should make decisions from “behind the veil of ignorance”: without knowing whether any one person, including the policymakers themselves, would be a winner or loser from a particular policy, which society would they choose?

Mr Tirole applies this type of reasoning to topics ranging from carbon taxes to industrial policy, from competition to the digital economy. He presents economists as detectives, sniffing out abuse of market power and identifying trade-offs where populists make empty promises. His analysis is laden with French examples of ill-advised attempts to defy the constraints that those in his discipline delight in pointing out. When in 1996 the French government blocked new large stores in an effort to restrain the power of supermarket chains, share prices of existing ones rose. The new laws inadvertently worsened the problem by restricting competition.

He also depicts economists as ill-equipped to deal with the dirty reality of politics. To those who might be catapulted into sudden stardom as he was, he warns that academic economists will be quickly put into political pigeonholes, and their arguments celebrated or dismissed according to whether the recipient favours that pigeonhole. Though populists revel in simplicity, his aim is to make economics context-specific and point out its complexities. This is his strength, but his discipline’s limitation. He is economists’ defender, but not their saviour.

Unlocking the promise of antitrust enforcement

An AT&T Inc. logo on a retail store front in Philadelphia. The Department of Justice recently announced it was suing to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner Inc.<br />

The Washington Center for Equitable Growth last month co-hosted an event with the Program on Law and Government at the Washington College of Law, called “Unlocking the Promise of Antitrust Enforcement.” The event featured nine presentations, videos of which are now available online, and discussion by leading scholars in antitrust law and economics that explored the scope for more vigorous enforcement of existing antitrust laws.

It was a particularly exciting moment to convene this type of conversation, as the issues of market power, competition, and antitrust have garnered so much attention this year. From headlines about the acquisition of Whole Foods by Amazon.com Inc., to last week’s announcement that the Department of Justice is suing to block AT&T Inc.’s acquisition of Time Warner Inc., to the introduction of two new antitrust bills by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), concern that growing market power and declining competition are having widespread negative effects on the economy has been getting a lot of coverage. Scholars are also actively in the mix, with new working papers exploring the potential relationship between declining competition and declining business investment, declining labor share, and a whole lot of other negative economic trends.

Antitrust is frequently pointed to as a pre-existing policy tool that can be used to address these concerns. As the debate heats up further around these broader economic concerns amid questions about whether antitrust is a potentially appropriate tool to address them, it’s crucial that we have rigorous research underpinning the debate and guiding policymaking. That’s why conversations like the one we convened last month are more important now than ever before.

One of the most news-cycle-relevant presentations of the day was by Steven C. Salop, professor of economics and law at the Georgetown Law Center, who has studied vertical mergers for years. He discussed how vertical merger enforcement could and should be reinvigorated—a subject that is particularly relevant in the wake of the recent Department of Justice announcement that it is suing to block the merger of AT&T and Time Warner. Vertical mergers, in which two companies working at different stages of an industry’s supply chain merge, came to be seen as generally harmless and in fact beneficial for consumers as a result of the influence of the so-called Chicago School on antitrust and economics that gained prominence beginning in the 1980s. Salop, however, argued that the presumptions underlying the Chicago School’s perspective on the competitive effects of vertical mergers have not been borne out by the economic evidence over the ensuing decades and called for further research.

Another timely presentation was by Nancy L. Rose, the Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of applied economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She discussed the less-studied effects of reduced competition in upstream markets, including monopsony. While antitrust is commonly thought of in terms of downstream effects—a producer controlling such a large share of a market that it can raise prices for its products—increasingly there is concern about monopsony power, where a buyer of a good or service has the power to pay lower prices than would be possible in a competitive market.

Monopsonic markets are of particular interest and concern in the case of the labor market, in which monopsony refers to a firm or firms’ ability to restrict wages below what they would be in a competitive market. If an increasingly smaller handful of firms are dominating their industries, then they have fewer competing buyers of labor. Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) recently wrote a letter to the antitrust enforcement agencies asking them about exactly this issue, and one of the bills introduced by Sen. Klobuchar directly addresses concerns about monopsony as well.

The Washington Center for Equitable Growth is proud to have convened such a thoughtful and interesting day of presentations, conversations, and debate about antitrust enforcement, and we look forward to continuing these conversations going forward. The papers presented last month will be available as papers in the Yale Law Journal in May 2018. Meanwhile, you can find them on the event’s website, along with a number of other resources on the subject. And you can always find Equitable Growth’s growing body of research and analysis on market power and antitrust here.

Must-Read: Jason Furman and Larry Summers: A modest proposal: time to rethink the impact of US tax reform

Must-Read: Jason and Larry bring plenty of refreshments to the debate over tax “reform”. They are really unhappy with the Nine Unprofessional Republican Economists. Shrill, even. And so they provide great detail on how these nine economists are being unprofessional. This is good to see:

Jason Furman and Larry Summers: A modest proposal: time to rethink the impact of US tax reform: “You recently wrote an open letter to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin quantifying the economic impact of tax reform…

…We are interested in and surprised by your analysis. We share your commitment to the idea that well-designed tax reform can make the economy stronger and that careful economic analysis is essential. And we know that you all share our belief that such careful analysis is well served by discussion and debate of these issues that is at least as frank and vigorous as what we are all accustomed to in the average economics seminar. To that end, we think it would be useful to lay out some of the questions we have about your analysis:

  1. Many members of Congress are citing growth estimates consistent with your letter to claim that the tax cuts would pay for themselves and that the legislation currently being considered by Congress would not add to the deficit or debt over the next decade. Your letter, however, does not say that tax cuts would pay for themselves. Would it be fair to say that you agree with Martin Feldstein (who did not sign the letter) that these tax cuts will not pay for themselves and, in fact, would add more than $1tn to the debt over the next decade?
  2. Can you explain how the studies you cite justify the conclusions you reach? You cite three studies to justify your conclusion that the annual growth rate would rise by 0.3-0.4 percentage points over the next decade. But two of these studies actually appear to have estimated substantially lower growth rates — potentially as low as a 0.01 percentage point increase in the annual growth rate.

    You cite a Treasury study of the Bush tax reform commission’s growth and investment tax plan that you asserted found a 4.8 per cent increase in long-run GDP. But the study you refer to provides estimates from three different models ranging from 1.4 per cent to 4.8 per cent increases in national income and does not express any views on which model is preferred.

    What was your reason for citing only the upper end of the range of Treasury’s estimates, from one model and ignoring its other calculations? Also, why did you not mention that the middle of the range of Treasury’s 10-year estimates was 1 per cent, a figure that would corroborate the views of critics of the tax bills since there would be only a 0.1 percentage point increase in the growth rate? (Moreover, the Bush Commission’s growth and investment tax plan differed in important ways from the one before Congress: it included permanent expensing, applied expensing to structures, raised taxes on investments that are already in place and was fully paid for. Do these differences affect the validity of your use of this plan as a model for the current Congressional bills?)

    You also cite an OECD study that you say justifies the conclusion that long-run GDP would go up by 2 per cent. But since you are explicitly talking about 10-year growth rates in your letter, would it not be better to use estimates from this same study that show that the effect in the 10th year is less than one-third of the long-run effect, translating into an annual growth rate of less than 0.1 percentage point? Moreover, how did you come up with the 2 per cent long-run GDP number since the OECD study says that a 1 per cent of GDP reduction in corporate taxes adds 1.25 per cent to long-run GDP? Applying that estimate to corporate rate reductions in the Congressional bills would yield only a 0.8 per cent increase in long-run GDP, translating into a growth rate increase of 0.02 percentage point per year (and if you factored in the base broadeners, the magnitude would be half as large). Either way, the OECD study you cite also corroborates the critics of the tax bill.

  3. Did you give thought to the impact of the corporate rate cut, assuming that expensing as proposed in the bill was enacted? We suspect that much of the projected growth benefit from corporate tax reform comes from enacting expensing of equipment, which reduces the entity-level effective tax rate to zero on equity-financed investment and makes it negative if financed in part with debt. In the presence of debt finance, textbook analysis would suggest that a cut in the corporate tax rate would raise the cost of capital because interest deductions would no longer be as valuable and thus discourage investment.

    Have you considered this important possibility, since most of the budget cost of the reform comes from the corporate rate reduction? Moreover, even with the lower statutory tax rates in the bills if expensing ended after five years, as it does in the bill, effective marginal tax rates on equipment investment would actually be higher than they are today with bonus depreciation in effect. It would be ironic if lower corporate rates and an expiration of bonus depreciation actually discouraged investment at the margin relative to continuing current policy but we believe this is likely.

  4. The pass-through provisions in the House and Senate bills would appear to create new sources of complexity in the tax code and violate the basic principle of tax policy that similar sources of income should be taxed at similar rates. A number of you have expressed concerns about the pass-through provisions in the past. Did you model the impact that these provisions would have on macroeconomic impact of the tax cuts?
  5. President Donald Trump has expressed concern about the magnitude of the trade deficit. As his chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers said, “A corporate tax cut to 20 per cent would dramatically reduce the trade deficit.” In your analysis, you reject concerns about the macroeconomic impact of budget deficits because, you argue, the United States will be able to attract capital from the global capital market. As a matter of logic, won’t increased capital inflows require an increase in the trade deficit, totaling hundreds of billions of dollars annually if they are to finance your projected 15 per cent increase in the capital stock?
  6. Apart from the question of global financing of the budget deficit, do you worry about the impact of enlarged deficits given projections of rising spending on entitlements and national security? Do you think that it is realistic that Congress will actually sunset provisions like the expanded child credit or corporate expensing, or do you think that the true cost of this bill is likely to significantly exceed $1.5tn? One of the authors of your letter wrote that the Bowles-Simpson fiscal commission “was very good”, and several other signatories wrote that it should be the “starting point” for fiscal negotiations. Do you think that cutting revenue to less than 18 per cent of GDP, as would happen under the Congressional legislation, is consistent with the 21 per cent of GDP in revenue that the Bowles-Simpson commission recommended for long-run fiscal sustainability?

    Moreover, we understand that you support entitlement reform, but do you believe that it is politically realistic for the Republicans to actually achieve your goal when it would entail asking seniors to sacrifice by cutting social security and Medicare shortly after Republicans argued that we could afford to add more than $1tn to the deficit for tax cuts that largely benefit corporations and high-income households?

    Finally, one of you [Douglas Holtz-Eakin] signed a previous letter stating that because outside estimates are often “not objective and not as well informed as the Congressional Budget Office’s analysts” that relying on CBO’s estimates in the legislative process has served the Congress — and the American people — very well during the past four decades.

As the House and Senate consider potential policy changes this year and in the years ahead, we urge you to maintain and respect the Congress’s decades-long reliance on CBO’s estimates in developing and scoring bills.

Your recent letter ignores many specific features of the legislation — to give just three of many examples that you did not incorporate into your analysis: the legislation would increase the after-tax cost of research and development, would increase asymmetric penalties on corporate risk-taking and would raise effective marginal tax rates for many individuals through the repeal of the state and local tax deduction. Do you think your analysis of a highly simplified hypothetical plan that is different from the actual legislation before Congress should serve as a substitute for the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the CBO producing analysis? Do you think it is responsible for Congress to vote on technically complex legislation in the absence of hearings or complete analysis?

Thank you for your attention to these questions. We may disagree on the merits of particular proposals but as professional economists we can all agree on the importance of critical discussion and debate to advance the improved understanding that is the basis of better public policies.